

Online Appendix for “Immigration and Redistribution”

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A-1 Variables Definitions

Core Respondents' Characteristics

Each variable is defined as a dummy equal to one if:

Male: respondent is male.

Female: respondent is female.

Age 18-45: respondent's age is between 18 and 45 years.

Age 46-69: respondent's age is between 46 and 69 years.

High Income: respondent's household income is in the top quartile of the household income distribution in the country.

Low Income: respondent's household income is not in the top quartile of the household income distribution in the country.

College: respondent has at least a college degree.

No College: respondent does not have a college degree.

Left-wing: respondent has voted or is planning to vote (Italy and Sweden) for a party or presidential candidate classifiable as *Left* or *Far-Left*.¹²

Right-wing: respondent has voted or is planning to vote (in Italy and Sweden) for a party or presidential candidate classifiable as *Right* or *Far-Right*.³

Republican: respondent supports the Republican party (U.S. only).

Immigrant parent: at least one of the respondent's parents is not born in the country of current residence.

High Immigration Sector & No College: respondent works in an immigration-intensive sector and does not have a college degree. See Appendix A-3 for details on the sector classification.

High Immigration Sector & College: respondent works in an immigration-intensive sector and has a college degree. See Appendix A-3 for details on the sector classification.

Children: respondent has one or more children.

Has immigrant friend/acquaintance: respondent has immigrant friends or acquaintances.

Perceptions of Immigration

Note: For all cross-country analyses we transform these variables into *misperceptions*, defined as the perceived value minus the actual value. A positive value means that the statistic is overestimated, a negative value means it is underestimated. See Section A-2 for a description of the data sources and calculations.

All Immigrants: perceived share of immigrants (according to the OECD definition of "foreign-born") in the country.

Share of Immigrants from ...: perceived share of immigrants born in, respectively, North Africa, Middle East, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania.

Share of Muslim/Christian Immigrants: perceived share of immigrants of Muslim or Christian faith.

¹More precisely, we first ask respondents whether they voted in the last elections or not. If they did, we ask them to select the candidate or party they voted for; if they did not, we ask them to select the candidate or party they would have most likely supported if they had voted. In some countries, the electoral system is such that people vote for parties. In others, they vote for candidates. In the U.S. and in France we provide a list of all the presidential candidates. In the other countries we list all the major parties that together attract more than 95% of the vote and also add an empty field for Other where respondents can write the party that they voted for. Afterwards we classify candidates and parties into Far-left, Left, Center, Right and Far-right.

²The candidates or parties that we classify as *Left* or *Far-Left* are: in the U.S., Clinton and Stein; in the U.K., Labour Party, Scottish National Party, Sinn Fein, Green Party, and Party of Wales; in France, Arthaud, Hamon, Mélenchon and Poutou; in Italy, Democratic Party (PD), +Europa, Civica Popolare, Five Star Movement, Liberi e Uguali, Potere al Popolo; in Germany, SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Die Linke; in Sweden, Socialdemokraterna, Miljöpartiet, Vänsterpartiet, and Feministiskt Initiativ.

³The candidates or parties that we classify as *Right* or *Far-Right* are: in the U.S., Trump and Johnson; in the U.K., Conservative Party, Democratic Unionist Party, Ukip; in France, Dupont-Aignan, Fillon, Le Pen; in Italy, Forza Italia, Fratelli d'Italia, Lega Nord; in Germany, CDU, AfD, ÖDP; in Sweden, Sverigedemokraterna, Liberalerna, Moderaterna, and Kristdemokraterna.

Share of Immigrants without a High-School Diploma: perceived share of immigrants without a high school diploma (in the U.S.) or equivalent in other countries.

Share of College-Educated Immigrants: perceived share of immigrants with at least a two-year college degree in the U.S. or equivalent in other countries.

Share of Unemployed Immigrants: perceived share of unemployed immigrants.

Share of Poor Immigrants: perceived share of immigrants who live below the poverty line.

Attitudes towards Immigration

Immigrants Poor Due to Lack of Effort: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that an immigrant living in the country is poor because of lack of effort.

Immigrants Rich Because of Effort: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks an immigrant is rich because he or she has worked harder than others.

Mohammad Gets More: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that Mohammad receives more than John on net – either receives more social benefits but pays the same or less taxes, or receives the same or more social benefits but pays less taxes.

Immigrants Receive More Transfers: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that, on average, an immigrant receives more transfers from the government than a non-immigrant.

Immigrants Receive at Least Twice as Many Transfers: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that, on average, an immigrant receives at least twice as many transfers from the government as a non-immigrant.

Support for Immigration

Imm. Not a Problem: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that immigration is not a problem or not a problem at all.

Imm. Benefits Soon: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that immigrants should get social benefits on the same basis as non-immigrants at the latest three years after they arrive in the country.

Imm. Citizenship Soon: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that immigrants should be allowed to apply for citizenship at the latest five years after they arrive in the country.

American Upon Citizenship/Before: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent would consider immigrants to be “truly American” at the latest when they get citizenship.

Govt. Should Care about Everyone: variable ranging from 1 to 7 where 1 means that the respondent thinks the government should only care about non-immigrants in the country and 7 means that s/he thinks the government should care equally about all the people living in the country.

Support for Redistribution

Inequality Serious Problem: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that income inequality is a serious or very serious problem.

Inequality No Problem: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that income inequality is not a problem.

Tax Top1: respondent’s preferred tax rate on the top 1% of the income distribution.

Tax Bottom50: respondent’s preferred tax rate on the bottom 50% of the income distribution.

Social Budget: share of the government budget that the respondent would allocate to health and social safety net (social insurance and income support programs).

Budget Education: share of the government budget that the respondent would allocate to schooling and higher education

Donation

Donation above Median: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent’s donation amount is above the median in his or her country.

Total % Donation: total amount the respondent wishes to donate to the charities, as a percentage of the

potential prize (\$1,000 in the U.S.; 1,000 pound in the U.K.; 1,000 euro in France, Italy and Germany; 10,000 SEK in Sweden).

Indices

Following the methodology in Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007), we define a set of indices to summarize respondents' perceptions and policy views, and actual immigrants' characteristics at the local level. Each index consists of an equally-weighted average of the z-scores of its components. Variables are transformed into z-scores by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation, so that each z-score has mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the control group. The resulting index is then further standardized by subtracting the mean of the control group and dividing by the standard deviation, so that each index has mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the control group.⁴

Perceptions

Misperception Index: includes misperceptions of the overall share of immigrants, share of Muslim immigrants, share of Christian immigrants, share of unemployed immigrants, share of immigrants without a high-school diploma, share of college-educated immigrants, share of poor immigrants. Signs are oriented so that a higher index means that respondents think there are more immigrants, immigrants are more culturally distant and economically weaker.

Perceived Cultural Distance Index: includes misperceptions of the origins of immigrants, the share of Muslim immigrants, and the share of Christian immigrants, with signs oriented so that a higher index means that respondents perceive immigrants to be more culturally distant.⁵

Perceived Economic Weakness Index: includes misperceptions of the share of unemployed immigrants, the share of immigrants without a high-school diploma, the share of college-educated immigrants, the share of poor immigrants, with signs oriented so that a higher index means that respondents perceive immigrants to be economically weaker.⁶

Perceived Free Riding Index: includes *Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort*, *Mohammad Gets More* and *Immigrants receive more transfers*. A higher index means that respondents are more likely to think immigrants "free ride" on the welfare system.

Support for Immigration and Redistribution

Immigration Support Index: includes the 5 variables listed under *Immigration Support*. Signs are oriented so that a higher index means that respondents support more strongly pro-immigration policies.

Redistribution Support Index: includes the variables *Inequality No Problem*, *Tax Top1*, *Tax Bottom50*, *Social Budget*, *Budget Education* and *Donation above Median*. Signs are oriented so that a higher index means that respondents support public and private redistribution more strongly.

Local Immigrants Characteristics

Actual Local Cultural Distance Index: includes the origins of immigrants in the region, with signs oriented so that a higher index means that immigrants in the region are more culturally distant from non-immigrants.

Actual Local Economic Circumstances Index: includes the local unemployment rate of immigrants, the local share of college-educated immigrants, and the local share of immigrants without a high-school diploma, with signs oriented so that a higher index means that immigrants in the region are economically weaker.

⁴When we transform the components of the indices into z-scores we set them to 0 (the z-score control group mean) if they are missing. This is to avoid dropping respondents who have just one missing component from the analysis entirely. Results are robust to just excluding these respondents.

⁵In the local-level regressions we omit religion from index, since we do not have actual local-level statistics on immigrants' religion.

⁶In the local-level regressions we omit the share of poor immigrants from the index, since we do not have actual local-level statistics on immigrants' poverty.

A-2 Definitions, Data Sources and Construction of Actual Statistics about Immigrants and Non-immigrants

A-2.1 Definitions

Number, Origins and Religion of Immigrants

Share of Immigrants: share of foreign-born people in the country.

Share of Second-Generation Immigrants: share of people born in the country from at least one foreign-born parent.

Origin of Immigrants: share of the foreign-born residents in the country born in North America (or just Canada in the U.S.), Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North Africa, Middle East, or Asia.

Religion of Immigrants: share of foreign-born residents in the country who are of Muslim or Christian faith.

Economic Circumstances of Immigrants

Share of Immigrants without a High-School Diploma: share of foreign-born population holding a qualification corresponding to ISCED 2011 levels 0-2 (in European countries) or having no high-school diploma in the U.S.

Share of College-Educated Immigrants: share of foreign-born population holding a qualification corresponding to ISCED 2011 levels 5-8 (in European countries) or having at least an associate degree (two-year college degree in the U.S.).

Unemployment: unemployment rate among the foreign-born in the country.

Poverty: U.S.: share of foreign-born population having income below the official Poverty Threshold.⁷ European countries: share of foreign-born population with an adult-equivalent disposable income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (60% of the national median disposable income).

Economic Circumstances of Non-immigrants

Equivalent definitions for native-born population.

Local Statistics

Unless otherwise stated, statistics are at the commuting zone level in the U.S.; NUTS2 region level in France, Italy and Sweden; NUTS1 in the U.K. and Germany.

Local Share of Immigrants: number of foreign-born residents (foreign-nationals in Italy) in the region over the total population of the region.

Local Origin of Immigrants: for the U.S., the U.K., France and Sweden, share of the foreign-born residents in the region who were born in North America (or just Canada in the U.S.), Latin America, Europe, Africa, or Asia; for Italy and Germany, share of the foreign nationals residing in the region who are citizens of respectively, North America, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia.

Local Share of Immigrants without a High-School Diploma: share of foreign-born population of the region holding a qualification corresponding to ISCED 2011 levels 0-2 (in European countries) or having no high-school diploma in the U.S.

Local Share of College-Educated Immigrants: share of foreign-born population of the region holding a qualification corresponding to ISCED 2011 levels 5-8 (in European countries) or having at least an associate degree (two year college degree in the U.S.).

Local Unemployment of Immigrants: unemployment rate among the foreign-born in the region.

Local Education and Unemployment of Non-immigrants: equivalent definitions for native-born.

Local Minorities – U.S. only

⁷See <https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-poverty-thresholds.html>

Local Share of African American: Number of African American living in the region over the total population of the region.

Local Share of Hispanic: Number of Hispanics living in the region over the total population of the region.

A-2.2 Data Sources and Construction – National Statistics

A-2.2.1 U.S.

For the U.S., the statistics which are readily available refer to total immigrants, both documented and undocumented. We construct our statistics on documented immigrants only using data on the total immigrant population and estimates on undocumented immigrants. Given that there is some uncertainty surrounding the characteristics of undocumented immigrants, we provide bounds for each statistic, using several different data sources. All the raw data, calculations, and links to the sources used are available in the Excel spreadsheet at https://www.dropbox.com/s/cl/fi/qoop6iclrha729tc214pa/Database_US.xlsx?dl=0&rlkey=gyang3lod0rgxz97frd3hzy13.

Number and Origins of Immigrants

Share of total immigrants: 13.4% (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

Share of documented immigrants: 10%, computed as:

$$\frac{\text{Number of immigrants in the U.S.} - \text{Number of undocumented immigrants}}{\text{Total U.S. population}}$$

- Number of immigrants in the U.S. in 2015 = 43,158,110 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)
- Number of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. in 2015 = 11,000,000 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017) As Mexican share declined, U.S. unauthorized immigrant population fell in 2015 below recession level.)⁸
- Total U.S. population in 2015 = 321,418,821 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

The estimate of the undocumented immigrant population in 2015 by Pew is consistent with the estimate provided by the Center for Migration Studies (11,042,503) and close to the estimate of the Migration Policy Institute for 2014 (11,009,000).

Origins of documented immigrants: for each area X, computed as:

$$\frac{\text{Number of immigrants from area X} - \text{Number of undocumented immigrants from area X}}{\text{Number of immigrants in the U.S.} - \text{Number of undocumented immigrants in the U.S.}}$$

- Number of immigrants from area X in 2015 – See Excel spreadsheet (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)
- Number of immigrants in the U.S. in 2015 = 43,158,110 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017) Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

⁸<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/25/as-mexican-share-declined-u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-population-fell-in-2015-below-recession-level/>

- Number of undocumented immigrants from area X in 2015 – See Excel spreadsheet (Source: Pew Research Center (2017) As Mexican share declined, U.S. unauthorized immigrant population fell in 2015 below recession level.)
- Number of undocumented in the U.S. = 11,000,000 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017) As Mexican share declined, U.S. unauthorized immigrant population fell in 2015 below recession level.)

The Pew Research Center reports the number of undocumented immigrants for all of the regions we consider in our analysis. However, the number of undocumented immigrants is reported jointly for 1) Europe & Canada, and for 2) Middle East & North Africa. To obtain the shares of documented/undocumented immigrants for Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Canada, the Middle East, and North Africa separately, we attribute them a share of undocumented immigrants in proportion to their share of total immigrants within the larger areas reported by the Pew Research Center. We obtain the following shares of documented immigrants: Canada: 2.3%; Western Europe: 7.7%; Eastern Europe: 6.2%; Middle East: 4.15%; North Africa: 0.3%. We can compute very strict lower bounds by attributing all the undocumented immigrants from the larger Pew areas to each of our areas in turn (e.g., attribute all undocumented immigrants from Europe & Canada to Canada.) This would lead to the following shares of legals: Canada: 0.9%; Western Europe: 6.8%; Eastern Europe: 5.1%; Middle East: 4.12%; North Africa: 0%. See the Excel spreadsheet for the exact calculations.

Second-Generation Immigrants

Share of second-generation immigrants: 11.9% (Source: Pew Research Center (2018). Facts on U.S. Immigrants, 2016).

Religion of Immigrants

Data on documented immigrants' religions are taken directly from a report by the Pew Research Center (2013).⁹

Unemployment of Immigrants

Unemployment rate for total immigrants: 5.5% (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015).

Unemployment rate for documented immigrants: 5.5%, computed as:

$$\frac{\text{Number of immigrants unemployed} - \text{Number of undocumented unemployed}}{\text{Number of immigrants in labor force} - \text{Number of undocumented in labor force}}$$

- Number of immigrants unemployed in 2015 = 1,495,466 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)
- Number of undocumented immigrants unemployed in 2015 = 423,124 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)
- Number of immigrants in the labor force in 2015 = 27,184,775 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)
- Number of undocumented immigrants in the labor force in 2015 = 7,721,686 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)

⁹<http://www.pewforum.org/2013/05/17/the-religious-affiliation-of-us-immigrants/>

Using the alternative estimate of undocumented unemployed from the Migration Policy Institute (Unauthorized Immigrant Population Profiles: 2014) and estimates of unemployed immigrants from the Pew Research Center (Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2014), we obtain unemployment rate = 5% for 2014.

Poverty of Immigrants

Poverty rate for total immigrants: 16.3% (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015).

Poverty rate for documented immigrants: 13.6%, computed as:

$$\frac{\text{Number of immigrants below the poverty threshold} - \text{Number of undocumented below the poverty threshold}}{\text{Number of immigrants in the U.S.} - \text{Number of undocumented in the U.S.}}$$

- Number of immigrants below the poverty threshold = 7,045,815 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)
- Number of undocumented below the poverty threshold = 2,673,947 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)
- Number of immigrants in the U.S.= 43,158,110 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)
- Number of undocumented in the U.S.= 11,042,503 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)

Using the alternative estimate of undocumented below the poverty threshold from the Migration Policy Institute (Unauthorized Immigrant Population Profiles: 2014) and estimates of poor immigrants from the Pew Research Center (Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2014), we obtain poverty rate = 12.3% for 2014.

Education of Immigrants

Share of total immigrants without a high-school diploma: 27.6% (Source: Current Population Survey 2015)

Share of documented immigrants without a high-school diploma: 22.0%, computed as

$$\frac{\text{Number of immigrants who have not completed high school} - \text{Number of undocumented who have not completed high school}}{\text{Number of immigrants 18 and older in the U.S.} - \text{Number of undocumented 18 and older in the U.S.}}$$

- Number of immigrants who have not completed high school = 10,961 (Source: CPS 2015)
- Number of undocumented who have not completed high school= 4,413,535 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)
- Number of immigrants 18 and older in the U.S. = 39,681,000 (Source: Current Population Survey 2015)
- Number of undocumented 18 and older= 9,978,611 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)

Using the alternative estimate for undocumented 25 and older from the Migration Policy Institute (Unauthorized Immigrant Population Profiles: 2014) and for immigrants 25 and older from the Current Population Survey 2014, we obtain a share = 20.9%.

Share of college-educated total immigrants: 35.9% (Source: Current Population Survey 2015)

Share of college-educated documented immigrants: 41.4%, computed as

$$\frac{\text{Number of immigrants who have at least a 2-year degree} - \text{Number of undocumented who have at least a 2-year degree}}{\text{Number of immigrants 18 and older in the U.S.} - \text{Number of undocumented 18 and older in the U.S.}}$$

- Number of immigrants who have at least a 2-year degree= 13,075,000 (Source: Current Population Survey 2015)
- Number of undocumented who have at least a 2-year degree= 1,955,770¹⁰ (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)
- Number of immigrants 18 and older in the U.S.= 39,681,000 (Source: CPS 2015)
- Number of undocumented 18 and older= 9,978,611 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)

Using the alternative estimate for undocumented 25 and older from the Migration Policy Institute (Unauthorized Immigrant Population Profiles: 2014) and for immigrants 25 and older from the Current Population Survey 2014, we obtain share of high educated = 42.8%.

Unemployment of Non-immigrants

Current Population Survey 2016, as reported in OECD, International Migration Outlook 2017, Unemployment rates by place of birth.

Education of Non-immigrants

Educational attainment by nativity, Current Population Survey 2017. Population: 16 to 64 years old.

Poverty of Non-immigrants

Poverty status in 2016 by nativity, Current Population Survey 2017. Population: 18+ years old

A-2.2.2 European Countries

Number and Origins of Immigrants

Data on the number of immigrants is from the United Nations (UN, Trends in International Migrant Stock: the 2017 Revision) for all countries. Data on the origins of immigrants also comes from the UN (Trends in International Migrant Stock: the 2017 Revision) for Italy, France, the U.K., and Germany. Data on origins for Sweden is from the OECD (International Migration Database, 2015). Both the UN and the OECD use national censuses as their original sources. For each country, we report here some information on the way these censuses are conducted and on the population they reach. In Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and Finland, censuses only cover documented immigrants. In the U.K., France and Germany, censuses cover both documented and undocumented immigrants. However, *i*) undocumented immigrants are likely to be severely underrepresented in the census, because they typically have very low response rates to official surveys; *ii*) estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants suggest that these make up, on average, only around

¹⁰The Center for Migration Studies reports joint estimates of undocumented with some college or a 2-year degree. To obtain the number of undocumented with a 2-year degree we assume that the splitting between some college and 2-year degree is proportional to the splitting in the total immigrant population in the CPS. If, instead, we assume that no undocumented in the joint category has a 2-year degree, the number of high educated undocumented would be 1,467,157, and the share of high educated among documented immigrants would be 43%.

0.5% of the population in these countries. Thus, for the U.K, France, and Germany none of our statistics would be significantly different if we tried to compute it for documented immigrants only. We thus use the UN and OECD data without further corrections.

Italy: 2011 Census. They only survey immigrants that have a legal permit to stay in the country.¹¹

Sweden: 2011 Census. The census is based on the population register, which takes data from the Swedish Tax Agency.¹² In Sweden only documented immigrants pay taxes.¹³

Germany: The 2011 Census is based on official registers and complemented by surveys. In Germany, undocumented immigrants were estimated to be between 180,000 and 520,000 (less than 0.5% of the total population) as of 2014.¹⁴

U.K.: 2011 Census. Respondents are not asked about their legal status.¹⁵ According to the most recent estimate, undocumented immigrants were 533,000 in 2007, around 0.8% of the total population.¹⁶

France: 2011 Census. Respondents are not asked about their legal status, but, as in the U.K., undocumented immigrants have very low response rates and are unlikely to be represented in the data. According to recent estimates from the Ministry of the Interior, in France there are about 300,000 undocumented immigrants, making up around 0.5% of the total population.¹⁷

Finland: 2011 Census. The census is based on official registries. Only people with a valid residence permit may be registered in the Population Register.¹⁸

Switzerland: 2011 Census. The variable related to country of birth in the census is based on official residents' registers, which do not include undocumented immigrants. Thus, all statistics are based on documented immigrants only.¹⁹

Second-Generation Immigrants

For France, the U.K. and Italy data for 2017 are not available. Hence, we use the most recent available estimates, under the assumption that the share of second generation immigrants over the total population remained constant until 2017.

Sweden: 13%. Source: Statistics Sweden, 2017.

Germany: 7.4%. Source: Destatis, 2017, defined as people “with a migration background” born in Germany, with and without German citizenship.

France: 11%. Source: INSEE, 2015.

U.K.: 9.2%. Source: Eurostat, 2014.

Italy: 2.4%. Source: Eurostat, 2014.

Religion of Immigrants

Data are from the Pew Research Center, Global Religious Futures 2010, which is mostly based on national

¹¹See Methodological notes to the 2011 Census, p. 16 https://www.istat.it/it/files/2012/12/volume_popolazione-legale_XV_censimento_popolazione.pdf

¹²See <http://www.scb.se/contentassets/8f66bcf5abc34d0b98afa4fcbfc0e060/rtb-bar-2016-eng.pdf>, pages 6 and 7.

¹³See <https://www.skatteverket.se/service/ankar/otherlanguages/inenglish/individualsandemployees/movingtosweden.4.7be5268414bea064694c40c.html>

¹⁴See http://irregular-migration.net/fileadmin/irregular-migration/dateien/4.Background_Information/4.5.Update_Reports/Vogel_2015_Update_report_Germany_2014_fin-.pdf

¹⁵See <https://www.ons.gov.uk/aboutus/transparencyandgovernance/freedomofinformationfoi/illegalimmigrantsintheuk>. According to survey agencies, undocumented immigrants have very low response rates in the U.K. and are, hence, not likely to be represented in the statistics derived from census data. See <https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/key-topics/illegal-immigration>.

¹⁶See https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/irregular-migrants-report.pdf

¹⁷<http://www.observationsociete.fr/population/combien-de-sans-papiers-en-france.html>

¹⁸http://www.maistraatti.fi/en/Services/place_of_domicile_and_population_data/Basic-information/

¹⁹See Roberts, C., Lipps, O., & Kissau, K. (2013). Using the Swiss population register for research into survey methodology. FORS Working Paper Series, paper 2013-1. Lausanne: FORS.

Censuses.²⁰

Unemployment of Immigrants and Non-immigrants

Data are from the Eurostat Labor Force Survey 2016. The survey covers legal immigrants only.²¹ We take the 2016 statistics reported in the OECD International Migration Outlook 2017, Unemployment rates by place of birth

Education of Immigrants and Non-immigrants

Population 15 to 64 years old by educational attainment and country of birth, 2016. Source: Labor Force Survey 2016.

Poverty of Immigrants and Non-immigrants

At-risk-of-poverty rate by country of birth, population aged 18 and over, 2016. Source: Labor Force Survey 2016.

A-2.3 Data Sources and Construction – Local Statistics

A-2.3.1 U.S.

Geographic level: all statistics except unemployment are the commuting zone (cz) level. Unemployment is at the state level.

All the statistics on immigrants and non-immigrants, and minorities, with the exception of unemployment, are computed at the county level from the 5-year 2017 American Community Survey (ACS) and then aggregated at the commuting zone level using the county-cz crosswalk in Autor and Dorn (2013).²² Because of lack of county-level data on employment by country of birth, the unemployment rate for immigrants and non-immigrants is computed at the state level from the 5-year 2017 ACS.

A-2.3.2 European Countries

All the statistics and source data are reported in the Excel database, available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/7h8xjw466ps7fy/Database_local_EU.xlsx?dl=0

Geographic level: Unless otherwise stated, all the statistics for Italy, Sweden and France are at the NUTS2 level; for Germany and the U.K at the NUTS1 level.

Share of Immigrants

Italy: Foreign nationals resident in Italy on January 1, 2018, ISTAT.

Sweden: Foreign-born residents in Sweden in 2017, Statistics Sweden.

Germany: Population with migration background born in a foreign country, Integrationsmonitoring der Länder 2017.

²⁰The Pew Research Center has published a more recent report (Pew Research Center (2017). Europe’s Growing Muslim Population, available at <http://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/>) on the inflow of Muslim immigrants in Europe between 2010 and 2016. According to the report, Sweden experienced a significant inflow of Muslim immigrants, in particular because of the large inflow of refugees from Middle East. However, there is some uncertainty around the number of Muslim immigrants in Sweden. The Pew Research Center reports that about 300,000 Muslim immigrants moved to Sweden between 2010 and 2016, while the Swedish government claims that in 2017 “The Muslim faith communities have approximately 140,000 members” (see <https://www.government.se/articles/2017/02/facts-about-migration-and-crime-in-sweden/>). Moreover, the report only focuses on recent immigrants. For these reasons we decide to stick to the estimates from Pew based on the 2010 Censuses.

²¹See <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey>.

²²<http://ddorn.net/data.htm>

U.K.: Foreign-born residents in U.K. in 2017, Annual Population Survey (APS), ONS.

France: Immigrant population in France in 2016, aggregated at the NUTS2 level from Département level data, Insee, RP2016 exploitation principale.

Origins of Immigrants

Italy: Foreign nationals resident in Italy on January 1, 2018, by country of nationality, ISTAT.

Sweden: Foreign born resident in Sweden in 2017, by country of birth, Statistics Sweden.

Germany: Foreigners resident in Germany in 2017, by country of nationality, DESTATIS.

U.K.: Foreign born resident in U.K. in 2017, by country of birth, Annual Population Survey (APS), ONS.

France: Own calculations at the NUTS1 level from microdata of the Recensement de la Population 2016.

Unemployment and Education of Immigrants and Non-immigrants

Data are from the Eurostat Labor Force Survey 2017.

Poverty

We managed to find data only on the overall local poverty rate – i.e. not separately by immigrants and non-immigrants. Sources, definitions and reference years are as follows.

Italy, Sweden: At-risk-of-poverty rate from Eurostat, 2017.

Germany: At-risk-of-poverty rate from MICROCENSUS - Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017.

France: Aggregated at the NUTS2 level from Poverty rate at the Département level, Insee-DGFIP-Cnaf-Cnav-CCMSA, Fichier localis social et fiscal, 2016.

U.K.: Percentage of individuals living in households with less than 60 per cent of contemporary median household income from FRS, average over 2014-2016.

A-3 High Immigration Sectors

We define a sector as *High Immigration* if the share of immigrants working in that sector is higher than the average share of immigrants employed in the country. The sectors that we classify as *High Immigration* are listed here in English for each country. Sectors are described in greater detail and in each original language online at https://www.dropbox.com/s/9kmgmqy6qvdgpn/sector_list.pdf?dl=0.

- U.S.: Farming, fishing, and forestry; Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance; Construction and extraction; Computer and mathematical occupations; Production occupations; Life, physical, and social science; Food preparation and serving related occupations; Occupations related to transportation and material moving; Occupations related to personal care, childcare and leisure; Healthcare support occupations. Source: Current Population Survey 2016.
- U.K.: Domestic personnel; Accommodation and food services; Transport and storage; Information and communication; Administrative and support service activities; Manufacturing; Professional, scientific and technical activities; Health and social work; Financial and insurance activities. Source: Annual Population Survey, April 2016 - March 2017²³. Sector breakdown criteria: SIC 2007.
- France: Non qualified artisanal workers; Domestic personnel; Merchants and retailer workers; Qualified artisanal workers; Craftsmen; Agricultural workers; Non qualified industrial workers; Police ad military; Information, arts and entertainment; Drivers; Teachers and scientific occupations; Industrial workers. Source: INSEE (Enquete Emploi en continu 2016). Sector breakdown criteria: CSE two digits sectors.

²³<https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue?sn=8197>

- Italy: Street and related sales and service workers; Personal care workers; Cleaners and helpers; Food preparation assistants; Agricultural, forestry and fishery laborers; Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport; Building and related trades workers, excluding electricians; Refuse workers and other elementary workers; Personal service workers; Food processing, wood working, garment and other craft and related trades workers; Market-oriented skilled forestry, fishery and hunting workers; Stationary plant and machine operators; Metal, machinery and related trades workers; Assemblers; Drivers and mobile plant operators. Source: RCFL Survey, January 2016 - December 2016. Sector breakdown criteria: ISCO2008.
- Germany: Transport, logistics, protection and security; Commodity production and manufacturing; Commercial services, trade, sales, hotels and tourism; Construction, architecture, surveying and mapping, and facility technology. Source: Destatis (Mikrozensus 2015).
- Sweden: Hotel and restaurant; Transport; Healthcare and care; Education; Business and financial operations. Source: Statistics Sweden (Sysselessatta efter näringsgren 2006-2015, Table 3).

A-4 Additional Information on the Surveys

A-4.1 Links to Surveys

- Survey U.S.: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_eKEjDcjYFz33eHr
- Survey U.S. version 2: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bCz2hXK5sjoyAzr
- Survey U.K.: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0ILUH3So1ChjhPv
- Survey France: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_77K4hoafSeGsuWN
- Survey Italy: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_004wAyEt61DcE6N
- Survey Germany: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_1GgE10hY9ef75Pf
- Survey Sweden: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_cUvZMTYuYPRiAw5
- Additional Survey U.S. with incentives: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_6eUmUM48VDnbIDH

A-4.2 Survey Structure

TABLE A-1: RANDOMIZATION GROUPS

	Video Treatment/Control	Saw redistribution block before/after immigration block
Group 1	Control	Before
Group 2	Control	After
Group 3	T: Share of immigrants	Before
Group 4	T: Share of immigrants	After
Group 5	T: Origins of immigrants	Before
Group 6	T: Origins of immigrants	After
Group 7	T: Hard work of immigrants	Before
Group 8	T: Hard work of immigrants	After

Notes: “Before” and “After” refer to whether the redistribution block was seen before or after the immigration block.

A-4.3 Full U.S. Questionnaire in English

FIGURE A-1: FIRST PAGE OF THE SURVEY (ENGLISH VERSION)

We are a non-partisan group of academic researchers from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University. Our goal is to understand how information we see and hear in the media influences views on policies. No matter what your political views are, this is an important matter, and by completing this survey, you are contributing to our knowledge as a society. You might not agree with all the information presented, and that is perfectly fine. If you do not feel comfortable with a question you can skip it. Our survey will give you an opportunity to express your own views.

Please note that it is very important for the success of our research that you **answer honestly** and **read the questions very carefully** before answering. Any time you don't know an answer, just give your best guess. However, please be sure to spend enough time reading and understanding the question. To ensure the quality of survey data, your responses will be subject to sophisticated statistical control methods, which can detect incoherent or rushed answers. **Responding without adequate effort or skipping many questions may result in your responses being flagged for low quality and you may not receive your payment.**

It is also very important for the success of our research project that you **complete the entire survey**, once you have started. This survey should take (on average) about 20 minutes to complete. If you complete the entire survey, you will be invited to take another voluntary paid follow up survey a week from now, if you wish.

Notes: Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. Your name will never be recorded by researchers. Results may include summary data, but you will never be identified. The data will be stored on Harvard servers and will be kept confidential. The collected anonymous data may be made available to other researchers for replication purposes. Please print or make a screen-shoot of this page for your records. If you have any question about this study, you may contact us at socialsciencestudies@gmail.com. For any question about your rights as a research participant you may contact cuhs@harvard.edu.

Answer options are in *italic*, separated by a semicolon.

1. See Figure A-1

Yes, I would like to take part in this study, and confirm that I WAS BORN IN THE U.S. and I am 18 or older; No, I would not like to participate

2. Were you born in the United States?

Yes; No

3. What is your gender?


Male; Female

4. What is your age?


FIGURE A-2: “SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS” TREATMENT

Today, legal immigrants make up 10.0 % of all people in the United States.


Today, what share of the population of the United States are legal immigrants?



For comparison, among rich countries, the lowest share of legal immigrants is 6.1 %.




For comparison, among rich countries, the lowest share of legal immigrants is 6.1 %. The largest share of legal immigrants is 29.1 %.



5. What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year? \$0-\$9999; \$10000-\$14999; \$15000-\$19999; \$20000-\$29999; \$30000-\$39999 ; \$40000-\$49999 ; \$50000-\$69999; \$70000-\$89999; \$90000-\$109999; \$110000-\$149999; \$150000-\$199999 : \$200000+
6. Please indicate your marital status.
Single; Married; Legally separated or divorced; Widowed
7. How many children do you have?
I do not have children: 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more
8. How would you describe your ethnicity/race?
European American/White; African American/Black; Hispanic/Latino; Asian/Asian American; Other
9. Were both of your parents born in the United States?
Yes; No
10. *[If Yes to Q9]* Where was your father born?
[dropdown menu with list of countries]
11. *[If Yes to Q9]* Where was your mother born?
[dropdown menu with list of countries]
12. What is your ZIP code?
13. Which category best describes your highest level of education?
Eighth Grade or less; Some High School; High School degree / GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)

FIGURE A-3: “ORIGIN OF IMMIGRANTS” TREATMENT



14. What is your current employment status?

Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner; Unemployed and looking for work; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree

15. [If Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner] Are you employed in one of the following sectors? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

[See Appendix A-1]

16. [If Unemployed and looking for work; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree] Even if you are not currently working, what sector did your latest occupation fall under? Check the one that applies. If you have had multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

FIGURE A-4: “HARD WORK OF IMMIGRANTS” TREATMENT

Emma legally came to the U.S. at age 25.



She lives with her husband - a construction worker - and two small children in a one-bedroom apartment.

She starts work at 5 am every day of the week, earning the minimum wage for such tasks as restocking the shelves, helping customers, mopping the floor and cleaning the bathrooms.



When her day shift at the store ends at 3 pm, Emma starts her second job as a cleaning lady.

For the past 5 years, she has been working in a retail store.

She takes two buses to get to her clients.



She finishes around 7 pm and gets home by 8 pm.



She then makes dinner for her family and sometimes helps the children with their homework before they go to bed.



Emma takes online courses. She stays up until midnight to work on her courses.

Emma and her husband have no free time, no weekends, and haven't taken any holidays since arriving in the U.S..

Despite working two jobs and barely making ends meet, Emma is very happy to be in the U.S..

She cannot take out a loan to go to a full-time college.

She hopes that thanks to her hard work she will one day be able to start her own small business.

[See Appendix A-1]

17. On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?
Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very conservative
18. In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or an independent?
Republican; Democrat; Independent
19. Did you vote in the last presidential election?
Yes; No
20. [If Yes to Q19] In the last presidential election, you supported:
Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump; Jill Stein; Gary Johnson
21. [If No to Q19] Even if you did NOT vote, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views most closely
Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump; Jill Stein; Gary Johnson
22. Before proceeding to the next set of questions, we want to ask for your feedback about the responses you provided so far. It is vital to our study that we only include responses from people who devoted their full attention to this study. This will not affect in any way the payment you will receive for taking this survey. In your honest opinion, should we use your responses, or should we discard your responses since you did not devote your full attention to the questions so far?

FIGURE A-5: QUESTION ON PREFERRED INCOME TAX RATES FOR VARIOUS INCOME GROUPS


The government currently raises a certain amount of revenue through the income tax in order to sustain the current level of public spending. In your view, what would be the fair split of the tax burden to sustain public spending?

The income tax* rate is the percentage of your income that you pay in federal income tax. For example, if you earn \$30,000 and you pay \$3,000 in income taxes, your income tax rate is 10%.

Please use the sliders below to tell us how much you think each of the following groups should pay as a percentage of their total income.

While you adjust the four sliders for each group, the fifth bar at the bottom moves in order to show you how much of the current revenue you have been able to raise so far. The bar appears red as long as you have not raised enough revenue, or if you have raised more money than what is needed.

You will only be able to move to the next question when you meet the revenue target and the bar becomes green.



Yes, I have devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should use my responses for your study; No, I have not devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should not use my responses for your study

Video Treatments

- *Control*: No video [go directly to *Redistribution or Immigration Block*]
- *Share of immigrants*: See Figure A-2

FIGURE A-6: QUESTION ON PREFERRED ALLOCATION OF GOVERNMENT BUDGET

- 1) **Defense and National Security**, which refers to the costs of the Defense department and the costs of supporting security operations in the U.S. and in foreign countries.
- 2) **Public Infrastructure**, which includes, among others, transport infrastructure like roads, bridges and airports, and water infrastructure.
- 3) **Spending on Schooling and Higher Education**, including help for children from low income families to attend school and university.
- 4) **Social Security, Medicare, Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)**, which provide income support and help with health care expenses to the elderly and the disabled.
- 5) **Social Insurance and Income Support Programs**. This covers help to the unemployed (through unemployment insurance) and help for low income families (such as through Food stamps or the earned income tax credit (EITC), a tax credit for low-income working families)
- 6) **Public Spending on Health**, such as Medicaid for the poor (a healthcare program for low income families) or tax subsidies to help families buy health insurance.
- 7) **Affordable Housing**. This includes subsidies to make housing more affordable for low income families and funds to build and manage public housing.

Please enter the percent of the budget you would assign to each spending category (the total must sum to 100):

Defense and National Security	<input type="text"/>
Public Infrastructure	<input type="text"/>
Spending on Schooling and Higher Education	<input type="text"/>
Social Security, Medicare, Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)	<input type="text"/>
Social Insurance and Income Support Programs	<input type="text"/>
Public Spending on Health	<input type="text"/>
Affordable Housing	<input type="text"/>
Total	<input type="text" value="0"/>

- *Origins of immigrants*: See Figure A-3
- *Hard work of immigrants*: See Figure A-4

Redistribution Block

In the next two questions, we ask you to think about the total level of funds that the government raises and spends today on various policies. For the purpose of these questions, suppose that the level of government spending is fixed at its current level and cannot be changed. We will ask about your views on two aspects: a. First, on the fair split of the tax burden to raise these funds; b. Second, on how you think the government should spend these funds.

23. See Figure A-5

24. See Figure A-6

25. Do you think income differences between rich and poor people are:

Not a problem at all; A small problem; A problem; A serious problem; A very serious problem

26. To reduce income differences between rich and poor people, the government (at the local, state, or federal level) has the ability and the tools to do:

Nothing at all; Not much; Some; A lot

27. Some people think that the government (at the local, state, or federal level) should not care about income differences between rich and poor people. Others think that the government should do everything in its power to reduce income inequality. Rate on a scale of 1 to 7 on how you feel about this issue, with 1 being the government should not concern itself with income inequality and 7 being the government should do everything in its power to reduce income inequality.

Here are several things that the local, state, or federal government might do to reduce income differences between rich and poor people. Please indicate if you favor or oppose them. Keep in mind that, in order to finance an expansion of any of these, other types of spending (like spending on infrastructure and defense, for example) would have to be scaled down or taxes would have to be raised.

28. Would you say that you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose or strongly oppose spending more money on schools in poor neighborhoods?

Strongly favor; favor; neither favor nor oppose; oppose; strongly oppose

29. Would you say that you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose strongly oppose spending more money to provide decent housing for those who cannot afford it?

Strongly favor; favor; neither favor nor oppose; oppose; strongly oppose

30. Would you say that you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose or strongly oppose increasing income support programs for the poor?

Strongly favor; favor; neither favor nor oppose; oppose; strongly oppose

31. How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right?

Almost always; A lot of the time; Not very often; Almost never


32. By taking this survey, you are automatically enrolled in a lottery to win \$1000. In a few days you will know whether you won the \$1000. The payment will be made to you in the same way as your regular survey pay, so no further action is required on your part. In case you won, would you be willing to donate part or all of your \$1000 gain for a good cause? Below you will find 2 charities which help people in the U.S. deal with the hurdles of everyday life. You can enter how many dollars out of your \$1000 gain you would like to donate to each of them. If you are one of the lottery winners, you will be paid, in addition to your regular survey pay, \$1000 minus the amount you donated to charity. We will directly pay your desired donation amount to the charity or charities of your choosing. Enter how much of your \$1000 gain you'd like to donate to each charity:

Feeding America: ... ; The Salvation Army: ...

Immigration Block

In what follows, we refer to immigrants as people who were not born in the U.S. and legally moved here at a certain point of their life. We are NOT considering illegal immigrants.

FIGURE A-7: ELICITING PERCEPTIONS ON THE ORIGIN OF IMMIGRANTS



33. See Figure 1

34. The map here shows you the main regions of the world. The pie chart below represents all legal IMMIGRANTS currently living in the U.S.. Where do you think these immigrants come from? Move the sliders to indicate how many out of every 100 immigrants come from each region, in your opinion. As you move the sliders, the pie chart will adjust to show your responses, reflecting the colors of the various regions, as in the map. (Your responses must add up to 100)

[See Figure A-7]

35. Think again about all of the legal immigrants currently living in the U.S.. What do you think is their religion? Fill in the boxes below to indicate how many out of every 100 immigrants you think practice each religion.

Christianity ...; Islam ...; Buddhism ...; Hinduism ...; Other Religions/Atheist ...

36. Out of every 100 people born in the U.S. how many are currently unemployed? By unemployed we mean people who are currently not working but searching for a job (and maybe unable to find one).

Now let's compare this to the number of unemployed among legal immigrants. Out of every 100 legal immigrants how many do you think are currently unemployed?

37. Out of every 100 people born in the U.S., how many have at least a two-year college degree?

Now let's compare this to the number of college-educated legal immigrants. Out of every 100 immigrants in the U.S. today how many do you think have at least a two-year college degree?

38. Out of every 100 people born in the U.S., how many have not completed high school?

Out of every 100 legal immigrants in the U.S. today how many do you think have not completed high school?

39. Out of every 100 people born in the U.S., how many live below the poverty line? The poverty line is the estimated minimum level of income needed to secure the necessities of life.

Let's compare this to poverty among legal immigrants. Out of every 100 legal immigrants in the U.S. today, how many do you think live below the poverty line?

40. Some people think that the government (at the local, state, or federal level) should only support people who were born in the U.S.. Others think that the government should care equally about all the people living in the country, regardless of their country of origin and regardless of whether they are born in the U.S.. Rate on a scale of 1 to 7 on how you feel about this issue, with 1 being the government should focus on supporting people born in the U.S. and 7 being the government should care equally about everyone.

41. What is your view on the number of legal immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live? Pick the answer that best reflects your view.

The excessive number of legal immigrants today is a very big problem. We should ask many legal immigrants to leave the country and we should stop accepting new immigrants; The number of legal immigrants today is a big problem and we should decrease by a lot the number permitted to come to the U.S. in the future; The number of legal immigrants today is somewhat of a problem and we should try and decrease a bit the number permitted to come in; The number of legal immigrants today is not a problem. We should keep letting in the same number of immigrants each year as until now; The number of legal immigrants today is not a problem at all. We should let even more legal immigrants come live in the U.S. and increase the number that is permitted to come every year

42. In your view, how soon after arriving should immigrants be entitled to government assistance such as Medicaid, food stamps, or welfare on the same basis as citizens?

Immediately, as soon as they arrive; 1 year after; 3 years after; 5 or more years after; only after they receive citizenship; never

43. As you may know, once immigrants who come into the country receive U.S. citizenship, they are allowed to vote in all local, state, and federal elections. In your view, when should immigrants who come into the country legally be allowed to apply for U.S. citizenship?

2 years after arriving; 5 years after arriving; 10 years after arriving; 20 years after arriving; They should never be allowed to apply for citizenship

44. Suppose someone is not born in the United States but now lives here. At what point would you consider this person to be “American”?
- Immediately, as soon as he arrives; After he has spent 5 years in the U.S.; After he has spent 10 years in the U.S.; It depends on where he comes from; As soon as he gets citizenship; I would never consider him to be American, but if his kids were born in the U.S. I would consider them truly American; I would not consider him or his kids to ever be truly American*
45. Which has more to do with why an immigrant living in the U.S. is poor?
- Lack of effort on his or her own part; Circumstances beyond his or her control*
46. Which has more to do with why an immigrant living in the U.S. is rich?
- Because she or he worked harder than others; Because she or he had more advantages than others*
47. U.S. born residents receive government transfers in the form of public assistance, Medicaid, child credits, unemployment benefits, free school lunches, food stamps or housing subsidies when needed. How much do you think each legal immigrant receives on average from such government transfers? An average immigrant receives...
- No transfers; One third as much as a U.S. born resident; Half as much as a U.S. born resident; As much as a U.S. born resident; Slightly more than a U.S. born resident; Twice as much as a U.S. born resident; Three times as much as a U.S. born resident; More than ten times as much as a U.S. born resident*
48. Imagine two people, John and Mohammad, currently living in the U.S. with their families. John is born in the U.S., while Mohammad legally moved to the U.S. five years ago. They are both 35, have three children, and earn the same low income from their jobs. In your opinion, does Mohammad pay more, the same, or less in income taxes than John?
- A lot more; More; same; less; a lot less*
49. In your opinion does Mohammad, who is an immigrant, receive more, the same, or less government transfers (such as e.g., public assistance, Medicaid, child credits, unemployment benefits during unemployment spells, free school lunches, food stamps or housing subsidies) than John?
- A lot more; More; same; less; a lot less*
50. Do you have any friends or acquaintances who were born outside the U.S.?
- Yes; No*
51. *[If Yes to Q50]* Where do they come from? (check all that apply)
- Canada; Latin America; Western Europe; Eastern Europe; North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Middle-East; Asia; Australia/New Zealand*
52. Do you feel that this survey was biased?
- Yes, left-wing bias; Yes, right-wing bias; No, it did not feel biased*

A-4.4 Charities Listed for the Donation Question

We report here the charities we listed in the donation question in each country. See Q32 in Appendix A-4.3 for the exact wording of the question.

- **U.S.:** Feeding America, The Salvation Army
- **U.K.:** Save the Children U.K., The Salvation Army
- **France:** Les Restos du Cœur, Emmaüs
- **Germany:** SOS Kinderdorf, Tafel

- **Italy:** Caritas, Save the Children Italia
- **Sweden:** Frälsningsarmén, Majblomman

A-5 Summary of Perceptions and Misperceptions

TABLE A-2: PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY

	U.S.			U.K.			France		
	Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived	
		Mean	Median		Mean	Median		Mean	Median
	(1)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]	(4)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]	(7)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]
	(2)	(3)		(5)	(6)		(8)	(9)	
Panel A: Perceptions									
Share of Immigrants	10.00	36.08 (0.73)	31.00 [20.00, 48.00]	13.40	31.39 (0.64)	30.00 [15.00, 42.00]	12.20	28.81 (0.61)	25.00 [14.00, 40.00]
Share Immigrants from North Africa	0.30	8.43 (0.23)	7.00 [4.00, 11.00]	0.90	9.88 (0.27)	10.00 [5.00, 14.00]	35.30	27.21 (0.50)	25.00 [18.00, 35.00]
Share of Immigrants from Middle East	4.10	12.20 (0.32)	10.00 [5.00, 16.00]	5.10	10.84 (0.34)	9.00 [5.00, 15.00]	5.60	10.98 (0.34)	9.00 [4.00, 15.00]
Share of Immigrants from Western Europe	7.70	10.88 (0.27)	10.00 [5.00, 15.00]	19.00	16.22 (0.43)	13.00 [7.00, 21.00]	29.30	10.94 (0.33)	10.00 [4.00, 15.00]
Share of Immigrants from Eastern Europe	6.10	9.88 (0.23)	10.00 [5.00, 13.00]	20.00	23.51 (0.47)	20.00 [14.00, 30.00]	5.20	14.53 (0.34)	13.00 [8.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from North America	2.30	9.69 (0.33)	7.00 [4.00, 11.00]	2.30	6.10 (0.22)	5.00 [2.00, 9.00]	1.00	5.97 (0.31)	3.00 [1.00, 7.00]
Share of Immigrants from Latin America	42.30	24.42 (0.55)	20.00 [12.00, 32.00]	3.90	5.61 (0.19)	5.00 [2.00, 8.00]	3.40	5.69 (0.20)	4.00 [2.00, 8.00]
Share of Muslim Immigrants	10.00	22.69 (0.50)	20.00 [10.00, 30.00]	23.00	33.89 (0.68)	30.00 [20.00, 45.00]	48.00	50.23 (0.72)	50.00 [30.00, 65.00]
Share of Christian Immigrants	61.00	39.17 (0.72)	40.00 [20.00, 50.00]	58.00	29.45 (0.65)	25.00 [15.00, 40.00]	43.00	24.30 (0.53)	20.00 [10.00, 31.00]
Share of Unemployed Immigrants	5.50	26.39 (0.77)	20.00 [8.00, 40.00]	5.70	27.00 (0.78)	20.00 [8.00, 40.00]	16.60	38.79 (0.85)	30.00 [15.00, 60.00]
Share of Poor Immigrants	13.60	34.66 (0.76)	30.00 [16.00, 50.00]	19.00	29.05 (0.72)	22.00 [10.00, 40.00]	23.80	41.57 (0.82)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]
Share of Immigrants without a High-School Diploma	22.00	28.96 (0.79)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	16.60	25.58 (0.76)	20.00 [8.00, 40.00]	39.10	51.62 (0.84)	50.00 [30.00, 70.00]
Share of College-Educated Immigrants	41.40	34.86 (0.77)	30.00 [15.00, 50.00]	48.80	25.33 (0.69)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	28.80	27.36 (0.61)	24.50 [10.00, 40.00]
Panel B: Attitudes									
Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort		0.41 (0.02)			0.36 (0.02)			0.31 (0.01)	
Immigrants Rich because of Effort		0.67 (0.02)			0.70 (0.01)			0.62 (0.02)	
Mohammad Gets More		0.26 (0.01)			0.18 (0.01)			0.34 (0.02)	
Immigrants Receive More Transfers		0.25 (0.01)			0.23 (0.01)			0.38 (0.02)	
Imm. Receive at Least Twice as Many Transfers		0.14 (0.01)			0.11 (0.01)			0.24 (0.01)	
Observations		960			973			980	

TABLE A-2: PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY (CONT.)

	Italy			Germany			Sweden		
	Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived	
		Mean	Median		Mean	Median		Mean	Median
	(10)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]	(13)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]	(16)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]
	(11)	(12)	(14)	(15)	(17)	(18)			
Panel A: Perceptions									
Share of Immigrants	10.00	26.41 (0.65)	20.00 [10.00, 35.00]	14.80	30.26 (0.68)	25.00 [15.00, 40.00]	17.60	27.00 (0.81)	21.00 [15.00, 33.00]
Share Immigrants from North Africa	10.20	24.90 (0.49)	23.00 [15.00, 31.00]	1.50	16.02 (0.37)	15.00 [8.00, 21.00]	1.20	12.09 (0.37)	10.00 [7.00, 17.00]
Share of Immigrants from Middle East	2.90	8.95 (0.25)	8.00 [3.00, 13.00]	17.30	16.84 (0.45)	14.00 [7.00, 23.00]	23.80	25.09 (0.72)	22.00 [15.00, 34.00]
Share of Immigrants from Western Europe	14.30	6.02 (0.24)	4.00 [1.00, 9.00]	14.90	13.43 (0.42)	10.00 [4.00, 20.00]	23.60	15.00 (0.71)	10.00 [4.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from Eastern Europe	38.10	18.63 (0.38)	18.00 [10.00, 25.00]	42.60	23.45 (0.41)	22.00 [15.00, 30.00]	22.20	13.80 (0.41)	13.00 [8.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from North America	0.90	4.55 (0.26)	2.00 [0.00, 5.00]	1.10	4.92 (0.20)	4.00 [1.00, 6.00]	1.40	4.74 (0.41)	3.00 [1.00, 5.00]
Share of Immigrants from Latin America	9.10	9.59 (0.26)	9.00 [4.00, 13.00]	3.20	5.42 (0.16)	5.00 [2.00, 8.00]	5.50	7.93 (0.32)	6.00 [3.00, 10.00]
Share of Muslim Immigrants	33.00	46.95 (0.73)	45.00 [30.00, 60.00]	30.00	43.89 (0.68)	40.00 [30.00, 60.00]	27.00	44.77 (1.01)	40.00 [30.00, 60.00]
Share of Christian Immigrants	57.00	26.82 (0.63)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	51.00	31.66 (0.61)	30.00 [20.00, 45.00]	61.00	32.67 (0.97)	30.00 [16.00, 48.00]
Share of Unemployed Immigrants	14.70	41.80 (0.87)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	6.90	39.20 (0.93)	30.00 [12.00, 60.00]	16.10	37.16 (1.14)	30.00 [15.00, 55.00]
Share of Poor Immigrants	34.90	42.86 (0.82)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	20.50	33.53 (0.81)	30.00 [10.00, 50.00]	29.80	25.26 (1.00)	20.00 [10.00, 35.00]
Share of Immigrants without a High-School Diploma	49.10	43.56 (0.84)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	35.10	37.23 (0.80)	30.00 [16.00, 50.00]	33.70	40.88 (1.21)	38.00 [20.00, 60.00]
Share of College-Educated Immigrants	11.70	18.75 (0.59)	10.00 [5.00, 30.00]	22.30	21.88 (0.58)	20.00 [10.00, 30.00]	37.90	36.39 (1.01)	35.00 [20.00, 50.00]
Panel B: Attitudes									
Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort		0.31 (0.01)			0.41 (0.02)			0.32 (0.02)	
Immigrants Rich because of Effort		0.69 (0.01)			0.60 (0.02)			0.69 (0.02)	
Mohammad Gets More		0.33 (0.02)			0.20 (0.01)			0.01 (0.01)	
Immigrants Receive More Transfers		0.35 (0.02)			0.24 (0.01)			0.42 (0.02)	
Imm. Receive at Least Twice as Many Transfers		0.18 (0.01)			0.09 (0.01)			0.18 (0.02)	
Observations		971			973			481	

Notes: Panel A reports mean and median perceptions for each country. The standard errors of the means are in parentheses and the interquartile ranges (25th and 75th percentiles) are in square brackets. The actual value of the statistic for each country is reported in columns (1), (4), (7), (10), (13) and (16). Panel B reports the mean of each attitude variable for each country and its standard error (in parentheses). Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment.

TABLE A-3: MISPERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS BY RESPONDENT GROUP

	Immigrants		Muslim		Christian		Unemployed		Poor		No High School		College-educated		Obs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
College	15.34 (0.45)	10.00 [0.0;25.0]	8.95 (0.44)	7.00 [-3.0;20.0]	-21.66 (0.43)	-23.00 [-37.0;-11.0]	19.48 (0.53)	13.10 [0.3;34.3]	9.82 (0.51)	6.20 [-9.0;25.1]	3.63 (0.52)	-0.10 [-14.0;18.4]	-3.33 (0.47)	-6.70 [-18.8;11.2]	2155
No College	19.23 (0.37)	15.80 [3.0;30.0]	12.95 (0.39)	10.00 [-3.0;27.0]	-25.78 (0.36)	-28.00 [-41.0;-12.0]	27.76 (0.48)	23.10 [4.3;45.3]	13.98 (0.47)	9.50 [-7.0;31.2]	6.30 (0.48)	2.40 [-14.1;24.9]	-5.54 (0.41)	-7.30 [-21.0;8.3]	3185
High Income	16.90 (0.74)	11.50 [0.1;26.5]	10.33 (0.69)	7.00 [-3.0;22.0]	-22.63 (0.70)	-26.00 [-37.0;-11.0]	20.66 (0.86)	13.40 [-0.5;35.3]	9.79 (0.81)	5.10 [-9.0;25.1]	4.63 (0.87)	0.90 [-14.1;20.9]	-5.14 (0.72)	-7.30 [-18.8;8.3]	872
Low Income	17.82 (0.31)	14.20 [1.6;27.8]	11.54 (0.32)	10.00 [-3.0;25.0]	-24.42 (0.30)	-27.00 [-41.0;-11.0]	25.15 (0.40)	18.10 [3.4;43.9]	12.79 (0.38)	8.50 [-8.6;29.5]	5.34 (0.39)	0.90 [-14.1;22.3]	-4.56 (0.34)	-6.70 [-18.8;8.6]	4470
Age 18-45	19.77 (0.39)	16.60 [3.6;30.0]	10.30 (0.41)	7.00 [-3.0;22.0]	-24.05 (0.38)	-27.00 [-38.0;-11.0]	25.01 (0.49)	18.40 [3.4;43.9]	13.67 (0.48)	9.50 [-6.0;31.0]	4.10 (0.48)	0.90 [-14.6;20.9]	-2.04 (0.44)	-3.70 [-18.8;11.2]	2826
Age 46-69	15.32 (0.41)	10.00 [0.0;25.0]	12.52 (0.42)	10.00 [-2.0;27.0]	-24.22 (0.40)	-27.00 [-41.0;-11.0]	23.76 (0.53)	14.50 [2.5;43.1]	10.76 (0.49)	6.20 [-9.0;26.2]	6.48 (0.52)	0.90 [-13.7;24.9]	-7.59 (0.43)	-8.80 [-21.4;3.3]	2516
Male	15.52 (0.42)	10.00 [0.0;25.0]	11.12 (0.42)	9.50 [-3.0;25.0]	-22.88 (0.41)	-26.00 [-38.0;-11.0]	22.62 (0.52)	14.30 [1.1;39.9]	10.96 (0.50)	6.20 [-9.6;26.2]	5.68 (0.52)	0.90 [-14.1;23.4]	-7.03 (0.43)	-8.80 [-21.3;6.2]	2615
Female	19.73 (0.39)	16.80 [4.2;30.0]	11.56 (0.41)	10.00 [-3.0;23.0]	-25.33 (0.37)	-28.00 [-41.0;-12.0]	26.14 (0.51)	19.50 [4.3;44.3]	13.59 (0.48)	9.50 [-5.5;30.1]	4.79 (0.49)	0.90 [-14.1;20.9]	-2.37 (0.44)	-2.30 [-18.8;11.2]	2727
Left-Wing	18.01 (0.43)	14.00 [1.2;27.8]	9.40 (0.41)	7.00 [-3.0;20.0]	-22.94 (0.41)	-26.00 [-37.0;-11.0]	23.24 (0.52)	15.30 [3.1;39.5]	13.07 (0.50)	9.50 [-5.5;29.5]	2.50 (0.50)	-1.60 [-15.1;18.0]	-2.02 (0.46)	-2.70 [-17.3;11.2]	2452
Right-Wing	18.45 (0.44)	15.00 [2.4;29.0]	15.08 (0.47)	12.00 [0.0;30.0]	-26.50 (0.45)	-31.00 [-41.0;-13.0]	27.31 (0.59)	20.20 [4.3;45.3]	11.82 (0.57)	6.40 [-9.0;30.1]	8.64 (0.59)	3.40 [-12.0;28.0]	-8.85 (0.48)	-10.70 [-23.8;3.3]	2146
Immigrant Parent	23.46 (0.99)	20.00 [5.2;36.6]	9.79 (0.95)	7.00 [-3.0;22.0]	-21.66 (0.89)	-23.00 [-36.0;-11.0]	22.10 (1.14)	14.30 [3.1;39.3]	11.45 (1.10)	6.40 [-9.0;26.4]	5.94 (1.12)	-1.10 [-12.0;21.3]	-2.68 (1.05)	-2.30 [-18.8;12.1]	505
No Immigrant Parent	17.05 (0.30)	12.80 [1.0;26.9]	11.51 (0.31)	10.00 [-3.0;25.0]	-24.39 (0.29)	-27.00 [-40.0;-11.0]	24.67 (0.38)	16.50 [3.1;43.4]	12.38 (0.36)	6.40 [-8.8;29.5]	5.14 (0.37)	0.90 [-14.1;22.0]	-4.86 (0.33)	-6.70 [-18.8;8.3]	4836
Knows an Immigrant	16.37 (0.35)	11.60 [0.4;26.2]	10.33 (0.35)	7.00 [-3.0;22.0]	-22.47 (0.33)	-23.00 [-37.0;-11.0]	21.50 (0.42)	13.90 [1.5;35.3]	10.47 (0.42)	6.20 [-9.0;26.2]	4.10 (0.42)	-0.10 [-14.1;20.9]	-2.90 (0.38)	-5.70 [-18.8;11.2]	3560
Does Not Know any Immigrant	20.27 (0.50)	16.60 [4.0;31.6]	13.37 (0.54)	10.00 [-3.0;27.0]	-27.44 (0.49)	-31.00 [-42.0;-13.0]	30.29 (0.67)	24.50 [5.1;53.1]	15.97 (0.61)	11.40 [-4.6;35.1]	7.47 (0.66)	3.40 [-13.6;28.0]	-8.15 (0.54)	-8.80 [-23.4;6.2]	1782
High Imm. Sector & No College	20.56 (0.51)	17.20 [4.2;30.8]	12.62 (0.54)	10.00 [-3.0;27.0]	-26.13 (0.50)	-28.00 [-41.0;-13.0]	28.47 (0.66)	23.40 [4.3;45.3]	15.16 (0.64)	11.00 [-4.9;35.1]	7.09 (0.66)	3.40 [-14.1;26.3]	-7.69 (0.57)	-8.80 [-23.8;7.7]	1721
High Imm. Sector & College	16.49 (0.67)	10.80 [0.2;26.6]	8.40 (0.64)	7.00 [-5.0;20.0]	-21.84 (0.64)	-23.00 [-37.0;-11.0]	20.96 (0.80)	13.40 [-0.5;34.5]	10.41 (0.73)	6.20 [-9.0;26.0]	4.32 (0.76)	-1.60 [-12.6;18.0]	-4.11 (0.71)	-7.30 [-18.8;11.2]	1025
Not High Imm. Sector	16.14 (0.40)	11.20 [0.2;26.0]	11.66 (0.42)	10.00 [-3.0;23.0]	-23.70 (0.40)	-26.00 [-38.0;-11.0]	23.01 (0.51)	14.50 [3.1;42.3]	11.13 (0.50)	6.20 [-9.0;26.4]	4.25 (0.50)	0.90 [-15.1;20.9]	-2.82 (0.43)	-6.30 [-17.8;9.2]	2568

Notes: The table shows the mean (in odd columns) and median (in even columns) misperceptions – computed as perceived minus real – by groups. Groups are defined by the indicator variables listed to the left. The standard errors of the means are in parentheses and the interquartile ranges (25th and 75th percentiles) are in square brackets. Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment.

TABLE A-4: MISPERCEPTIONS BY RESPONDENT GROUP – REGRESSIONS

	All immigrants (misp.) (1)	North Africa (misp.) (2)	Middle East (misp.) (3)	Western Europe (misp.) (4)	Eastern Europe (misp.) (5)	North America (misp.) (6)	Latin America (misp.) (7)	Muslim (misp.) (8)	Christian (misp.) (9)
Voted Right	0.841 (0.572)	1.030*** (0.346)	1.125*** (0.331)	-0.880*** (0.330)	-0.229 (0.336)	-0.217 (0.249)	-0.0385 (0.273)	5.955*** (0.606)	-4.463*** (0.571)
Female	4.103*** (0.567)	-0.301 (0.338)	1.077*** (0.318)	-1.025*** (0.319)	0.109 (0.324)	0.393* (0.238)	-0.283 (0.268)	0.434 (0.585)	-2.600*** (0.558)
Age 18-45	4.182*** (0.566)	-1.234*** (0.335)	1.678*** (0.321)	-0.368 (0.314)	-0.951*** (0.325)	0.989*** (0.238)	0.330 (0.268)	-1.855*** (0.590)	-0.00924 (0.558)
Immigrant parent	6.713*** (1.035)	0.169 (0.501)	-1.014** (0.513)	0.316 (0.562)	-1.439*** (0.514)	-0.536* (0.321)	1.465*** (0.447)	-1.356 (0.965)	1.838** (0.936)
University degree	-4.185*** (0.788)	-0.164 (0.457)	-1.362*** (0.461)	1.158** (0.481)	0.564 (0.438)	-0.781** (0.329)	0.311 (0.404)	-2.760*** (0.837)	3.507*** (0.803)
High Income	0.453 (0.796)	0.874* (0.463)	-0.933** (0.407)	-0.139 (0.424)	-0.394 (0.453)	0.000510 (0.331)	0.0857 (0.382)	-0.637 (0.775)	0.934 (0.772)
H. Imm. Sect. No College	3.211*** (0.747)	-0.210 (0.449)	-0.0295 (0.436)	-0.696* (0.411)	0.0957 (0.439)	0.309 (0.325)	-0.00505 (0.342)	0.123 (0.788)	0.176 (0.738)
H. Imm. Sect. College	1.820** (0.889)	0.0798 (0.507)	0.432 (0.463)	-0.498 (0.519)	-0.0699 (0.467)	0.858** (0.361)	-0.247 (0.445)	0.198 (0.877)	-0.348 (0.865)
Observations	5061	5063	5064	5061	5063	5060	5065	5063	5065
Control mean	17.68	7.97	4.63	-5.70	-4.48	4.61	-1.98	11.29	-23.98


	Unemployment (misp.) (10)	Poverty (misp.) (11)	No High School (misp.) (12)	College- Educated (misp.) (13)	Imm. Receive More Transfers (14)	Lack of Effort Poor (15)	Effort Rich (16)	Mohammad Gets More (17)
Voted Right	5.552*** (0.751)	-1.406** (0.704)	4.667*** (0.736)	-5.093*** (0.576)	0.178*** (0.0129)	0.252*** (0.0136)	-0.0458*** (0.0137)	0.138*** (0.0120)
Female	3.317*** (0.731)	2.282*** (0.684)	-1.157 (0.708)	4.762*** (0.566)	0.0261** (0.0124)	-0.0221* (0.0131)	-0.0425*** (0.0133)	0.0112 (0.0115)
Age 18-45	1.735** (0.733)	2.870*** (0.686)	-1.353* (0.713)	4.737*** (0.567)	-0.0138 (0.0125)	0.0319** (0.0131)	0.0167 (0.0134)	0.0127 (0.0116)
Immigrant parent	-1.322 (1.180)	-0.889 (1.101)	-0.339 (1.173)	3.597*** (1.029)	-0.0108 (0.0205)	-0.0257 (0.0219)	0.00916 (0.0229)	-0.0442** (0.0178)
University degree	-7.106*** (1.033)	-4.715*** (0.977)	-2.760*** (1.017)	-0.210 (0.830)	-0.104*** (0.0177)	-0.0472** (0.0190)	0.0611*** (0.0193)	-0.0814*** (0.0161)
High Income	-2.146** (0.974)	-2.224** (0.910)	-0.433 (0.970)	0.203 (0.773)	-0.0616*** (0.0159)	-0.00208 (0.0178)	0.0773*** (0.0173)	-0.0503*** (0.0150)
H. Imm. Sect. No College	2.780*** (0.985)	1.992** (0.936)	1.019 (0.962)	-1.940*** (0.742)	0.0286* (0.0171)	0.0199 (0.0175)	-0.0386** (0.0179)	0.0157 (0.0158)
H. Imm. Sect. College	4.262*** (1.095)	0.169 (1.005)	-0.836 (1.069)	2.525*** (0.914)	0.00501 (0.0182)	0.0412** (0.0199)	-0.0242 (0.0205)	0.0366** (0.0172)
Observations	5057	5061	5057	5057	5060	5060	5052	5062
Control mean	24.44	12.40	5.34	-4.90	0.30	0.36	0.66	0.24

Notes: The table reports regressions of misperceptions of and attitudes towards immigrants on the personal characteristics listed on the left. Misperceptions are computed as the perception minus the actual value. See Appendix A-1 for the variable definitions. All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-6 Sample and Response Quality

A-6.1 Time Spent on the Survey

FIGURE A-8: DISTRIBUTION OF TIME SPENT ON THE SURVEY



Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the time respondents in the main analysis sample spent on the survey (truncated at 200 minutes). The mean duration is 27 minutes, the median 21, and the 25th and 75th percentiles are 16 and 29, respectively.

A-6.2 Sample Representativeness

TABLE A-5: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS – “RAW” SAMPLE

	US		UK		France		Italy		Germany		Sweden	
	Sample (1)	Pop (2)	Sample (3)	Pop (4)	Sample (5)	Pop (6)	Sample (7)	Pop (8)	Sample (9)	Pop (10)	Sample (11)	Pop (12)
Male	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50
18-29 y.o.	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.23	0.23	0.20	0.19	0.23	0.22	0.24	0.24
30-39 y.o.	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.19
40-49 y.o.	0.19	0.19	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.24	0.23	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.21
50-59 y.o.	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.18	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.19	0.23	0.23	0.19	0.18
60-69 y.o.	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.15	0.17	0.18	0.18
Income Bracket 1	0.16	0.16	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.26	0.33	0.33
Income Bracket 2	0.19	0.19	0.35	0.35	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.29
Income Bracket 3	0.22	0.22	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.20	0.19	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.22
Income Bracket 4	0.43	0.43	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.26	0.22	0.22	0.17	0.17
Married	0.51	0.49	0.52	0.41	0.42	0.46	0.58	0.46	0.48	0.46	0.34	0.33
Employed	0.60	0.70	0.68	0.74	0.64	0.65	0.66	0.57	0.66	0.75	0.72	0.77
Unemployed	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
College	0.51	0.41	0.37	0.36	0.51	0.31	0.36	0.16	0.27	0.25	0.43	0.36

Notes: This table replicates Table 1 on the “Raw” sample that includes all respondents who have completed the survey.

TABLE A-6: ADDITIONAL U.S. SURVEY – SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

	US	
	Sample (1)	Pop (2)
Male	0.48	0.49
18-29 y.o.	0.23	0.24
30-39 y.o.	0.20	0.20
40-49 y.o.	0.19	0.19
50-59 y.o.	0.21	0.20
60-69 y.o.	0.18	0.17
Income Bracket 1	0.15	0.16
Income Bracket 2	0.19	0.19
Income Bracket 3	0.23	0.22
Income Bracket 4	0.43	0.43
Married	0.53	0.49
Employed	0.63	0.70
Unemployed	0.06	0.05
College	0.60	0.41

Notes: This table displays summary statistics from the additional U.S. survey (in column 1) alongside nationally representative statistics (in column 2). See notes to Table 1.

A-6.3 Flagging Respondents with Careless Answers

The three flags refer to i) respondents in the top 2% and bottom 10% of the time spent on a given question; ii) clearly suspicious patterns in respondents’ answers that are indicative of carelessness, such as entering “0” or “100” to questions about shares (reported in Panel A of Table A-7); iii) inattentive participants which are identified by computing a *Response Pattern Index* as in Meade and Craig (2012): this index represents the share of answers to qualitative questions for which the respondent selected answer options in the same position – ordered first, last, or middle. Careless respondents are more likely to just mechanically select the option in the same position in every question to get to the end of the survey more quickly. As reported in Panel B of Table A-7, few respondents systematically select the same-positioned answer options. We flag respondents with a *Response Pattern Index* greater than or equal to 0.8.

Appendix Tables A-31 and A-32 report misperceptions by country and by group estimated on a “reduced” sample where we exclude respondents flagged according to the above criteria. They are very close to the misperceptions estimated in the benchmark sample, showing that the (few) inattentive respondents do not drive the aforementioned patterns.

Table A-8 shows the ability of covariates to predict “low quality answers,” i.e. respondents who are dropped from the raw data because they spent too much or too little time on the survey (bottom and top 2% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey by country and treatment group) or who spent too much time on one of the treatment videos (top 2%). Younger and higher-income respondents are more likely to be flagged as low quality. It is often the case that younger respondents tend to rush more through surveys. Male respondents and respondents working in a high immigration sector are also slightly more likely. However, these effects are quite small.

TABLE A-7: SHARE OF RESPONDENTS WITH STRANGE PATTERNS OF ANSWERS

Panel A: Extreme Answers				
	Control		Full sample	
	= 0	= 100	= 0	= 100
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share of Immigrants	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.004
Share of Christian Immigrants	0.057	0.006	0.052	0.007
Share of Muslim Immigrants	0.016	0.020	0.017	0.018
College-educated - Immigrants	0.018	0.003	0.017	0.004
Unemployment - Immigrants	0.006	0.014	0.006	0.013
Poverty - Immigrants	0.020	0.010	0.019	0.011
College-educated - Non-immigrants	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.005
Unemployment - Non-immigrants	0.001	0.007	0.001	0.008
Poverty - Non-immigrants	0.003	0.007	0.004	0.007

Panel B: Response Pattern Indices				
	Control		Full sample	
	≥ 0.6	≥ 0.8	≥ 0.6	≥ 0.8
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Response Pattern Index - First Option	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.000
Response Pattern Index - Last Option	0.004	0.000	0.004	0.000
Response Pattern Index - Middle Option	0.021	0.001	0.024	0.001

Notes: Panel A reports the share of respondents in the control group (columns 1 and 2) and in the full sample (columns 3 and 4) who gave extreme answers ($= 0$ or $= 100$) to the questions listed on the left; Panel B reports the share of respondents whose Response Pattern index for the first, last and middle option is greater or equal than 0.6 and 0.8. *Response Pattern Index - First Option* is computed as the number of qualitative questions (both in the immigration and in the redistribution block) where the respondent selected the first option divided by the total number of qualitative questions. The other indices are constructed in a similar way for the options ordered last or placed in the middle, respectively. The First and Last Option indices are based on 15 questions, the Middle Option index is based on 11 questions – we exclude questions for which it is difficult to identify a “middle” option (e.g., questions with four options).

TABLE A-8: ABILITY OF COVARIATES TO PREDICT LOW QUALITY ANSWERS

	Top/Bottom 2%		Top 2%	
	Time on Survey		Time on Video Treatment	
	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value
Voted right	0.000	0.895	-0.002	0.265
Voted left	-0.001	0.833	0.002	0.182
Male	0.006	0.020	0.000	0.982
Age 18-45	0.031	0.000	0.006	0.000
Immigrant parent	-0.007	0.112	0.003	0.382
College degree	0.003	0.233	0.001	0.392
High income	0.011	0.005	0.002	0.359
High immigration sector	0.006	0.019	0.002	0.196

Notes: The table shows the coefficients and p-values from a series of regressions of the form $y_{ic} = \alpha + \beta Covariate_i + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{ic}$, where $Covariate_i$ is the variable listed in the row and γ_c are country fixed effects. In the column “Top/Bottom 2% Time on Survey,” y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent is in the bottom 2% or top 2% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey. In the column “Top 2% Time on Video Treatment,” y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent is in the Top 2% of the distribution of the time spent on one of the treatment videos.

A-6.4 Survey Fatigue

To test for survey fatigue, we exploit the randomization in the order of the redistribution and immigration blocks. We check whether the time spent on questions and the response patterns differ depending on the order in which the blocks were displayed. In Panel A of Table A-9 we regress the average time spent per question in the redistribution (column 1) and immigration (column 2) block on an indicator for whether the immigration block appeared first. Having seen the immigration block first does not reduce the time spent per question in the redistribution block, while it does increase only slightly the time spent per question on the immigration block.

In columns (1)-(6) in Panel B of Table A-9 the outcome variables are dummy variables equal to one if the respondent has a high *Response Pattern Index* for the first, last, and middle option in the redistribution and immigration block. These indices represent the share of answers to qualitative questions for which the respondent selected options in the same position – ordered first, last, or middle (see Appendix Section A-6.3 for more details). Careless respondents are more likely to mechanically select the option in the same position in every question to get to the end of the survey more quickly. We want to check whether respondents were more likely to do so as the survey progressed. In columns (7) and (8) the outcome variables are dummy variables equal to one if the respondent has a high *Extreme Answers Index* for the redistribution and the immigration block. This index is constructed as the share of numerical questions where the respondent gave extreme answers (e.g. = 0 or = 100). Having seen the immigration block first reduces the probability of giving extreme answers in the redistribution block and only slightly so in the immigration block. Overall these results suggest that survey fatigue did not affect respondents’ answers.

TABLE A-9: TEST FOR SURVEY FATIGUE BASED ON RANDOMIZATION OF BLOCK ORDER

Panel A: Time spent on questions		
	Minutes spent per question on Redistribution block (1)	Minutes spent per question on Immigration block (2)
Immigration block first	-0.0467 (0.0904)	0.0632*** (0.0203)
Observations	19765	19764
Sample mean	2.45	0.87

Panel B: Response patterns								
	Response pattern index ≥ 0.8						Extreme Answers index ≥ 0.8	
	First Option (1)	Redistribution block Last Option (2)	Middle Option (3)	First Option (4)	Immigration block Last Option (5)	Middle Option (6)	Redistribution block (7)	Immigration block (8)
Immigration block first	0.000204 (0.000205)	-0.00000479 (0.000569)	0.00139 (0.00124)	-0.000403 (0.000534)	-0.000203 (0.000248)	-0.00291 (0.00350)	-0.00817*** (0.00299)	-0.000807* (0.000453)
Observations	19765	19765	19765	19765	19765	19765	19765	19765
Sample mean	0.0002	0.0016	0.0077	0.0014	0.0003	0.0646	0.0464	0.0010

Notes: Panel A: the dependent variables are the average minutes spent per question in the redistribution block (column 1) and in the immigration block (column 2). The questions included are, in the redistribution block, the ones on tax rates and government budget allocation, and, in the immigration block, the ones on the share, origin, religion of immigrants, and on unemployment, education and poverty of immigrants and non-immigrants. Panel B: in columns (1)-(6) the dependent variables are dummies = 1 if the *Response Pattern Indices* for the first, last and middle option, for the redistribution block and the immigration block, respectively, are ≥ 0.8 . In column (7) the dependent variables is a dummy = 1 if the *Extreme Answers Index* for the redistribution block is ≥ 0.5 (this is computed only on two questions). In column (8) the dependent variable is a dummy = 1 if the *Extreme Answers Index* for the immigration block is ≥ 0.8 . The *Extreme Answers Indices* are defined as the number of numerical questions where the respondent gave extreme answers (i.e. = 0 or = 100) in the redistribution or in the immigration block divided by the total number of numerical questions in the relevant block. The independent variable Immigration block first is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent was randomly assigned to the group that saw first the Immigration block and then the Redistribution block. Regressions also include standard personal controls and indicator variables for exposure to the video treatments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-6.5 Monetary Incentives and Willingness to Pay for Information

Another possible concern about survey results in general is that respondents may not put in enough effort when answering, because they lack external incentives to do so, above and beyond their intrinsic motivation. To a randomly selected subsample of participants in the additional U.S. survey, we provide monetary incentives of varying amounts. More precisely, at the beginning of the immigration block and on top of each question about immigrants' statistics, respondents see a bold and highlighted message announcing that the five respondents whose guesses are closest to the true statistics will receive an additional monetary award. We design this incentive as a tournament to be able to offer substantial rewards randomized between \$5, \$10, \$20, \$30. To summarize the results, we also construct a "Misperception Index" following the methodology in Kling *et al.* (2007) that consists of an equally weighted average of the z-scores of misperceptions, with signs oriented so that a higher index means that respondents think there are more immigrants, immigrants are more culturally distant and economically weaker²⁴ The index is standardized again so that it has mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Regardless of the size of the award and controlling for respondent characteristics, incentives do not seem to be effective at reducing misperceptions, as shown in Table A-10, which looks at incentives of different amounts separately, and Table A-11, which looks at the overall effect of being offered any positive monetary incentive at all.

Table A-12 summarizes the willingness to pay to receive correct information about immigrants (Panel B), and shows the characteristics that correlate with it (Panel A, column 1) and with being surprised conditional on receiving the information (Panel A, column 2). See Section 3.2 for a discussion.

²⁴Variables included in the index are the perceived share of immigrants, the perceived share of Muslim immigrants, share of Christian immigrants, share of unemployed immigrants, share of immigrants without a high school diploma, share of college-educated immigrants, and share of poor immigrants.

TABLE A-10: EFFECT OF MONETARY INCENTIVES ON MISPERCEPTIONS

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)
\$5 Incentive	-0.354 (2.162)	0.0238 (0.0211)	-1.305 (1.083)	0.182 (1.371)	-0.202 (1.476)	1.802 (1.951)
\$10 Incentive	2.263 (2.431)	0.0195 (0.0208)	0.0386 (1.412)	-1.024 (1.541)	-1.691 (1.340)	2.559 (2.197)
\$20 Incentive	0.907 (2.365)	-0.00218 (0.0181)	-0.340 (1.383)	1.582 (1.601)	-1.350 (1.525)	3.376 (2.130)
\$30 Incentive	-1.085 (2.188)	0.00326 (0.0189)	-0.680 (1.124)	-1.136 (1.442)	-1.163 (1.433)	3.416 (2.085)
Constant	20.37*** (2.317)	0.0286 (0.0231)	20.02*** (1.534)	13.79*** (1.561)	13.41*** (1.602)	-22.68*** (2.303)
Observations	914	914	914	914	914	914

	Unemployment (misp.) (7)	No High School (misp.) (8)	College-educated (misp.) (9)	Poverty (misp.) (10)	Misperception Index (11)
\$5 Incentive	-0.448 (2.037)	-1.400 (2.178)	2.327 (2.558)	-2.234 (2.221)	-0.104 (0.0938)
\$10 Incentive	-0.916 (2.223)	3.358 (2.491)	5.435** (2.457)	0.718 (2.218)	-0.0593 (0.0985)
\$20 Incentive	1.471 (2.363)	-1.687 (2.465)	1.687 (2.658)	-1.596 (2.476)	-0.0950 (0.102)
\$30 Incentive	2.539 (2.241)	-1.979 (2.334)	3.169 (2.547)	1.345 (2.333)	-0.0874 (0.0998)
Constant	16.34*** (2.379)	-0.992 (2.589)	-10.76*** (2.700)	20.83*** (2.497)	0.0762 (0.110)
Observations	913	914	914	914	914

Notes: The table reports the effect of monetary incentives on misperceptions, computed as perceptions minus actual statistics. *Accurate Perception All Immigrants* is a dummy equal to 1 if the absolute value of the respondent's misperception of the share of immigrants is less than 1. The *Misperception Index* is an index summarizing respondents' misperceptions, constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007). All variables are detailed in Appendix A-1. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having at least one parent not born in the country, working in a high immigration sector. Sample: respondents who have not seen any video treatment, additional U.S. survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A-11: EFFECT OF MONETARY INCENTIVES ON MISPERCEPTIONS - POOLED

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)
Any Incentive	0.432 (1.486)	0.0115 (0.0130)	-0.582 (0.844)	-0.109 (1.007)	-1.087 (1.005)	2.763* (1.428)
Constant	20.46*** (2.301)	0.0283 (0.0232)	20.06*** (1.537)	13.81*** (1.560)	13.37*** (1.600)	-22.66*** (2.297)
Observations	914	914	914	914	914	914
	Unemployment (misp.) (7)	No High School (misp.) (8)	College-educated (misp.) (9)	Poverty (misp.) (10)	Misperception Index (11)	
Any Incentive	0.621 (1.454)	-0.405 (1.592)	3.166* (1.713)	-0.464 (1.552)	-0.0865 (0.0660)	
Constant	16.32*** (2.364)	-0.881 (2.575)	-10.72*** (2.700)	20.85*** (2.490)	0.0771 (0.110)	
Observations	913	914	914	914	914	

Notes: The table reports the effect of monetary incentives on misperceptions, pooling all the incentives together. See notes to Table A-10.

TABLE A-12: WILLINGNESS TO PAY TO RECEIVE CORRECT INFORMATION ABOUT IMMIGRANTS

Panel A		
	Willing To Pay (1)	Surprised (2)
Misperception Index	-0.0562*** (0.0168)	0.0751*** (0.0231)
Republican	-0.0792** (0.0339)	0.0158 (0.0509)
Female	-0.0707** (0.0327)	0.0527 (0.0481)
H. Imm. Sector and No College	0.0822 (0.0510)	0.0140 (0.0797)
H. Imm. Sector and College	0.0690 (0.0423)	0.0150 (0.0589)
No College	-0.112** (0.0458)	0.0182 (0.0706)
High Income	-0.0317 (0.0410)	0.0122 (0.0589)
Age 18-45	-0.0770** (0.0328)	0.0282 (0.0481)
Immigrant parent	0.125** (0.0545)	-0.0850 (0.0725)
Observations	918	448

Panel B						
	All	\$0.5	\$1	\$2	\$5	\$10
Share Willing to Pay	0.49	0.51	0.50	0.53	0.45	0.45

Notes: Panel A reports the determinants of the willingness to pay to receive correct information about immigrants (column 1) and the determinants of being surprised by the information received, conditional on having accepted to pay for it (column 2). In column 1 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondents accepts to forfeit part of its lottery gain to receive the information. In column 2 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent declares to have been surprised by the information received. All variables are detailed in Appendix A-1. The regression in (1) also includes dummies for the various “prices” of information, not reported. Sample: respondents who have not seen any video treatment, additional U.S. survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Panel B reports the share of respondents who are willing to forfeit part of their lottery gains to receive the information, conditional on the information “price” reported in each column.

A-6.6 Sample Selection

TABLE A-13: ABILITY OF COVARIATES TO PREDICT TREATMENT STATUS

	Order/Salienc T		T: Share of Immigrants		T: Origin of Immigrants		T: Hard Work of Immigrants	
	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value
Voted right	-0.006	0.436	-0.001	0.888	0.004	0.549	-0.006	0.324
Voted left	0.002	0.820	-0.003	0.668	-0.002	0.758	0.009	0.150
Male	0.009	0.168	-0.003	0.588	0.002	0.721	-0.000	0.999
Age 18-45	-0.001	0.918	0.009	0.130	-0.003	0.671	-0.011	0.063
Immigrant parent	0.009	0.479	0.003	0.739	0.002	0.875	-0.013	0.189
College degree	-0.001	0.887	0.011	0.088	0.001	0.934	-0.011	0.087
High income	-0.006	0.516	0.001	0.857	-0.003	0.732	-0.005	0.556
High immigration sector	-0.005	0.485	0.004	0.517	-0.004	0.538	-0.002	0.769

Notes: The table shows the coefficients and p-values from a series of regressions of the form $y_{ic} = \alpha + \beta Covariate_i + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{ic}$, where $Covariate_i$ is the variable listed in the row and γ_c are country fixed effects. In the column “Order/Salienc T,” y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent was shown the immigration block before the redistribution block. In columns “Share of Immigrants,” “Origins of Immigrants,” and “Hard Work of Immigrants” y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent saw the corresponding treatment.

TABLE A-14: ABILITY OF COVARIATES TO PREDICT PARTICIPATION IN THE FOLLOW-UP SURVEY

	Has taken the Follow-up	
	Coefficient	P-value
Voted right	-0.005	0.712
Voted left	0.005	0.712
Male	-0.126	0.000
Age 18-45	-0.132	0.000
Immigrant parent	-0.043	0.064
College degree	0.009	0.504
Rich	-0.122	0.000
High immigration sector	-0.020	0.161

Notes: The table shows the coefficients and p-values from a series of regressions of the form $y_{ic} = \alpha + \beta Covariate_i + \epsilon_{ic}$, where $Covariate_i$ is the variable listed in the row. y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent took the follow-up.

A-7 Where Do Misperceptions Come from: Additional Tables

TABLE A-15: PERCEIVED SHARE, CULTURAL DISTANCE AND ECONOMIC WEAKNESS OF IMMIGRANTS VERSUS REALITY – HAVING AN IMMIGRANT FRIEND

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Perc. Cultural Distance Index (2)	Perc Econ. Weakness Index (3)	Perc. Free Riding Index (4)
Act. local share of immigrants	0.227*** (0.0456)			
Act. local cultural distance index		0.0527*** (0.0147)		
Act. local economic circumstances index			0.0840*** (0.0294)	
Right-wing	0.772 (0.572)	0.0694*** (0.0232)	0.300*** (0.0273)	0.557*** (0.0278)
Female	4.052*** (0.565)	0.0131 (0.0223)	-0.0762*** (0.0263)	0.00997 (0.0267)
Age 18-45	4.059*** (0.566)	-0.0192 (0.0223)	-0.0942*** (0.0264)	0.0334 (0.0268)
Immigrant parent	6.310*** (1.055)	0.0832** (0.0339)	-0.0677 (0.0451)	-0.0542 (0.0413)
College	-4.013*** (0.787)	-0.0180 (0.0323)	-0.158*** (0.0376)	-0.220*** (0.0381)
High Income	0.246 (0.797)	0.00201 (0.0305)	-0.0221 (0.0357)	-0.101*** (0.0349)
H. Imm. Sect. No College	3.282*** (0.747)	0.00211 (0.0295)	0.109*** (0.0348)	0.0597 (0.0366)
H. Imm. Sect. College	1.760** (0.887)	-0.0298 (0.0348)	0.00668 (0.0416)	0.0829** (0.0391)
Has immigrant friend/acquaintance	-2.723*** (0.623)	0.0648** (0.0251)	-0.317*** (0.0289)	-0.202*** (0.0302)
Observations	5047	5065	5065	5065
Control mean	17.67	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: This table replicates 2 also including a dummy for declaring to have an immigrant friend or acquaintance as additional control. See notes to Table 2.

TABLE A-16: PERCEIVED SHARE, CULTURAL DISTANCE, AND ECONOMIC WEAKNESS OF IMMIGRANTS VERSUS REALITY – CONTROLLING FOR ETHNIC AND RACIAL MINORITIES IN THE U.S.

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Perc. Cultural Distance Index (2)	Perc Econ. Weakness Index (3)	Perc. Free Riding Index (4)	Latin America (misp.) (5)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (6)	Muslim (misp.) (7)
Act. local share of immigrants	0.378*** (0.124)				0.180* (0.101)	-0.163*** (0.0594)	-0.139 (0.0906)
Act. cultural distance index		0.0778** (0.0346)					
Act. economic circumstances index			0.0225 (0.0372)				
Local share of African American	-0.0469 (0.0738)	-0.00290 (0.00316)	0.00347 (0.00321)	-0.000483 (0.00312)	0.0128 (0.0563)	0.0175 (0.0417)	0.00801 (0.0567)
Local share of Hispanic	-0.121 (0.0808)	0.00127 (0.00238)	-0.00172 (0.00275)	-0.0000523 (0.00236)	0.0281 (0.0678)	0.000346 (0.0402)	-0.0452 (0.0594)
Observations	943	944	944	944	944	944	943
Control mean	26.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	-18.12	16.37	12.78

Notes: This table replicates Table 2 restricting the sample to the U.S. only. It includes the local share of African American and the local share of Hispanics as additional regressors and reports three additional outcomes to show the relation between misperceptions and local minorities. Regressions also include personal controls as in Table 2, not reported.

A-8 Summary of Policy Views on Immigration and Redistribution

TABLE A-17: VIEWS ON IMMIGRATION POLICIES

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)
U.S.	0.37 (0.02)	0.39 (0.02)	0.83 (0.01)	0.80 (0.01)	4.68 (0.06)
U.K.	0.19 (0.01)	0.45 (0.02)	0.73 (0.01)	0.52 (0.02)	4.43 (0.06)
France	0.26 (0.01)	0.46 (0.02)	0.66 (0.02)	0.64 (0.02)	4.48 (0.06)
Italy	0.19 (0.01)	0.51 (0.02)	0.58 (0.02)	0.57 (0.02)	4.35 (0.06)
Germany	0.23 (0.01)	0.56 (0.02)	0.69 (0.01)	0.55 (0.02)	4.58 (0.06)
Sweden	0.25 (0.02)	0.63 (0.02)	0.84 (0.02)	0.61 (0.02)	4.85 (0.09)
Left-wing	0.35 (0.01)	0.59 (0.01)	0.79 (0.01)	0.68 (0.01)	5.07 (0.04)
Right-wing	0.12 (0.01)	0.35 (0.01)	0.62 (0.01)	0.53 (0.01)	3.85 (0.04)
College	0.33 (0.01)	0.53 (0.01)	0.76 (0.01)	0.68 (0.01)	4.74 (0.04)
No College	0.19 (0.01)	0.46 (0.01)	0.68 (0.01)	0.57 (0.01)	4.39 (0.03)
Age 18-45	0.28 (0.01)	0.51 (0.01)	0.72 (0.01)	0.61 (0.01)	4.65 (0.03)
Age 46-69	0.22 (0.01)	0.46 (0.01)	0.70 (0.01)	0.62 (0.01)	4.40 (0.04)
Imm. Parent	0.30 (0.02)	0.55 (0.02)	0.76 (0.02)	0.61 (0.02)	5.00 (0.08)
High Income	0.28 (0.02)	0.51 (0.02)	0.70 (0.02)	0.64 (0.02)	4.68 (0.06)
H. Imm. Sec. & No College	0.16 (0.01)	0.45 (0.01)	0.65 (0.01)	0.55 (0.01)	4.23 (0.05)
H. Imm. Sec. & College	0.31 (0.01)	0.56 (0.02)	0.78 (0.01)	0.68 (0.01)	4.80 (0.06)
Not H. Imm. Sec	0.28 (0.01)	0.49 (0.01)	0.73 (0.01)	0.63 (0.01)	4.63 (0.04)

Notes: The table reports the mean of the variables capturing views on immigration policies for each group of respondents or country. See Appendix A-1 for the variable definitions. Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment. Mean standard errors in parentheses.


TABLE A-18: VIEWS ON REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES

	Inequality Serious Problem (1)	Tax Top1 (2)	Tax Bottom50 (3)	Social Budget (4)	Education Budget (5)	Total % Donation (6)
U.S.	0.49 (0.02)	27.29 (0.57)	9.04 (0.44)	23.27 (0.41)	14.93 (0.31)	36.45 (1.70)
U.K.	0.53 (0.02)	35.00 (0.61)	7.52 (0.40)	31.34 (0.42)	14.84 (0.25)	29.78 (1.57)
France	0.63 (0.02)	42.18 (0.74)	8.61 (0.41)	30.65 (0.34)	17.41 (0.28)	30.50 (1.52)
Italy	0.62 (0.02)	34.27 (0.76)	11.06 (0.49)	33.17 (0.41)	13.92 (0.30)	27.73 (1.39)
Germany	0.76 (0.02)	42.56 (0.76)	12.69 (0.52)	27.32 (0.34)	17.73 (0.27)	32.19 (1.42)
Sweden	0.45 (0.03)	46.55 (0.91)	23.44 (0.69)	34.23 (0.47)	17.74 (0.40)	29.46 (2.31)
Left-wing	0.71 (0.01)	37.91 (0.47)	10.35 (0.31)	30.56 (0.26)	16.37 (0.18)	33.32 (0.97)
Right-wing	0.45 (0.02)	35.76 (0.50)	11.70 (0.34)	28.26 (0.28)	15.28 (0.20)	28.74 (1.04)
College	0.54 (0.02)	36.84 (0.47)	10.91 (0.32)	29.50 (0.27)	16.63 (0.19)	32.76 (1.05)
No College	0.62 (0.01)	37.51 (0.43)	11.10 (0.28)	29.73 (0.23)	15.48 (0.16)	30.00 (0.84)
Age 18-45	0.59 (0.01)	36.40 (0.44)	11.74 (0.29)	28.86 (0.25)	16.55 (0.18)	34.00 (0.94)
Age 46-69	0.59 (0.01)	38.13 (0.45)	10.23 (0.31)	30.50 (0.25)	15.29 (0.17)	27.98 (0.90)
Imm. Parent	0.61 (0.03)	38.10 (1.03)	11.40 (0.74)	29.46 (0.49)	16.55 (0.40)	31.70 (2.06)
High Income	0.50 (0.02)	34.99 (0.77)	11.27 (0.50)	28.96 (0.45)	16.45 (0.31)	36.39 (1.77)
H. Imm. Sec. & No College	0.61 (0.02)	36.03 (0.59)	11.01 (0.38)	29.99 (0.32)	15.02 (0.21)	30.79 (1.15)
H. Imm. Sec. & College	0.56 (0.02)	36.32 (0.71)	11.09 (0.51)	29.62 (0.39)	16.74 (0.28)	35.00 (1.58)
Not H. Imm. Sec	0.58 (0.01)	38.32 (0.44)	11.02 (0.29)	29.42 (0.25)	16.29 (0.18)	29.93 (0.92)

Notes: The table reports the mean of the variables capturing views on redistribution for each group of respondents or country. See Appendix A-1 for the variable definitions. Social and Education budget are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile by country. Mean standard errors in parentheses. Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment and who have seen the redistribution block before the immigration block.


A-9 Immigration and Redistribution: Additional Figures and Tables

FIGURE A-9: WHAT DETERMINES SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION AND REDISTRIBUTION?
- EXTENDED



Notes: Panel A shows the correlation between the variables listed on the left and the Immigration support index (blue squares) or the Redistribution support index (red diamonds). All variables are included in the same regression, together with standard personal controls, as well as country fixed effects. Panel B replicates Figure 10. See notes to Figure 10.

FIGURE A-10: WHAT DETERMINES SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION AND REDISTRIBUTION?
 - EXTENDED, ONE-BY-ONE



Notes: Panel A shows the correlation between the variables listed on the left and the Immigration support index (blue squares) or the Redistribution support index (red diamonds). Each correlation is estimated in a separate regression which also includes standard personal controls, as well as country fixed effects.

TABLE A-19: MISPERCEPTION INDICES AND SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
Perc. cultural distance index	-0.0523*** (0.0145)	-0.0539*** (0.0155)	0.00629 (0.0165)	-0.0157 (0.0161)	-0.0804*** (0.0148)	-0.0602*** (0.0138)
Perc. economic weakness index	-0.167*** (0.0130)	-0.0624*** (0.0141)	-0.103*** (0.0147)	-0.0838*** (0.0143)	-0.143*** (0.0136)	-0.172*** (0.0123)
Perc. free-riding index	-0.240*** (0.0115)	-0.232*** (0.0139)	-0.242*** (0.0150)	-0.196*** (0.0145)	-0.317*** (0.0138)	-0.376*** (0.0121)
All Immigrants (misp.)	-0.0375*** (0.0136)	0.0393*** (0.0137)	0.00255 (0.0138)	-0.0211 (0.0139)	0.0351*** (0.0132)	0.00569 (0.0121)
Observations	5056	5056	5056	5056	5059	5060

Notes: The table explores the correlation between support for immigration and misperceptions of immigrants. Indices are defined in Appendix A-1. Each regression includes the variables listed on the left, plus standard personal controls as in Figure 10, as well as country fixed effects. All variables have been transformed into z-scores and coefficients can be interpreted as partial correlations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-20: MISPERCEPTIONS AND SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
All Immigrants (misp.)	-0.0301** (0.0138)	0.0321** (0.0139)	0.00407 (0.0140)	-0.0217 (0.0142)	0.0383*** (0.0133)	0.00708 (0.0123)
Muslim (misp.)	-0.0740*** (0.0133)	-0.0594*** (0.0150)	-0.0616*** (0.0164)	-0.0679*** (0.0156)	-0.0909*** (0.0153)	-0.109*** (0.0135)
M. East and N. Africa (misp.)	0.0213 (0.0204)	-0.0504** (0.0225)	0.0376 (0.0243)	-0.0135 (0.0233)	-0.0449** (0.0217)	-0.0158 (0.0198)
Latin America (misp.)	0.0306 (0.0218)	0.0103 (0.0210)	0.0424** (0.0208)	0.0274 (0.0204)	-0.0382* (0.0213)	0.0220 (0.0191)
W. Europe (misp.)	0.0547*** (0.0186)	-0.0404** (0.0204)	-0.00272 (0.0211)	-0.0402* (0.0209)	0.00686 (0.0197)	-0.00707 (0.0177)
E. Europe (misp.)	0.0434** (0.0207)	-0.0623*** (0.0227)	0.0230 (0.0246)	0.0119 (0.0236)	-0.0348 (0.0221)	-0.00594 (0.0203)
Asia (w/o M. East) (misp.)	0.0844*** (0.0180)	-0.0589*** (0.0189)	0.0436** (0.0199)	0.0126 (0.0196)	0.0292 (0.0188)	0.0337** (0.0166)
Unemployment (misp.)	-0.0710*** (0.0142)	-0.0310** (0.0158)	-0.0577*** (0.0164)	-0.0659*** (0.0165)	-0.0901*** (0.0154)	-0.0967*** (0.0135)
Poverty (misp.)	-0.0203 (0.0139)	0.0106 (0.0154)	0.0127 (0.0161)	0.0420*** (0.0156)	0.0373** (0.0150)	0.0253* (0.0132)
No High School (misp.)	-0.0612*** (0.0129)	-0.0391*** (0.0145)	-0.0530*** (0.0153)	-0.0568*** (0.0147)	-0.0715*** (0.0142)	-0.0864*** (0.0127)
Lack of Effort Reason Poor	-0.134*** (0.0124)	-0.119*** (0.0143)	-0.142*** (0.0151)	-0.0986*** (0.0148)	-0.186*** (0.0138)	-0.209*** (0.0123)
Mohammad receives more on net	-0.0987*** (0.0121)	-0.0579*** (0.0153)	-0.0817*** (0.0169)	-0.0590*** (0.0161)	-0.104*** (0.0152)	-0.123*** (0.0131)
Immigrants receive more transfers	-0.0931*** (0.0127)	-0.137*** (0.0156)	-0.0975*** (0.0166)	-0.0906*** (0.0163)	-0.132*** (0.0153)	-0.169*** (0.0133)
Observations	5022	5021	5022	5021	5024	5025

Notes: The table explores the correlation between support for immigration and misperceptions of immigrants. Each regression includes the variables listed on the left, plus standard personal controls as in Figure 10, as well as country fixed effects. All variables have been transformed into z-scores and coefficients can be interpreted as partial correlations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-21: MISPERCEPTION INDICES AND SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality No Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)	Redistribution Index (7)
Perc. cultural distance index	0.0633*** (0.0167)	-0.0649*** (0.0173)	0.0497*** (0.0175)	0.0128 (0.0175)	0.0268 (0.0171)	-0.000323 (0.0165)	0.0588*** (0.0174)
Perc. economic weakness index	-0.0372** (0.0150)	0.0930*** (0.0148)	-0.0205 (0.0147)	-0.0573*** (0.0149)	-0.00357 (0.0166)	-0.0104 (0.0151)	-0.0772*** (0.0158)
Perc. free-riding index	-0.0129 (0.0146)	0.0287** (0.0145)	-0.0831*** (0.0141)	-0.0785*** (0.0146)	0.0318** (0.0155)	-0.0837*** (0.0149)	-0.114*** (0.0146)
All Immigrants (misp.)	-0.0171 (0.0149)	0.0627*** (0.0166)	-0.0425*** (0.0143)	-0.0197 (0.0151)	-0.0268* (0.0155)	0.00467 (0.0149)	-0.0397** (0.0159)
Observations	5060	5060	5060	5060	5060	5060	5060

Notes: The table explores the correlation between support for redistribution and misperceptions of immigrants. Indices are defined in Appendix A-1. Each regression includes the variables listed on the left, plus standard personal controls as in Figure 10, as well as country fixed effects. All variables have been transformed into z-scores and coefficients can be interpreted as partial correlations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-22: MISPERCEPTIONS AND SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION


	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality No Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)	Redistribution Index (7)
All Immigrants (misp.)	-0.00871 (0.0152)	0.0479*** (0.0167)	-0.0321** (0.0144)	-0.00828 (0.0153)	-0.0279* (0.0156)	0.00204 (0.0152)	-0.0241 (0.0161)
Muslim (misp.)	0.0448** (0.0174)	-0.0410** (0.0177)	-0.00630 (0.0169)	-0.00158 (0.0169)	0.00296 (0.0172)	-0.0172 (0.0162)	0.0208 (0.0178)
M. East and N. Africa (misp.)	0.0557** (0.0260)	-0.0870*** (0.0253)	0.0886*** (0.0263)	0.0333 (0.0276)	0.0522** (0.0250)	-0.0198 (0.0241)	0.0692*** (0.0251)
Latin America (misp.)	-0.0155 (0.0207)	-0.0438** (0.0213)	0.00197 (0.0240)	0.0113 (0.0247)	0.0371 (0.0270)	0.00765 (0.0224)	0.00436 (0.0228)
W. Europe (misp.)	0.0284 (0.0217)	-0.0435** (0.0222)	0.0386* (0.0230)	0.00671 (0.0233)	0.0141 (0.0217)	-0.0316 (0.0219)	0.0257 (0.0212)
E. Europe (misp.)	0.0595** (0.0259)	-0.0973*** (0.0245)	0.0848*** (0.0257)	0.0690** (0.0268)	0.00383 (0.0237)	-0.0312 (0.0246)	0.0989*** (0.0265)
Asia (w/o M. East) (misp.)	0.0222 (0.0202)	-0.0678*** (0.0199)	0.0490** (0.0230)	0.0596*** (0.0226)	0.0277 (0.0219)	-0.00855 (0.0209)	0.0583*** (0.0201)
Unemployment (misp.)	-0.0203 (0.0169)	0.0590*** (0.0174)	-0.0167 (0.0164)	-0.0391** (0.0166)	0.00867 (0.0180)	-0.0199 (0.0169)	-0.0588*** (0.0172)
Poverty (misp.)	-0.0308* (0.0171)	0.0549*** (0.0171)	-0.00519 (0.0164)	-0.0376** (0.0167)	-0.0279* (0.0164)	0.0215 (0.0165)	-0.0284* (0.0170)
No High School (misp.)	-0.000623 (0.0160)	0.00908 (0.0164)	-0.0114 (0.0155)	0.0234 (0.0159)	0.0254 (0.0159)	-0.000882 (0.0156)	-0.00862 (0.0159)
Lack of Effort Reason Poor	-0.0475*** (0.0140)	0.0538*** (0.0144)	-0.107*** (0.0142)	-0.0328** (0.0149)	0.0739*** (0.0164)	-0.0363** (0.0150)	-0.126*** (0.0146)
Mohammad receives more on net	-0.00794 (0.0161)	0.0283* (0.0169)	-0.0215 (0.0158)	-0.0392** (0.0166)	0.000931 (0.0181)	-0.0485*** (0.0163)	-0.0526*** (0.0163)
Immigrants receive more transfers	0.0261* (0.0156)	-0.0321** (0.0162)	0.0137 (0.0151)	-0.0382** (0.0161)	-0.0291* (0.0174)	-0.0215 (0.0165)	0.0148 (0.0160)
Observations	5025	5025	5025	5025	5025	5025	5025

Notes: The table explores the correlation between support for redistribution and misperceptions of immigrants. Each regression includes the variables listed on the left, plus standard personal controls as in Figure 10, as well as country fixed effects. All variables have been transformed into z-scores and coefficients can be interpreted as partial correlations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-10 Treatment Effects: Additional Figures and Tables

FIGURE A-11: MISPERCEPTION OF THE SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS: CONTROL VS. “SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS” TREATMENT

(A) U.S.



(B) U.K.





FIGURE A-11: MISPERCEPTION OF THE SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS: (CONT.)

(C) FRANCE



(D) ITALY






FIGURE A-11: MISPERCEPTION OF THE SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS: (CONT.)

(E) GERMANY



(F) SWEDEN



Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the misperception of the share of immigrants of respondents in the control group (left panel) and in the Share of immigrants treatment group (right panel), by country.

TABLE A-23: REDISTRIBUTION BLOCK FIRST: EFFECT ON PERCEPTIONS AND IMMIGRATION POLICY VIEWS

Panel A: Perceptions							
	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (2)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (3)	Muslim (misp.) (4)	Christian (misp.) (5)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (6)	Misperception Index (7)
Redistribution First	1.366** (0.560)	-0.465 (0.431)	-0.519 (0.492)	-1.298** (0.579)	-0.270 (0.553)	-0.00613 (0.0129)	0.0126 (0.0268)
Observations	5060	5061	5054	5062	5064	5059	5064
Control mean	17.68	12.60	-5.56	11.30	-23.98	0.36	0.00

Panel B: Support for Immigration						
	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should Care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
Redistribution First	-0.0175 (0.0114)	-0.0258* (0.0135)	-0.00938 (0.0122)	-0.00562 (0.0131)	-0.00525 (0.0507)	-0.0390 (0.0255)
Observations	5060	5060	5060	5060	5063	5064
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.71	0.62	4.53	0.00

Notes: The table shows the effect of seeing the “Redistribution Block” before the “Immigration Block” on perceptions of immigrants – Panel A – and on support for immigration – Panel B. See Appendix A-1 for the definitions of the indices. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Sample: respondents who have not seen any video treatment.

TABLE A-24: U.S. SAMPLE: “SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS” TREATMENT WITH DOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS ONLY

Panel A: First Stage Effects on Perceptions							
	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
Share of Immigrants	-13.27*** (1.955)	0.417*** (0.0355)	0.308 (1.031)	0.405 (1.412)	2.013 (1.470)	-5.464*** (1.956)	0.0511 (0.0402)
Observations	476	476	477	477	477	477	476
Control mean	24.78	0.06	15.31	13.19	11.78	-17.13	0.35

Panel B: Treatment Effects on Support for Redistribution						
	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Share of Immigrants	-0.970 (1.081)	0.144 (0.665)	0.359 (0.806)	-0.0155 (0.612)	0.0107 (0.0430)	0.0119 (0.0454)
Observations	477	477	477	477	475	477
Control mean	28.13	7.92	22.62	16.18	0.51	0.41

Notes: Panel A reports the first-stage effect of the Share of immigrants treatment on (mis)perceptions of immigration. Panel B reports the effect of the Share of immigrants treatment on support for redistribution. See notes to Tables 4 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-25: FIRST-STAGE EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – ADDITIONAL VARIABLES

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	North Africa (misp.) (2)	Middle East (misp.) (3)	Western Europe (misp.) (4)	Eastern Europe (misp.) (5)	North America (misp.) (6)	Latin America (misp.) (7)	Muslim (misp.) (8)	Christian (misp.) (9)
Information T: Share of Immigrants	-4.864*** (0.411)	-0.181 (0.237)	-0.0628 (0.226)	-0.204 (0.225)	-0.0125 (0.236)	0.439** (0.178)	0.231 (0.196)	0.00857 (0.419)	0.144 (0.397)
Information T: Origins of Immigrants	2.315*** (0.426)	-3.091*** (0.226)	-1.695*** (0.213)	0.372* (0.212)	2.212*** (0.243)	-0.766*** (0.176)	2.556*** (0.213)	-1.829*** (0.405)	2.456*** (0.397)
Anecdote T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.709* (0.409)	-0.303 (0.231)	-0.0824 (0.227)	-0.0802 (0.223)	0.416* (0.231)	0.0548 (0.172)	0.371* (0.192)	-0.869** (0.404)	0.796** (0.393)
Observations	19735	19756	19756	19747	19759	19744	19758	19761	19757
Control mean	17.02	7.98	4.63	-5.70	-4.48	4.62	-1.98	11.30	-23.98

	Unemployment (misp.) (10)	Poverty (misp.) (11)	No High School (misp.) (12)	College- educated (misp.) (13)	Imm. Receive More Transfers (14)	Lack of Effort Poor (15)	Effort Rich (16)	Mohammad Gets More (17)
Information T: Share of Immigrants	-1.499*** (0.511)	-0.489 (0.482)	-0.654 (0.503)	-0.0276 (0.406)	0.000113 (0.00874)	0.000297 (0.00921)	-0.0116 (0.00943)	0.000905 (0.00815)
Information T: Origins of Immigrants	-0.163 (0.517)	0.614 (0.484)	0.417 (0.505)	-0.375 (0.404)	-0.00305 (0.00875)	-0.000234 (0.00925)	-0.00870 (0.00944)	-0.00693 (0.00812)
Anecdote T: Hard Work of Immigrants	-2.149*** (0.501)	3.159*** (0.482)	-0.730 (0.501)	-0.912** (0.400)	-0.0105 (0.00871)	-0.0535*** (0.00899)	-0.00441 (0.00944)	-0.0131 (0.00810)
Observations	19732	19739	19723	19729	19745	19721	19709	19752
Control mean	24.44	12.40	5.35	-4.91	0.30	0.36	0.66	0.24

Notes: The table reports first-stage effects on an extended set of (mis)perceptions of immigration. Misperceptions are computed as the perception minus the actual value. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions. All regressions include the same controls as Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-26: FIRST-STAGE EFFECTS: PERSISTENCE IN FOLLOW-UP (US ONLY)

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	L. America (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
Panel A: First survey who took the follow-up							
Information T: Share of Immigrants	-7.045*** (2.019)	0.230*** (0.0280)	1.515 (1.038)	-1.016 (1.487)	0.578 (1.347)	3.745* (2.061)	0.0110 (0.0404)
Information T: Origins of Immigrants	1.671 (2.115)	-0.0214** (0.0106)	-7.220*** (0.929)	15.12*** (1.723)	-3.436*** (1.283)	5.457** (2.127)	-0.0418 (0.0427)
Anecdote T: Hard Work of Immigrants	1.035 (2.046)	0.00854 (0.0142)	1.889* (1.105)	0.278 (1.598)	1.008 (1.322)	0.336 (2.005)	-0.0889** (0.0406)
Control mean	21.29	0.02	14.86	-16.85	12.08	-22.66	0.45
Panel B: Follow-up respondents							
Information T: Share of Immigrants	-1.369 (1.903)	0.0201 (0.0183)	0.853 (1.039)	-1.303 (1.398)	0.539 (1.213)	3.411* (2.038)	-0.0124 (0.0399)
Information T: Origins of Immigrants	-1.301 (1.859)	-0.0177 (0.0144)	-2.808*** (0.987)	7.234*** (1.549)	-0.566 (1.262)	2.148 (1.970)	-0.0370 (0.0421)
Anecdote T: Hard Work of Immigrants	-1.246 (1.887)	-0.00130 (0.0157)	1.057 (1.049)	0.640 (1.416)	1.102 (1.222)	-1.584 (1.899)	-0.0822** (0.0389)
Control mean	21.08	0.03	15.95	-18.61	11.05	-21.85	0.47
Panel C: Differences in perceptions between follow-up and main survey							
Information T: Share of Immigrants	5.669*** (1.991)	-0.210*** (0.0311)	-0.660 (1.171)	-0.287 (1.506)	-0.0388 (1.298)	-0.334 (2.033)	-0.0234 (0.0410)
Information T: Origins of Immigrants	-2.971 (2.116)	0.00371 (0.0165)	4.414*** (1.155)	-7.888*** (1.886)	2.870** (1.421)	-3.308 (2.074)	0.00479 (0.0428)
Anecdote T: Hard Work of Immigrants	-2.355 (1.978)	-0.00986 (0.0202)	-0.791 (1.250)	0.361 (1.612)	0.0946 (1.316)	-1.919 (1.964)	0.00676 (0.0406)
Observations	1031	1031	1033	1034	1034	1034	1032
Control mean	-0.21	0.01	1.10	-1.76	-1.03	0.81	0.02

Notes: Panel A reports estimates of the first-stage effects in the first-round survey, on the subsample of respondents who also took the follow-up survey. Panel B shows the persistence of the treatment effects on that subsample in the follow-up survey. Panel C shows the effect of the treatments on the difference in perceptions between the follow-up and the main survey – defined as the value of the variable in the follow-up minus its value in the main survey. See notes to Table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-27: HETEROGENEOUS TREATMENT EFFECTS – ORDER TREATMENT

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Panel A: Right-Wing vs. Left-Wing						
Order/Salience T x Right	-2.156*** (0.630)	0.987** (0.438)	-0.947** (0.375)	0.466* (0.270)	0.00772 (0.0207)	-0.0526** (0.0210)
Order/Salience T x Left	-1.851*** (0.605)	0.851** (0.390)	-0.336 (0.343)	0.306 (0.256)	-0.0575*** (0.0187)	-0.0480** (0.0200)
p-value diff.	0.727	0.815	0.229	0.668	0.019	0.875
Panel B: College-Educated vs. No High School						
Order/Salience T x College	-1.636*** (0.613)	0.220 (0.390)	-0.496 (0.366)	0.495* (0.272)	-0.0161 (0.0209)	-0.0575*** (0.0218)
Order/Salience T x No College	-2.195*** (0.563)	1.396*** (0.381)	-0.575* (0.313)	0.390* (0.230)	-0.0356** (0.0171)	-0.0406** (0.0178)
p-value diff.	0.503	0.032	0.869	0.769	0.471	0.548
Panel C: Male vs. Female						
Order/Salience T x Male	-2.045*** (0.592)	0.910** (0.399)	-0.496 (0.345)	0.393 (0.252)	-0.00891 (0.0189)	-0.0717*** (0.0198)
Order/Salience T x Female	-1.894*** (0.588)	0.928** (0.383)	-0.589* (0.328)	0.471* (0.245)	-0.0459** (0.0186)	-0.0240 (0.0192)
p-value diff.	0.856	0.974	0.845	0.824	0.164	0.084
Panel D: High Immigration sector/No college vs. Not						
Order/Salience T x H imm	-2.590*** (0.790)	1.318** (0.533)	-0.783* (0.426)	0.628** (0.308)	-0.0308 (0.0233)	-0.0814*** (0.0240)
Order/Salience T x Not H imm	-1.710*** (0.486)	0.747** (0.319)	-0.425 (0.286)	0.332 (0.213)	-0.0266* (0.0161)	-0.0316* (0.0168)
p-value diff.	0.342	0.359	0.486	0.430	0.884	0.090
Control mean	37.12	10.94	29.53	16.00	0.59	0.47
Observations	5064	5064	5064	5064	5064	5064

Notes: The table reports the effects of the Order/Salience treatment, estimated only on respondents who have not seen any video treatment. Panel A reports heterogeneous effects on Left-wing and on Right-wing respondent. The regressions also include a “Treatment x Center” interaction, not reported. Panel B reports the effects on respondents with a college degree and respondents without. Panel C reports the effects on male and female respondents. Panel D reports the effects on respondents working in a high immigration sector who do not have a college degree, and on all the other respondents. “p-value diff.” is the p-value of the test of equality of treatment effects on the pairs of groups. All regressions include the same controls as in Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


A-11 Effort vs. Luck in Germany

To get a sense of the general attitudes towards the importance of luck versus hard work in Germany we look at the following question from the 2014 wave of the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS/GGSS):

What is the best way to get to the top in our society? Using the card, please rate the importance of the qualities and situations. Please tell me for each one how important you think it is for getting ahead in our society today. [Unimportant, Less Important, Important, Very important].

Figure A-12 reports the share of respondents thinking that the factor listed on the y-axis is important or very important to make it to the top. Some of these factors (Luck, Corruption, Opportunism, Right Social Background, Connections, Talent) are mostly related to luck/advantages, others (Industriousness, Initiative, Education) are more closely linked to hard work.

FIGURE A-12: WHAT FACTORS ARE IMPORTANT TO MAKE IT TO THE TOP?



Notes: The figure reports the share of German respondents who think that the factor listed on the y-axis is important or very important to make it to the top. Source: German General Social Survey (ALLBUS/GGSS) 2014. See Section A-11 for details.

A-12 Power Calculation and Pooling Treatments

We set the target sample size for our survey experiments to make sure we have at least 80 percent power to detect a treatment effect of around 10 percent of a standard deviation with a 5 percent significance. This is in line with other information provision experiments. For instance, Haaland et al. (2021) recommend to have at least 80 percent power to detect a treatment effect of 15 percent of a standard deviation, or around 700 respondents per treatment arm. In our main survey we collect 2,750 observations for each of the groups listed in Table A-1. After dropping respondents who spent too much or too little time on the survey (top 2% and bottom 2% in the time distribution per country and treatment arm) we are left with about 2,600 observations per group. Under the standard assumption of normality of estimation errors, this sample size gives us 80 percent power to detect a treatment effect of about 7 percent of a standard deviation with a 5 percent significance.

We have also tried pooling the two information experiments (“Share of Immigrants” and “Origins of Immigrants”), to further increase power. Results are reported in Tables A-28 to A-30. The pooled information treatment still has a strong first stage effect on perception. However, its effect on policy preference is virtually identical to that of the two separate treatments. That is, the pooled information treatment slightly increases the share of respondents who think that immigration is not a problem (driven by the “Share of

immigrants” treatment) and has substantially no effects on support for redistribution — except for a small negative effect on preferred spending on health and safety net, as for the two treatments separately. Coefficients that were not statistically significant for the two separate treatments remain as such for the pooled treatment. This further supports that the lack of statistical significance is not due to power issues.

TABLE A-28: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – POOLED INFORMATION TREATMENT

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Saliency T	-1.948*** (0.416)	0.914*** (0.276)	-0.543** (0.238)	0.439** (0.175)	-0.0280** (0.0132)	-0.0479*** (0.0138)
Pooled T: Share & Origin of Immigrants	-0.347 (0.365)	0.0386 (0.244)	-0.472** (0.204)	0.176 (0.149)	0.000175 (0.0114)	-0.00721 (0.0121)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0772 (0.422)	-0.212 (0.279)	-0.0944 (0.235)	0.333** (0.170)	0.0158 (0.0132)	0.00910 (0.0139)
Observations	19765	19765	19765	19765	19763	19765
Control mean	37.12	10.94	29.53	16.00	0.59	0.47

Notes: The table replicates Table 4 pooling respondents who have seen the Share of immigrants or the Origin of immigrants treatment. See notes to Table 4 . Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-29: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – POOLED INFORMATION TREATMENT

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
Pooled T: Share & Origin of Immigrants	-1.281*** (0.358)	0.115*** (0.00464)	-2.520*** (0.264)	1.000*** (0.307)	-0.909** (0.356)	1.300*** (0.342)	0.0000322 (0.00797)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.708* (0.409)	-0.00416 (0.00396)	-0.385 (0.308)	0.378 (0.352)	-0.868** (0.404)	0.795** (0.393)	-0.0535*** (0.00899)
Observations	19735	19735	19747	19728	19761	19757	19721
Control mean	17.02	0.04	12.60	-5.56	11.30	-23.98	0.36

Notes: The table replicates Table 5 pooling respondents who have seen the Share of immigrants or the Origin of immigrants treatment. See notes to Table 5 . Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-30: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – POOLED INFORMATION TREATMENT

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
Pooled T: Share & Origin of Immigrants	0.0147** (0.00709)	0.00676 (0.00829)	0.00823 (0.00744)	0.00478 (0.00808)	-0.00309 (0.0311)	0.0226 (0.0157)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0252*** (0.00829)	0.0202** (0.00957)	0.0133 (0.00857)	0.0171* (0.00934)	0.131*** (0.0359)	0.0708*** (0.0181)
Observations	19727	19749	19745	19742	19754	19765
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.71	0.62	4.53	0.00

Notes: The table replicates Table 6 pooling respondents who have seen the Share of immigrants or the Origin of immigrants treatment. See notes to Table 6 . Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-13 Robustness Checks

A-13.1 Reduced sample

In this section we report misperceptions by country and by group, and treatment effects estimated on a “reduced” sample that excludes flagged respondents. The three flags refer to i) respondents in the top 2% and bottom 5% of the time spent on a given question; ii) clearly suspicious patterns in respondents’ answers that are indicative of carelessness, such as entering “0” or “100” to questions about shares (reported in Panel A of Table A-7 in the Online Appendix); iii) inattentive participants that have a *Response Pattern Index* greater or equal than 0.8. As in Meade and Craig (2012), this index represents the share of answers to qualitative questions for which the respondent selected answers in the same position – ordered as first, last or middle. Careless respondents are more likely to just mechanically select the option in the same position in every question to get to the end of the survey more quickly.

TABLE A-31: PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY – REDUCED SAMPLE

	U.S.			U.K.			France		
	Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived	
		Mean	Median		Mean	Median		Mean	Median
	(1)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]	(4)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]	(7)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]
	(2)	(3)		(5)	(6)		(8)	(9)	
Panel A: Perceptions									
Share of Immigrants	10.00	34.88 (0.72)	30.00 [19.00, 45.00]	13.40	30.71 (0.64)	29.00 [15.00, 41.00]	12.20	28.59 (0.62)	26.00 [14.00, 40.00]
Share Immigrants from North Africa	0.30	8.44 (0.21)	7.00 [4.00, 11.00]	0.90	9.93 (0.26)	10.00 [5.00, 14.00]	35.30	27.45 (0.49)	26.00 [18.00, 35.00]
Share of Immigrants from Middle East	4.10	12.35 (0.33)	10.00 [5.00, 16.00]	5.10	10.94 (0.32)	10.00 [5.00, 15.00]	5.60	11.31 (0.35)	9.00 [4.00, 15.00]
Share of Immigrants from Western Europe	7.70	10.89 (0.27)	10.00 [5.00, 15.00]	19.00	16.03 (0.41)	13.00 [7.00, 20.00]	29.30	10.84 (0.34)	10.00 [4.00, 15.00]
Share of Immigrants from Eastern Europe	6.10	10.04 (0.24)	10.00 [5.00, 13.00]	20.00	23.61 (0.47)	20.00 [14.00, 30.00]	5.20	14.56 (0.33)	13.00 [9.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from North America	2.30	9.02 (0.28)	7.00 [4.00, 11.00]	2.30	5.77 (0.20)	5.00 [2.00, 9.00]	1.00	5.20 (0.23)	3.00 [1.00, 7.00]
Share of Immigrants from Latin America	42.30	24.28 (0.54)	20.00 [12.00, 32.00]	3.90	5.21 (0.17)	4.00 [2.00, 7.00]	3.40	5.36 (0.18)	4.00 [2.00, 8.00]
Share of Muslim Immigrants	10.00	22.58 (0.48)	20.00 [10.00, 30.00]	23.00	33.08 (0.63)	30.00 [20.00, 44.00]	48.00	48.57 (0.67)	50.00 [30.00, 60.00]
Share of Christian Immigrants	61.00	38.83 (0.70)	40.00 [20.00, 50.00]	58.00	29.47 (0.64)	25.00 [15.00, 40.00]	43.00	24.70 (0.52)	20.00 [10.00, 33.50]
Share of Unemployed Immigrants	5.50	25.44 (0.75)	20.00 [8.00, 40.00]	5.70	26.36 (0.79)	20.00 [7.00, 40.00]	16.60	37.16 (0.84)	30.00 [15.00, 55.00]
Share of Poor Immigrants	13.60	34.49 (0.76)	30.00 [18.00, 50.00]	19.00	29.99 (0.75)	25.00 [10.00, 41.00]	23.80	41.18 (0.81)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]
Share of Immigrants without a High School Diploma	22.00	28.39 (0.77)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	16.60	25.73 (0.77)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	39.10	50.69 (0.84)	50.00 [30.00, 70.00]
Share of College-educated Immigrants	41.40	34.80 (0.77)	30.00 [19.00, 50.00]	48.80	25.78 (0.71)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	28.80	27.81 (0.62)	25.00 [10.00, 40.00]
Panel B: Attitudes									
Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort		0.41 (0.02)			0.36 (0.02)			0.31 (0.01)	
Immigrants Rich because of Effort		0.67 (0.02)			0.70 (0.01)			0.62 (0.02)	
Mohammad Gets More		0.26 (0.01)			0.18 (0.01)			0.34 (0.02)	
Immigrants Receive More Transfers		0.25 (0.01)			0.23 (0.01)			0.38 (0.02)	
Imm. Receive at Least Twice as Many Transfers		0.14 (0.01)			0.11 (0.01)			0.24 (0.01)	
Observations		898			916			922	

TABLE A-31: PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY – REDUCED SAMPLE (CONT.)

	Italy			Germany			Sweden		
	Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived	
		Mean	Median		Mean	Median		Mean	Median
	(10)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]	(13)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]	(16)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]
	(11)	(12)	(14)	(15)	(17)	(18)			
Panel A: Perceptions									
Share of Immigrants	10.00	25.41 (0.63)	20.00 [10.00, 33.00]	14.80	30.21 (0.69)	25.00 [15.00, 40.00]	17.60	26.41 (0.79)	21.00 [15.00, 33.00]
Share Immigrants from North Africa	10.20	24.76 (0.46)	23.00 [16.00, 30.00]	1.50	16.38 (0.38)	15.00 [8.00, 22.00]	1.20	12.35 (0.37)	10.00 [7.00, 17.00]
Share of Immigrants from Middle East	2.90	9.04 (0.25)	8.00 [3.00, 13.00]	17.30	16.77 (0.44)	15.00 [7.00, 23.00]	23.80	25.26 (0.72)	23.00 [15.00, 34.00]
Share of Immigrants from Western Europe	14.30	5.99 (0.23)	4.00 [1.00, 9.00]	14.90	13.06 (0.41)	10.00 [4.00, 20.00]	23.60	15.05 (0.73)	10.00 [4.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from Eastern Europe	38.10	18.70 (0.36)	19.00 [10.00, 25.00]	42.60	23.78 (0.41)	22.00 [15.00, 30.00]	22.20	14.07 (0.42)	13.00 [8.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from North America	0.90	4.12 (0.22)	2.00 [0.00, 5.00]	1.10	4.54 (0.17)	3.00 [1.00, 6.00]	1.40	3.95 (0.24)	3.00 [1.00, 5.00]
Share of Immigrants from Latin America	9.10	9.49 (0.25)	9.00 [4.00, 13.00]	3.20	5.19 (0.15)	5.00 [2.00, 8.00]	5.50	7.67 (0.31)	6.00 [3.00, 10.00]
Share of Muslim Immigrants	33.00	45.49 (0.69)	45.00 [30.00, 60.00]	30.00	43.44 (0.66)	40.00 [30.00, 60.00]	27.00	44.37 (1.02)	40.00 [30.00, 60.00]
Share of Christian Immigrants	57.00	26.77 (0.61)	22.00 [10.00, 40.00]	51.00	31.74 (0.61)	30.00 [20.00, 45.00]	61.00	32.56 (0.96)	30.00 [17.00, 47.00]
Share of Unemployed Immigrants	14.70	40.99 (0.87)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	6.90	39.24 (0.95)	30.00 [15.00, 60.00]	16.10	37.13 (1.15)	30.00 [16.00, 55.00]
Share of Poor Immigrants	34.90	42.88 (0.82)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	20.50	34.18 (0.83)	30.00 [15.00, 50.00]	29.80	25.81 (1.02)	20.00 [10.00, 37.00]
Share of Immigrants without a High School Diploma	49.10	43.91 (0.85)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	35.10	37.66 (0.82)	30.00 [20.00, 50.00]	33.70	40.48 (1.21)	38.00 [20.00, 60.00]
Share of College-educated Immigrants	11.70	18.53 (0.58)	10.00 [5.00, 27.00]	22.30	21.79 (0.59)	20.00 [10.00, 30.00]	37.90	36.67 (1.03)	35.00 [20.00, 50.00]
Panel B: Attitudes									
Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort		0.31 (0.01)			0.41 (0.02)			0.32 (0.02)	
Immigrants Rich because of Effort		0.69 (0.01)			0.60 (0.02)			0.69 (0.02)	
Mohammad Gets More		0.33 (0.02)			0.20 (0.01)			0.01 (0.01)	
Immigrants Receive More Transfers		0.35 (0.02)			0.24 (0.01)			0.42 (0.02)	
Imm. Receive at Least Twice as Many Transfers		0.18 (0.01)			0.09 (0.01)			0.18 (0.02)	
Observations		914			920			451	

Notes: Panel A reports mean and median perceptions for each country. The standard errors of the means are in parentheses and the interquartile ranges (25th and 75th percentiles) are in square brackets. The actual value of the statistic for each country is reported in columns (1), (4), (7), (10), (13) and (16). Panel B reports the mean of each attitude variable for each country and its standard error (in parentheses). Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment, excluding flagged respondents.

TABLE A-32: MISPERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS BY RESPONDENT GROUPS - REDUCED SAMPLE

	Immigrants		Muslim		Christian		Unemployed		Poor		No High School		College-educ		Obs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
College	14.60 (0.43)	10.00 [0.0;24.0]	8.27 (0.41)	7.00 [-3.0;20.0]	-21.50 (0.41)	-23.00 [-36.0;-11.0]	18.99 (0.52)	11.50 [0.3;33.4]	9.76 (0.49)	6.20 [-8.8;25.1]	3.48 (0.51)	-0.10 [-13.7;18.0]	-3.27 (0.47)	-6.70 [-18.8;11.2]	2152
No College	18.65 (0.36)	15.20 [3.0;28.8]	12.07 (0.36)	10.00 [-3.0;27.0]	-25.88 (0.35)	-28.00 [-41.0;-12.0]	26.88 (0.46)	23.10 [4.3;44.5]	14.44 (0.45)	10.20 [-4.9;31.4]	6.11 (0.46)	3.00 [-13.7;24.9]	-5.37 (0.40)	-6.70 [-20.3;8.3]	3182
High Income	15.26 (0.67)	10.80 [0.0;25.0]	9.84 (0.64)	7.00 [-3.0;22.0]	-22.57 (0.66)	-26.00 [-37.0;-11.0]	20.62 (0.84)	13.90 [-0.5;34.5]	9.88 (0.79)	5.10 [-9.0;25.1]	4.73 (0.84)	0.90 [-13.7;20.9]	-5.12 (0.70)	-7.00 [-18.8;8.3]	869
Low Income	17.38 (0.30)	14.00 [1.6;27.8]	10.68 (0.30)	9.00 [-3.0;22.0]	-24.42 (0.29)	-27.00 [-38.0;-11.0]	24.30 (0.38)	18.10 [3.4;43.4]	13.05 (0.37)	9.50 [-5.6;29.5]	5.12 (0.38)	0.90 [-13.7;20.9]	-4.41 (0.33)	-6.70 [-18.8;8.6]	4467
Age 18-45	18.77 (0.37)	15.80 [3.2;28.6]	9.36 (0.37)	7.00 [-3.0;20.0]	-24.19 (0.35)	-27.00 [-38.0;-11.0]	24.02 (0.47)	18.10 [3.4;43.1]	13.96 (0.47)	9.75 [-4.9;31.0]	3.90 (0.46)	0.90 [-14.1;20.9]	-1.97 (0.42)	-2.30 [-17.9;11.2]	2823
Age 46-69	15.18 (0.41)	10.00 [0.0;25.0]	11.80 (0.40)	10.00 [-2.0;25.0]	-24.05 (0.40)	-26.00 [-38.0;-11.0]	23.38 (0.52)	14.50 [2.9;43.1]	11.02 (0.48)	6.40 [-8.8;26.2]	6.31 (0.51)	0.90 [-12.6;23.4]	-7.28 (0.42)	-8.70 [-20.8;3.6]	2513
Male	14.76 (0.40)	9.00 [-0.2;23.5]	10.36 (0.40)	8.00 [-3.0;23.0]	-22.94 (0.40)	-26.00 [-38.0;-11.0]	22.14 (0.51)	14.30 [1.3;39.3]	11.33 (0.48)	6.20 [-9.0;26.2]	5.47 (0.50)	0.90 [-13.7;23.4]	-6.98 (0.42)	-8.70 [-20.3;6.2]	2611
Female	19.22 (0.37)	16.60 [4.2;29.0]	10.71 (0.37)	8.50 [-3.0;22.0]	-25.25 (0.36)	-27.00 [-38.0;-13.0]	25.21 (0.48)	19.50 [4.3;43.4]	13.71 (0.46)	10.10 [-4.9;29.5]	4.66 (0.47)	0.90 [-13.7;20.9]	-2.19 (0.43)	-2.30 [-18.8;11.2]	2725
Left-Wing	17.25 (0.42)	13.00 [1.0;27.0]	8.88 (0.39)	7.00 [-3.0;20.0]	-22.92 (0.39)	-26.00 [-37.0;-11.0]	22.73 (0.50)	15.30 [3.1;39.3]	13.08 (0.49)	9.50 [-4.9;29.5]	2.57 (0.49)	-1.60 [-15.1;18.4]	-1.95 (0.45)	-2.30 [-17.3;11.2]	2449
Right-Wing	17.88 (0.43)	15.00 [2.4;27.8]	14.13 (0.43)	12.00 [0.0;27.0]	-26.54 (0.43)	-29.00 [-41.0;-13.0]	26.34 (0.57)	19.50 [4.3;44.5]	12.38 (0.54)	6.40 [-8.8;30.1]	8.34 (0.56)	3.40 [-12.0;28.0]	-8.70 (0.47)	-9.70 [-23.8;3.6]	2144
Immigrant Parent	23.40 (0.98)	20.40 [5.2;37.6]	9.11 (0.87)	7.00 [-3.0;20.0]	-21.48 (0.86)	-23.00 [-36.0;-9.0]	21.10 (1.07)	14.30 [3.1;38.1]	11.93 (1.07)	9.50 [-8.6;29.4]	6.13 (1.09)	-0.10 [-12.0;21.3]	-2.19 (1.01)	-2.30 [-18.8;12.1]	505
No Immigrant Parent	16.35 (0.29)	12.40 [0.8;26.2]	10.70 (0.29)	8.00 [-3.0;22.0]	-24.41 (0.28)	-27.00 [-38.0;-11.0]	23.99 (0.37)	15.30 [3.3;43.1]	12.60 (0.35)	6.80 [-7.0;29.5]	4.94 (0.36)	0.90 [-14.0;20.9]	-4.77 (0.32)	-6.70 [-18.8;8.3]	4830
Knows an Immigrant	15.88 (0.33)	11.60 [0.4;25.4]	9.98 (0.33)	7.00 [-3.0;22.0]	-22.61 (0.32)	-23.00 [-37.0;-11.0]	21.18 (0.41)	13.90 [1.5;35.3]	10.71 (0.41)	6.20 [-9.0;26.2]	4.05 (0.41)	0.00 [-14.1;20.9]	-3.01 (0.37)	-4.70 [-18.4;11.2]	3556
Does Not Know any Immigrant	19.42 (0.49)	16.00 [3.2;30.0]	11.72 (0.48)	10.00 [-3.0;25.0]	-27.24 (0.47)	-31.00 [-41.0;-13.0]	28.96 (0.63)	24.30 [5.1;49.5]	16.31 (0.58)	11.40 [-3.8;35.1]	7.17 (0.62)	3.40 [-12.0;25.9]	-7.71 (0.52)	-8.80 [-21.4;6.2]	1780
High Imm. Sector & No College	19.93 (0.50)	16.80 [4.2;30.0]	11.77 (0.50)	10.00 [-3.0;27.0]	-26.34 (0.47)	-28.00 [-41.0;-13.0]	27.63 (0.64)	23.40 [4.3;45.3]	15.52 (0.61)	11.00 [-4.7;35.1]	7.13 (0.64)	3.40 [-12.0;24.9]	-7.51 (0.55)	-8.80 [-23.8;7.7]	1719
High Imm. Sector & College	15.07 (0.62)	10.20 [0.0;24.6]	7.41 (0.57)	7.00 [-3.0;20.0]	-21.63 (0.59)	-23.00 [-36.0;-11.0]	20.40 (0.78)	13.40 [-0.5;34.5]	10.07 (0.70)	6.20 [-8.8;25.2]	4.13 (0.73)	-1.60 [-12.0;18.0]	-4.07 (0.70)	-7.30 [-18.8;11.2]	1024
Not High Imm. Sector	15.82 (0.39)	11.00 [0.2;25.2]	10.92 (0.39)	10.00 [-3.0;23.0]	-23.58 (0.38)	-26.00 [-38.0;-11.0]	22.30 (0.49)	14.50 [3.1;38.9]	11.53 (0.48)	6.40 [-8.6;26.4]	3.96 (0.49)	0.90 [-14.6;20.9]	-2.71 (0.42)	-3.80 [-17.3;10.7]	2565

Notes: The table shows the mean (in odd columns) and median (in even columns) misperceptions – computed as perceived minus real – by groups. Groups are defined by the indicator variables listed to the left. The standard errors of the means are in parentheses and the interquartile ranges (25th and 75th percentiles) are in square brackets. Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment, excluding flagged respondents.

TABLE A-33: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – REDUCED SAMPLE

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-1.775*** (0.424)	0.927*** (0.274)	-0.413* (0.232)	0.503*** (0.175)	-0.0276** (0.0133)	-0.0476*** (0.0138)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.512 (0.426)	0.150 (0.279)	-0.376* (0.228)	0.260 (0.171)	-0.00561 (0.0133)	-0.0165 (0.0140)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.0223 (0.430)	0.0968 (0.282)	-0.405* (0.235)	0.177 (0.173)	0.00754 (0.0132)	0.00265 (0.0140)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0218 (0.428)	-0.00121 (0.277)	-0.0746 (0.230)	0.300* (0.169)	0.0150 (0.0132)	0.00918 (0.0140)
Observations	18656	18656	18677	18677	19724	19726
Control mean	37.46	10.65	29.79	16.14	0.59	0.47

Notes: See notes to Table 4. Flagged respondents are excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-34: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – REDUCED SAMPLE

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-5.296*** (0.406)	0.239*** (0.00720)	-0.107 (0.305)	-0.0486 (0.352)	-0.230 (0.397)	-0.185 (0.386)	-0.000161 (0.00922)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.121*** (0.426)	0.00262 (0.00424)	-4.778*** (0.288)	1.725*** (0.351)	-1.597*** (0.388)	2.316*** (0.391)	-0.000575 (0.00926)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.562 (0.408)	-0.00401 (0.00409)	-0.343 (0.301)	0.321 (0.348)	-0.514 (0.386)	0.578 (0.383)	-0.0534*** (0.00900)
Observations	18554	18554	18640	18632	18437	18560	19682
Control mean	16.40	0.04	12.83	-6.07	10.51	-23.98	0.36

Notes: See notes to Table 5. Flagged respondents are excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-35: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – REDUCED SAMPLE

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0243*** (0.00826)	0.0101 (0.00960)	0.0165* (0.00857)	0.00547 (0.00937)	-0.00192 (0.0359)	0.0377** (0.0181)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00535 (0.00823)	0.00398 (0.00962)	0.000912 (0.00863)	0.00466 (0.00937)	0.0000960 (0.0361)	0.00973 (0.0183)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0247*** (0.00829)	0.0202** (0.00958)	0.0130 (0.00857)	0.0168* (0.00934)	0.131*** (0.0359)	0.0702*** (0.0181)
Observations	19689	19710	19706	19703	19715	19726
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.72	0.62	4.53	0.00

Notes: See notes to Table 6. Flagged respondents are excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-13.2 Excluding Respondents who Think the Survey was Biased

At the end of the survey we asked respondents whether they thought that our survey was biased towards either left-wing or right-wing opinions. In this section we re-estimate the treatment effects dropping from the sample respondents who thought our survey was either left-wing or right-wing biased. These respondents account for 16.8% of our main sample. The treatment effects estimated in this sample are slightly stronger, perhaps because the remaining respondents are more receptive to what they think is un-biased information.

TABLE A-36: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – EXCLUDING RESPONDENTS WHO THINK THE SURVEY WAS BIASED

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-1.687*** (0.447)	0.774*** (0.289)	-0.612** (0.247)	0.429** (0.186)	-0.0312** (0.0143)	-0.0424*** (0.0150)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.520 (0.448)	0.0367 (0.297)	-0.383 (0.245)	0.135 (0.184)	-0.0106 (0.0144)	-0.00957 (0.0153)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.119 (0.454)	0.0892 (0.300)	-0.442* (0.247)	0.174 (0.184)	0.00213 (0.0143)	0.0102 (0.0153)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.199 (0.458)	-0.122 (0.301)	-0.139 (0.245)	0.339* (0.182)	0.0159 (0.0143)	0.0133 (0.0153)
Observations	16575	16575	16575	16575	16573	16575
Control mean	37.49	10.53	29.93	16.12	0.60	0.47

Notes: This Table replicates Table 4 excluding from the estimation sample respondents who thought our survey was biased. See notes to Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-37: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – EXCLUDING RESPONDENTS WHO THINK THE SURVEY WAS BIASED

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-5.106*** (0.434)	0.232*** (0.00760)	-0.119 (0.331)	0.106 (0.381)	0.0736 (0.444)	0.163 (0.423)	-0.00696 (0.00990)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.365*** (0.454)	0.00503 (0.00451)	-4.945*** (0.314)	1.941*** (0.380)	-1.766*** (0.432)	2.571*** (0.423)	-0.00459 (0.00992)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.751* (0.435)	-0.00448 (0.00433)	-0.475 (0.329)	0.685* (0.378)	-0.889** (0.432)	0.747* (0.422)	-0.0601*** (0.00963)
Observations	16555	16555	16559	16545	16574	16568	16538
Control mean	16.53	0.04	12.86	-5.80	11.30	-24.08	0.34

Notes: This Table replicates Table 5 excluding from the estimation sample respondents who thought our survey was biased. See notes to Table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-38: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – EXCLUDING RESPONDENTS WHO THINK THE SURVEY WAS BIASED

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0297*** (0.00906)	0.0107 (0.0104)	0.0185** (0.00920)	0.00694 (0.0101)	0.00497 (0.0389)	0.0452** (0.0197)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00752 (0.00897)	0.00265 (0.0104)	0.00140 (0.00927)	0.000589 (0.0101)	-0.0230 (0.0390)	0.00456 (0.0199)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0273*** (0.00913)	0.0250** (0.0105)	0.0153* (0.00925)	0.0137 (0.0102)	0.161*** (0.0390)	0.0795*** (0.0198)
Observations	16548	16561	16562	16560	16566	16575
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.73	0.63	4.57	0.00

Notes: This Table replicates Table 6 excluding from the estimation sample respondents who thought our survey was biased. See notes to Table 6. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-13.3 Re-weighted Sample

In our sample college-educated and unemployed are slightly over-represented compared to the population of our countries. As a robustness check, we compute weights to match the unemployment rate and the share of college educated in the countries of our sample. In order to keep our sample balanced along gender, age, and income, we also target these variables in constructing the weights. Hence, for each country, we split the sample into 160 cells based on gender (2, male vs. female) \times age (5, the five groups in Table 1) \times income (4, the four groups in Table 1) \times unemployed (2, unemployed vs. not) \times college (2, with vs. without a college degree), and we compute a weight for each cell, so that the distribution of these characteristics in the weighted sample matches the distribution in the population of our countries, reported in Table 1.

In this section we report average perceptions by country and treatment effects estimated on the re-weighted sample. Re-weighting observations does not affect significantly our estimates.

TABLE A-39: PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY – RE-WEIGHTED SAMPLE

	U.S.			U.K.			France		
	Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived	
		Mean	Median		Mean	Median		Mean	Median
	(1)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]	(4)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]	(7)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]
	(2)	(3)		(5)	(6)		(8)	(9)	
Panel A: Perceptions									
Share of Immigrants	10.00	36.21 (0.75)	31.00 [20.00, 48.00]	13.40	31.63 (0.64)	30.00 [15.00, 43.00]	12.20	29.62 (0.67)	29.00 [15.00, 40.00]
Share Immigrants from North Africa	0.30	8.48 (0.22)	7.00 [4.00, 11.00]	0.90	9.83 (0.27)	10.00 [5.00, 14.00]	35.30	26.74 (0.57)	25.00 [16.00, 35.00]
Share of Immigrants from Middle East	4.10	12.19 (0.33)	10.00 [5.00, 16.00]	5.10	10.96 (0.35)	10.00 [5.00, 15.00]	5.60	11.44 (0.40)	9.00 [4.00, 15.00]
Share of Immigrants from Western Europe	7.70	10.85 (0.27)	10.00 [5.00, 15.00]	19.00	16.18 (0.43)	13.00 [7.00, 21.00]	29.30	10.79 (0.36)	9.00 [4.00, 15.00]
Share of Immigrants from Easter Europe	6.10	9.87 (0.24)	10.00 [5.00, 13.00]	20.00	23.43 (0.48)	20.00 [13.00, 30.00]	5.20	14.61 (0.41)	13.00 [8.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from North America	2.30	9.69 (0.35)	7.00 [4.00, 11.00]	2.30	6.17 (0.23)	5.00 [2.00, 9.00]	1.00	6.11 (0.35)	4.00 [1.00, 8.00]
Share of Immigrants from Latin America	42.30	24.38 (0.57)	20.00 [11.00, 32.00]	3.90	5.66 (0.20)	5.00 [2.00, 8.00]	3.40	5.79 (0.22)	5.00 [2.00, 9.00]
Share of Muslim Immigrants	10.00	22.75 (0.52)	20.00 [10.00, 30.00]	23.00	33.92 (0.69)	30.00 [20.00, 45.00]	48.00	50.54 (0.79)	50.00 [30.00, 65.00]
Share of Christian Immigrants	61.00	39.09 (0.76)	40.00 [20.00, 50.00]	58.00	29.34 (0.65)	25.00 [15.00, 40.00]	43.00	23.80 (0.57)	20.00 [10.00, 30.00]
Share of Unemployed Immigrants	5.50	26.53 (0.80)	20.00 [8.00, 40.00]	5.70	27.14 (0.78)	20.00 [8.00, 40.00]	16.60	40.06 (0.95)	35.00 [18.00, 60.00]
Share of Poor Immigrants	13.60	35.11 (0.80)	30.00 [18.00, 50.00]	19.00	29.39 (0.73)	25.00 [10.00, 40.00]	23.80	42.90 (0.91)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]
Share of Immigrants without a High School Diploma	22.00	29.26 (0.82)	20.00 [10.00, 44.00]	16.60	25.82 (0.77)	20.00 [8.00, 40.00]	39.10	52.55 (0.93)	50.00 [30.00, 75.00]
Share of College-educated Immigrants	41.40	34.27 (0.80)	30.00 [15.00, 50.00]	48.80	25.43 (0.70)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	28.80	26.62 (0.65)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]
Panel B: Attitudes									
Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort		0.41 (0.02)			0.36 (0.02)			0.33 (0.02)	
Immigrants Rich because of Effort		0.67 (0.02)			0.70 (0.01)			0.61 (0.02)	
Mohammad Gets More		0.26 (0.01)			0.18 (0.01)			0.36 (0.02)	
Immigrants Receive More Transfers		0.25 (0.01)			0.23 (0.01)			0.41 (0.02)	
Imm. Receive at Least Twice as Many Tranfers		0.15 (0.01)			0.11 (0.01)			0.26 (0.02)	
Observations		958			973			980	

TABLE A-39: PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY – RE-WEIGHTED SAMPLE (CONT.)

	Italy			Germany			Sweden		
	Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived	
		Mean	Median		Mean	Median		Mean	Median
	(10)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]	(13)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]	(16)	(Stand. Error)	[Interq. Range]
	(11)	(12)		(14)	(15)		(17)	(18)	
Panel A: Perceptions									
Share of Immigrants	10.00	26.79 (0.72)	20.00 [10.00, 36.00]	14.80	30.36 (0.68)	25.00 [15.00, 40.00]	17.60	27.40 (0.83)	22.00 [15.00, 34.00]
Share Immigrants from North Africa	10.20	25.60 (0.58)	23.00 [16.00, 32.00]	1.50	16.07 (0.37)	15.00 [8.00, 21.00]	1.20	12.18 (0.39)	10.00 [7.00, 17.00]
Share of Immigrants from Middle East	2.90	8.98 (0.28)	8.00 [3.00, 13.00]	17.30	16.87 (0.45)	15.00 [7.00, 23.00]	23.80	25.53 (0.77)	23.00 [15.00, 34.00]
Share of Immigrants from Western Europe	14.30	6.00 (0.26)	4.00 [1.00, 9.00]	14.90	13.43 (0.42)	10.00 [4.00, 20.00]	23.60	14.52 (0.69)	10.00 [4.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from Easter Europe	38.10	18.12 (0.41)	18.00 [10.00, 25.00]	42.60	23.40 (0.41)	22.00 [15.00, 30.00]	22.20	13.87 (0.44)	13.00 [8.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from North America	0.90	4.57 (0.29)	2.00 [0.00, 5.00]	1.10	4.90 (0.20)	4.00 [1.00, 6.00]	1.40	4.64 (0.39)	3.00 [1.00, 5.00]
Share of Immigrants from Latin America	9.10	9.46 (0.28)	9.00 [3.00, 13.00]	3.20	5.42 (0.16)	5.00 [2.00, 8.00]	5.50	7.80 (0.32)	6.00 [3.00, 10.00]
Share of Muslim Immigrants	33.00	47.51 (0.81)	50.00 [30.00, 60.00]	30.00	43.95 (0.68)	40.00 [30.00, 60.00]	27.00	45.67 (1.08)	42.00 [30.00, 60.00]
Share of Christian Immigrants	57.00	26.54 (0.70)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	51.00	31.61 (0.61)	30.00 [20.00, 45.00]	61.00	31.63 (0.98)	30.00 [15.00, 45.00]
Share of Unemployed Immigrants	14.70	42.59 (0.97)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	6.90	39.53 (0.94)	30.00 [12.00, 60.00]	16.10	38.21 (1.20)	30.00 [17.00, 60.00]
Share of Poor Immigrants	34.90	43.00 (0.92)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	20.50	33.72 (0.82)	30.00 [11.00, 50.00]	29.80	25.88 (1.07)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]
Share of Immigrants without a High School Diploma	49.10	43.48 (0.95)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	35.10	37.42 (0.81)	30.00 [17.00, 50.00]	33.70	41.13 (1.26)	38.00 [20.00, 60.00]
Share of College-educated Immigrants	11.70	18.32 (0.62)	10.00 [5.00, 25.00]	22.30	21.94 (0.58)	20.00 [10.00, 30.00]	37.90	36.42 (1.05)	35.00 [20.00, 50.00]
Panel B: Attitudes									
Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort		0.31 (0.02)			0.41 (0.02)			0.32 (0.02)	
Immigrants Rich because of Effort		0.68 (0.02)			0.59 (0.02)			0.69 (0.02)	
Mohammad Gets More		0.35 (0.02)			0.20 (0.01)			0.01 (0.00)	
Immigrants Receive More Transfers		0.38 (0.02)			0.24 (0.01)			0.42 (0.02)	
Imm. Receive at Least Twice as Many Tranfers		0.19 (0.01)			0.09 (0.01)			0.19 (0.02)	
Observations		970			971			480	

Notes: See notes to Table A-2. Observations are re-weighted to match the distribution of gender, age, income, unemployment and college education in each country.

TABLE A-40: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – RE-WEIGHTED SAMPLE

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-2.059*** (0.444)	1.118*** (0.296)	-0.618** (0.250)	0.446** (0.186)	-0.0321** (0.0139)	-0.0441*** (0.0143)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.422 (0.452)	0.0793 (0.294)	-0.459* (0.246)	0.215 (0.183)	-0.0123 (0.0139)	-0.0164 (0.0145)
T: Origins of Immigrants	-0.0438 (0.455)	0.112 (0.303)	-0.456* (0.255)	0.146 (0.183)	0.00471 (0.0139)	0.00284 (0.0146)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.235 (0.452)	-0.205 (0.295)	0.0368 (0.246)	0.326* (0.178)	0.0112 (0.0138)	0.00751 (0.0145)
Observations	19753	19753	19753	19753	19751	19753
Control mean	34.97	12.12	28.83	16.35	0.56	0.43

Notes: See notes to Table 4. Observations are re-weighted to match the distribution of gender, age, income, unemployment and college education in each country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The number of observations is slightly smaller than in Table 4 because some characteristics targeted by the re-weighting are missing for a few respondents of the main analysis sample.

TABLE A-41: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – RE-WEIGHTED SAMPLE

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-4.800*** (0.433)	0.223*** (0.00707)	-0.351 (0.333)	0.244 (0.374)	-0.0724 (0.442)	0.0203 (0.412)	0.000782 (0.00966)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.377*** (0.444)	0.00418 (0.00421)	-4.943*** (0.317)	1.967*** (0.375)	-1.887*** (0.429)	2.223*** (0.412)	0.00452 (0.00973)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.791* (0.427)	-0.00377 (0.00399)	-0.514 (0.327)	0.536 (0.368)	-0.977** (0.427)	0.771* (0.410)	-0.0516*** (0.00947)
Observations	19723	19723	19735	19716	19749	19745	19709
Control mean	17.33	0.04	12.85	-5.85	11.61	-24.31	0.36

Notes: See notes to Table 5. Observations are re-weighted to match the distribution of gender, age, income, unemployment and college education in each country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-42: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – RE-WEIGHTED SAMPLE

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0233*** (0.00839)	0.0117 (0.0100)	0.0162* (0.00909)	0.00113 (0.00985)	-0.00365 (0.0377)	0.0347* (0.0189)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00596 (0.00839)	0.00233 (0.0100)	0.00194 (0.00913)	0.00311 (0.00985)	-0.0145 (0.0379)	0.00660 (0.0190)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0267*** (0.00845)	0.0207** (0.01000)	0.0160* (0.00907)	0.0197** (0.00980)	0.125*** (0.0378)	0.0747*** (0.0189)
Observations	19715	19737	19734	19730	19742	19753
Control mean	0.24	0.48	0.71	0.61	4.50	-0.03

Notes: See notes to Table 6. Observations are re-weighted to match the distribution of gender, age, income, unemployment and college education in each country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-13.4 “Raw” Sample

In our main samples we exclude respondents in the top and bottom 2% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey, excluding respondents who may have rushed through the survey without paying sufficient attention, and respondents who got distracted while taking the survey. We also drop respondents who spent too much time on the video treatments page (who probably did something else instead of watching the video and did not realize it ended). In this section we re-estimate the main treatment effect on a “Raw” sample, where we do not apply any of these sample refinements. Results are broadly consistent with those estimated on the main sample. The first stage treatment effects are, not surprisingly, slightly smaller, showing that by trimming the sample we are indeed excluding some inattentive respondents.

TABLE A-43: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – “RAW” SAMPLE

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-2.095*** (0.411)	1.009*** (0.274)	-0.713*** (0.240)	0.369** (0.177)	-0.0299** (0.0130)	-0.0485*** (0.0135)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.576 (0.412)	0.0334 (0.276)	-0.560** (0.233)	0.157 (0.173)	-0.00300 (0.0130)	-0.0174 (0.0136)
T: Origins of Immigrants	-0.0668 (0.418)	0.0612 (0.281)	-0.515** (0.239)	0.110 (0.174)	0.00611 (0.0130)	0.000946 (0.0137)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.162 (0.415)	-0.183 (0.276)	-0.143 (0.234)	0.307* (0.171)	0.0174 (0.0129)	0.0101 (0.0136)
Observations	20857	20857	20857	20857	20854	20857
Control mean	36.93	11.09	29.37	15.88	0.58	0.47

Notes: This Table replicates Table 4 on the “Raw” sample, where we do not apply any sample refinement. See notes to Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-44: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – “RAW” SAMPLE

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-4.712*** (0.408)	0.221*** (0.00668)	-0.325 (0.309)	0.181 (0.354)	0.00151 (0.413)	0.0433 (0.395)	0.000393 (0.00904)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.200*** (0.420)	0.00245 (0.00399)	-4.690*** (0.294)	1.615*** (0.352)	-1.662*** (0.402)	2.202*** (0.394)	0.000750 (0.00906)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.814** (0.405)	-0.00461 (0.00384)	-0.451 (0.305)	0.416 (0.349)	-0.664* (0.399)	0.368 (0.389)	-0.0520*** (0.00884)
Observations	20823	20823	20838	20819	20853	20847	20811
Control mean	17.41	0.04	12.34	-5.26	11.05	-23.79	0.36

Notes: This Table replicates Table 5 on the “Raw” sample, where we do not apply any sample refinement. See notes to Table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-45: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – “RAW” SAMPLE

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0230*** (0.00804)	0.00832 (0.00936)	0.0133 (0.00840)	0.00188 (0.00915)	-0.0216 (0.0349)	0.0282 (0.0177)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00325 (0.00801)	0.000861 (0.00937)	0.0000402 (0.00846)	0.00232 (0.00915)	-0.0100 (0.0351)	0.00267 (0.0178)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0245*** (0.00808)	0.0189** (0.00934)	0.0134 (0.00838)	0.0149 (0.00912)	0.121*** (0.0350)	0.0670*** (0.0177)
Observations	20817	20841	20836	20833	20845	20857
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.71	0.62	4.54	0.00

Notes: This Table replicates Table 6 on the “Raw” sample, where we do not apply any sample refinement. See notes to Table 6. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-13.5 Alternative Sample Trimmings

In our main samples we exclude respondents in the top and bottom 2% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey. In this sections we re-estimate the main treatment effects on a smaller sample where, instead, we drop respondents in the top and bottom 5% of the distribution. Results are robust to this alternative sample refinement.

TABLE A-46: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – TRIMMING BOTTOM AND TOP 5%

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Saliency T	-2.103*** (0.425)	0.933*** (0.277)	-0.458* (0.238)	0.464*** (0.179)	-0.0299** (0.0137)	-0.0489*** (0.0142)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.677 (0.427)	0.140 (0.281)	-0.444* (0.234)	0.167 (0.176)	-0.00675 (0.0137)	-0.0162 (0.0144)
T: Origins of Immigrants	-0.269 (0.433)	0.154 (0.289)	-0.407* (0.238)	0.115 (0.176)	0.00522 (0.0136)	-0.000263 (0.0144)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	-0.0855 (0.431)	-0.136 (0.281)	-0.0842 (0.235)	0.239 (0.173)	0.0134 (0.0136)	0.00478 (0.0144)
Observations	18560	18560	18560	18560	18558	18560
Control mean	37.43	10.69	29.64	16.09	0.59	0.47

Notes: This Table replicates Table 4 on a smaller sample where we exclude respondents in the bottom and top 5% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey. See notes to Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-47: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – TRIMMING BOTTOM AND TOP 5%

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-5.028*** (0.420)	0.235*** (0.00720)	-0.0925 (0.318)	-0.0259 (0.367)	0.170 (0.428)	0.0323 (0.405)	0.00376 (0.00946)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.201*** (0.436)	0.00338 (0.00429)	-4.725*** (0.301)	1.653*** (0.364)	-1.717*** (0.413)	2.333*** (0.405)	0.00393 (0.00950)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.625 (0.418)	-0.00492 (0.00410)	-0.287 (0.313)	0.258 (0.360)	-0.721* (0.412)	0.645 (0.401)	-0.0525*** (0.00923)
Observations	18535	18535	18544	18526	18556	18553	18518
Control mean	16.76	0.04	12.68	-5.62	11.34	-23.92	0.35

Notes: This Table replicates Table 5 on a smaller sample where we exclude respondents in the bottom and top 5% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey. See notes to Table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-48: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – TRIMMING BOTTOM AND TOP 5%

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0235*** (0.00855)	0.00964 (0.00988)	0.0148* (0.00879)	0.00416 (0.00964)	-0.0137 (0.0373)	0.0328* (0.0187)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00230 (0.00851)	0.00123 (0.00990)	-0.00331 (0.00888)	-0.00145 (0.00965)	-0.0101 (0.0374)	-0.00246 (0.0189)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0260*** (0.00858)	0.0190* (0.00986)	0.0115 (0.00881)	0.0138 (0.00962)	0.131*** (0.0372)	0.0672*** (0.0187)
Observations	18529	18545	18542	18540	18549	18560
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.72	0.62	4.54	-0.00

Notes: This Table replicates Table 6 on a smaller sample where we exclude respondents in the bottom and top 5% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey. See notes to Table 6. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-13.6 Time Fixed Effects

In this section we re-estimate the treatment effects on perceptions and on support for immigration and redistribution including week fixed effects – i.e., dummies for the weeks the respondent took the survey – to account for time varying factors that may confound our estimates. The coefficients and standard errors are almost identical to those estimated in the main specification without week fixed effects. Results are virtually unchanged if we use dummies for the day or the month of completion of the survey, instead of the week.

TABLE A-49: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – TIME FIXED EFFECTS

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-1.949*** (0.416)	0.915*** (0.276)	-0.541** (0.237)	0.442** (0.175)	-0.0280** (0.0132)	-0.0479*** (0.0138)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.633 (0.419)	0.0471 (0.278)	-0.481** (0.233)	0.195 (0.172)	-0.00624 (0.0133)	-0.0163 (0.0140)
T: Origins of Immigrants	-0.0709 (0.425)	0.0349 (0.284)	-0.467* (0.239)	0.167 (0.173)	0.00607 (0.0132)	0.00219 (0.0140)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0740 (0.422)	-0.211 (0.278)	-0.0965 (0.235)	0.335** (0.170)	0.0156 (0.0132)	0.00930 (0.0139)
Observations	19765	19765	19765	19765	19763	19765
Control mean	37.12	10.94	29.53	16.00	0.59	0.47
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: See notes to Table 4. All regressions include a set of week dummies to control for the week the respondent took the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-50: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – TIME FIXED EFFECTS

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-4.853*** (0.411)	0.227*** (0.00691)	-0.255 (0.312)	0.178 (0.357)	0.000141 (0.419)	0.147 (0.397)	-0.0000126 (0.00921)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.316*** (0.426)	0.00254 (0.00411)	-4.801*** (0.295)	1.829*** (0.356)	-1.842*** (0.405)	2.458*** (0.397)	-0.000286 (0.00925)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.705* (0.409)	-0.00416 (0.00396)	-0.387 (0.308)	0.383 (0.352)	-0.872** (0.404)	0.797** (0.393)	-0.0536*** (0.00899)
Observations	19735	19735	19747	19728	19761	19757	19721
Control mean	17.02	0.04	12.60	-5.56	11.30	-23.98	0.36
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: See notes to Table 5. All regressions include a set of week dummies to control for the week the respondent took the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-51: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – TIME FIXED EFFECTS

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0242*** (0.00825)	0.0104 (0.00958)	0.0162* (0.00857)	0.00550 (0.00936)	-0.00185 (0.0359)	0.0376** (0.0181)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00543 (0.00823)	0.00378 (0.00961)	0.000984 (0.00862)	0.00468 (0.00936)	-0.00128 (0.0360)	0.00951 (0.0182)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0253*** (0.00829)	0.0202** (0.00956)	0.0133 (0.00857)	0.0172* (0.00934)	0.131*** (0.0359)	0.0710*** (0.0181)
Observations	19727	19749	19745	19742	19754	19765
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.71	0.62	4.53	0.00
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: See notes to Table 6. All regressions include a set of week dummies to control for the week the respondent took the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-14 Media Coverage of Immigration

In this section we investigate whether (mis)perceptions of immigration are correlated with coverage of immigration by the media. If the immigration issue is very salient in the media, people may be led to overestimate the share of immigrants. In addition, if some immigrants characteristics are systematically covered more than others in the media, people may over-perceive their actual prevalence. We construct two measures of media coverage of immigration based on data compiled by the platform Media Cloud, one capturing general coverage of immigration, the other focusing on specific coverage of immigration in association with issues related to redistribution and immigrants' reliance on welfare. We regress these variables on our measures of misperceptions and we report results in Table A-53. In what follows we give more information on the data compiled by Media Cloud, the way we construct our measures and the regressions we estimate. We close by briefly commenting on the results of the analysis.

Media Cloud Media Cloud is an open source platform to study media ecosystems, designed by a team of researchers across multiple institutions, including the University of Massachusetts Amherst, Northeastern University, and the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University.²⁵ It collects news stories from media sites around the web using RSS feeds and stores them in a freely accessible database. Researchers can search this database through an explorer tool, which allows to track coverage of a certain issue by counting the number of news stories mentioning specific words over a given time period, geography and collection of media outlets. The database covers newspapers' and other traditional media outlets' websites (e.g., [nytimes.com](https://www.nytimes.com), [cnn.com](https://www.cnn.com), [foxnews.com](https://www.foxnews.com)) as well as websites of online-only media (e.g., [vox.com](https://www.vox.com), [breitbart.com](https://www.breitbart.com)).

Measures of media coverage We construct two measures of online media coverage of immigration by country: i) *Share Stories Imm.*, measuring general coverage of immigration; ii) *Share Stories Imm. + Welfare*, measuring coverage of immigration in association with issues related to welfare and unemployment. For the first measure, we search for news stories containing the word “immigration” and its derivatives in the Media Cloud database.²⁶ We take the number of stories that satisfy this condition on a given day and collection of media outlets, and we divide it by the total number of stories in the Media Cloud database for the same day and collection. In this way we obtain the share of stories mentioning immigration (over all the relevant stories available). For the second measure, we go over the same steps, but searching, instead, for stories containing the word “immigration” together with “welfare” and/or “unemployed” (or their derivatives). Hence, the second measure is defined as the number of stories mentioning immigration in association with welfare or unemployment over the total number of relevant stories in the Media Cloud database.

To obtain media coverage by country we repeat this procedure for six geographic collections of media outlets compiled by Media Cloud, which include media that have national relevance in the six countries in our sample.²⁷ Finally, to reduce noise and account for persistence of potential exposure effects, we construct a moving average version of the measures (MA3), averaging media coverage over three days—the day the survey was taken and the two days before.

Table A-52 shows the average by country of the two measures of media coverage over the period we fielded our main survey. The first two rows report the averages of the daily version of the measures, the MA3 version is summarized in the last two rows. Measures are defined in percentage points.

²⁵It is accessible at <https://mediacloud.org>.

²⁶That is, we search for the string “immigr*.”

²⁷The specific reference to each collection, as well as the list of the sources included, are available at: U.S., <https://sources.mediacloud.org/#/collections/34412234>; U.K., <https://sources.mediacloud.org/#/collections/34412476>; Italy, <https://sources.mediacloud.org/#/collections/34412372>; France, <https://sources.mediacloud.org/#/collections/34412146>; Germany, <https://sources.mediacloud.org/#/collections/34412409>; Sweden, <https://sources.mediacloud.org/#/collections/34412223>.

TABLE A-52: AVERAGE MEDIA COVERAGE OF IMMIGRATION

	U.S.	U.K.	Italy	France	Germany	Sweden
Share Stories Imm. – Daily	4.97	1.98	1.31	0.90	0.53	0.63
Share Stories Imm. + Welfare – Daily	0.38	0.22	0.10	0.04	0.02	0.12
Share Stories Imm. – MA3	5.39	2.11	1.35	1.04	0.69	0.68
Share Stories Imm. + Welfare – MA3	0.34	0.29	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.08

Notes: The table reports the average by country of our two measures of media coverage of immigration over the period we fielded our main survey – January 22 to February 11, 2018 for the U.S., February to mid-March 2018 for European countries. For each measure we summarize the daily version and the MA3 versions. Measures are defined in percentage points.

Regression specification We link the media coverage variables to our main survey records and we estimated the following set of linear regressions.

$$y_{i,d,c} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{ShareStoriesImmMA3}_{d,c} + \beta_2 \text{ShareStoriesImmWelfareMA3}_{d,c} + \gamma C_i + \lambda_c + \varepsilon_{i,d,c} \quad (\text{A-1})$$

Where $y_{i,d,c}$ is the misperception or the perception index of respondent i in country c recorded on day d – the day he has taken the survey – $\text{ShareStoriesImmMA3}_{d,c}$ and $\text{ShareStoriesImmWelfareMA3}_{d,c}$ are the two measures discussed above, capturing average media coverage in country c on the day the survey was taken and the two days before, C_i is a vector of usual personal controls (age, gender, education, political affiliation, income, working in a high immigration sector, having a foreign-born parent), and λ_c are country fixed effects.

Results Table A-53 shows the results of estimating equation A-1 on a set of misperceptions and on the perceived cultural distance, perceived economic weakness and perceived free riding index. General coverage of immigration is negatively correlated with the misperception on the share of immigrants. A one standard deviation increase in the share of stories mentioning immigration on the day the survey was taken and in the two days before is associated with a reduction in the misperception of the share of immigrants by 0.11 of a s.d. It is positively correlated with the perceived cultural distance index – a one s.d. increase in the share of stories is associated with an increase in the index of 0.11 of a s.d. – and positively correlated with the perceived share of immigrants from Middle East and immigrants that are Muslim – one s.d. increase in the share of stories is associated with an increase in these two variables of 0.11 and 0.06 s.d., respectively. Coverage of immigration in association with “welfare” or “unemployment” is positively correlated with misperceptions of the share of immigrants and with perceptions of immigrants’ economic weakness. A one s.d. increase in the share of stories mentioning “immigration” and “welfare” or “unemployment” is associated with an increase in the share of immigrants of 0.05 of a s.d., an increase in the perceived economic weakness index of 0.05 s.d., an increase in the misperception of the share of poor immigrants of 0.05 of a s.d. and a similar increase in the share of low educated immigrants. Coverage of immigration and welfare seems to also reduce the perceived free riding of immigrants: a one s.d. increase in the share of stories is associated with a reduction of the index of 0.051 of a s.d.

It is worth recalling that in this analysis we are not able to distinguish between media coverage *per se* and media coverage induced by specific events that make the immigration issue more salient. Events making immigration or certain aspects of immigration more salient are likely to have a direct effect on perceptions, in addition to the amplification that may come from the media.

TABLE A-53: MEDIA COVERAGE OF IMMIGRATION AND PERCEPTIONS

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Perc. Cultural Distance Index (2)	Perc Econ. Weakness Index (3)	Perc. Free Riding Index (4)	Middle East (misp.) (5)	Western Europe (misp.) (6)	Muslim (misp.) (7)	Christian (misp.) (8)	Poverty (misp.) (9)	No High School (misp.) (10)
Shares Stories Imm. – MA3	-1.331** (0.520)	0.0606*** (0.0200)	-0.00882 (0.0223)	0.0154 (0.0226)	0.713*** (0.235)	-0.209 (0.223)	0.748* (0.425)	-0.778 (0.480)	-0.0376 (0.552)	-0.142 (0.581)
Shares Stories Imm. + Welfare – MA3	5.861** (2.619)	-0.137 (0.108)	0.273** (0.122)	-0.303*** (0.115)	-2.254* (1.340)	0.265 (1.478)	-2.741 (2.444)	1.964 (2.721)	6.946** (2.998)	7.373** (3.132)
Observations	5061	5065	5065	5065	5064	5061	5063	5065	5061	5057
Control mean	17.68	-0.02	0.01	0.00	4.63	-5.70	11.29	-23.98	12.40	5.34

Notes: The outcome variables are the perception indices and misperceptions of immigrants listed on top of the columns. See Appendix Section A-1 for details on the variables. Each regression includes the two measures of media coverage listed on the left plus standard personal controls as in Table 2 (indicator variables for gender, college degree, age > 45, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, political affiliation, having at least one parent not born in the country, working in a high immigration sector with and without a college degree) and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Sample: only respondents in the main survey who have not seen any of the video treatments.

A-15 Bibliography

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