ONLINE APPENDIX

for "Understanding Tax Policies: How Do People Reason?"

by Stefanie Stantcheva

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OA-1 Variable Definition

Core respondents characteristics
Female: respondent is female.
Age 18-29: respondent's age is between 18 and 29 years (usually omitted category in the regressions).
Age 30-49: respondent's age is between 30 and 49 years.
Age 50-69: respondent's age is between 50 and 69 years.
White: respondent's ethnicity is European American/White (usually omitted category in the regressions).
Black: respondent's ethnicity is African American/Black.
Hispanic: respondent's ethnicity is Hispanic/Latino.
Other races: respondent's ethnicity is Asian/Asian American or other.
Has children: respondent has children.
Low-Income: respondent's household income is below $39 000 (usually omitted category in the regressions).
Middle-Income: respondent's household income is between $40 000 - $69 000.
High-Income: respondent's household income is above $70 000.
Upper Class (self-reported): respondent's self-reported social class is upper-middle class or upper class.
Student: respondent is student (usually omitted category in the regressions).
Working: respondent is full-time or part-time employee, or self-employed, or small business owner.
Not working: respondent is unemployed and looking for work or not currently working and not looking for work.
Retiree: respondent is retiree.
Republican: respondent's political affiliation is Republican.
Democrat: respondent's political affiliation is Democrat (usually omitted category in the regressions).
Independent and others: respondent's political affiliation is independent or other or non-affiliated.
Economics related major: respondent has a college degree with an economics-related major.
College (degree): respondent has at least a 4-year college degree.
Self-reported knowledge: respondent self-reports being "highly knowledgeable" or "somewhat knowledgeable" on economic policies and issues.
Redistribution T: respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on the distributional impacts of the policies.
Efficiency T: respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on the efficiency costs of the policies.
Economist T: respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on both efficiency costs and distributional impacts of the policies.

Mechanisms and Outcomes (Income Tax survey)
All dependent variables in the perceived behavioral response to income tax: indicator variables equal to one if the respondent thinks that the extent to which an increase in the federal personal income tax would encourage the middle class or the richest people in the economy towards the behaviors listed ranges from *a moderate amount* to *a great deal*.
"Which of the following groups mostly win if taxes on high earners were cut?": indicator variables equal to one if the respondent believes that the given group mostly wins if taxes on high-earners were cut.
"Which of the following groups mostly win if overall taxes were increased?": indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that the given group mostly wins if overall taxes were increased.
Trickle down: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks that lowering income taxes is a better way (than increasing them) to reduce income differences between poor and rich families.
↑ *Taxes high-incomes hurt economy:* indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that taxes on high-income households would hurt the U.S. economy (as opposed to help or not have an effect on U.S. economy).
Laffer effect high-incomes/middle class: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that tax cuts on high-income/middle class households would eventually decrease the U.S. deficit because they would stimulate the economy and bring in more money for the government.
Wealth distribution unfair: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks that money and wealth

in the U.S. should be more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of the people.
Inequality serious issue: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that income inequality is a serious or very serious issue.
Person rich due to luck: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that a person is rich because they had more advantages than others (as opposed to because they worked harder than others).
High-incomes entitled to keep their income: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that high-income individuals are entitled to keep a very large share of their income and should not have to pay high taxes, even if that means less government revenues available to help low-income families.
Income tax fair: indicator variable equal to one if the if the respondent believes that the current U.S. federal income tax system is fair or very fair.
Satisfied income tax: indicator variable equal to one if the if the respondent is satisfied or very satisfied with the current U.S. federal income tax system.
Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that a progressive tax system in which people with higher incomes pay a higher share of income in taxes than people with lower incomes is an important tool to reduce income inequality.
Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes: the respondent supports or strongly supports raising federal income taxes on higher income households to expand programs that support lower-income individuals.
Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to increase investment: the respondent supports or strongly supports raising federal income taxes on higher income households to increase investment in the U.S.

Mechanisms and outcomes (Estate Tax survey)
All dependent variables in the perceived behavioral response to estate tax: indicator variables equal to one if the respondent thinks that the extent to which an increase in the federal estate tax would encourage the middle class or the richest people in the economy towards the behaviors listed ranges from *a moderate amount* to *a great deal*.
Which of the following groups mostly win if the estate tax were cut?: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the given group mostly wins if the estate tax were cut.
↑ Estate tax hurt economy: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that the federal estate tax on wealthy households would hurt the U.S. economy (as opposed to help or not have an effect on U.S. economy).
Laffer effect: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that cuts to the estate tax of wealthy households would eventually decrease the U.S. deficit because they would stimulate the economy and bring in more money for the government.
Wealth distribution unfair: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that money and wealth in this country should be more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of the people.
Inequality serious issue: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that wealth inequality in America is a serious or a very serious problem.
Person wealthy due to luck: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that a person is wealthy because they had more advantages than others (as opposed to because they worked harder than others).
Unfair tax estates of hard workers: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that it is "somewhat unfair" or "very unfair" to tax the estate of wealthy people who worked hard.
Unfair tax estates of wealthy heirs: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that it is "somewhat unfair" or "very unfair" to tax the estate of people who are wealthy because they have inherited a lot of wealth from their parents.
Fair that children from wealthy families access better amenities: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that it is "somewhat fair" or "very fair" that children born in very wealthy families have access to better amenities.
Fair that children from wealthy families inherit more: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that it is "somewhat fair" or "very fair" that children born in very wealthy families inherit much more than children born in less wealthy families.
Trade-off: parents should pass on wealth even if unequal for children: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that wealthy parents should be able to pass on all of her wealth to her children.

Estate tax system fair: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that the current U.S. federal estate tax system is fair or very fair.
Satisfied with estate tax: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is satisfied or very satisfied with the current U.S. federal estate tax system.
Estate tax should exist: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that there should be a federal estate tax in the U.S.
Estate tax should be increased: conditional on believing that there should be a federal estate tax (see previous variable), indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks that the federal estate tax should be increased.
↑ *Estate tax good way to* ↓ *inequality:* indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that increasing the federal estate tax is a good way or is one of the best ways to reduce wealth inequality.

Indices

The summary indices that aggregate information over the same domain are constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007). Each index consists of an equally weighted average of the z-scores of its components with signs oriented consistently within domain (e.g. the higher the distortion index, the higher the belief of the respondent in the distortionary nature of taxes). Variables are transformed into z-scores by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation, so that each z-score has mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the control group. To further ease interpretation, the resulting index is itself standardized by subtracting the mean in the control group and dividing by the standard deviation, so that each index has mean zero and standard deviation one.

Overestimate level of taxes (income tax survey): index based on the misperceptions, defined as the deviation between the perception and the actual value, for the following variables: top tax rate in the 50s; top tax rate today; share of income paid in taxes in top bracket; share of households in top bracket; share of households not paying income taxes; top tax threshold; top state tax rate; share of income paid in taxes by the median household.
Overestimate level of taxes (estate tax survey): index based on the misperceptions, defined as the deviation between the perception and the actual value, for the following variables: estate tax rate above exemption threshold in the 50s; estate tax rate above exemption threshold today; estate tax exemption threshold; number of households, out of 1,000, subject to the estate tax.
Taxes lead to changes in behaviors (income & estate tax surveys): index that captures the respondents' belief in the distortionary nature of taxes. The index combines all the variables on the behavioral responses to increased taxation. The sign is oriented so that a higher index value indicates stronger the perceived distortion.
Higher taxes hurt the economy: index that capture the respondent's perception of the efficiency costs of taxation. The sign is oriented so that a higher index means a stronger belief in the distortionary nature of taxes. It includes the "Laffer effect" variables and the variables "↑ Taxes on high-incomes hurt economy" in the income tax survey or "↑ Estate tax hurt economy" in the estate tax survey.
Believe in trickle-down: index that captures whether the respondent believes in trickle-down effects. In the income tax survey, it combines the variables on whether the respondents think that i) poor households, ii) the working class would mostly lose if overall taxes were raised so that more revenues were spent on government programs and the "trickle down" variable. In the estate tax, it combines variables on whether the respondents think that i) poor households, ii) the working class would mostly win if the estate tax were cut. The sign is oriented so that a higher index means a stronger belief in the detrimental effect for lower classes of income redistribution through increased taxation.
Think inequality is serious problem (income & estate tax surveys): index that captures whether the respondent thinks that inequality is a serious problem. It combines the variables on whether the respondent feels that money and wealth should be more evenly distributed, whether they believe that income (or wealth in the estate tax survey) inequality is a serious or very serious issue, the perceived share of national income owned by the top 1% richest households (only in the income tax survey), and whether they think that the

share of total U.S. income that goes to the top 1% in the U.S. in the income tax survey or the share of total U.S. wealth held by the top 0.1% in the estate tax survey has increased somewhat or a lot over the past 30 years.
Perceived % of wealth inherited: perceived share of wealth that respondents think comes from inheritances in the U.S.
Unfair to tax parents: index that captures whether the respondent thinks that it is unfair to tax the estate of people who are wealthy either because they have inherited a lot of wealth from their parents or because they worked hard.
Fair that children from wealthy families inherit more: index that captures whether the respondent thinks that it is fair that children from wealthy families inherit more and have better opportunities. It combines the variables "Fair that children from wealthy families access better amenities" and "Fair that children from wealthy families inherit more."

Trust the government (income & estate tax surveys): index that captures the respondent's trust in the government and desire for action. It includes the following three variables: "How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right;" "Some people think the government is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and businesses. Others think that government should do more to solve our country's problems. Which come closer to your own view?;" "Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens?." The sign is oriented so that a higher index indicates more trust in the government and more desire for action.

Income tax policy index: the index combines variables on whether the respondent thinks that progressive taxation is an important tool to reduce inequality, whether they support increasing taxes on higher-income to expand programs targeted to low incomes or to increase investments, and whether they believe that the government should have responsibility in reducing income inequality between the rich and the poor.
Estate tax policy index: the index combines variables on whether the respondent thinks that the estate tax is a good way to reduce wealth inequality, whether they think that the estate tax should exist, whether they think it should be increased, and whether they believe that the government should have responsibility in reducing intergenerational wealth transmission.

General policy views (asked in both surveys)
Pay less than their fair share in taxes - High incomes: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks high income households pay less or much less than their fair share in taxes.
Pay less than their fair share in taxes - Middle class: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks middle class households pay their fair share or less or much less than their fair share in taxes.
Support increased taxation to fund - Transfers and income support programs to those out of work : indicator variable equal to one if the respondent supports increased funding for transfer and income support programs for those out of work even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas (as opposed to services and taxes as now or less of the service and reduced tax).
Support increased taxation to fund - Better schools for children from low-income families : indicator variable equal to one if the respondent supports increased funding for better schools for children from low-income families even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas (as opposed to services and taxes as now or less of the service and reduced tax).
Support increased taxation to fund - Income support and retraining programs for workers displaced by international trade: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent supports increased funding for income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas (as opposed to services and taxes as now or less of the service and reduced tax).
Support increased taxation to fund - Subsidies to low-income households for the costs of health insurance: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent supports increased funding for subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care even if that means

more taxes or reduced spending in other areas (as opposed to services and taxes as now or less of the service and reduced tax).
Support increased taxation to fund - Wage subsidies and help for the working poor: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent supports increased funding for wage subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas (as opposed to services and taxes as now or less of the service and reduced tax).

General government views (asked in both surveys)
Trust: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent believes that he can trust the government doing the right thing almost always or a lot of the time.
Purposes: indicator variable equal to one if respondent thinks the government should do more to solve the country's problems.
Involvment: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks the government should take active steps to improve the lives of its citizens (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means the government should take active steps).
Cents Wasted: cents wasted of every tax dollar that goes to the federal government in Washington, D.C.
Satisfaction: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the way the federal government in Washington is dealing with the country's problems.
Government should be responsible for - Reducing income inequality: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks the government should have responsibility in reducing income inequality between the rich and the poor (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "no responsibility at all" and 5 means "total responsibility").
Government should be responsible for - Reducing wealth transmission: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks the government should have responsibility in reducing inter-generational wealth transmission (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "no responsibility at all" and 5 means "total responsibility").
Government should be responsible for - Health care: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks the government should have responsibility in making sure Americans have adequate health care (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "no responsibility at all" and 5 means "total responsibility").
Government should be responsible for - Reducing opportunity diff.: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks the government should have responsibility in reducing the differences in opportunity between children from wealthy and poor families (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "no responsibility at all" and 5 means "total responsibility").
Government should be responsible for - Regulating trade: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks the government should have responsibility in regulating trade to and from the U.S. to protect American producers and consumers (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "no responsibility at all" and 5 means "total responsibility").
Government should be responsible for - Stable financial system: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks the government should have responsibility in maintaining a stable financial system and ensuring that the credit market works (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "no responsibility at all" and 5 means "total responsibility").
Government should be responsible for - Stable dollar: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks the government should have responsibility in ensuring a stable dollar (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "no responsibility at all" and 5 means "total responsibility").
Government should be responsible for - Min. living standard: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks the government should have responsibility in providing a minimum standard of living for all (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "no responsibility at all" and 5 means "total responsibility").

Willingness to pay
Willingness to pay: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is willing to pay either $1, $2, $5 or

$10, according to which branch he was randomized into, to learn the correct answers (payment is conditional on winning the $1,000 lottery in which the respondent is automatically enrolled by taking the survey) .

OA-2 Full Questionnaires

OA-2.1 Consent Form

See Figure OA-1.

FIGURE OA-1: CONSENT PAGE

Academic Research Survey We are a non-partisan group of academic researchers from the Economics Department at Harvard University. Our goal is to learn about people's attitudes on several issues. Please read the information below before consenting to begin the research study.

• This survey is voluntary. You have the right to not answer any question, and to stop the survey at any time or for any reason (to exit the survey, simply close this window). We expect that it will take about 20 minutes. You will likely learn a lot!

• Your name will never be recorded by researchers. Results may include summary data, but you will never be identified. The data will be stored on Harvard servers and will be kept confidential. The collected anonymous data may be made available to other researchers for replication purposes.

• You will be compensated for this interview conditional upon (i) completing the survey and (ii) passing our survey quality checks, which use sophisticated statistical control methods to detect incoherent and rushed responses. **Responding without adequate effort may result in your responses being flagged for low quality and you may not receive your payment.**

Please note that it is very important for the success of our research that you **answer honestly** and **read the questions very carefully** before answering. If at any time you don't know an answer, please give your best guess **without consulting any external sources**. However, please be sure to spend enough time reading and understanding the questions.

You are encouraged to print or take a screenshot of this page for your records. If you have any questions about this study, you may contact us at studysocialsciences2018@gmail.com.

This research has been reviewed and approved by the Harvard University Area Institutional Review Board ("IRB"). You may talk to them at (617) 496-2847 or cuhs@harvard.edu if:

• Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team.
• You cannot reach the research team.
• You want to talk to someone besides the research team.
• You have questions about your rights as a research subject.
• You want to get information or provide input about this research.

○ Yes, I would like to take part in this study, and confirm that I LIVE IN THE U.S., and I am 18 or older

○ No, I would not like to participate

OA-2.2 Background questions (same for all surveys)

1. What is your gender?
   Male; Female
2. What is your age?
3. What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year?
   $0-$9999; $10000-$14999; $15000-$19999; $20000-$29999; $30000-39999; $40000-$49999; $50000-$69999; $70000-$89999; $90000-$109999; $110000-$149999; $150000-$199999; $200000+
4. Were you born in the United States?
   Yes; No
5. In which ZIP code do you live?
6. Please indicate your marital status
   Single; Married; Legally separated or divorced; Widowed
7. How many children do you have?
   I do not have children; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more
8. *Screening Question 1.* Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both strongly agree and strongly disagree among the alternatives below, no matter what your opinion is.
   Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "It is easy to find accurate and reliable information in the media these days."
   Strongly agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly disagree
9. How would you describe your ethnicity/race?
   European American/White; African American/Black; Hispanic/Latino; Asian/Asian American; Mixed race; Other (please specify)
10. Which category best describes your highest level of education?
    Primary education or less; Some High School; High School degree/GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)
11. (If highest level of education superior to "High School" to 10) What is/was your field of study in college? If multiple degrees apply, please select the field corresponding to your last degree.
    Accounting/bookkeeping; Administrative science/public administration; Advertising; Agriculture/ horticulture; Allied health; Anthropology; Architecture; Art; Aviation/aeronautics; Biology; Business administration; Chemistry; Child/human/family development; Comm. disorders; Communications/speech; Computer science; Counseling; Criminology/criminal justice; Dance; Dentistry; Economics; Education; Educational administration; Electronics; Engineering; English; Environmental science/ecology; Ethnic studies; Fashion; Finance; Fine arts; Food science/nutrition/culinary arts; Foreign language; Forestry; General sciences; General studies; Geography; Geology; Gerontology; Health; History; Home economics; Human services/human resources; Humanities; Industrial relations; Industry and technology; Information technology; Journalism; Law; Law enforcement; Liberal arts; Library science; Marketing; Mathematics; Mechanics/machine trade; Medicine; Music; Nursing; Other; Other vocational; Parks and recreation; Pharmacy; Philosophy; Physical education; Physics; Political science/international relations; Psychology; Public relations; Social sciences; Social work: Sociology; Special education; Statistics/biostatistics; Television/film; Textiles/cloth; Theater arts; Theology; Urban and regional planning; Veterinary medicine; Visual arts/graphic design/design and drafting; Other
12. What is your current employment status?
    Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner; Unemployed and looking for work; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree
13. (If "Full-time employee", "Part-time employee", or "Self-employed or small business owner" to 12) Which category best describes your main occupation?
    Managers; Professionals; Technicians and associate professionals; Clerical support workers; Service and sales workers; Agricultural workers; Craft and related trades workers; Plant and machine operators, and assemblers; Elementary occupations; Armed forces occupations
14. *[For health and trade surveys only]* (If "Full-time employee", "Part-time employee", or "Self-employed

or small business owner" to 12) Are you employed in one of the following sectors? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.
Agriculture, plantations, other rural sectors; Basic metal production; Chemical industries; Commerce; Construction; Education; Financial services, professional services; Food, drink, tobacco; Forestry, wood; Health services; Hotels, tourism, catering; Mining; Mechanical and electrical engineering; Media, culture, graphical; Oil and gas production, oil refining; Postal and telecommunications services; Public service; Shipping, ports, fisheries, inland waterways; Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear; Transport (including civil aviation, railways, road transport); Transport equipment manufacturing; Utilities (water, gas, electricity); None of the above

15. (If "Unemployed and looking for work', "Not currently working and not looking for work", or "Retiree" to 12) Even if you are not currently working, which category best describes your latest occupation? Check the one that applies. If you have had multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.
Same options as above
16. Are you covered by Medicaid, Medical Assistance, or Medicaid?
Yes; No
17. Did you, or anyone in your household, receive food stamps or use a food stamp benefit card at any time during 2018?
Yes; No
18. At any time during 2018, even for one month, did you or anyone in your household receive any cash assistance from a state or county welfare program such as welfare or welfare to work, TANF, general assistance, diversion payments or refugee cash?
Yes; No
19. If you had to use one of these five commonly-used names to describe your social class, which one would it be?
Lower Class or Poor; Working Class; Middle Class; Upper-middle Class; Upper Class
20. On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?
Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very conservative
21. What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?
Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated
22. (If respondent answered "Other" to previous question) Please specify your political affiliation.
23. Did you vote in the last presidential election?
Yes; No
24. (If "Yes" to 23) In the last presidential election, supported:
Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump; Jill Stein; Gary Johnson; Other
(If "No" to 23) Even if you did NOT vote, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views more closely.
Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump; Jill Stein; Gary Johnson; Other
25. Are you registered to vote at your current address?
Yes; No
26. There are many types of elections such as federal elections for president and members of Congress, primary elections where voters choose party nominees, local elections for city council and school boards, and special elections when vacancies arise in between scheduled elections.
Which best describes how often you vote, since you became eligible?
Every election without exception; Almost every election, may have missed one or two; Some elections; Rarely; Don't vote in elections
27. Did you vote in the November midterms elections?
Yes; No
28. (If "Yes" to 27) Which party did you vote for?
Republican Party; Democratic Party; Other
29. (If "No" to 27) Which party would you have liked to support?
Republican Party; Democratic Party; Other
30. Thinking about various sources of news available today, what would you say is your main source of

news about current events in the U.S. and around the world?
TV; Newspaper (print); Magazine; Radio; Internet; Word of mouth; Other; None, I don't follow the news

31. Please specify
32. (If respondent gets their news mostly from online newspapers) Would you say that you access most of the articles you read through a social media like Facebook or Twitter or by going directly on the website of the newspaper?
Mostly through social media; Mostly through the newspaper's website
33. In general, how important do you think it is to stay informed about economic policy?
Very important; Somewhat important; Not very important; Not important at all
34. (If "Very important" or "Somewhat important" at 33) What would you say are the main reasons why you wish to be well informed about economic policy?
You may select several options.
Affects personal finances; Affects business or profession; Relevant to stock market and investments; Economic issues are important politically and might affect my vote; To be a responsible citizen, I like to keep informed
35. How knowledgeable do you consider yourself on economic policies and issues?
Highly knowledgeable; Somewhat knowledgeable; Not very knowledgeable; Not knowledgeable at all
36. For the following sources of information, how often would you say you use them to stay informed about economic policy?
Often; Regularly; Occasionally; Rarely; Never
    - TV
    - Newspapers (print)
    - (online)
    - Magazines
    - Radio
    - Internet
    - Word of mouth

OA-2.3 Open-ended questions

We now want to ask you a few broader questions. Please use the text boxes below and write as much as you feel like. Your opinion and thoughts are important to us! There is no right or wrong answer.

OA-2.3.1 Income Taxation Survey

1. When you think about federal personal income taxation and whether the U.S. should have higher or lower federal personal income taxes, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?
2. What would be a "good" federal tax system in your view? What would be the goal of a good tax system?
3. What do you think are the issues with or shortcomings of the U.S. federal income tax system?
4. Which important aspects of the U.S. federal income tax system would you say are not discussed enough in the current policy debate?
5. What do you think would be the effects on the U.S. economy if the federal personal income taxes were increased?
6. Which groups of people do you think would gain if federal personal income taxes on high earners were increased?
7. Which groups of people do you think would lose if federal personal income taxes on high earners were increased?

OA-2.3.2 Estate Tax Survey

1. The Federal Estate tax is a tax imposed on the transfer of wealth from a deceased person to his or her heirs.

When you think about the federal estate tax and whether the U.S. should have a higher or a lower federal estate tax, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?
2. In your view, what would be a "good" federal estate tax that you would be satisfied with? What would be the goal of a good estate tax system?
3. What do you think are the shortcomings of the U.S. federal estate tax?
4. What do you think would be the effects on the U.S. economy if the federal estate tax were increased?
5. Which groups of people do you think would gain if the federal estate tax were increased?
6. Which groups of people do you think would lose if the federal estate tax were increased?

OA-2.4 Personal Exposure

OA-2.4.1 Income Taxation Survey

1. Do you feel that U.S. federal income tax policy has important direct effects on your own life?
   Yes, it has very important direct effects on my own life; It has some effects on my own life; No, it has no direct effects on my own life

OA-2.4.2 Estate Tax Survey

1. Do you feel personally affected by the federal estate tax? *Yes; No*
2. Why? / Why not?
3. How likely do you think it is that your estate will be subject to the federal estate tax in the future?
   Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely

OA-2.4.3 Income Taxation Survey

1. As you probably know, the government and researchers gather a lot of statistical information about the economy. We are interested in learning whether this information finds its way to the general public. The next set of questions is about some economic policies in the United States. These are questions for which there are right or wrong answers.
   In order for your answers to be most helpful to us, it is really important that you answer these questions as accurately as you can. Although you may find some questions difficult, it is very important for our research that you try your best. Thank you very much!
2. See Figure OA-2

Figure OA-2: Share of income paid in taxes

Let us ask you a few questions about the U.S. federal income tax system.

First, let us define the **share** of income that a person pays in taxes. It is the total amount of taxes he pays relative to their total income. For instance,

- If John earns $100,000, and pays $15,000 in taxes, he pays 15,000/100,000 = 15% of his income in taxes.
- If Bill earns $200,000 and pays $20,000 in taxes, he pays 20,000/200,000 = 10% of his income in taxes.

Thus, Bill pays a higher total amount of taxes than John, but still pays a lower share of his total income in taxes.



3. Do you think that, broadly speaking, everyone in the U.S. currently pays approximately the same share of income in federal personal income taxes or do you think people pay very different shares of income in federal personal income taxes?
   Everyone pays more or less the same share; People pay somewhat different shares of their income in taxes; People pay very different shares of their incomes in taxes
4. (If not "Everyone pays more or less..." at 3) Do you think that people with higher incomes pay a higher or lower share of their total income in federal personal income taxes than people with lower incomes?
   People with higher incomes pay a higher share of their income in taxes than those with lower incomes.; People with higher incomes pay a lower share of their income in taxes than those with lower incomes.
5. A share of the respondents sees Figure OA-3

FIGURE OA-3: INCENTIVES TO ANSWER CORRECTLY

For the next set of questions, **we will award additional survey pay** for respondents whose answers are closest to the true answer. All questions which are subject to this additional award are clearly marked with a green text at the top of the page. **Please note that consulting outside sources will disqualify you from this award. Please answer on your own.**

6. How high is the threshold of total annual income for a married household above which the top tax rate applies?
   Lower than $99,999; Between $100,000 and $499,999; Between $500,000 and $999,999, Between $1,000,000 and $1,999,999; Higher than $2,000,000
7. Please specify the exact threshold.
8. Out of 100 households in the U.S., how many are in the top federal personal income tax bracket?
   Slider going from 0 to 100
9. What is the top federal personal income tax rate in the U.S.?
10. What share of their total income do people in the top federal personal income tax bracket pay in taxes?
    Slider going from 0 to 100
11. Can you guess what the top federal personal income tax rate used to be in the 1950s in the U.S.?
12. Out of 100 U.S. households, how many pay no federal income taxes?
    Slider going from 0 to 100
13. Imagine a middle class household that is right at the middle of the income distribution, such that half of all households in the U.S. earn more than this household and half earn less. What share of their income do you think such a household pays in federal income taxes?
    Slider going from 0 to 100
14. If you compare the U.S. to other rich countries such as Canada or Western Europe, do you think the U.S. has, on average, higher federal personal income taxes, similar levels of federal personal income taxes, or lower federal personal income taxes than these countries?
    Higher income taxes; Comparable levels of income taxes; Lower income taxes
15. States can also levy income taxes. What is the top personal income tax rate in your state that applies (in addition to whatever people are paying in federal taxes)?
16. What share of total national income do you think goes to the top 1% richest households?
    Slider going from 0 to 100
17. What professions come to your mind when thinking about who the highest earners in our country are? Please list them here:
18. Imagine 100 of the top 1% highest-earning taxpayers in the U.S. What share of them would you say are: (these numbers should NOT sum up to 100, as there are other professions that we do not mention here: the total should be lower than 100).
    - Executives, managers, supervisors (non-finance)
    - Physicians and medical professionals
    - Financial professions, including management
    - Lawyers
    - Computer, math, engineering, or technical professionals (excluding finance)
    - Real estate professionals
    - Entrepreneurs
    - Professors and Scientists
    - People who work in Arts, Media, and Sports
    - People who work in government, or social services, or teachers
19. Which has more to do with why a person is rich?
    Because she or he worked harder than others; Because she or he had more advantages than others

20. How has the share of total U.S. income that goes to the top 1% in the U.S. evolved over the past 30 years?
    It has increased by a lot; It has increased somewhat; It has remained the same; It has decreased somewhat; It has decreased by a lot

OA-2.4.4 Estate Tax Survey

As you probably know, the government and researchers gather a lot of statistical information about the economy. We are interested in learning whether this information finds its way to the general public. The next set of questions is about some economic policies in the United States. These are questions for which there are right or wrong answers. In order for your answers to be most helpful to us, it is really important that you answer these questions as accurately as you can. Although you may find some questions difficult, it is very important for our research that you try your best. Thank you very much!

1. A share of the respondents see Figure OA-3
2. Is every individual's estate subject to the federal estate tax at death?
   Yes; No
3. Out of 1000 people, how many would you say pay the federal estate tax at death?
   Less than 1 out of 1000; Between 1 and 10 out of 1000; Between 10 and 50 out of 1000; Between 50 and 100 out of 1000; Between 100 and 200 out of 1000; Between 200 and 300 out of 1000; Between 300 and 400 out of 1000; Between 400 and 500 out of 1000; Between 500 and 600 out of 1000; Between 600 and 700 out of 1000; Between 700 and 800 out of 1000; Between 800 and 900 out of 1000; More than 900 out of 1000
4. Please specify the exact amount of people, out of 1000, who pay the federal estate tax at death.
5. The federal estate tax in the U.S. features an exemption threshold per person. This means that every person is allowed to pass on to their children or heirs an amount of estate up to that threshold free of tax. Above the exemption threshold, a tax rate applies on every dollar of the estate left by a person above this threshold.
   How high is the current threshold for exemption per person?
   Less than $100,000; Between $100,000 and $500,000; Between $500,000 and $1 million; Between $1 million and $5 million; Between $5 million and $10 million; Between $10 million and $20 million; Higher than $20 million
6. Please specify the exact threshold.
7. At what rate is each dollar of estate that is passed on and falls above the exemption threshold taxed?
8. Let's compare this to how things used to be in the U.S. in the past. At what rate was each dollar of estate that is passed on and falls above the threshold taxed in the 1950s?
9. Do you think that many or few small business or small farm owners are subject to the federal estate tax?
   Almost all are subject to the estate tax; Many are subject to the estate tax; Few are subject to the estate tax; Almost none are subject to the estate tax
10. Do you think that the federal estate tax is mostly taxing assets that have already been taxed and thus leads to "double taxation" or do you think that it is mostly taxing assets that have not been taxed before during the life of the owner?
    It's mostly double taxation; It mostly taxes assets that have not been taxed before
11. A capital gain is an increase in the price of an asset, such as real estate, stocks, or even an art collection. Capital gains are called realized when the asset is sold at a higher or lower price and a capital gains tax is due on the gain from the increase in price of such sold assets. A capital gain is called unrealized if the asset is not sold. under the current U.S. tax system, only realized capital gains are taxed. This means that the increase in value of the asset can, in principle, completely escape any capital gains tax if the owner holds on to the asset until death.
    If you think of all the large estates that will be subject to the federal estate tax, what share of those estates would you say is made up of unrealized capital gains that have never been taxed before?
12. Consider the total value of all estates that are passed on and subject to the federal estate tax. In total, what fraction of the total value of these estates is paid in taxes?

13. Do you know what the stepped-up cost basis at death is?
14. (If "Yes" at 13) Please explain briefly what it is.
15. Let's work through a concrete example about the federal estate tax now. Jack inherits a house from his father. His father paid $50,000 for the house 30 years ago. This house is now worth $350,000 at the time of the father's death. But Jack manages to sell the house for $400,000.
    What is the amount that the IRS will consider as capital gains that Jack made and that will be taxed at the capital gains tax rate?
    $50,000; $300,000; $350,000; $400,000; Other
16. Imagine now that the father had sold the house for $350,000 before his death.
    What is the amount that the IRS will consider as capital gains that Jack's father made and that will be taxed at the capital gains tax rate?
    $50,000; $300,000; $350,000; $400,000; Other
17. What share of all of the wealth in the U.S. do you think is currently owned by the following groups?
    - The top 1% wealthiest households
    - The bottom 50% least wealthy households
18. How has the share of total U.S. wealth that is held by the top 0.1% evolved over the past 30 years?
    It has increased by a lot; It has increased somewhat; It has remained the same; It has decreased somewhat; It has decreased by a lot
19. What share of total wealth owned by households in the U.S. today is inherited from their parents?
20. Which has more to do with why a person is wealthy?
    Because she or he worked harder than others; Because she or he had more advantages than others
21. See Figures OA-4 and OA-5

Figure OA-4: Mobility Question 1



FIGURE OA-5: MOBILITY QUESTION 2



OA-2.5 Video Treatments

Randomized groups of respondents see one of three videos. In each case, the videos were introduced by the following:

- Recent academic research has studied what the effects of income taxation/the federal estate tax are. We will now show you one short video that summarizes some key ideas of these studies. Please pay attention to the information provided as you will be asked questions about it later. Do not skip forward or close the page while the video is running.
  Please proceed to the next page when you are ready. Note that you will not be able to move forward with the survey before the end of the short video.

OA-2.5.1 Income Taxation Survey

- Links to the videos can be found here: Redistributional treatment, Efficiency treatment, or Economist treatment.

OA-2.5.2 Estate Tax Survey

- Links to the videos can be found here: Redistributional treatment, Efficiency treatment, or Economist treatment.

OA-2.6 Mechanisms

Three randomized formulations: Note that when asking about these mechanisms, respondents are randomized into one of three branches, which feature a different formulation of these questions. The first branch sees the formulation of the questions in a "neutral" way (e.g. "If the federal personal income tax rate were to increase for the middle class, to what extent would it encourage them towards the following behaviors?") with an impersonal and gender neutral formulation. Respondents in the second branch receive a personal formulation of the questions that asks them about themselves, or about people or households similar to themselves along the relevant dimension. For instance, on the behavioral responses to taxes, respondents may be asked "If your federal personal income tax rate were to increase, to what extent would it encourage you towards the following behaviors?." In cases in which an individual-level question does not make sense, the question is asked about "households similar to yours" or "people with similar incomes to yours." For instance: "What effects do you think that increasing the federal estate tax on the estates of households similar to yours would have on economic activity?" In the third branch, questions are formulated to be explicitly about women. For instance, "If the federal income tax rate were to increase for women in the middle class, to what extent would it encourage these women towards the following behaviors?" or "Do you think that increasing income taxes that high-income women have to pay would hurt economic activity, not have an effect on economic activity, or help economic activity in the U.S.?"

OA-2.6.1 Income Taxation Survey

1. *CONTROL GROUP.* If the federal personal income tax rate were to increase for the richest people in the economy, to what extent would it encourage them towards the following behaviors?
   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. If your federal personal income tax rate were to increase, to what extent would it encourage you towards the following behaviors?
   "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. If the federal personal income tax rate were to increase for a given woman among the richest people in the economy, to what extent would it encourage this woman towards the following behaviors?
   A great deal; A lot; A moderate amount; A little; None at all
   - Evade taxes
   - Work less
   - Stop working altogether
   - Have their/your/her spouse stop working
   - Move to a state with lower taxes
   - Be less entrepreneurial and create fewer businesses
2. *CONTROL GROUP.* If the federal personal income tax rate were to increase for the middle class, to what extent would it encourage them towards the following behaviors?
   "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. If the federal personal income tax rate were to increase for a given woman in the middle class, to what extent would it encourage this woman towards the following behaviors?
   Same options as above
3. *CONTROL AND "ME".* What do you think would ultimately do more to reduce the income differences between poor and rich families?
   "WOMEN". What do you think would ultimately do more to reduce the income differences between poor and rich women?
   Lowering taxes on wealthy people/women and corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth.; Raising taxes on wealthy people/women and corporations to expand programs for the poor.
4. *CONTROL GROUP.* Typically, when the top federal income tax rate on high earners is cut, which of these groups would you say mostly win or mostly lose from this change?
   Mostly Lose; Mostly Win
   - Lower Class or Poor
   - Working Class
   - Middle Class
   - Upper-Middle Class
   - Upper Class

   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. Typically, when the top federal income tax rate on high earners is cut, would you mostly win or mostly lose from this change?
   Mostly Lose; Mostly Win
   "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Typically, when the top federal income tax rate on high earners is cut, which of these groups would you say mostly win or mostly lose from this change?
   Mostly Lose; Mostly Win
   - Lower Class or Poor Women
   - Lower Class or Poor Men
   - Working Class Women
   - Working Class Men
   - Middle Class Women
   - Middle Class Men
   - Upper-middle Class Women
   - Upper-middle Class Men
   - Upper Class Women
   - Upper Class Men
5. *CONTROL GROUP.* When overall taxes are raised and there are extra revenues to spend on govern-

ment programs, which of these groups would you say mostly win or mostly lose from this change?
"ME" RANDOMIZATION. When overall taxes are raised and there are extra revenues to spend on government programs, would you mostly win or mostly lose from the increase in government tax revenue?
"WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. When overall taxes are raised and there are extra revenues to spend on government programs, which of these groups would you say mostly win or mostly lose from this change?
Same options as in previous question.

6. *CONTROL GROUP AND "ME".* Do you think that increasing income taxes on high-income households would hurt economic activity, not have an effect on economic activity, or help economic activity in the U.S.?
"WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Do you think that increasing income taxes that high-income women have to pay would hurt economic activity, not have an effect on economic activity, or help economic activity in the U.S.?
Hurt economic activity in the U.S.; Not have an effect on economic activity in the U.S.; Help economic activity in the U.S.
7. *CONTROL GROUP.* Which comes closer to your view about the long-term impact that tax cuts on high-income households may have on the federal budget deficit?
"ME" RANDOMIZATION. Which comes closer to your view about the long-term impact that tax cuts on households with your level of income may have on the federal budget deficit?
"WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Which comes closer to your view about the long-term impact that the cuts on taxes that high-income women have to pay may have on the federal budget deficit?
The tax cuts would increase the deficit in the long run because the government would take in a lot less money that it won't be able to recover; The tax cuts would decrease the deficit in the long run because they would stimulate the economy and bring in more money for the government
8. *CONTROL GROUP.* What about the long-term impact that tax cuts on the middle-class may have on the federal budget deficit?
"WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. What about the long-term impact that cuts on taxes that women from the middle-class have to pay may have on the federal budget deficit?
Same options as in previous question.
9. *CONTROL GROUP AND "ME".* Do you think that a progressive federal income tax system, in which people with higher incomes pay a higher share of income in taxes than people with lower incomes is an important tool to reduce inequality?
"WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Do you think that a progressive federal income tax system, in which women with higher incomes pay a higher share of their income in taxes than women with lower incomes is an important tool to reduce inequality?
Yes; No
10. Why?/Why not?
11. Which statement do you agree with most? (Please pick the one closest to your views, even if it does not match your view perfectly.)
CONTROL GROUP. High-income individuals are entitled to keep a very large share of their income and should not have to pay high taxes, even if that means less government revenues available to help low-income families make ends meet.; It is important to ensure enough government revenues to fund programs that help low-income families make ends meet, even if that means that high-income individuals will have to pay higher taxes on their high incomes.
"ME" RANDOMIZATION. Individuals with a similar income to mine are entitled to keep a very large share of their income and should not have to pay high taxes, even if that means less government revenues available to help low-income families make ends meet.; It is important to ensure enough government revenues to fund programs that help low-income families make ends meet, even if that means that individuals with a similar income to mine will have to pay higher taxes on their high incomes.
"WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. High-income women are entitled to keep a very large share of their income and should not have to pay high taxes, even if that means less government revenues available to help low-income families make ends meet.; It is important to ensure enough government revenues

to fund programs that help low-income women make ends meet, even if that means that high-income individuals will have to pay higher taxes on their high incomes.

12. *CONTROL GROUP AND "ME".* When thinking about how much to tax higher income individuals, do you think we should take into consideration how their income was earned? Please explain
    "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. When thinking about how much to tax higher income women, do you think we should take into consideration how their income was earned? Please explain
13. Which statement most closely reflects your view?
    CONTROL GROUP. People with the same income should pay the same level of federal income taxes, regardless of how they earned their income and whether they worked hard for it.; People who have worked hard for their income should be taxed less than those who have not worked hard for it, even if that means that people with the same income will end up paying different taxes.
    "ME" RANDOMIZATION. People with similar incomes to mine should pay the same level of federal income taxes as me, regardless of whether they earned their income the same way as I did and whether they worked as hard for it as I did.; People who have worked hard for their income should be taxed less than those who have not worked hard for it, even if that means that people with the same income as me will end up paying higher taxes than me because they worked less hard for their income.
    "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Women with the same income should pay the same level of federal income taxes, regardless of how they earned their income and whether they worked hard for it.; We should tax less women who have worked hard for their income, even if that means that people with the same income will end up paying different taxes.

OA-2.6.2 Estate Tax Survey

1. *CONTROL GROUP.* If the federal estate tax increases, to what extent would it encourage the very wealthy individuals towards the following behaviors?
   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. If the federal estate tax were to increase, to what extent would it encourage you towards the following behaviors?
   "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. If the federal estate tax were to increase for women among the richest in the economy, to what extent would it encourage these women towards the following behaviors?
   A great deal; A lot; A moderate amount; A little; None at all
   - Evade taxes and hide part of their/your wealth from the tax authorities
   - Work less during their/your lifetime in anticipation of a higher estate tax
   - Stop working altogether
   - Have their/your spouse stop working
   - Move to a state (to take advantage of no or lower state estate taxes in other states)
   - Be less entrepreneurial and create fewer businesses during their/your lifetime in anticipation of a higher estate tax
   - Save less for their/your children and instead spend more
2. *CONTROL GROUP AND "ME".* Imagine some people who are currently young and not yet rich, but could possibly expect to get rich and face a higher federal estate tax when they are old. If the federal estate tax were to increase, to what extent would it encourage these people towards the following behaviors?
   "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Imagine women who are currently young and not yet rich, but could possibly expect to get rich and face a higher federal estate tax when they are old. If the federal estate tax were to increase, to what extent would it encourage these women towards the following behaviors?
   A great deal; A lot; A moderate amount; A little; None at all
   - Evade taxes and hide part of their/your wealth from the tax authorities
   - Work less during their/your lifetime in anticipation of a higher estate tax
   - Stop working altogether
   - Have their/your spouse stop working
   - Move to a state (to take advantage of no or lower state estate taxes in other states)
   - Be less entrepreneurial and create fewer businesses during their/your lifetime in anticipation of a higher estate tax

- Save less for their/your children and instead spend more

3. *CONTROL GROUP* If the federal estate tax rate is cut, which of these groups would you say mostly win or lose from this change?
   Mostly lose; Mostly
   - Lower Class or Poor
   - Working Class
   - Middle Class
   - Upper-middle Class
   - Upper Class

   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. If the federal estate tax rate is cut, would you mostly win or mostly lose from this change?
   "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. If the federal estate tax rate is cut, which of these groups would you say mostly win or lose from this change?
   - Lower Class or Poor Women
   - Lower Class or Poor Men
   - Working Class Women
   - Working Class Men
   - Middle Class Women
   - Middle Class Men
   - Upper-middle Class Women
   - Upper-middle Class Men
   - Upper Class Women
   - Upper Class Men
4. *CONTROL GROUP.* What effect do you think that increasing the federal estate tax on wealthy households would have on economic activity?
   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. What effect do you think that increasing the federal estate tax on the estates of households similar to yours would have on economic activity?
   "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. What effect do you think that increasing the federal estate tax on the estates of wealthy women would have on economic activity?
   Hurt economic activity; Have no effect on economic activity; Help economic activity
5. *CONTROL GROUP.* Which comes closer to your view about the long-term impact that cuts in the federal estate tax for wealthy households may have on the federal budget deficit:
   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. Which comes closer to your view about the long-term impact that cuts in the federal estate tax on the estates of households similar to yours may have on the federal budget deficit:
   "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Which comes closer to your view about the long-term impact that cuts in the federal estate tax on the estates of wealthy women may have to pay may have on the federal budget deficit:
   The tax cuts would increase the deficit in the long run because the government would take in a lot less money that it won't be able to recover; The tax cuts would decrease the deficit in the long run because they would stimulate the economy and bring in more money for the government
6. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you think that increasing the federal estate tax is a good or bad way to reduce wealth inequality?
   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. Do you think that increasing the federal estate tax on the estates of households similar to yours is a good or bad way to reduce wealth inequality?
   "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Do you think that increasing the federal estate tax on the estates of wealthy women is a good or bad way to reduce wealth inequality?
   It is one of the best ways to reduce wealth inequality; It is a good way to reduce wealth inequality, but there are better ways; It is a bad way to reduce wealth inequality; It is one of the worst ways to reduce wealth inequality
7. Why?
8. *CONTROL GROUP.* Would you say that it is fair or unfair that the estate of wealthy parents who have worked hard and saved a lot in order to pass on wealth to their children is subject to the federal

estate tax at death?

"ME" RANDOMIZATION. Would you say that it is fair or unfair that the estate for which you have worked hard and saved a lot in order to pass on wealth to your children will be subject to the federal estate tax at your death?

"WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Would you say that it is fair or unfair that the estate of a wealthy woman who has worked hard and saved a lot in order to pass on wealth to her children is subject to the federal estate tax at death?

Very unfair; Somewhat unfair; Somewhat fair; Very fair

9. *CONTROL GROUP.* Imagine now wealthy parents who are wealthy because they have themselves inherited a lot of wealth from their own parents. Would you say that it is fair or unfair for their estate to be subject to the federal estate tax at death?

   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. Imagine now parents wealthier than you, who are wealthier than you because they have themselves inherited a lot more wealth from their own parents than you. Would you say that it is fair or unfair for their estate to be subject to the federal estate tax at death?

   "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Imagine now a woman who is wealthy because she has herself inherited a lot of wealth from her parents. Would you say that it is fair or unfair for her estate to be subject to the federal estate tax at death?

   Very unfair; Somewhat unfair; Somewhat fair; Very fair

10. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you think it is fair or unfair that children born in very wealthy families have access to better schools, better medical care, better neighborhoods, and better professional and social networks than children from less wealthy families?

    "ME" RANDOMIZATION. Do you think that it is fair or unfair that people born in wealthier families than yours have had access to better schools, better medical care, better neighborhoods, and better professional and social networks than you have had?

    "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Do you think that it is fair or unfair that a girl born to a very wealthy mother has access to better schools, better medical care, better neighborhoods, and better professional and social networks than a girl born to a less wealthy mother?

    Very unfair; Somewhat unfair; Somewhat fair; Very fair

11. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you think it is fair or unfair that children born in very wealthy families inherit much more than children born in less wealthy families?

    "ME" RANDOMIZATION. Do you think it is fair or unfair that people born in wealthier families than yours inherit more than you?

    "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Do you think that it is fair or unfair that a girl born to a very wealthy mother inherits much more than a girl born to a less wealthy mother?

    Very unfair; Somewhat unfair; Somewhat fair; Very fair

12. Which statement do you agree with most?

    (Please pick the one closest to your view, even if it does not match your view perfectly)

    CONTROL GROUP. Wealthy parents should be allowed to pass on all of their wealth to their children. As a result, some children will start their own life with much larger wealth just by virtue of being born in a richer family.; Children should not start their life with much larger wealth just by virtue of being born in a richer family. Part of the wealth passed on by parents to their children should therefore be taxed, even if that means that some parents who have worked hard will be taxed.

    "ME" RANDOMIZATION. Individuals with similar levels of wealth to mine should be allowed to pass on all of their wealth to their children. As a result, some children will start their own life with larger wealth just by virtue of being born in a richer family than others.; Children should not start their life with larger wealth just by virtue of being born in a richer family. Part of the wealth passed on by parents with wealth similar to mine to their children should be taxed, even if I and some of those other parents have worked hard for it.

    "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. A wealthy mother should be able to pass on all of her wealth to her children. As a result, some children will start their own life with much larger wealth just by virtue of being born with to richer mother.; Children should not start their life with much larger wealth just by virtue of being born to a richer mother. Part of the wealth passed on by wealthy mothers to their children should be taxed, even if some mothers have worked hard for it.

OA-2.7 Policy Outcomes

In this section, all respondents get the following screening question:

- When a big news story breaks people often go online to get up-to-the-minute details on what is going on. We want to know which websites people trust to get this information. We also want to know if people are paying attention to the question. To show that you've read this much, please ignore the question and select ABC News and The Drudge Report as your two answers.
  When there is a big news story, which is the one news website that you would visit first? (Please only choose one)

OA-2.7.1 Income Taxation Survey

Note: The order in which respondents saw the Mechanisms and Policy Outcomes blocks in the Income Tax survey was randomized. In particular, 12.6% of the respondents saw first the Policy Outcomes block and then the Mechanisms block, whereas the remaining 87.4% saw first the Mechanisms block and then the Policy Outcomes block.

1. Would you say that the current U.S. federal income tax system is broadly very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair, or very unfair?
   Very fair; Somewhat fair; Somewhat unfair; Very unfair
2. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current U.S. federal income tax system?
   Very satisfied; Somewhat satisfied; Somewhat dissatisfied; Very dissatisfied
3. *CONTROL GROUP.* Would you say that high income, upper-class households in the U.S. today:
   "ME" RANDOMIZATION. Would you say that you:
   "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Would you say that high income, upper-class women in the U.S. today:
   Pay much more than their fair share in income taxes; Pay more than their fair share in income taxes; Pay their fair share in income taxes; Pay less than their fair share in income taxes; Pay much less than their fair share in income taxes
4. *CONTROL GROUP.* Would you say that middle-class households in the U.S. today:
   "WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION. Would you say that women in the middle-class in the U.S. today:
   Same options as in the previous question
5. Do you feel that the distribution of money and wealth in this country today is fair, or do you feel that the money and wealth in this country should be more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of the people?
   The distribution and money and wealth in this country today is fair; The money and wealth in this country should be more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of the people
6. How big of an issue do you think income inequality is in America?
   Not an issue at all; A small issue; An issue; A serious issue; A very serious issue
7. Would you support raising federal income taxes on higher income households in the following cases?
   - – *CONTROL GROUP AND "ME" RANDOMIZATION.* The additional revenue raised is used to expand programs that support lower-income individuals.
     – *"WOMEN" RANDOMIZATION.* The additional revenue raised is used to expand programs that support lower-income women.
   - The additional revenue raised is used to increase investment in the U.S.

   Strongly support; Support; Neither support nor oppose; Oppose; Strongly oppose

OA-2.7.2 Estate Tax Survey

1. Do you feel that the distribution of money and wealth in this country today is fair, or do you feel that the money and wealth in this country should be more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of the people?
   The distribution of money and wealth in this country today is fair; The money and wealth in this country should be more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of the people

2. How big of a problem do you think wealth inequality is in America?
   Not a problem at all; A small problem; A problem; A serious problem; A very serious problem
3. How fair would you say that the current U.S. federal estate tax system is?
   Very fair; Somewhat fair; Somewhat unfair; Very unfair
4. How satisfied are you with the current U.S. federal estate tax system?
   Very satisfied; Somewhat satisfied; Somewhat dissatisfied; Very dissatisfied
5. Do you think there should be a federal estate tax in the U.S.?
   Yes; No
6. (If "Yes" at 5) Do you think the federal estate tax should be increased, left at the current level, or lowered?
   Increased a lot; Increased somewhat; Left at the current level; Lowered somewhat; Lowered a lot

OA-2.8 General Policy Outcomes

1. (This question is not repeated in the Income Taxation Survey) For these different groups, please tell me if you think that they are paying their fair share in federal taxes, paying too much, or paying too little?
   - High-income households...
   - Middle-class households...

   ... pay much more than their fair share in income taxes; ... pay more than their fair share in income taxes; ... pay their fair share in income taxes; ... pay less than their fair share in income taxes; ... pay much less than their fair share in income taxes
2. Take the following government services. For each of them, say if would you like it to receive increased funding (even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas), decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere) or would you like for its funding to be left unchanged?
   - Transfers and income support programs for those out of work
   - Better schools for children from low-income families
   - Income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade
   - Subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care
   - Wage subsidies and help for the working poors who work for low wages

     More of this service, more taxes; Service and taxes as now; Less of this service, reduced taxes.

OA-2.9 Government Questions (Specific)

OA-2.9.1 Income Taxation Survey

1. To reduce income differences between rich and poor people, the government (at the local, state, or federal level) has the ability and the tools to do:
   Nothing at all; Not much; Some; A lot

OA-2.9.2 Estate Tax Survey

1. To reduce differences in wealth between rich and poor people, the government (at the local, state or federal level) has the ability and the tools to do:
   Nothing at all; Not much; Some; A lot
2. To improve opportunities for children from low-income families, the government (at the local, state, or federal level) has the ability and the tools to do:
   Nothing at all; Not much; Some; A lot

OA-2.10 Government Questions (General)

1. How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right?
   Almost always; A lot of the time; Not very often; Almost never
2. Some people think the government is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and businesses. Others think that government should do more to solve our country's problems. Which come closer to your own view?
   Government is doing too much; Government is doing just the right amount; Government should do more
3. Next, we'd like you to think more broadly about the purposes of government.
   Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? You may use any number from 1 to 5.
   1; 2; 3; 4; 5
4. Of every tax dollar that goes to the federal government in Washington, D.C., how many cents would you say are wasted?
   Slider going from 0 to 100
5. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way the federal government in Washington is dealing with the problems the country is facing today?
   Very satisfied; Somewhat satisfied; Somewhat dissatisfied; Very dissatisfied
6. Consider now a list of functions the federal government could serve.
   On a 1 to 5 scale, please say how much responsibility you think the government should have for each — with 1 meaning the government should have no responsibility at all and 5 meaning the government should have total responsibility in this area:
   - Reducing income differences between the rich and the poor
   - Reducing the transmission of wealth from one generation to the other
   - Making sure Americans have adequate health care
   - Reducing the differences in opportunities between children from wealthy and poor families
   - Regulating trade to and from the U.S. to protect American producers and consumers
   - Maintaining a stable financial system and ensuring that credit markets work
   - Ensuring a stable dollar
   - Providing a minimum standard of living for all

OA-2.11 Willingness to pay for information

By taking this survey, you are automatically enrolled in a lottery to win $1,000. In a few days you will know whether you won the $1,000. The payment will be made to you in the same way as your regular survey pay, so no further action is required on your part.
Are you are interested in learning the correct answers to all the questions about (income taxation/estate taxation) in the U.S.? If you are, you can forfeit part of your gain (should you win the lottery) in exchange for the correct answers. If you select that option, you will be given the right answers on the next page. You will only pay the amount selected if you do, in fact, win the lottery.
Note: This information would be very hard to find online on your own. It is the result of a lot of careful research and you cannot easily find the correct answers.
In case you win the lottery are you willing to give up ($1 / $2 / $5 / $10 [1]) to receive all the correct answers to the questions about income/estate tax policy in the U.S.?

No, I am not willing to pay anything (We will not provide you with the correct answers); Yes, I am willing to pay $1 / $2 / $5 / $10 (We will provide you with all the correct answers on the next page. You will only pay this amount out of your lottery earnings if you do win the lottery).

[1] Note: the amount is randomized among participants

OA-2.12 Self-reported questions

1. It is vital to our study that we only include responses from people that devoted their full attention to this study. Otherwise years of effort (the researchers' and the time of other participants) could be wasted. You will receive credit for this study no matter what, however, please tell us how much effort you put forth towards this study.
   I put forth almost no effort; I put forth very little effort; I put forth some effort; I put forth quite a bit of effort; I put forth a lot of effort
2. Also, often there are several distractions present during studies (other people, TV, music, etc.). Please indicate how much attention you paid to this study. Again, you will receive credit no matter what. We appreciate your honesty!
   I gave this study almost no attention; I gave this study very little attention; I gave this study some of my attention; I gave this study most of my attention; I gave this study my full attention

OA-2.13 Feedback

1. Do you feel that this survey was biased?
   Yes, left-wing bias; Yes, right-wing bias; No, it did not feel biased
2. Please feel free to give us any feedback or impression regarding this survey.

OA-3 Knowledge about Taxes and the Income and Wealth Distributions

Table OA-1: Correct Answers to Factual Questions about the Income Tax System

Question	**Correct Answer**	**Source**
What is the threshold for the top tax bracket in the U.S. for a married household?	$600,000 in 2018	Tax Foundation.org
Out of 100 households in the U.S. households, how many are in the top tax bracket?	0.73 in 2017	Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
What is the top tax rate in the U.S.?	37% in 2018-19	Tax Foundation.org
What share of their total income do people in the top tax bracket pay in taxes?	32.7%	Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
What the top tax rate used to be in the 1950s in the U.S.?	91% in 1950	Tax Foundation.org
What is the top personal income tax rate in your state?	See table at the reported link	Tax Foundation.org
Out of 100 U.S. households, how many pay no federal personal income taxes?	44% in 2016	Tax Policy Center.org
What share of their income do you think the median income household pays in taxes?	13% in 2017	Tax Foundation.org
What share of total national income goes to the top 1% richest households?	20% in 2016	World Inequality Database (WID)
Distribution of the top 1% highest-earning taxpayers in the U.S. in various professions	See table at the reported link	Forbes

Table OA-2: Correct Answers to Factual Questions about the Estate Tax System

Question	**Correct Answer**	**Source**
Out of 1000 households, how many pay the federal estate tax?	~ 0.7 in 2019	Tax Policy Center
What is the current threshold for exemption per person?	$11,400,000 in 2019	Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
At what rate is each dollar of bequest above the exemption threshold taxed?	40%	Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.org (CBPP)
At what rate was each dollar of bequest above the threshold taxed in the 1950s?	77%	Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
What share of total U.S. wealth is currently owned by the he top 1% wealthiest households	42%	Zucman (2016)
What share of total U.S. wealth is currently owned by the bottom 50% least wealthy households	2.5%	Zucman (2016)
What share of total wealth owned by households in the U.S. today is inherited from their parents?	35%-45% 56%-64%	Kopczuk in Brookings.edu Alvaredo, Garbinty and Piketty (2017)
Out of all the large estates that will be subject to the federal estate tax, what share of those estates would you say is made up of unrealized capital gains that have never been taxed before?	55%	Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.org (CBPP)

Table OA-3: Willingness to Pay for Information

	Income (1)	Estate (2)
Female	-0.06***	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	-0.01	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.02	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican	-0.08***	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	0.04*	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)
College	0.04**	0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	-0.03	-0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Self reported knowledge	0.07***	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.03	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Feel personally exposed to tax	0.05***	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Randomized amount to pay for info: $2	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Randomized amount to pay for info: $5	-0.03	-0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Randomized amount to pay for info: $10	-0.08***	-0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Descriptive statistics:		
Control Mean	0.37	0.40
Observations	2783	2358

Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is willing to pay the requested amount (randomized between $1, $2, $5 or $10) for access to the correct answers at the end of the income and estate tax survey, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-4: Misperceptions about the Income Tax System

	Tax System								Income Distribution
	Top tax rate in today (1)	Top tax rate the 50s (2)	State top tax rate (3)	Top tax threshold (4)	Share of income paid in taxes by median households (5)	Share of income paid in taxes in top bracket (6)	Share of households in top bracket (7)	Share of households not paying income taxes (8)	Share of US income owned by top 1% (9)
Female	-0.89	-7.67***	1.34***	-18568.10**	-1.31**	-1.07	2.29***	-0.72	-4.90***
	(0.68)	(1.13)	(0.51)	(7291.74)	(0.65)	(0.72)	(0.84)	(0.80)	(1.15)
Republican	3.74***	-2.52*	0.33	-8632.43	1.46*	6.15***	3.24***	5.97***	-7.72***
	(0.84)	(1.38)	(0.63)	(8915.36)	(0.80)	(0.88)	(1.03)	(0.98)	(1.41)
Independent and others	2.01**	0.02	-0.63	-1553.94	-0.68	1.47*	-0.10	2.10**	-1.81
	(0.81)	(1.34)	(0.61)	(8683.14)	(0.78)	(0.86)	(1.01)	(0.95)	(1.37)
Age 30-49	2.40***	0.05	-0.64	-23895.56**	1.90**	0.02	1.89*	3.01***	3.58**
	(0.90)	(1.48)	(0.68)	(9592.16)	(0.86)	(0.95)	(1.11)	(1.05)	(1.51)
Age 50-69	2.11**	2.17	-4.58***	-17175.48*	-2.38***	-3.58***	-2.67**	1.40	4.08***
	(0.89)	(1.48)	(0.67)	(9517.70)	(0.85)	(0.94)	(1.10)	(1.05)	(1.50)
Middle-Income	-1.73*	-1.26	-1.55**	15366.34	-1.21	-1.92**	-2.61**	-1.22	-2.80*
	(0.91)	(1.51)	(0.68)	(9792.86)	(0.87)	(0.96)	(1.13)	(1.07)	(1.53)
High-Income	0.23	1.32	-0.53	59858.63***	-0.00	0.15	-1.76*	0.08	-2.32
	(0.84)	(1.39)	(0.63)	(8946.39)	(0.80)	(0.89)	(1.04)	(0.98)	(1.41)
Self reported knowledge	2.78***	8.29***	0.65	24268.44***	2.39***	3.70***	-0.11	5.38***	5.53***
	(0.76)	(1.26)	(0.57)	(8163.86)	(0.73)	(0.81)	(0.94)	(0.89)	(1.28)
College	0.93	6.12***	-1.09**	39112.78***	-0.41	0.78	-4.94***	0.40	6.52***
	(0.72)	(1.19)	(0.54)	(7714.02)	(0.69)	(0.76)	(0.89)	(0.85)	(1.22)
Descriptive statistics:									
Actual value	37	91		600000	13	32.7	0.73	44	20
Average perception	31	33	17	187996.6	26.3	27.4	20.3	25.3	44.7
Observations	2779	2779	2731	2651	26.3	2777	2762	2779	2780

Notes: The dependent variables are deviations of the respondent's answer from the correct answer; a positive sign on the "Mean" indicates that respondents overall overestimate the actual value; a negative sign means they underestimate. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-5: Misperceptions about the Estate Tax System

	Tax System					Wealth Distribution			
	Estate tax rate today (1)	Estate tax rate in the 50s (2)	No. households out 1,000 paying estate tax (3)	Exemption threshold (4)	Average estate tax rate (5)	Share of estates unrealized capital gains (6)	Share of Wealth inherited (7)	Share of wealth owned by top 1% (8)	Share of wealth owned by bottom 50% (9)
Female	-2.91***	-6.56***	45.08***	-12327.09	0.57	-1.44	-2.10**	-3.16	0.22
	(0.86)	(1.01)	(12.67)	(149139.23)	(0.92)	(1.01)	(1.00)	(2.20)	(0.80)
Republican	-0.54	-3.51***	16.15	-486504.56***	2.85**	-4.92***	-2.96**	-7.13**	1.64
	(1.05)	(1.24)	(15.53)	(182797.77)	(1.13)	(1.24)	(1.22)	(2.79)	(1.01)
Independent and others	-1.40	-1.72	-6.21	136180.47	1.07	-3.87***	-2.92**	3.14	-1.94**
	(1.01)	(1.19)	(14.86)	(174882.46)	(1.08)	(1.19)	(1.17)	(2.64)	(0.95)
Age 30-49	0.54	0.56	19.28	-10005.68	0.14	1.85	-3.86***	1.73	-1.99*
	(1.14)	(1.34)	(16.76)	(197281.78)	(1.22)	(1.34)	(1.32)	(3.02)	(1.09)
Age 50-69	-1.18	-1.78	-50.14***	-25306.29	-4.34***	0.59	-5.84***	2.30	-3.28***
	(1.13)	(1.33)	(16.64)	(195791.81)	(1.21)	(1.33)	(1.31)	(3.03)	(1.10)
Middle-Income	-0.60	1.19	-6.86	275831.22	-1.79	-0.24	-1.63	1.60	0.42
	(1.12)	(1.32)	(16.49)	(194259.23)	(1.20)	(1.32)	(1.30)	(3.11)	(1.13)
High-Income	-0.16	0.80	-42.81***	1111072.07***	-0.62	1.94	-1.81	1.81	-0.35
	(1.06)	(1.25)	(15.65)	(184273.68)	(1.14)	(1.25)	(1.23)	(2.75)	(1.00)
Self reported knowledge	4.03***	6.48***	5.81	792758.06***	1.73*	3.32***	1.74	-0.98	0.74
	(0.97)	(1.15)	(14.34)	(168747.59)	(1.04)	(1.14)	(1.13)	(2.50)	(0.91)
College	0.00	4.33***	-50.69***	818974.82***	-3.15***	1.22	2.23**	8.65***	-2.82***
	(0.92)	(1.08)	(13.57)	(159750.72)	(0.99)	(1.08)	(1.07)	(2.38)	(0.86)
Descriptive statistics:									
Actual value	40	77	0.7	11400000	16.5	55	≈ 50	41.8	2.5
Average perception	33	29	364.1	2428139.6	36	45.7	41.9	49.1	12.5
Observations	2350	2335	2357	2357	2357	2354	2357	695	695

Notes: The dependent variables are deviations of the respondent's answer from the correct answer; a positive sign on the "Mean" indicates that respondents overall overestimate the actual value; a negative sign means they underestimate. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure OA-6: Knowledge About the Income Tax



Notes: The figure presents, for nine income tax knowledge questions, the average (blue bar) and median (dotted line) response of survey participants. The actual values are represented by the orange bar. A comprehensive list of sources used to determine the correct responses is provided in Table OA-1.

Figure OA-7: Knowledge About the Estate Tax



Notes: The figure presents, for nine estate tax knowledge questions, the average and median (dotted line) response of survey participants (in blue). Correct answers are depicted in orange. A comprehensive list of sources used to determine the correct responses is provided in Table OA-2. The sample used for Panel E *Wealth Inequality* includes only responses according to which the perceived wealth owned by the 99-50 percentile of the wealth distribution is strictly greater than the perceived wealth owned by the bottom 50 percentile.

Figure OA-8: Income Taxation Perceptions by Groups

(a) By Political Affiliation



(b) By Political Ideology



(c) By Income Group



(d) By Age Group



(e) By Education Level



Notes: The figures show the mean perception by group, with 90% confidence intervals. Panel A reports mean responses by political affiliation, Panel B by political ideology, Panel C by income group, Panel D by age group, and Panel E by level of education. *Low income* (*High income*) corresponds to respondents who report a pre-tax household income below (above) 39,000 (70,000) U.S. dollar. Correct values are reported in orange on the right side of the figure. A comprehensive list of sources used to determine the correct responses is provided in Table OA-1.

Figure OA-9: Estate Taxation Perceptions by Groups

(a) By Political Affiliation



(b) By Political Ideology



(c) By Income Group



(d) By Age Group



(e) By Education Level



Notes: The figures show the mean perception by group, with 90% confidence intervals. Panel A reports mean responses by political affiliation, Panel B by political ideology, Panel C by income group, Panel D by age group, and Panel E by level of education. *Low income* (*High income*) corresponds to respondents who report a pre-tax household income below (above) 39,000 (70,000) U.S. dollar. Correct values are reported in orange on the right side of the figure. A comprehensive list of sources used to determine the correct responses is provided in Table OA-2.

OA-4 Survey and Data Quality

OA-4.1 Ensuring high quality answers

The trustworthiness of this type of survey data depends on the quality of the survey design. I employed several methods to ensure the highest possible quality of answers. On the survey's landing page – the consent page– respondents are warned that low quality responses will be flagged and their payment possibly withheld. At the same time, I also attempt to make them feel involved and socially responsible by emphasizing that we are non-partisan academic researchers seeking to advance our knowledge of society and that their answers are entirely voluntary, but that it is very important for the research that they answer as accurately as they can. Furthermore, the questions themselves are designed so as to prevent careless answers: for instance, percentages are constrained to add up to 100% and respondents are alerted with a pop-up message if there is an inconsistency. When appropriate, rather than using data entry boxes, I let respondents select numbers using sliders to minimize fatigue and typos. I also keep track of and check the time spent by the respondent on the survey as a whole, as well as on specific pages and questions, which permits flagging respondents who spend too little time on questions. For the benchmark sample, I drop respondents in the bottom 5% of the survey time distribution. None of our results are affected by trimming these outliers, as shown in Appendix OA-8.2. We provide checks for survey fatigue below in Section OA-4.3.

A randomized subsample of respondents was also provided with financial incentives for correct responses to the policy knowledge questions. This is expected to encourage respondents to pay more attention. In practice, the effect of financial incentives turns out to be negligible here, even for the larger ones, and is thus not explored further in the paper. This likely signals that respondents are already answering to the best of their knowledge. In addition, three screening questions are interspersed in the survey, which ask respondents to ignore the question and select a given or several given answer options as a check for whether respondents are reading the questions carefully. Dropping all respondents who fail them does not change the results (see Appendix OA-8.3).

Finally, respondents are asked whether they thought the survey was left- or right-wing biased. Around 80% of respondents believe the survey was not biased in any direction; 15% believe it was left-wing biased and 5% believe it was right-wing biased. These shares vary only little between treatment branches (see Section OA-5).

These techniques minimize willful misreporting or simple carelessness. In addition, the questions themselves are formulated in the clearest possible way, without complicated terms or jargon, building on lessons from multiple pilots. As the full questionnaire in Appendix OA-2 shows, concepts such as average taxes are first explained intuitively to respondents. The survey is readable and easy to scroll and click through, and there is a mobile version for phones, which further lowers the barrier to participating. Finally, it is worth noting that the setting of the survey itself minimizes incentives to misreport or express incorrect views: the survey is entirely anonymous and respondents know it can never be matched to their identity or other data. There is also no social image concern or pressure as respondents are alone and in their own chosen surroundings, without any surveyor in front of them or any other respondents around (contrary to face to face or phone surveys). We address experimenter demand effect in Section OA-5.

OA-4.2 Sample

Response rates and composition of the panel. The commercial survey company that distributed the surveys sets projects live on the dashboard in their platform for respondents who receive an invite through various channels, including email. They set quotas based on the need of the sample (e.g., "nationally representative") and define how many clicks are needed in each one of the quotas to reach the targets. Furthermore, their invitations can be targeted sample for the demographic profile required on my end (nationally representative). Indeed, the survey company can pre-target income, age, and gender (as well as other characteristics, which I did not target). To compute the average response rate, they take a ratio of the people who completed the study over the number of people that opened the invite (regardless of how they received it). For a nationally representative sample, with invitations that are targeted, it is reasonable to expect to have 8,000 to 10,000 exposures to achieve 2000 completes. The values per group vary with males,

ages 16-24 and high-income earners being the hardest groups to reach with varying response rates below 10%. Hence, these groups need to receive more targeted invites in order to meet the quotas.

The demographic breakdown for whole U.S. panel (the largest pool of respondents available to take any survey) is as follows:

- Gender: 65% female / 35% male.
- Age: 6% 13-17 / 23% 18-24 years old / 25% 25-34 years old / 20% 35-44 years old / 21% 45-64 years old / 5% 65+ years old.
- Income: 26% Less than $25,000 income / 25% $25,000-$49,000 / 21% $50,000-$74,000 / 13% $75,000 - $99,000 / 15% $100,000 or more.

How are respondents initially recruited by the survey company and how do the become members of the panel? The respondents are recruited through a variety of channels: databases of potential participants who declare that they will cooperate for future data collection if selected, generally in exchange for a reward or incentive. This includes traditional access panels, co-branded panels, or opt-in databases of individuals who agreed to complete research projects and undertake other non-market research activities (watch ads, download an app, complete marketing offers, etc., also known as loyalty programmes, or rewards communities within GPT (Get paid to) sites.) The databases are formed via social media, online and offline advertising (connected TV, radio, online, through mobile apps), member referrals, as well as through partnerships with firms such as United Airlines, Hilton Hotels and more (which also contribute to offering rewards in the form of "points" for their loyalty programs). The recruitment process is 'open to all' through any of the marketing channels in which they are recruiting from and they encourage members to refer people from their network to join.

Selection into the survey and attrition. When respondents land on the survey entry page, they are only told the length of the survey, but neither the topic nor the sender. This is important to avoid selection based on the topic. After clicking on the link, respondents were channeled to a consent page (see Figure OA-1) that informed them that they were about to take an academic research survey, destined solely for research purposes run by non-partisan researchers. They were asked to respond accurately to the best of their knowledge and were assured that participation was entirely voluntary. Respondents were then guided through some screening questions that ensured that the final sample was nationally representative along gender, age, and income dimensions, as well as through the detailed background socio-economic questions. Thus, if respondents decided to drop out at some point during the survey – e.g., upon learning the topic of the survey – all their demographic and background information would be known and I could check for differential attrition by observable characteristics such as political affiliation.

Table OA-11 regresses the probability of completing the survey on the full array of individual characteristics and treatment indicators and shows that attrition is not significantly driven by individual characteristics. Note also that overall attrition after passing just the screening questions (which ask about background info) and entering the first question that is actually about taxes (the first open-ended question) is only around 9%. Respondents who see any treatment (regardless of which version) are a little bit more likely to drop out and this is very likely because the videos take time to watch.

Importantly, there is no differential selection by political affiliation, which is also the biggest predictor of views on tax policy, as explained in the text. To see this, note the sample composition in terms of voting behavior and political party in Table I. These were not targeted dimensions (i.e., i did not impose quotas on them), and yet they are representative of the US population, suggesting that there was no differential selection into the survey. Selection based on income, age, etc. is less likely to be relevant for views.

OA-4.3 Length of the Survey and Survey Fatigue

Figure OA-10 shows the distribution of times it took respondents to complete each of the two surveys. Table OA-6 reports the average time per question, page, and block for each of the blocks of the survey, described in Section 3.

Recall that the survey has a mechanism block (the block that asks about efficiency, distributional, and fairness effect, as clearly labeled in the questionnaire) and a policy block that asks about policy views. The order of these blocks was randomized. To test for survey fatigue, Table OA-7 regresses the time spent per page in the mechanism block (column 1) and in the policy block (column 2) on the full range of individual characteristics, treatment indicators, and an indicator for whether the policy block appeared first (randomly). There is barely any effect on the time. Having seen the mechanism block first does not make respondents spend more time on it. Regardless of the order, econ majors and those who are older spend more time on each question. On the other hand, those who believe to be more knowledgeable go faster through all blocks.

A further test for survey fatigue is in Table OA-8. The outcome variable here are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent selects answers that are in the same position, e.g., always selecting the first option in the matrix format questions. Note that this is not necessarily indicative of carelessness. A respondent may genuinely think that, e.g., all margins of responses of high income earners to taxes are unlikely to occur. Indeed, as I show in the paper, respondents' responses to the mechanism block questions are predictive of their policy views. Nevertheless, if respondents start selecting the same position answer more as the survey progresses, it may be indicative of increased fatigue. In Table OA-8, I leverage again the order randomization. The questions represented in columns 1-4 are in the mechanism block. The indicator variable in the first row indicates that the policy block was (randomly) seen first; while the mechanism block was seen last. There is no effect on the prevalence of same position answer selection, except a little bit in column 2. The variables in column 5-6 are from the policy block, and again, there is no significant difference based on the order of the blocks.

Other surveys' length.

It is useful to get a sense of how long some other surveys are, including surveys that are done through other channels (e.g., face to face interviews).

Consumer Expenditure Diary Survey: It takes about 15 minutes to record daily expenditures; in addition, it takes about 25 minutes for each of the U.S. BLS's visits over the two-week period. Source here.
Consumer Expenditure Interview: The average interview takes about 60 minutes. Source here.
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID):. In 2017, the mean questionnaire length was 85.8 minutes. Source here.
Gallup World Poll: Face-to-face interviews are approximately one hour, while telephone interviews are about 30 minutes. Source here.
Gallup Student Poll: The survey takes an average of 10 minutes per student to complete. Source here.
The Survey of Household Economics and Decision making: The median time to complete the survey was 24 and 21 minutes in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Source here.
Survey of Consumer Payment Choice: The SCPC is an approximately 30-minute online questionnaire that collects data on consumer adoption and use of bank accounts and payment instruments. Source here.
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP): Completing the SIPP interview takes approximately 60 minutes per adult on average. Source here.
New York State Department of Labor Workforce Survey: The survey takes about 20-minute. Source here.
Consumer Research (NMG consulting for the Financial Conduct Authority): The survey takes about 25 minutes and was conducted online. Source here.

Figure OA-10: Distribution of Time Spent on the Surveys

(a) Income Taxation



(b) Estate Tax



Notes: The figures show the distribution of the time (in minutes) spent by respondents to complete the survey for our benchmark sample (excluding the 5% fastest responses). The mean is represented by a vertical blue line, and the median by a vertical red line. Responses above two hours are also excluded from the figures.

Table OA-6: Minutes Spent per Block, per Page, and per Question

	Income			Estate		
	Block	Page	Question	Block	Page	Question
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Open-ended Questions	7.4	1.05	1.05	6.2	1	1
Knowledge and Exposure	9.3	0.66	20 sec	9.8	0.8	21 sec
Mechanisms	5.96	0.60	19 sec	5.9	44 sec	13 sec
Policy Views	2.70	0.54	18 sec	2.3	28 sec	10 sec
Government Views	2.39	0.40	11 sec	2.4	24 sec	9 sec

Notes: The table shows how many minutes on average respondents spent per block (columns 1 and 4), per page (columns 2 and 5), and per question (columns 3 and 6) for the income and estate surveys, respectively.

Table OA-7: Test for Survey Fatigue based on Randomization of Block Order

	(1)	(2)
	Minutes spent per page on Mechanism block	Minutes spent per page on Policy block
Order: Policy views first	-0.01	0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Me	-0.08*	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Women	0.06	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Redistribution T	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Efficiency T	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Economist T	-0.03	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Female	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)
kids	-0.03	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Black	0.15**	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Hispanic	0.16***	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Other	0.06	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Age 30-49	0.04	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 50-69	0.17***	0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	0.04	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)
High-Income	0.03	-0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Republican	0.05*	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Independent and others	0.12***	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)
College	0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economics related major	0.09**	-0.08
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Working	0.06	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Not working	0.10	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Retiree	0.08	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.09)
Knowledgeable	-0.08***	-0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.10**	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Sample Mean	0.60	0.54
Observations	2783	2783

Notes: The dependent variables are the average number of minutes spent per page on the Mechanisms (column 1) and Policy (column 2) blocks. The independent variable "Order: Policy view first" is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent was randomly assigned to the group that saw the Policy block first, and the Mechanisms block second. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-8: Test for Survey Fatigue: Selecting Answers in the Same Position

	(1) Behaviors high-earners	(2) Behaviors middle class	(3) Groups win if taxes on high-incomes ↓	(4) Groups win if overall taxes ↑	(5) Support ↑ taxation to fund services	(6) Govt should be responsible for services
Order: Policy views first	0.04	0.08***	0.00	0.03	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Women	0.05**	0.06**	0.05**	0.06**	0.02	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Redistribution T	-0.00	0.04	-0.04	0.04	-0.00	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Efficiency T	0.03	0.05*	0.02	0.01	-0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Economist T	0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Female	0.03**	0.00	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Has children	0.03*	0.04**	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Black	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Hispanic	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Other	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Age 50-69	-0.04**	-0.04*	0.04**	0.02	0.04	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Middle-Income	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-Income	-0.02	-0.04**	0.01	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Republican	-0.01	-0.02	0.17***	0.01	-0.07***	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	0.01	0.01	0.09***	0.03*	-0.05**	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College	-0.02*	-0.04***	0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Working	0.04	0.10**	0.01	-0.00	0.03	0.09**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Not working	0.05	0.12***	0.02	0.02	0.09	0.09**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Retiree	0.04	0.14***	0.03	0.01	0.06	0.13***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Sample Mean	0.10	0.16	0.15	0.20	0.26	0.12
Observations	2439	2439	2439	2439	2439	2439

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Behaviors rich people:* the respondent selects answers that are in a same position in the matrix format questions shown in Table III about the behaviors of rich people should taxes increase; *Behaviors middle class:* the respondent selects answers that are in a same position in the matrix format questions shown in Table III about the behaviors of middle class should taxes increase; *Groups win if taxes on high-incomes ↓:* the respondent selects answers that are in a same position in the matrix format questions shown in Table OA-21 about whether groups would mostly win if taxes on high-incomes were cut; *Groups win if overall taxes ↑:* the respondent selects answers that are in a same position in the matrix format questions shown in Table OA-21 about whether groups would mostly win if overall taxes were increased; *Support ↑ taxation to fund services:* the respondent selects answers that are in a same position in the matrix format questions shown in Figure OA-37 about whether they would increase spending and taxation on the services listed; *Govt should be responsible for services:* the respondent selects answers that are in a same position in the matrix format questions shown in Table OA-41 about whether they think government should be responsible for the services listed. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-9: Ability of Covariates to Predict Treatment Status in the Income Tax Survey

	Redistribution T	Efficiency T	Economist T
Female	-0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Has children	-0.01	-0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Black	-0.04	-0.06**	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.01	-0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 50-69	-0.04*	-0.00	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.03	0.02	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-Income	0.00	0.03	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Republican	-0.01	0.03*	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	-0.01	0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College	0.00	-0.03**	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Economics related major	0.01	0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Working	0.05	0.02	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Not working	0.03	0.04	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Retiree	0.08*	-0.00	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Self reported knowledge	0.00	0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	2783	2783	2783

Notes: The table shows results from the regressions of an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent was randomly assigned to the video treatment course indicated in the column on individual socio-demographic characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-10: Ability of Covariates to Predict Treatment Status in the Estate Tax Survey

	Redistribution T	Efficiency T	Economist T
Female	0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	-0.00	0.03*	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	0.05	0.05	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.04	-0.02	-0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.01	-0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.01	0.00	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Republican	-0.00	0.01	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	0.00	0.00	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College	-0.02	0.02	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	0.01	-0.02	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Working	-0.03	-0.02	-0.08*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Not working	-0.03	-0.02	-0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Retiree	-0.04	-0.01	-0.12**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Self reported knowledge	0.02	-0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.05**	0.04	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	2360	2360	2360

Notes: See the notes to table OA-9. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-11: Attrition

	Respondents that agreed to participate		Respondents that learned the topic of the surveys		Respondents that passed the treatments' randomization point	
	Income Tax	Estate Tax	Income Tax	Estate Tax	Income Tax	Estate Tax
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Redistribution T	-0.03**	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Efficiency T	-0.03**	-0.02	-0.03**	-0.02	-0.03**	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economist T	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Missing treatment video	-0.92***	-0.93***	-0.92***	-0.93***		
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Female	0.02*	-0.04***	0.02*	-0.04***	0.02*	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Missing gender	0.01	-0.00				
	(0.15)	(0.12)				
Has children	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Has children missing	0.00	-0.01				
	(0.09)	(0.07)				
Age 30-49	0.02	-0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Age 50-69	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Missing age group	-0.00	-0.01				
	(0.08)	(0.05)				
Middle-Income	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
High-Income	0.02	0.03**	0.02	0.03**	0.02	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Missing income group	0.01	-0.01				
	(0.10)	(0.09)				
Republican	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Independent and others	-0.02*	-0.02	-0.02*	-0.02	-0.02*	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Missing political affiliation	-0.00	-0.01				
	(0.06)	(0.06)				
Working	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Not working	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Retiree	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Missing employment status	-0.00	-0.03				
	(0.12)	(0.12)				
4-year college degree	0.04***	-0.00	0.04***	0.00	0.04***	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Missing education	0.01	0.01				
	(0.13)	(0.12)				
Observations	3635	3089	3301	2781	3245	2719

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent completed the income and estate tax surveys. The sample includes only respondents who progressed at least to the point where the randomization into treatment videos happened. Columns 1 and 2 include all the respondents that agreed to participate in the surveys; columns 3 and 4 include all the respondents that passed the background block and saw the open-ended questions thus learning the topic of the survey; columns 5 and 6 include all the respondents that passed the point where the randomization in treatment and control groups happened. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
For the income survey, 3,825 respondents land on our consent page. 3,635 respondents agreed to participate in the survey and pass the consent page, of which 19% did not finish. 190 respondents do not agree to participate in the survey. Out of the ones that did not finish 47% drop out before the first open-ended question, i.e., before learning the topic of the survey. 53% drop out after. Thus, overall, 9% of those that agree to take the survey drop out before learning the topic and 10% of those that agree to take the survey drop out after learning the topic. For the estate tax survey, 3,226 respondents land on our consent page. 3,089 respondents agree to participate in the survey and pass the consent page, of which 20% did not finish. 137 respondents do not agree to participate in the survey. Out of the ones that did not finish 50% drop out before the first open-ended question, i.e., before learning the topic of the survey. 50% drop out after. Thus, overall, 10% of those that agree to take the survey drop out before learning the topic and 10% of those that agree to take the survey drop out after learning the topic.

OA-4.4 Data to Assess Sample Representativeness

To compute the population characteristics in Table I, we use the IPUMS-CPS, ASEC data from March 2019 (Flood et al., 2020). We construct variables and categories that are as comparable as possible between our sample data and the population statistics. The shares computed are based on the following IPUMS-CPS, ASEC data:

- **Age bracket**: AGE variable divided in brackets
- **Household income bracket**: FTOTVAL variable divided in brackets
- **Education**: EDUC variable split into categories as follows

  High School or Less: "none or preschool," "grades 1, 2, 3, or 4," "grades 5 or 6," "grades 7 or 8," "grade 9," "grade 10," "grade 11," "12th grade, no diploma."

  4-Year College or More: "bachelor's degree," "master's degree," "professional school degree," "doctorate degree."

  Other: "Some college but no degree," "associate's degree, occupational/vocational," "associate's degree, academic program."

- **Employment**: the variable is built as follows

  Self-Employed: self-employed during the current or previous week.

  Employed: EMPSTAT is "armed forces," "at work," "has job, not at work last week" but CLASSWKR is not "unpaid family worker."

  Unemployed: EMPSTAT is "unemployed, experienced worker," "unemployed, new worker" and CLASSWKR not "self-employed, not incorporated," "self-employed, incorporated," "unpaid family worker."

- **Marital status**:

  Married: MARST is "married, spouse present," "married, spouse absent."

  Not Married: MARST is "separated," "divorced," "widowed," "never married/single."

- **Race and ethnicity**:

  Black/African-American: RACE = "black", HISPAN="not hispanic."

  White: RACE = "white", HISPAN="not hispanic."

  Asian/Asian-American: RACE = "asian", HISPAN="not hispanic."

  Hispanic/Latino: HISPAN is not equal to "not hispanic."

For party affiliation, data is taken from Gallup (2019). In particular, the question asked was *"In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or an independent?."* The share of "Independent" respondents in the samples is computed aggregating the "Independent" and the "Non-affiliated." The Pew Research Center (2019) states that "most independents are not all that 'independent' politically. And the small share of Americans who are truly independent – less than 10% of the public has no partisan leaning – stand out for their low level of interest in politics." 2% of the respondents in both surveys report their political affiliation to be "Other." Finally, the data for the 2016's Presidential election were taken from Leip (2019).

OA-5 Experimenter Demand Effects

Recent empirical evidence that explicitly designs surveys to test for experimenter demand effects (hereafter, EDE) suggests that it may be of limited quantitative importance (de Quidt et al. (2018); Mummolo and Peterson (2019); Zizzo (2010)). Haaland et al. (2021) suggest many of the following techniques to deal with EDE, which I have tried to implement already at the survey design stage.

First, anonymity is one way to minimize EDE, because there is no social pressure. Respondents are entirely anonymous and taking the survey at home, on their computers or phones, with full privacy.

Second, incentivized answers could help motivate respondents to answer accurately. In the present two surveys respondents were randomly incentivized for all questions which have an accurate answer (all the "Knowledge" section questions). It is not possible to incentivize them for questions related to attitudes and views, as those do not have an accurate answer.

Third, field outcomes, i.e., real outcomes are desirable. This is why I have the willingness to pay question, which asks people whether they would be willing to forfeit part of their potential lottery gains in exchange of the accurate answers to all knowledge questions (see the full questionnaire in Section OA-2).

Fourth, the survey questions themselves have a neutral framing. The mechanism and policy questions are asked intentionally using formulations that are symmetric ("Do you agree or disagree..?" "Do you support or oppose..?") so that there is no prevalence given to one direction over another. The questions themselves are thus not likely to carry any information on what the experimenter's views or goals are. In addition, the purpose of the survey is not clear (and, in fact, the purpose is to truly understand many aspects of how people reason about taxes, not only the favorable or unfavorable parts!). This is because respondents are walked through multiple different blocks that have different foci: the open-ended questions; the factual knowledge questions, the efficiency costs, the perceived gains and losses, and only at the end views on policies. It is hard to perceive these as being systematically in favor or against taxes for instance.

Fifth, it is often useful to obfuscate the information provision so that it is not clear what the actual main "treatment" is. In this case, at several points before the actual treatment videos, respondents are given explanations and information. For instance, I explain to them what an average tax rate is.

Sixth, it is a good idea to measure beliefs about the study purpose. I do this at the end of the survey by asking respondents about whether they perceived the survey to be either left-wing biased, right-wing biased, or not biased. Table OA-12 shows the shares of respondents who think the survey was biased or unbiased, condition on being in the control group or one of the other three treatment branches. The shares of respondents who thought that either survey was biased is not large. For instance, in the income tax survey, 15% thought it was left-wing biased, 5% that it is right-wing biased, and 80% that it was not biased either way. In the control group, these shares are 17%, 13%, and 4%. In the redistribution treatment, 21% felt some left-wing bias and 5% some right-wing bias. In the efficiency treatment, 11% thought there was some left-wing bias and 10% that there was some right-wing bias. In the Economist treatment, these shares are 16% and 6%.

Table OA-13 suggests that the major predictor of perceiving the survey as being left-wing bias is being Republican, which makes sense. This suggests that the content appears to be left-wing to those who are more right-wing. On the other hand, political affiliation is not a predictor of whether a respondent considered the survey to be right-wing biased. College-educated respondents were more likely to consider the survey biased overall, but equally so in terms of right-wing or left-wing bias. Those with an economics degree were less likely to consider the survey right-wing biased. Women were less likely to consider the survey biased overall (either left- or right-wing).

Furthermore, the videos' impacts on Democrats and Republicans were quite similar, especially on their policy views (see the results in Tables OA-16 – OA-36). This is despite the fact just mentioned, namely that

Table OA-12: Did the Survey Feel Biased Conditional on Treatment?

Income Tax Survey

	No Treatment	Redistribution T	Efficiency T	Economist T	Total
No, it did not feel biased	82.6%	73.9%	79.3%	77.7%	79.9%
Yes, it felt left-wing biased	13.1%	21.5%	11.1%	16.6%	14.8%
Yes, it felt right-wing biased	4.3%	4.6%	9.6%	5.7%	5.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Estate Tax Survey

	No Treatment	Redistribution T	Efficiency T	Economist T	Total
No, it did not feel biased	78.8%	73.6%	71.4%	71.1%	74.5%
Yes, it felt left-wing biased	15.2%	19.5%	19.7%	22.7%	18.6%
Yes, it felt right-wing biased	6.8%	7%	9%	5.7%	6.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Notes: The table reports the share of respondents reporting that the survey did not feel biased, felt left-wing biased, or felt right-wing biased conditional on the video treatment branch in which they were randomized.

the strongest predictor of perceived left-wing bias is being Republican. This suggests that the perceived bias by some Republicans nevertheless did not lead to heterogenous treatment effects on policy views and that people are not affected by this perceived bias. In summary, those respondents who thought the purpose of the study was in line with a left wing vs. right wing agenda had the same response.

Finally, note that one proposed solution is to do an "obfuscated follow-up," whereby respondents are asked the same outcome questions some time later, in a way that does not make it clear that the original and follow up surveys are done by the same entity. This is a great approach when a topic is less common in the daily life. In the case of taxes, there are constant news and changes in information which means that a clean follow-up is very difficult to do.

Table OA-13: Determinants of Feeling that the Survey was Left-wing or Right-wing Biased

	Left-wing biased	Right-wing biased
Redistribution T	0.09***	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Efficiency T	0.02	0.03***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Economist T	0.08***	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Republican	0.17***	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Independent and others	0.10***	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.04***	-0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Has children	-0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Black	-0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Hispanic	-0.01	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Age 30-49	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age 50-69	0.01	-0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Middle-Income	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
High-Income	0.06***	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
College	0.06***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Economics related major	0.01	-0.03***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Working	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Not working	0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Retiree	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Self reported knowledge	0.04***	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Control Group Mean	0.13	0.06
Observations	5140	5140

Notes: The dependent variables are indicators equal to one if the respondents answered that the survey felt left-wing biased (column 1) or right-wing biased (column 2). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

OA-6 Tables and Figures

Figure OA-11: Share of Respondents who Feel Personally Affected by the Policy

(a) Income Taxation



(b) Estate Tax



Notes: The figure shows, for each survey, the share of respondents who feel personally affected by the policy, with a confidence interval of 90%. Panel A: *Do you feel that U.S. federal income tax policy has important direct effects on your own life?*; Panel B: *Do you feel personally affected by the federal estate tax?*. Coefficients are based on a linear regression that controls for sex, age, race, income, children, education, economics major, self-reported policy knowledge, employment status, political affiliation and perceived social class. Omitted categories: Low income, Age 18-29, Democrat, Student, Less than high school. Standard errors in parenthesis. Table OA-14 presents the regression analysis.

Table OA-14: Share of Respondents Who Feel Personally Affected by the Policy

	Income Tax (1)	Estate Tax (2)
Female	-0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	0.06***	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.07	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.01	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican	0.02	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	-0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.00	-0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.10***	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.07***	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)
College	0.04**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	-0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Self reported knowledge	0.16***	0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.05*	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Descriptive statistics:		
Control Mean	0.52	0.33
Observations	2783	2358

Notes: See the notes to Figure OA-11 for details on the question formulation and outcome variable definition. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

OA-6.1 Reasoning about Taxes: Efficiency, Distribution, and Fairness

Table OA-15: Perceived Behavioral Response to Income Taxation

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial	
	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Personal characteristics												
Republican	-0.04*	0.08***	0.14***	0.14***	0.09***	0.11***	0.13***	0.13***	0.10***	0.17***	0.18***	0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	0.00	0.08***	0.06***	0.05**	0.03	0.03	0.05**	0.07***	0.07***	0.09***	0.09***	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.05***	-0.09***	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.05***	0.02	-0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	0.02	0.02	0.06***	0.08***	0.07***	0.08***	0.10***	0.09***	0.03*	-0.00	0.07***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	0.04	0.06	0.17***	0.11***	0.20***	0.09**	0.11***	0.11***	0.09**	0.11***	0.10**	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.04	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.01	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.02	-0.02	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.12***	-0.13***	-0.08***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.06**	-0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.02	-0.00	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.00	-0.04*	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04**	-0.01	-0.05**	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	-0.02	-0.01	-0.07**	-0.06*	-0.08***	-0.08**	-0.03	-0.06*	-0.02	-0.09***	0.01	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Working	-0.07*	-0.08	-0.01	0.02	0.07	0.09*	0.05	-0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.04	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Not working	-0.07	-0.09	-0.03	0.01	0.08	0.10*	-0.00	-0.03	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retiree	-0.08	-0.12**	-0.06	-0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.00	-0.05	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Self reported knowledge	0.06***	0.05**	0.05**	0.02	0.07***	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.04**	0.03*	0.04**	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects												
Redistribution T	0.00	0.04	-0.02	0.06*	-0.01	0.06**	-0.04	0.07**	-0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	0.08***	0.07**	0.16***	0.27***	0.08**	0.17***	0.14***	0.20***	0.04	0.12***	0.14***	0.19***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	0.06***	0.05*	0.17***	0.28***	0.04	0.17***	0.12***	0.22***	0.04*	0.11***	0.15***	0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics												
Control mean	0.80	0.60	0.48	0.39	0.33	0.28	0.43	0.32	0.78	0.64	0.50	0.45
Observations	2782	2782	2783	2781	2781	2781	2783	2781	2783	2782	2782	2782

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-12 are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent thinks that the extent to which an increase in the federal personal income tax would encourage the middle class or the richest people in the economy towards the listed behavior ranges from *a moderate amount* to *a great deal*. Regressions in all panels include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, political affiliation, and dummies for all treatments. Regressions in all panels omit indicator variables for democrat, white, age 18-29, low-income, student, while the coefficients on the indicator variable for other races are not shown. Panel A reports the effects of various socio-demographic covariates. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses relative to the omitted category (*no video*). The row "Control mean" reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who did not see any video courses. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-16: Perceived Behavioral Response to Income Taxation: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial	
	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Gender												
Redistribution T	-0.01	0.02	-0.06	0.01	-0.01	0.03	-0.06	0.04	-0.02	-0.01	-0.08*	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.05	0.06	0.13***	0.23***	0.08**	0.12***	0.11**	0.18***	0.04	0.10**	0.11**	0.16***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.02	-0.02	0.10***	0.19***	-0.01	0.08**	0.08**	0.14***	0.03	0.07**	0.10***	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.08***	-0.13***	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.03	-0.07***	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.05**	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.09	-0.01	0.06	0.04	0.05	-0.01	0.11**	0.11*	0.14**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Female	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.09	-0.01	0.10*	0.07	0.04	-0.01	0.04	0.07	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Female	0.09**	0.14***	0.13***	0.17***	0.10**	0.18***	0.09**	0.16***	0.01	0.07*	0.09**	0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Panel B: Political affiliation												
Redistribution T	-0.00	0.10*	-0.12**	0.06	-0.09*	0.03	-0.16***	0.03	-0.01	0.07	-0.03	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	0.01	-0.03	0.10*	0.22***	-0.00	0.14***	0.08	0.11**	0.06	0.08	0.10*	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.07**	0.02	0.16***	0.27***	0.03	0.15***	0.09**	0.19***	0.08**	0.12***	0.14***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican	-0.05*	0.06*	0.11***	0.13***	0.06*	0.09***	0.08**	0.09***	0.12***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.01	0.08**	0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.09***	0.09***	0.08**	0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Republican	-0.05	-0.13*	0.13*	-0.02	0.11	0.03	0.17**	0.00	-0.04	-0.09	0.01	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.06	-0.05	0.18***	0.02	0.14**	0.07	0.19***	0.10	0.02	0.02	-0.00	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	0.11*	0.16**	0.09	0.06	0.10	0.07	0.09	0.17**	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.20***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.06	0.11	0.07	0.08	0.12*	0.02	0.08	0.09	-0.09	0.05	0.06	0.19***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	0.00	0.10*	0.02	-0.00	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.06	-0.06	0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.02	-0.06	-0.02	0.04	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Male control mean	0.84	0.66	0.50	0.40	0.33	0.31	0.42	0.32	0.80	0.63	0.52	0.46
Observations	2782	2782	2783	2781	2781	2781	2783	2781	2783	2782	2782	2782

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-15. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the video course interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-17: Perceived Behavioral Response to Estate Tax

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial		Save Less	
	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Panel A: Personal characteristics														
Republican	-0.01	0.01	0.06**	0.08***	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.09***	0.04**	0.07***	0.06**	0.14***	0.05*	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Independent and others	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.00	-0.03	0.04	0.04*	0.05**	0.01	0.06**	-0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.07***	-0.04**	-0.06***	-0.03	-0.07***	-0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	0.02	0.04**	0.03	0.06***	0.05**	0.05**	0.07***	0.07***	-0.00	0.02	0.04**	0.06***	0.00	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.02	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.09**	0.02	0.06	-0.01	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.05	-0.02	0.03	0.04	0.07*	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.09***	-0.01	-0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.02	-0.00	-0.11***	-0.14***	-0.07**	-0.14***	-0.09***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.05	-0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.04	-0.06**	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.06**	-0.05*	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04*	0.04	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College	0.00	0.00	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.07***	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	0.03	0.02	0.08**	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.10***	0.04	-0.00	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Working	0.01	-0.03	0.10**	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.06	0.04	-0.01	0.00	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Not working	-0.01	-0.05	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.04	-0.01	-0.00	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retiree	0.02	-0.05	0.09*	0.08	0.00	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.02	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Self reported knowledge	0.01	0.04*	0.04	0.08***	0.05**	0.06***	0.02	0.05**	0.08***	0.06***	0.04*	0.06***	0.02	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects														
Redistribution T	0.05*	-0.04	0.06	0.01	0.08**	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.11***	0.03	0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.04*	-0.00	0.26***	0.04	0.08**	0.03	0.06*	0.03	-0.05*	-0.04	0.24***	0.09**	0.22***	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.03	-0.03	0.27***	0.07**	0.13***	0.07**	0.10***	0.07**	-0.02	-0.02	0.23***	0.07**	0.20***	0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics														
Control mean	0.88	0.78	0.50	0.53	0.39	0.37	0.57	0.46	0.83	0.73	0.50	0.52	0.59	0.61
Observations	2357	2356	2356	2356	2357	2355	2355	2355	2356	2357	2356	2356	2356	2356

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-14 are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent thinks that the extent to which an increase in the federal estate tax would encourage the very wealthy individuals among the richest in the economy or young and not yet rich people towards the listed behaviors ranges from "a moderate amount" to a "great deal." Regressions in all panels include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, political affiliation, and dummies for all treatments. Panel A reports the effects of various socio-demographic covariates. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses relative to the omitted category (*no video*). The row "Control mean" reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who did not see any video courses. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-18: Perceived Behavioral Response to Estate Tax: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial		Save Less	
	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Panel A: Gender														
Redistribution T	-0.02	-0.05	-0.04	-0.09*	0.01	-0.05	-0.06	-0.14***	-0.02	-0.07	0.03	-0.07	-0.04	-0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.03	-0.08*	0.17***	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.01	-0.04	-0.07	0.16***	0.03	0.19***	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	-0.04	-0.08**	0.20***	0.01	0.10**	0.03	0.04	0.02	-0.05	-0.07*	0.17***	0.04	0.16***	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	-0.10***	-0.07**	-0.12***	-0.07**	-0.12***	-0.09***	-0.12***	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.05*	-0.10***	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	0.13***	0.02	0.18***	0.17***	0.11*	0.12**	0.12**	0.23***	0.01	0.12**	0.16***	0.18***	0.12**	0.14**
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Female	0.15***	0.14***	0.18***	0.02	0.09	0.06	0.05	0.04	-0.04	0.06	0.15**	0.10	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Female	0.14***	0.09**	0.13***	0.10**	0.05	0.07	0.11**	0.08*	0.04	0.09*	0.11**	0.06	0.07	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Panel B: Political affiliation														
Redistribution T	0.06	-0.00	0.07	-0.00	0.11**	0.02	0.04	-0.04	0.07	0.07	0.17***	0.05	0.04	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Efficiency T	0.08**	0.03	0.28***	0.04	-0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.24***	0.13**	0.21***	0.10*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Economist T	0.08**	0.01	0.32***	0.06	0.12**	0.10**	0.15***	0.08*	0.04	0.03	0.29***	0.10**	0.25***	0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Republican	0.02	0.05	0.09**	0.08**	-0.01	0.04	0.07*	0.11***	0.12***	0.16***	0.12***	0.17***	0.09***	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Independent and others	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.01	-0.05	-0.00	-0.03	0.01	0.06**	0.05	0.02	0.07**	-0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Republican	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06	0.04	-0.06	0.02	-0.07	0.08	-0.20***	-0.16**	-0.14*	-0.04	-0.05	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.03	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.06	-0.09	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.04	-0.07	-0.03	0.04	0.16**	0.11	0.00	0.04	-0.10	-0.14**	-0.01	-0.06	-0.04	-0.11
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.06	-0.05	-0.00	-0.04	0.12	-0.00	0.11	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01	-0.09	0.06	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	-0.07*	-0.08	-0.08	-0.02	-0.02	-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.12**	-0.13**	-0.17***	-0.14**	-0.08	-0.13**	-0.12**
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.05	-0.01	-0.06	0.05	0.03	0.01	-0.04	0.08	-0.07	0.01	-0.06	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Male control mean	0.88	0.74	0.52	0.51	0.44	0.39	0.58	0.47	0.85	0.74	0.53	0.51	0.60	0.59
Observations	2357	2356	2356	2356	2357	2355	2355	2355	2356	2357	2356	2356	2356	2356

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-17. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-19: Perceived Efficiency Costs of Income and Estate Taxes

	Income Tax			Estate Tax	
	↑ Taxes high-incomes hurt economy. (1)	Laffer effect high-incomes (2)	Laffer effect middle class (3)	↑ Estate tax hurt economy (4)	Laffer effect (5)
Panel A: Personal characteristics					
Republican	0.35***	0.18***	0.02	0.15***	0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Independent and others	0.16***	0.08***	0.01	0.08***	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.04**	0.06***	0.05***	-0.03	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	0.03	0.04*	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.05	0.07	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.00	0.01	-0.08**	0.04	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.03	0.01	0.00	0.04	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.02	-0.03	-0.00	-0.05*	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.04*	-0.03	-0.01	-0.07***	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College	0.02	-0.05**	-0.03	0.01	-0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03	0.05*	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Working	0.01	-0.07	0.05	0.07	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Not working	0.00	-0.06	0.07	0.02	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Retiree	0.00	-0.04	0.08	0.00	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Self reported knowledge	0.06***	-0.00	0.04**	0.08***	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.07**	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation					
Redistribution T	-0.01	0.00	-0.05	-0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.14***	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.06***	-0.03	0.00	0.07**	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics					
Control mean	0.31	0.48	0.65	0.28	0.46
Observations	2782	2780	2781	2358	2356

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: ↑ *Taxes on high-incomes hurt economy:* the respondent believes that increasing income taxes on high-income households/women would hurt economic activity in the U.S.; *Laffer effect high-incomes/middle-class:* the respondent believes that tax cuts on high-income households/women or on middle class/women from the middle class would decrease the deficit in the long run because they would stimulate the economy and bring in more money for the government. ↑ *Estate tax hurt economy:* the respondent believes that increasing the federal estate tax on wealthy households would hurt economic activity; *Laffer effect:* the respondent believes that cuts to the estate tax of wealthy households would decrease the deficit in the long run because they would stimulate the economy and bring in more money for the government. See the notes to Table OA-15. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-20: Efficiency Costs of Income and Estate Taxes: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

	Income Tax			Estate Tax	
	↑ Taxes high-incomes hurt economy. (1)	Laffer effect high-incomes (2)	Laffer effect middle class (3)	↑ Estate tax hurt economy (4)	Laffer effect (5)
Panel A: Gender					
Redistribution T	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	0.14***	0.00	0.01	0.11**	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.04	-0.04	0.02	0.10**	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	-0.04	0.04	0.07**	0.00	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	-0.07	0.06	-0.06	-0.00	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Female	-0.00	0.05	-0.01	-0.11**	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Female	0.05	0.03	-0.03	-0.05	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Panel B: Political affiliation					
Redistribution T	-0.05	0.05	-0.02	0.02	0.13**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Efficiency T	0.14***	0.01	0.02	-0.03	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Economist T	0.08**	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican	0.36***	0.18***	0.05	0.12***	0.21***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Independent and others	0.15***	0.11***	0.03	0.05	0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06	-0.24***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.06	-0.14**	-0.06	-0.05	-0.15**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.00	0.06	0.03	0.13*	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.00	-0.01	-0.07	0.13*	-0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	-0.05	-0.01	-0.12**	0.07	-0.09
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.00	-0.05	-0.02	0.04	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Male control mean	0.35	0.46	0.63	0.31	0.43
Observations	2782	2780	2781	2358	2356

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-19. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-21: Which Groups Would Mostly Win from the Following Changes in Income Taxation?

	Taxes on high-earners were cut					Overall taxes were increased					
	Poor households (1)	Working class (2)	Middle class (3)	Upper-middle class (4)	Upper class (5)	Poor households (6)	Working class (7)	Middle class (8)	Upper-middle class (9)	Upper class (10)	Trickle down (11)
Panel A: Personal characteristics											
Republican	0.23***	0.22***	0.24***	0.08***	0.01	-0.12***	-0.21***	-0.25***	-0.14***	-0.13***	0.43***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.05**	0.03	-0.09***	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.09***	-0.06**	0.22***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.04**	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.02	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.03*	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	0.03	0.08**	0.08**	0.01	-0.07**	-0.09**	-0.10**	-0.06	0.12***	0.11***	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.07*	0.09**	0.08**	-0.05	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.06	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.04*	-0.07***	-0.08***	0.01	0.06***	-0.00	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.01	0.04	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Age 50-69	0.02	-0.06**	-0.10***	-0.04	0.08***	0.03	-0.04	-0.15***	-0.11***	-0.07**	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.05**	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.04	-0.05**	-0.06**	-0.07***	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-Income	0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.04**	0.06**	-0.00	-0.06**	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
College	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03*	0.02	0.03*	0.04*	0.05**	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	0.06*	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.08**	0.01	-0.04	-0.07**	-0.08***	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Working	-0.06	-0.07	-0.05	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	-0.02	0.01	0.04	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Not working	-0.06	-0.02	-0.04	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retiree	-0.09	-0.08	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.09	0.01	0.04	0.07	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Self reported knowledge	0.05**	0.08***	0.05**	0.06***	0.04**	-0.02	0.03	0.05**	0.02	0.02	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.02	0.05**	0.06**	-0.05*	-0.02	0.01	0.08***	0.10***	0.03	0.04	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects											
Redistribution T	0.00	-0.02	-0.04	-0.07**	-0.04	-0.02	0.06*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**	-0.05	-0.06**	0.00	0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	0.02	0.03	0.04	-0.02	-0.04	0.05**	0.05*	0.01	-0.08***	-0.10***	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics											
Control mean	0.32.	0.32	0.33	0.69	0.82	0.65	0.49	0.40	0.39	0.41	0.32
Male control mean	0.36	0.35	0.36	0.67	0.81	0.62	0.51	0.42	0.39	0.39	0.36
Democrat control mean	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.67	0.80	0.67	0.59	0.54	0.48	0.47	0.10
Observations	2762	2756	2746	2743	2765	2774	2757	2759	2757	2762	2781

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-10 are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent believes that the listed group would *mostly* win if the top federal income tax rate on high earners were cut, in columns 1-5, or if overall taxes were raised and the extra revenues were spent on government programs, in columns 6-10. The dependent variable in column 11 is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent thinks that lowering taxes on wealthy people and corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth would ultimately do more to reduce the income differences between poor and rich families. Panel A reports the effects of various socio-demographic covariates. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses relative to the control group that saw no video. Panel C reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who saw the generic question formulation and no video ("Control mean"), and separately for male respondents ("Male control mean") and Democrats ("Democrat control mean"). See the notes to Table OA-15. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-22: Which Groups Would Mostly Win from the Following Changes in Income Taxation?: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

	Taxes on high-earners were cut					Overall taxes were increased					
	Poor households (1)	Working class (2)	Middle class (3)	Upper-middle class (4)	Upper class (5)	Poor households (6)	Working class (7)	Middle class (8)	Upper-middle class (9)	Upper class (10)	Trickle down (11)
Panel A: Gender											
Redistribution T	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.05	0.07*	0.07*	-0.03	-0.09**	0.00	0.01	0.05	-0.02	-0.03	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	-0.00	0.04	0.06	-0.00	-0.02	0.06*	0.05	0.01	-0.04	-0.09**	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.00	0.04	-0.02	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Redistribution T × Female	0.05	-0.03	-0.06	-0.08	-0.09*	-0.05	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Efficiency T × Female	0.04	-0.01	0.00	-0.04	0.05	-0.00	-0.01	-0.16***	-0.05	-0.04	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Economist T × Female	0.05	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.07	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel B: Political Affiliation											
Redistribution T	0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.08*	0.01	-0.02	0.07	0.04	0.02	-0.00	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.02	-0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.09	-0.06	-0.10*	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.08**	0.07*	0.08*	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.15***	-0.17***	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***	0.11***	0.07**	-0.14***	-0.24***	-0.26***	-0.17***	-0.17***	0.47***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	0.11***	0.10***	0.10***	0.06**	0.04	-0.11***	-0.17***	-0.18***	-0.10***	-0.08**	0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Republican	-0.06	-0.11	-0.03	0.05	-0.10	-0.00	0.02	-0.10	-0.08	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.06	-0.12*	-0.06	-0.03	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.01	0.08	0.08	-0.13*	-0.13**	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.03	0.08	-0.06
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.03	-0.00	0.01	-0.07	-0.05	0.02	-0.03	0.09	0.02	0.06	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Economist T × Republican	-0.08	-0.07	-0.06	-0.08	-0.13***	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.12**	0.14**	-0.12**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.10*	-0.06	-0.05	-0.01	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.09*	0.07	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Male control mean	0.36	0.35	0.36	0.67	0.81	0.62	0.51	0.42	0.39	0.39	0.36
Observations	2762	2756	2746	2743	2765	2774	2757	2759	2757	2762	2781

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-21. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-23: Which Groups Would Mostly Win If the Estate Tax were Cut?

	Poor households (1)	Working Class (2)	Middle Class (3)	Upper-middle Class (4)	Upper Class (5)
Panel A: Personal characteristics					
Republican	0.10***	0.10***	0.13***	0.06**	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Independent and others	0.04*	0.03	0.05*	0.04*	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	0.05**	0.07***	0.06***	0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.01	0.01	0.03	0.11**	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.02	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.05*	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.08**	0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.02	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	-0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Working	-0.03	-0.01	-0.12**	-0.03	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Not working	-0.05	-0.01	-0.10*	-0.02	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retiree	-0.07	-0.03	-0.11*	-0.04	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Self reported knowledge	0.01	0.03	0.05*	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.01	0.01	0.04	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects					
Redistribution T	-0.12***	-0.13***	-0.15***	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	-0.10***	-0.08**	-0.06	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Economist T	-0.09***	-0.12***	-0.15***	-0.06*	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics					
Control mean	0.42	0.47	0.53	0.70	0.75
Male control mean	0.37	0.43	0.50	0.75	0.82
Democrat control mean	0.39	0.42	0.50	0.69	0.74
Observations	2329	2314	2306	2312	2304

Notes: The dependent variables in each column are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent believes that the listed group/the respondent themselves/a women from the listed group would *mostly* win if the federal estate tax rate were cut. See the notes to Table OA-15 and Table OA-21. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-24: Which Groups Would Mostly Win If the Estate Tax were Cut?: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

	Poor households (1)	Working Class (2)	Middle Class (3)	Upper-middle Class (4)	Upper Class (5)
Panel A: Gender					
Redistribution T	-0.18***	-0.15***	-0.19***	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.09*	-0.04	-0.07	-0.11**	-0.13***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	-0.10**	-0.12***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	0.11*	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.09*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Female	-0.03	-0.07	0.02	0.14**	0.18***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Female	0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.12**	0.10**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Panel B: Political affiliation					
Redistribution T	-0.02	-0.06	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.09*	-0.04	-0.06	-0.03	-0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	-0.09*	-0.10**	-0.17***	-0.04	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Republican	0.13***	0.12***	0.13***	0.06	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Independent and others	0.06*	0.09**	0.06	0.05	0.07**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Republican	-0.12	-0.07	-0.11	0.01	-0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	-0.19***	-0.15**	-0.16**	0.01	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	0.04	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.01	-0.10	0.02	-0.05	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	-0.01	0.00	0.04	-0.04	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	0.00	-0.07	0.02	-0.00	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Male control mean	0.37	0.43	0.50	0.75	0.82
Observations	2329	2314	2306	2312	2304

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-23. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-25: Fairness Considerations about the Income Tax

	Wealth distribution unfair (1)	Inequality serious issue (2)	People rich due to luck (3)	High-income entitled to keep their income (4)
Panel A: Personal characteristics				
Republican	-0.42***	-0.38***	-0.34***	0.36***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.15***	0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.04**	-0.00	0.04**	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	-0.01	-0.05***	-0.04**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.06	-0.05	-0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.01	0.05*	0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Age 50-69	0.00	0.01	0.04	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.03	-0.06**	-0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-Income	-0.04**	-0.06**	-0.09***	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College	-0.02	0.06***	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	0.00	-0.01	0.05	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Working	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Not working	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retiree	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Self reported knowledge	-0.06***	-0.00	-0.04*	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.09***	-0.06**	-0.10***	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects				
Redistribution T	0.05	0.10***	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	0.02	0.06**	0.05*	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics				
Control mean	0.70	0.48	0.60	0.30
Observations	2781	2781	2780	2780

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Wealth distribution unfair:* the respondent thinks that money and wealth in the U.S. should be more evenly distributed; *Inequality serious issue:* the respondent believes that income inequality is a serious or very serious issue; *People rich due to luck:* the respondent believes that a person is rich because they had more advantages than others (as opposed to worked harder than others); *High-incomes entitled to keep their income:* the respondent believes that high-income individuals are entitled to keep a very large share of their income and should not have to pay high taxes, even if that means less government revenue is available to help low-income families make ends meet. Panel A reports the effects of various socio-demographic covariates. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses relative to the control group (*no video*). Panel C reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who saw the generic question formulation and no video ("Control mean"). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-26: Fairness Considerations about the Income Tax: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

	Wealth distribution unfair (1)	Inequality serious issue (2)	People rich due to luck (3)	High-income entitled to keep their income (4)
Panel A: Question Formulation				
Redistribution T	0.04	0.06	-0.02	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	-0.01	0.05	0.03	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Redistribution T × Female	0.02	0.07	0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Efficiency T × Female	0.01	0.04	0.04	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T × Female	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel B: Video treatment effects				
Redistribution T	0.00	0.14***	0.01	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	-0.05	0.03	0.00	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican	-0.47***	-0.38***	-0.36***	0.41***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.19***	-0.18***	-0.17***	0.20***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.10	-0.09	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.03	-0.03	0.01	-0.09
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Republican	0.06	-0.02	0.04	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.05	-0.04	0.06	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Economist T × Republican	0.14***	0.06	0.08	-0.12**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T × Independent and others	0.06	0.04	0.06	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Male control mean	0.68	0.49	0.59	0.32
Observations	2781	2781	2780	2780

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-25. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-27: Fairness Considerations about the Estate Tax

				Parents' side:		Children's side:		Trade-off:
	Wealth distribution unfair	Inequality serious issue	Person wealthy due to luck	Unfair tax estates of: hard workers	wealthy heirs	Fair that children from wealthy families: access better amenities	inherit more	Parents should pass on wealth even if unequal for children
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Personal characteristics								
Republican	-0.39***	-0.45***	-0.26***	0.25***	0.25***	0.20***	0.24***	0.27***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.14***	-0.19***	-0.09***	0.16***	0.11***	0.11***	0.16***	0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.06***	-0.01	0.07***	0.04*	0.03	-0.09***	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.07***	0.01	0.02	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	-0.04	-0.04	0.07*	0.15***	0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.07**	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.01	-0.05	-0.00	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.11***	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.02	0.00	-0.07***	0.02	0.01	0.06**	0.04	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College	0.02	0.04	0.05**	-0.07***	-0.03	0.00	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Economics related major	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.06*	0.09***	0.08**	0.04	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Working	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Not working	-0.01	0.04	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.03	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retiree	-0.05	-0.01	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.08	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Self reported knowledge	-0.08***	0.01	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.03	0.04	0.03	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Upper Class (self-reported)	-0.09***	-0.07**	-0.02	0.02	0.03	0.07**	0.06*	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects								
Redistribution T	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.05	0.03	-0.09**	-0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	-0.06*	-0.02	0.07*	0.03	0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.02	0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.05	-0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics								
Control mean	0.64	0.46	0.62	0.61	0.47	0.32	0.53	0.58
Observations	2358	2358	2357	2358	2358	2357	2357	2356

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Wealth distribution unfair:* the respondent believes that money and wealth in this country should be more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of the population; *Inequality serious issue:* the respondent believes that wealth inequality in the U.S. is a serious or very serious problem; *Person wealthy due to luck:* the respondent that a person is wealthy because they had more advantages than others (as opposed to worked harder than others); *Unfair tax estates of hard workers:* the respondent believes that it is somewhat unfair or very unfair to tax the estate of wealthy people who have worked hard and saved a lot in order to pass on wealth to their/her children; *Unfair tax estates of wealthy heirs:* the respondent believes that it is somewhat unfair or very unfair to tax the estate of people who are wealthy because they have inherited a lot from their parents; *Fair that children from wealthy families access better amenities:* the respondent believes that it is somewhat fair or very fair that children born in very wealthy families have access to better amenities; *Fair that children from wealthy families inherit more:* the respondent believes that it is somewhat fair or very fair that children born in very wealthy families inherit much more than children born in less wealthy families; *Parents should pass on wealth even if unequal for children:* the respondent believes that wealthy parents should be able to pass on all of her wealth to her children; as a result, some children will start their own life with much larger wealth just by virtue of being born in a richer family. Panel A reports the effects of various socio-demographic covariates. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses relative to the control group (*no video*). Panel C reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who saw the generic question formulation and no video ("Control mean"). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-28: Fairness Considerations about the Estate Tax: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

				Parents' side:		Children's side:		Trade-off:
	Wealth distribution unfair	Inequality serious issue	Person wealthy due to luck	Unfair tax estates of: hard workers	wealthy heirs	Fair that children from wealthy families: access better amenities	inherit more	Parents should pass on wealth even if unequal for children
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Gender								
Redistribution T	0.06	0.06	0.03	-0.06	-0.10**	0.04	-0.10**	-0.12**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.06	-0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04	-0.02	-0.03	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.05	-0.02	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	0.07**	-0.02	0.06**	0.03	0.04	-0.09***	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03	0.12**	0.10	-0.02	0.03	0.10*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Efficiency T × Female	-0.00	-0.00	0.05	0.00	-0.03	0.06	0.00	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Female	-0.01	0.06	0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.06	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Panel B: Political affiliation								
Redistribution T	-0.01	0.06	-0.02	-0.02	-0.07	0.07	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.05	0.02	0.05	-0.05	-0.09*	0.01	-0.02	-0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.00	0.06	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	-0.01	-0.09*	-0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican	-0.42***	-0.45***	-0.29***	0.22***	0.19***	0.19***	0.22***	0.23***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Independent and others	-0.15***	-0.13***	-0.08**	0.14***	0.08**	0.12***	0.16***	0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.14*	0.03	0.07	0.05	0.04	-0.14*	-0.10	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.03	-0.11	0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.04	-0.03	0.08	0.15**	0.24***	0.03	0.05	0.18**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.01	-0.12*	-0.04	0.10	0.13*	-0.01	-0.06	0.11
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	0.07	-0.03	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.11*	0.09	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	0.00	-0.12**	-0.02	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Male control mean	0.62	0.50	0.58	0.60	0.45	0.36	0.53	0.55
Observations	2358	2358	2357	2358	2358	2357	2357	2356

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-27. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's gender. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

FIGURE OA-12: WOULD A HIGHER INCOME TAX ENCOURAGE THE FOLLOWING? REPUBLICANS VS. DEMOCRATS



Notes: "pp" refers to "percentage points." Panels A, B, and C present the share of respondents who believe a given behavioral response by a certain group would be encouraged (either a *great deal*, *a lot*, or *a moderate amount*) if the federal personal income tax rate for said group were to increase. Panel A asks about tax increases for the respondents themselves (Me), the middle class (Middle Class) or the richest people in the economy (Top Earners). Panel C asks about tax increases for the richest people in the economy in the top panel (Top Earners) or the middle class in the bottom panel (Middle Class), but displays the responses of Republicans and Democrats separately. Panel B asks about tax increases for the richest people in the economy (Top Earners; Baseline) versus a woman among the richest people in the economy (Top Earners; Women) in the top panel and about tax increases for the middle class (Middle class; Baseline) versus a woman in the middle class (Middle class; Women) in the bottom panel. Intervals are based on a 90% level of confidence. Only respondents who saw no video treatment are included.

FIGURE OA-13: WOULD A HIGHER ESTATE TAX ENCOURAGE THE FOLLOWING? REPUBLICANS VS. DEMOCRATS



Notes: Panel A and B present the share of respondents who believe a given behavioral response by a certain group would be encouraged (either a *great deal*, *a lot*, or *a moderate amount*) if the federal estate tax rate for said group were to increase. Panel A asks about tax increases for the respondents themselves (Me), the currently young and not yet rich (Young), or very wealthy individuals (Wealthy). Panel B asks about tax increases for the currently young and not yet rich (Young; lower panel) and very wealthy individuals (Wealthy; upper panel), but displays the responses of Republicans and Democrats separately. Intervals are based on a 90% level of confidence. Only respondents who saw no video treatment are included.

Figure OA-14: Reasoning about Taxes: Efficiency Costs, and Fairness Considerations

(a) Efficiency Costs of the Income Tax



(b) Efficiency Costs of the Estate Tax

(c) Fairness Considerations About the Income Tax



(d) Fairness Considerations About the Estate Tax



Notes: The graph shows, for the different subgroups indicated in the legends, the share of respondents who agree with the statement reported on the y-axis in the income and estate tax survey. Intervals are based on a 90% level of confidence. Democrats and Republicans refers to the political affiliation of the respondent. The graph includes only respondents who were not assigned to any of the video courses. See Tables OA-19, OA-25, and OA-27 for regression analysis of the variables on the y-axis; the notes to these Tables report a more precise definition of the variables on the y-axis.

OA-6.2 Policy Outcomes of Income and Estate Tax

Table OA-29: Income Policy Views Index Regressed on Individual Mechanisms (Standardized Variables)

	Policy index
Rich people encouraged to evade taxes	0.00
	(0.01)
Middle class encouraged to evade taxes	0.01
	(0.01)
Rich people encouraged to work less	-0.01
	(0.01)
Middle class encouraged to work less	0.01
	(0.01)
Rich people encouraged to stop working	0.01
	(0.01)
Middle class encouraged to stop working	-0.01
	(0.01)
Rich people encouraged to have spouse stop working	0.00
	(0.01)
Middle class encouraged to have spouse stop working	-0.00
	(0.01)
Rich people encouraged to move state	0.01
	(0.01)
Middle class encouraged to save less	0.02
	(0.01)
Rich people encouraged to be less entreprenurial	0.00
	(0.01)
Middle class encouraged to be less entreprenurial	-0.02
	(0.01)
↑ Taxes on high-income hurt economy	-0.06***
	(0.01)
Laffer effect high-incomes	-0.05***
	(0.01)
Laffer effect middle class	0.00
	(0.01)
Believe in trickle down	-0.06***
	(0.01)
Poor households would lose if overall taxes were ↑	-0.00
	(0.01)
Working class would lose if overall taxes were ↑	-0.04***
	(0.01)
Wealth distribution should more evenly distributed	0.05***
	(0.01)
Inequality is serious issue	0.12***
	(0.01)
Share of national income owned by top 1%	0.02**
	(0.01)
Share of income owned by top 1% has increased over the past 30 years	0.04***
	(0.01)
Believe person rich due to luck	0.01
	(0.01)
Believe high-incomes entitled to keep their income	-0.14***
	(0.01)
Trust government	0.07***
	(0.01)
Government should do more to solve the country's problem	0.05***
	(0.01)
Government should take active steps to improve the lives of citizens	0.12***
	(0.01)
Misperception top tax rate	-0.00
	(0.01)
Misperception top tax in 1950s	-0.01
	(0.01)
Misperception state top tax rate	0.01
	(0.01)
Misperception top tax threshold	0.01
	(0.01)
Misperception average tax median household	0.01
	(0.01)
Misperception average tax in top bracket	0.00
	(0.01)
Misperception share of households in top bracket	0.03**
	(0.01)
Misperception share of households paying no income tax	-0.00
	(0.01)
Control Group Mean	-0.00
Observations	2784

Notes: The table reports regressions of the policy view index of the income tax on the individual components of the mechanisms indices, treatment indicators and personal characteristics of the respondents (not shown for the sake of space). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure OA-15: Policy views: Decomposition, Including Factors Separately

(a) Income



(b) Estate



Notes: Each line in this figure shows the coefficient, with confidence intervals, from the regression of the policy index on the single mechanisms variable indicated on the y-axis, personal characteristics, and treatment indicators.

Figure OA-16: Policy Views: Decomposition, Omitting Individual Characteristics

(a) Income Tax



(b) Estate Tax



Notes: The figure shows the coefficients from the regression of the policy index on the mechanisms indices and on treatment indicators. Individual covariates (sex, age, income, political affiliation, education, employment status) are not included in the regression.

Table OA-30: Estate Policy View Index Regressed on Individual Mechanisms (Standardized Variables)

	Policy Index
Misperception unrealized capital gains	-0.04***
	(0.01)
Misperception number of households paying estate tax out of 1,000	0.00
	(0.01)
Misperception exemption threshold	-0.03**
	(0.01)
Misperception estate tax rate	-0.01
	(0.01)
Misperception estate tax rate 1950	-0.05***
	(0.01)
Rich people encouraged to evade taxes if taxes ↑	0.02*
	(0.01)
Young people encouraged to evade taxes if taxes ↑	-0.00
	(0.01)
Rich people encouraged to work less if taxes ↑	-0.00
	(0.02)
Young people encouraged to work less if taxes ↑	-0.01
	(0.02)
Rich people encouraged to stop working if taxes ↑	0.00
	(0.02)
Young people encouraged to stop working if taxes ↑	0.01
	(0.02)
Rich people encouraged to have spouse stop working if taxes ↑	-0.00
	(0.02)
Young people encouraged to have spouse stop working if taxes ↑	0.01
	(0.02)
Rich people encouraged to move state if taxes ↑	0.01
	(0.01)
Young people encouraged to save less if taxes ↑	-0.03*
	(0.01)
Rich people encouraged to be less entreprenurial if taxes ↑	-0.01
	(0.02)
Young people encouraged to be less entreprenurial if taxes ↑	-0.01
	(0.02)
Rich people encouraged to save less if taxes ↑	0.03*
	(0.01)
Young people encouraged to save less if taxes ↑	-0.01
	(0.02)
↑ Estate tax hurt economy	-0.04***
	(0.01)
Laffer effect	-0.03***
	(0.01)
Poor households would win if estate tax were cut	0.06***
	(0.02)
Working class would win if estate tax were cut	-0.06***
	(0.02)
Share of wealth owned by top 0.1% has increased over the past 30 years	0.02**
	(0.01)
Wealth distribution should be more evenly distributed	0.03**
	(0.01)
Inequality serious issue	0.08***
	(0.01)
Believe person wealthy due to luck	-0.02
	(0.01)
Perceived % of wealth inherited	0.03**
	(0.01)
Unfair tax estates of wealthy heirs	-0.13***
	(0.01)
Unfair tax estates of hard workers	-0.13***
	(0.01)
Fair that children from wealthy families access better amenities	0.01
	(0.01)
Fair that children from wealthy families inherit more	-0.06***
	(0.01)
Parents should even if unequal for children	-0.14***
	(0.01)
Trust government	0.09***
	(0.01)
Government should do more to solve the country's problem	0.03**
	(0.01)
Government should take active steps to improve the lives of citizens	0.08***
	(0.01)
Control Group Mean	0.00
Observations	2360

Notes: The table reports regressions of the policy view index of the estate tax on the individual components of the mechanisms indices, treatment indicators and personal characteristics of the respondents (not shown for the sake of space). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-31: Policy Views on the Income Tax

	Income tax fair	Satisfied income tax	Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to increase investment	Government responsible to ↓ inequality	Policy index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Personal characteristics							
Republican	0.22***	0.23***	-0.32***	-0.41***	-0.10***	-0.35***	-0.61***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Independent and others	0.06***	0.09***	-0.18***	-0.27***	-0.08***	-0.23***	-0.39***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Female	-0.07***	-0.04**	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.10***	-0.03	-0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	0.03	0.05***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Black	0.08**	0.05	-0.02	-0.03	-0.07	0.02	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Hispanic	0.11***	0.08**	-0.03	-0.05	-0.09**	0.02	-0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Age 30-49	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.01	0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.13***	-0.16***	-0.05**	-0.11***	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.05*	0.01	-0.03	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.03	-0.00	-0.03	-0.07***	0.08***	-0.07***	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
College	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.03	0.07***	0.04**	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Working	-0.04	0.04	-0.00	-0.06	-0.09*	-0.01	-0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Not working	-0.02	0.05	0.00	-0.02	-0.12**	0.04	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Retiree	-0.06	0.03	0.07	-0.02	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Panel B: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	0.01	0.02	0.11***	0.04	0.05*	0.09***	0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.00	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Economist T	-0.02	-0.04*	0.06**	0.05*	0.06**	0.06**	0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.31	0.30	0.67	0.57	0.55	0.43	-0.00
Observations	2783	2782	2784	2783	2783	2780	2784

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Income tax fair:* the respondent believes that the current U.S. federal income tax system is somewhat fair or very fair; *Satisfied income tax:* the respondent is somewhat satisfied or very satisfied with the current U.S. federal income tax system; *Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality:* the respondent believes that a progressive tax system in which people with higher incomes pay a higher share of income in taxes than people/women with lower incomes is an important tool to reduce income inequality; *Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes:* the respondent supports or strongly supports raising federal income taxes on higher income households to expand programs that support lower-income individuals; *Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to increase investment:* the respondent supports or strongly supports raising federal income taxes on higher income households to increase investment in the U.S. *Government responsible to ↓ inequality:* the respondent thinks the government has a responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor. See the notes to Table OA-15. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-32: Policy Views on the Income Tax: Underlying Reasoning

	Income tax fair (1)	Satisfied income tax (2)	Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality (3)	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes (4)	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to increase investment (5)	Government responsible to ↓ inequality (6)	Policy index (7)
Panel A: Personal characteristics							
Republican	0.22***	0.23***	-0.32***	-0.41***	-0.10***	-0.35***	-0.61***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 30-49	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.01	0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.13***	-0.16***	-0.05**	-0.11***	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.05*	0.01	-0.03	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.03	-0.00	-0.03	-0.07***	0.08***	-0.07***	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Panel B: Underlying mechanisms							
Republican	0.10***	0.10***	-0.05***	-0.13***	0.04	-0.10***	-0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Overestimate level of taxes	0.15***	0.15***	0.04***	0.03*	-0.01	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Taxes lead to changes in behaviors	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03**	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Higher taxes hurt the economy	-0.02*	-0.03**	-0.08***	-0.04***	-0.04**	-0.05***	-0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Believe in trickle-down	-0.02*	-0.03**	-0.05***	-0.07***	-0.05***	-0.01	-0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Think inequality is serious problem	-0.19***	-0.19***	0.11***	0.14***	0.08***	0.16***	0.25***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Believe person rich due to luck	-0.07***	-0.06***	0.02***	0.02**	-0.01	0.02**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Believe high-incomes entitled to keep their income	0.01	0.02*	-0.12***	-0.10***	-0.03***	-0.05***	-0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trust the government	0.08***	0.07***	0.09***	0.15***	0.09***	0.21***	0.27***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Panel C: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	0.01	0.02	0.11***	0.04	0.05*	0.09***	0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.00	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Economist T	-0.02	-0.04*	0.06**	0.05*	0.06**	0.06**	0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.31	0.30 m	0.67	0.57	0.55	0.43	-0.00
Male control mean	0.34	0.32	0.66	0.57	0.58	0.44	0.02
Democrat control mean	0.21	0.20	0.84	0.80	0.59	0.63	0.33
Observations	2783	2782	2784	2783	2783	2780	2784

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Income tax fair:* the respondent believes that the current U.S. federal income tax system is somewhat fair or very fair; *Satisfied income tax:* the respondent is somewhat satisfied or very satisfied with the current U.S. federal income tax system; *Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality:* the respondent believes that a progressive tax system in which people with higher incomes pay a higher share of income in taxes than people/women with lower incomes is an important tool to reduce income inequality; *Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes:* the respondent supports or strongly supports raising federal income taxes on higher income households to expand programs that support lower-income individuals; *Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to increase investment:* the respondent supports or strongly supports raising federal income taxes on higher income households to increase investment in the U.S. *Government responsible to ↓ inequality:* the respondent thinks the government has a responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor. See the notes to Table OA-15. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-33: Policy Views on the Income Tax: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

	Income tax fair	Satisfied income tax	Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to increase investment	Government responsible to ↓ inequality	Policy index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Gender							
Redistribution T	0.01	0.00	0.13***	0.05	0.03	0.07*	0.14**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Efficiency T	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Economist T	-0.03	-0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.06*	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Female	-0.06**	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03	-0.11***	-0.03	-0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Redistribution T × Female	-0.01	0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.05	0.04	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Efficiency T × Female	-0.04	-0.05	-0.09*	-0.07	-0.05	-0.06	-0.13*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Economist T × Female	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Panel B: Political affiliation							
Redistribution T	-0.03	-0.01	0.05	0.03	-0.00	0.11**	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Efficiency T	0.06	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Economist T	0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.06	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Republican	0.24***	0.23***	-0.34***	-0.43***	-0.10***	-0.36***	-0.63***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Independent and others	0.08***	0.07**	-0.21***	-0.30***	-0.12***	-0.22***	-0.44***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.07	0.05	0.06	-0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.05	0.05	0.12*	0.06	0.15**	-0.05	0.14
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.10	-0.04	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.03	0.09	-0.00	0.02	0.14*	-0.01	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Economist T × Republican	-0.08	-0.01	0.06	0.08	-0.04	0.02	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.07	-0.02	0.05	0.06	0.03	-0.01	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Male control mean	0.34	0.32	0.66	0.57	0.58	0.44	0.02
Observations	2783	2782	2784	2783	2783	2780	2784

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-31. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-34: Policy Views of the Estate Tax

	Estate tax system fair	Satisfied with estate tax	Estate tax should exist	Estate tax should be increased	↑ Estate tax good way to ↓ inequality	Government responsible to ↓ wealth transm.	Policy index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Personal characteristics							
Republican	0.06**	0.07***	-0.29***	-0.28***	-0.28***	-0.18***	-0.54***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Independent and others	-0.02	-0.02	-0.19***	-0.17***	-0.16***	-0.12***	-0.34***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Female	-0.02	-0.00	-0.03	-0.08***	-0.03	-0.08***	-0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Has children	0.02	0.04**	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Black	0.02	0.10**	-0.05	-0.06	-0.07	0.03	-0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Hispanic	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Age 30-49	-0.04	-0.09***	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 50-69	-0.12***	-0.16***	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.20***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	0.00	0.00	0.04	-0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
High-Income	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
College	0.02	0.04*	0.07***	0.09***	0.00	0.03*	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Working	0.02	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Not working	0.03	0.06	0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Retiree	-0.00	0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Panel B: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	-0.04	-0.03	0.05	0.07**	0.14***	0.03	0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.08**	0.01	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.08***	0.12***	0.02	0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.40	0.36	0.56	0.31	0.53	0.28	0.00
Observations	2358	2356	2359	2359	2357	2355	2360

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Estate tax system fair:* the respondent believes that the current U.S. federal estate tax system is somewhat fair or very fair; *Satisfied with estate tax:* the respondent is somewhat satisfied or very satisfied with the current U.S. federal estate tax system; *Estate tax should exist:* the respondent believes that there should be a federal estate tax in the U.S.; *Estate tax should be increased:* conditional on believing that there should be a federal estate tax (see previous variable), the respondent thinks that the federal estate tax should be increased; ↑ *Estate tax good way to* ↓ *inequality:* the respondent believes that increasing the estate tax is a good way or it is one of the best ways to reduce wealth inequality; *Government responsible to* ↓ *wealth transm:* the respondent thinks the government should have responsibility in reducing inter-generational wealth transmission. See the notes to Table OA-15. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-35: Policy Views on the Estate Tax: Underlying Reasoning

	Estate tax system fair	Satisfied with estate tax	Estate tax should exist	Estate tax should be increased	↑ Estate tax good way to ↓ inequality	Government responsible to ↓ wealth transm.	Policy index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Personal Characteristics							
Republican	0.06**	0.07***	-0.29***	-0.28***	-0.28***	-0.18***	-0.54***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.04	-0.09***	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 50-69	-0.12***	-0.16***	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.20***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	0.00	0.00	0.04	-0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
High-Income	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Panel B: Underlying mechanisms							
Republican	0.05*	0.04	-0.06**	-0.06***	-0.08***	0.00	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Overestimate level of taxes	0.03	0.01	-0.05**	-0.13***	0.01	-0.05***	-0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Taxes lead to changes in behaviors	0.00	0.01	-0.04***	-0.01	0.05***	0.03**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Higher taxes hurt the economy	-0.03**	-0.02	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.07***	0.01	-0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Believe in trickle-down	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Think inequality is serious problem	-0.12***	-0.12***	0.04***	0.09***	0.01	0.06***	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Perceived % of wealth inherited	0.01	0.01	0.02*	0.01*	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Believe person wealthy due to luck	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.01	-0.02**	-0.00	-0.02*	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unfair to tax parents	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.18***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.09***	-0.27***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Fair that children from wealthy families inherit more	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05***	-0.03**	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trade-off: parents should pass on wealth even if unequal for children	0.02	0.01	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trust the government	0.06***	0.06***	0.08***	0.08***	0.11***	0.15***	0.22***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel C: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	-0.04	-0.03	0.05	0.07**	0.14***	0.03	0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.08**	0.01	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.08***	0.12***	0.02	0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.40	0.36	0.56	0.31	0.53	0.28	0.00
Male control mean	0.43	0.41	0.62	0.36	0.54	0.30	0.08
Democrat control mean	0.40	0.38	0.67	0.43	0.65	0.39	0.24
Observations	2358	2356	2359	2359	2357	2355	2360

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Estate tax system fair:* the respondent believes that the current U.S. federal estate tax system is somewhat fair or very fair; *Satisfied with estate tax:* the respondent is somewhat satisfied or very satisfied with the current U.S. federal estate tax system; *Estate tax should exist:* the respondent believes that there should be a federal estate tax in the U.S.; *Estate tax should be increased:* conditional on believing that there should be a federal estate tax (see previous variable), the respondent thinks that the federal estate tax should be increased; ↑ *Estate tax good way to* ↓ *inequality:* the respondent believes that increasing the estate tax is a good way or it is one of the best ways to reduce wealth inequality; *Government responsible to* ↓ *wealth transm:* the respondent thinks the government should have responsibility in reducing inter-generational wealth transmission. See the notes to Table OA-15. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-36: Policy Views on the Estate Tax: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

	Estate tax system fair	Satisfied with estate tax	Estate tax should exist	Estate tax should be increased	↑ Estate tax good way to ↓ inequality	Government responsible to ↓ wealth transm.	Policy index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Gender							
Redistribution T	-0.04	-0.07	0.11**	0.16***	0.13***	0.06	0.24***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Efficiency T	0.04	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02	0.07	0.03	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Economist T	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.07*	0.08**	0.01	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Female	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05*	-0.08***	-0.05*	-0.07**	-0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Female	0.01	0.07	-0.09	-0.16***	0.01	-0.05	-0.16*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Efficiency T × Female	-0.07	0.02	0.09	0.06	0.02	-0.05	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Economist T × Female	0.07	0.07	0.08*	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Panel B: Political affiliation							
Redistribution T	-0.07	-0.02	0.08	0.09*	0.17***	-0.01	0.17**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Efficiency T	-0.01	0.03	0.10*	0.09*	0.12**	0.03	0.18**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Economist T	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.13***	0.18***	0.03	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Republican	0.05	0.07*	-0.27***	-0.25***	-0.26***	-0.17***	-0.50***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Independent and others	-0.05	-0.03	-0.18***	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.14***	-0.29***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.07	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.00	0.09	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.03	-0.04	-0.05	-0.06	-0.10	0.06	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Efficiency T × Republican	0.02	-0.01	-0.16**	-0.13*	-0.07	-0.07	-0.23**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.04	-0.03	-0.09	-0.12*	-0.06	0.01	-0.14
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Economist T × Republican	0.00	0.03	0.04	-0.07	-0.05	-0.03	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Economist T × Independent and others	0.08	0.10*	0.02	-0.08	-0.12**	0.02	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Male control mean	0.43	0.41	0.62	0.36	0.54	0.30	0.08
Observations	2358	2356	2359	2359	2357	2355	2360

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-34. Panel A reports the treatment effects of the question formulation interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. Panel B reports the treatment effects of the video courses interacted with the respondent's political affiliation. The full set of controls is included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-37: Policy Views on Income and Estate Taxes

	Pay less than fair share		Support higher taxation to fund				
	High Incomes	Middle Class	Transfers to people out of work	Better Schools	Retraining Programs	Healthcare Subsidies	Wage Subsidies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
[Income Tax] Panel A: Underlying mechanisms							
Republican	-0.04**	0.04	-0.08***	-0.14***	-0.04*	-0.18***	-0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Misperception index	-0.06***	0.03	0.01	-0.16***	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Efficiency index	-0.12***	-0.11***	0.05***	-0.03*	0.03	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Redistribution index	0.23***	-0.02	0.11***	0.23***	0.18***	0.26***	0.23***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Government trust index	0.03**	0.04***	0.15***	0.11***	0.09***	0.14***	0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
[Income Tax] Panel B: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	0.03	0.06*	0.03	-0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.05*	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	-0.00	0.04*	0.04	-0.02	0.04*	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
[Income Tax] Panel C: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.78	0.36	0.26	0.62	0.33	0.42	0.42
Male Control mean	0.76	0.36	0.31	0.59	0.33	0.41	0.40
Democrat Control mean	0.91	0.36	0.38	0.76	0.42	0.62	0.61
Observations	2782	2781	2780	2779	2780	2780	2779
[Estate Tax] Panel D: Underlying mechanisms							
Republican	-0.18***	-0.01	-0.09***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.15***	-0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Misperception index	-0.03	0.05**	-0.06***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.09***	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Efficiency index	-0.10***	-0.08***	0.07***	-0.04***	0.03*	-0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Redistribution index	0.35***	-0.01	0.09***	0.21***	0.10***	0.21***	0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Government trust index	0.01	0.03*	0.15***	0.09***	0.11***	0.12***	0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
[Estate Tax] Panel E: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	-0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.06*	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	-0.06*	-0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.02	0.06*	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
[Estate Tax] Panel F: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.57	0.47	0.25	0.56	0.34	0.36	0.36
Male Control mean	0.56	0.49	0.30	0.57	0.38	0.36	0.32
Democrat Control mean	0.73	0.56	0.34	0.72	0.45	0.54	0.53
Observations	2357	2356	2356	2356	2355	2356	2356

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Pay less than fair share - High Incomes (Middle Class):* the respondent believes that high income, upper-class (middle class) households in the U.S. today pay their fair share, *less*, or *much less* than their fair share in income taxes; *Support higher taxation to fund:* the respondent would like the service to receive increased funding (even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas); *Transfers to people out of work:* transfers and income support programs for those out of work; *Better schools:* better schools for children from low-income families; *Retraining programs:* income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade; *Healthcare subsidies:* subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care; *Wage subsidies:* wage subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages. Panels A, B, and C refer to results from the Income Tax survey, whereas Panels D, E, and F refer to results from the Estate Tax survey. Panels B and D "Underlying mechanisms" show the effect of the indices summarizing the underlying reasoning of the respondents. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-38: General Policy Views [Income Tax Survey]

	Pay less than fair share		Support higher taxation to fund				
	High Incomes	Middle Class	Transfers to people out of work	Better Schools	Retraining Programs	Healthcare Subsidies	Wage Subsidies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Personal characteristics							
Republican	-0.20***	-0.01	-0.19***	-0.33***	-0.17***	-0.37***	-0.31***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	-0.05**	0.02	-0.15***	-0.20***	-0.10***	-0.25***	-0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.04**	-0.03	-0.07***	0.02	-0.04**	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	-0.03*	-0.04*	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.06*	0.07	0.16***	-0.04	0.00	0.07*	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.02	-0.04	0.00	-0.02	0.04	-0.01	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.08***	-0.10***	-0.06**	-0.09***	0.02	-0.02	-0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.01	-0.05*	-0.07***	0.02	-0.01	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-Income	-0.06***	-0.04*	-0.09***	-0.00	-0.01	-0.11***	-0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College	-0.05***	-0.04**	0.06***	0.07***	0.05**	0.04*	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Working	-0.03	-0.06	0.02	-0.12**	-0.07	-0.04	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Not working	-0.02	0.01	0.08	-0.07	-0.04	0.05	0.12**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retiree	-0.02	-0.06	0.09*	-0.08	-0.03	-0.01	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Panel B: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	0.03	0.06*	0.03	-0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	-0.04	0.00	-0.01	-0.05	0.02	-0.05*	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	-0.00	0.05*	0.04	-0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.78	0.36	0.26	0.62	0.33	0.42	0.42
Male Control mean	0.76	0.36	0.31	0.59	0.33	0.41	0.40
Democrat Control mean	0.91	0.36	0.38	0.76	0.42	0.62	0.61
Observations	2783	2782	2781	2780	2781	2781	2780

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Pay less than fair share - High Incomes (Middle Class):* the respondent believes that high income, upper-class (middle class) households in the U.S. today pay *less* or *much less* than their fair share in income taxes; *Support higher taxation to fund:* the respondent would like the service to receive increased funding (even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas); *Transfers to people out of work:* transfers and income support programs for those out of work; *Better schools: better schools for children from low-income families*; *Retraining programs:* income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade; *Healthcare subsidies:* subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care; *Wage subsidies:* wage subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-39: General Policy Views [Estate Tax Survey]

	Pay less than fair share		Support higher taxation to fund				
	High Incomes	Middle Class	Transfers to people out of work	Better Schools	Retraining Programs	Healthcare Subsidies	Wage Subsidies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Personal characteristics							
Republican	-0.36***	-0.02	-0.20***	-0.30***	-0.23***	-0.32***	-0.28***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Independent and others	-0.17***	0.00	-0.14***	-0.17***	-0.14***	-0.19***	-0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.04**	-0.02	-0.07***	0.06***	-0.04**	0.03*	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	-0.05**	-0.00	0.04*	0.01	-0.00	-0.04**	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.07*	0.07*	0.04	-0.03	-0.05	0.04	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.10**	0.07*	0.06*	-0.03	0.03	0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.06**	-0.08***	-0.02	0.01	-0.00	0.03	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.11***	-0.12***	-0.06**	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.03	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.04	-0.05**	-0.10***	-0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.02	-0.08***	-0.06***	-0.03	-0.04	-0.09***	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
College	-0.04	-0.02	0.05***	0.07***	0.09***	0.03	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Working	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Not working	0.04	0.02	0.00	-0.06	0.01	0.05	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retiree	0.04	0.02	-0.07	-0.04	0.06	-0.02	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Panel B: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.00	0.05	0.07*	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	-0.06*	-0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.06*	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.57	0.47	0.25	0.56	0.34	0.36	0.36
Observations	2357	2356	2356	2356	2355	2356	2356

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-38. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

OA-6.3 Views on Government for Income and Estate Taxes

Table OA-40: Views on Government [Income Tax Survey]

	Trust	Purposes	Involvment	Cents wasted	Satisfaction	Trust govt (index)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Personal Characteristics						
Republican	0.08***	-0.48***	-0.36***	3.00*	0.28***	-0.50***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.65)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Independent and others	-0.00	-0.31***	-0.33***	1.51	0.09***	-0.43***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.61)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Female	-0.05***	0.03*	-0.06***	2.71***	-0.04**	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.96)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	0.02	-0.04**	0.00	2.38**	0.03*	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Black	0.03	0.01	0.07*	1.80	0.04	0.07
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2.11)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Hispanic	0.07**	0.03	0.08**	0.87	0.09***	0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2.01)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Age 30-49	-0.01	0.04	0.04*	2.42*	-0.02	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(1.34)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.11***	0.04	-0.04	2.96**	-0.14***	-0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.46)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	0.02	-0.03	-0.05**	-1.37	0.02	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.29)	(0.02)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.03	-0.06***	-0.03	-3.78***	0.02	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.21)	(0.02)	(0.03)
College	-0.01	0.02	0.02	-2.96***	-0.03**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Working	-0.00	-0.00	-0.03	3.40	0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.63)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Not working	-0.07	0.02	0.02	2.75	-0.00	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.78)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Retiree	-0.04	-0.02	0.03	2.35	0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(3.03)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Panel B: Video treatment effects						
Redistribution T	0.06	0.04	0.10**	-5.02*	-0.01	0.15**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.59)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Efficiency T	0.04	-0.07	-0.01	0.20	0.00	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.80)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Economist T	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.20	-0.00	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.00	-0.04	-0.11	5.41	0.00	-0.10
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.62)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.01	-0.02	-0.05	5.70	0.02	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.56)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.03	0.09	0.06	2.00	-0.04	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.70)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.07	0.07	0.02	3.88	0.00	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.65)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Economist T × Republican	-0.01	0.04	0.05	-1.25	-0.03	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.87)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.07	0.10**	0.09*	3.99	-0.03	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.73)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics						
Control mean	0.21	0.43	0.43	53.39	0.23	-0.00
Observations	2783	2783	2780	2780	2782	2784

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if: *Trust:* respondent believes they can trust the government doing the right thing almost always or a lot of the time; *Purposes:* respondent thinks the government should do more to solve the country's problems; *Involvement:* respondent thinks the government should take active steps to improve the lives of its citizens (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means the government should take active steps); *Cents Wasted:* cents wasted of every tax dollar that goes to the federal government in Washington, D.C.; *Satisfaction:* respondent is very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the way the federal government in Washington is dealing with the country's problems. Questions are asked with the generic formulation. The dependent variables in column 6 is a summary index, constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007), that combines the variables in columns 1-3, with the sign oriented so that a higher index means more trust in government and a stronger belief that the scope of government should be broad. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-41: Views on Government: Should the Government be Responsible For the Following? [Income Tax Survey]

	Reducing income inequality (1)	Reducing wealth transmission (2)	Health Care (3)	Reducing opportunity differential (4)	Regulating trade (5)	Financial system stability (6)	Dollar stability (7)	Minimum living standard (8)
Panel A: Personal Characteristics								
Republican	-0.36***	-0.15***	-0.43***	-0.37***	-0.05	-0.12***	-0.09***	-0.41***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Independent and others	-0.22***	-0.12***	-0.24***	-0.23***	-0.11***	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.03	-0.06***	0.04**	0.01	0.04*	0.02	0.04**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	0.02	0.09**	0.04	0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.07**	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.02	0.09**	0.00	0.04	-0.00	-0.10***	-0.05	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Other	0.08***	0.08***	-0.01	0.00	-0.06**	-0.02	-0.08***	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 30-49	0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.04*	0.04	0.03	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.09***	-0.08***	0.00	-0.10***	0.04	0.04	0.05*	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.03	-0.04*	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.03	0.05**	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-Income	-0.07***	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.00	0.04	0.03*	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
College	0.04**	0.01	0.05***	0.02	0.00	0.07***	0.04**	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Working	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.09*	0.05	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Not working	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.04	-0.01	0.11**	0.06	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retiree	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.11**	0.10*	-0.00
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Panel B: Video treatment effects								
Redistribution T	0.11**	0.12***	-0.04	-0.00	-0.07	0.01	-0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.01	0.02	-0.04	-0.09*	-0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.06	0.07*	-0.06	0.01	-0.04	-0.07*	-0.06*	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Redistribution T × Republican	-0.02	-0.12*	0.01	-0.04	0.08	-0.08	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	-0.05	-0.10	0.09	0.02	0.03	-0.06	-0.02	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	0.05	-0.01	0.09	0.07	0.01	-0.04	-0.07	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02	0.04	-0.03	-0.07	-0.06	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	0.02	-0.06	0.06	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.01	-0.08	0.07	-0.02	0.05	0.04	0.08*	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics								
Control mean	0.43	0.25	0.66	0.49	0.68	0.72	0.78	0.56
Observations	2780	2780	2780	2779	2780	2780	2779	2780

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent believes the government should have responsibility in the given area, defined as answering either 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 means "no responsibility at all", 5 means "total responsibility"). Areas: *Reducing income inequality:* responsibility to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor; *Reducing wealth transmission:* responsibility to reduce inter-generational wealth transmission; *Health care:* responsibility to make sure Americans have adequate health care; *Reducing opportunity diff.:* responsibility to reduce the differences in opportunity between children from wealthy and poor families; *Regulating Trade:* responsibility to regulate trade to and from the U.S. to protect American producers and consumers; *Financial System Stability:* responsibility to maintain a stable financial system and ensure that credit markets work; *Dollar stability:* responsibility to ensure a stable dollar; *Minimum living standard:* responsibility to provide a minimum standard of living for all. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-42: Views on Government [Estate Tax Survey]

	Trust	Purposes	Involvment	Cents wasted	Satisfaction	Trust govt (index)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Personal characteristics						
Republican	0.03	-0.45***	-0.38***	5.42***	0.25***	-0.53***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(1.86)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Independent and others	-0.06*	-0.26***	-0.27***	6.44***	0.03	-0.39***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.78)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Female	-0.06***	0.04**	-0.08***	2.87***	-0.05***	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	0.06***	-0.07***	0.04**	0.84	0.05***	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.08)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Black	0.15***	0.03	0.03	-1.63	0.08**	0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(2.15)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Hispanic	0.04	0.00	0.07*	1.08	0.07**	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(1.99)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Age 30-49	-0.06**	0.04	0.01	2.69*	-0.10***	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.44)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 50-69	-0.14***	0.03	-0.06*	3.85**	-0.16***	-0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.55)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	-0.00	-0.03	-0.04	-1.32	-0.02	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.32)	(0.02)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.00	-0.04	-0.06**	-2.09	-0.00	-0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(1.29)	(0.02)	(0.03)
College	0.05**	-0.02	0.02	-3.88***	-0.01	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(1.09)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Working	0.04	-0.03	0.06	-1.22	0.07*	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.48)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Not working	0.02	0.01	0.04	-1.84	0.04	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.66)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Retiree	0.03	-0.02	0.06	-3.80	0.03	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(2.88)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Panel B: Video treatment effects						
Redistribution T	-0.09*	0.03	0.03	2.66	0.04	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.71)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Efficiency T	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.09	0.04	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(2.71)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Economist T	-0.04	0.03	0.00	1.95	0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(2.30)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.17**	0.02	0.10	-6.35*	0.01	0.21**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.78)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	0.06	0.00	-0.03	-6.14*	0.01	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.54)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Efficiency T × Republican	0.02	0.02	0.02	-1.91	0.01	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.62)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	0.05	-0.06	-0.01	-1.83	0.00	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(3.56)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Economist T × Republican	0.02	-0.01	0.04	-0.97	0.02	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(2.95)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Economist T × Independent and others	0.07	-0.06	-0.04	-4.28	0.10**	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(2.85)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics						
Control mean	0.25	0.44	0.41	58.78	0.21	0.00
Observations	2358	2357	2356	2354	2357	2360

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-40. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-43: Views on Government: Should the Government be Responsible For the Following? [Estate Tax Survey]

	Reducing income inequality	Reducing wealth transmission	Health Care	Reducing opportunity differential	Regulating trade	Financial system stability	Dollar stability	Minimum living standard
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Personal characteristics								
Republican	-0.27***	-0.17***	-0.38***	-0.33***	0.00	-0.12***	-0.04	-0.38***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Independent and others	-0.11***	-0.14***	-0.21***	-0.21***	-0.06	-0.09***	-0.08**	-0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Female	-0.07***	-0.07***	0.06***	0.01	0.04*	-0.01	0.04**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	0.03	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	0.05	0.03	-0.04	0.09**	-0.00	-0.08*	-0.07*	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.03	-0.05	-0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	0.00	-0.03	0.06**	0.00	0.10***	0.07***	0.08***	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.09***	-0.11***	0.01	-0.08***	0.09***	0.07**	0.08***	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.00	0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
College	0.02	0.03*	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.06***	0.03	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Working	-0.06	-0.00	-0.02	-0.00	-0.08	-0.02	0.04	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Not working	-0.07	-0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.05	-0.01	0.03	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retiree	-0.09	-0.03	0.02	0.00	-0.05	0.02	0.06	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Panel B: Video treatment effects								
Redistribution T	0.05	-0.01	-0.07	-0.03	-0.01	-0.05	0.02	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.05	0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.06	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.02	0.03	-0.04	0.02	0.07	-0.03	0.01	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Redistribution T × Republican	0.03	0.09	0.18**	0.12	-0.00	-0.01	-0.04	0.15**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Redistribution T × Independent and others	-0.16**	0.06	0.03	0.11	0.04	-0.03	-0.04	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Republican	-0.06	-0.07	-0.02	0.03	-0.07	-0.03	0.02	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Efficiency T × Independent and others	-0.07	0.01	0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.06	0.07	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Economist T × Republican	-0.06	-0.03	-0.00	-0.06	-0.08	-0.05	-0.09*	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Economist T × Independent and others	-0.13**	0.02	0.02	-0.06	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.05	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics								
Control mean	0.43	0.28	0.66	0.47	0.63	0.74	0.76	0.55
Observations	2357	2355	2355	2356	2353	2356	2355	2354

Notes: The dependent variables are indicator variables. See the notes to Table OA-41. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-44: What Type of Reasoning Predicts Political Affiliation?

	Probability of being Republican	
	Income Tax	Estate Tax
	(1)	(2)
Overestimate level of taxes	0.08***	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Taxes lead to changes in behaviors	0.02*	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Higher taxes hurt the economy	0.06***	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Believe in trickle-down	0.02*	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Think inequality is serious problem	-0.11***	-0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Believe person wealthy due to luck	-0.05***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
High-income entitled to keep their income	0.03***	
	(0.01)	
Trust the government	-0.06***	-0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Female	-0.02	-0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Has children	0.05***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black	-0.24***	-0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hispanic	-0.20***	-0.16***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 30-49	0.05**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.07***	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.02	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-Income	0.06***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
College	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Working	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Not working	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Retiree	0.00	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Perceived % of wealth inherited		0.01
		(0.01)
Unfair to tax parents		0.02
		(0.01)
Fair that children from wealthy families inherit more		0.01
		(0.01)
Trade-off: parents should pass on wealth even if unequal for children		0.01
		(0.01)
Control mean	0.31	0.30
Observations	2784	2360

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1 and 2 are indicator variables equal to one if the political affiliation of the respondent is Republican, in the income and estate tax surveys. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-45: Gelbach Decomposition – Income Tax

	Income tax fair (1)	Satisfied income tax (2)	Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality (3)	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes (4)	increase investment (5)	Government responsible to ↓ inequality (6)	Index specific outcomes	Index specific and general outcomes
Coefficient on Republican from partial model	0.21	0.22	-0.32	-0.40	-0.09	-0.36	-0.60	-0.58
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Coefficient on Republican from full model	0.09	0.10	-0.05	-0.12	0.05	-0.10	-0.11	-0.13
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Overestimate level of taxes	0.0210	0.0211	0.0056	0.0036	-0.0025	0.0067	0.0069	-0.0061
	(0.0043)	(0.0043)	(0.0024)	(0.0023)	(0.0027)	(0.0026)	(0.0031)	(0.0025)
Taxes lead to changes in behaviors	0.0015	0.0041	0.0008	0.0038	0.0049	0.0073	0.0085	0.0007
	(0.0028)	(0.0028)	(0.0026)	(0.0027)	(0.0033)	(0.0030)	(0.0036)	(0.0027)
Higher taxes hurt the economy	-0.0087	-0.0126	-0.0322	-0.0157	-0.0137	-0.0204	-0.0421	-0.0348
	(0.0052)	(0.0052)	(0.0054)	(0.0051)	(0.0060)	(0.0054)	(0.0071)	(0.0057)
Believe in trickle-down	-0.0133	-0.0153	-0.0251	-0.0358	-0.0268		-0.0491	-0.0474
	(0.0065)	(0.0065)	(0.0062)	(0.0066)	(0.0076)	(0.0065)	(0.0084)	(0.0069)
Person rich because of luck	0.0502	0.0432	-0.0149	-0.0139	0.0058	-0.0141	-0.0192	-0.0161
	(0.0070)	(0.0068)	(0.0058)	(0.0060)	(0.0071)	(0.0063)	(0.0076	(0.0098)
Think inequality is serious issue	0.0949	0.0978	-0.0565	-0.0722	-0.0388	-0.0822	-0.1271	-0.1159
	(0.0092)	(0.0092)	(0.0077)	(0.0082)	(0.0089)	(0.0089)	(0.0115)	(0.0097)
High-income entitled to keep their income	0.0104	0.0125	-0.0987	-0.0812	-0.0273	-0.0390	-0.1267	-0.1136
	(0.0076)	(0.0075)	(0.0090)	(0.0086)	(0.0088)	(0.0079)	(0.0117)	(0.0098)
Trust the government	-0.0444	-0.0364	-0.0459	-0.0742	-0.0429	-0.1078	-0.1376	-0.1118
	(0.0075)	(0.0073)	(0.0070)	(0.0079)	(0.0084)	(0.0094)	(0.0116)	(0.0093)

Notes: The table reports results from a Gelbach decomposition of the partisan gap, following Gelbach (2016). This method explains how much of the gap between the coefficient on the Republican indicator when all the mechanisms factors are also included as regressors and when they are not is explained by the factors. The first row shows the coefficient on the republican indicator resulting from a regression of the policy variables only on treatment indicators and personal characteristics, the mechanisms factors are excluded. The second row shows the coefficient on the republican indicator resulting from a regression of the policy variables on treatment indicators, personal characteristics, and mechanisms factors. The remaining lines reports how much each of the mechanisms factors contributes in explaining the gap of the republican indicator between the two models.

Table OA-46: Gelbach Decomposition – Estate Tax

	Estate tax system fair (1)	Satisfied with estate tax (2)	Estate tax should exist (3)	Estate tax should be increased (4)	↑ Estate tax good way to ↓ inequality (5)	Government responsible to ↓ wealth transm. (6)	Index specific outcomes (7)
Coefficient on Republican from partial model	-0.39	-0.45	-0.29	-0.28	-0.28	-0.19	-0.54
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Coefficient on Republican from partial model	-0.05	-0.12	-0.06	-0.05	-0.07	0.00	-0.09
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Overestimate level of taxes	0.0053	-0.0016	-0.0044	-0.0122	0.0008	-0.0049	-0.0111
	(0.0019)	(0.0015)	(0.0021)	(0.0034)	(0.0019)	(0.0022)	(0.0036)
Taxes lead to changes in behaviors	0.0001	0.0002	-0.0039	-0.0006	0.0047	0.0029	0.0016
	(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0019)	(0.0013)	(0.0021)	(0.0017)	(0.0018)
Higher taxes hurt the economy	-0.0062	0.0013	-0.0153	-0.0106	-0.0240	0.0051	-0.0226
	(0.0031)	(0.0032)	(0.0045)	(0.0040)	(0.0051)	(0.0042)	(0.0058)
Believe in trickle-down	-0.0027	0.0005	0.0005	-0.0018	-0.0002	0.0005	-0.0005
	(0.0016)	(0.0015)	(0.0020)	(0.0019)	(0.0020)	(0.0020)	(0.0025)
Share of wealth inherited	0.0010	0.0002	-0.0023	-0.0019	-0.0040	-0.0039	-0.0063
	(0.0010)	(0.0009)	(0.0015)	(0.0013)	(0.0019)	(0.0019)	(0.0028)
Believe person wealthy because of luck	-0.0271	-0.0082	0.0051	0.0110	0.0009	0.0091	0.0139
	(0.0045)	(0.0040)	(0.0051)	(0.0048)	(0.0053)	(0.0052)	(0.0065)
Think inequality is serious problem	-0.2413	-0.2844	-0.0262	-0.0534	-0.0071	-0.0335	-0.0637
	(0.0154)	(0.0178)	(0.0088)	(0.0086)	(0.0090)	(0.0089)	(0.0115)
Unfair to tax parents	-0.0023	-0.0143	-0.0942	-0.0743	-0.0604	-0.0462	-0.1433
	(0.0044)	(0.0048)	(0.0100)	(0.0084)	(0.0081)	(0.0072)	(0.0144)
Fair that children from wealthy families inherit more	-0.0259	-0.0114	-0.0080	-0.0044	-0.0212	-0.0121	-0.0237
	(0.0044)	(0.0039)	(0.0049)	(0.0044)	(0.0054)	(0.0050)	(0.0065)
Parents should pass on wealth even if unequal for children	-0.0240	-0.0053	-0.0449	-0.0368	-0.0372	-0.0298	-0.0776
	(0.0047)	(0.0044)	(0.0070)	(0.0062)	(0.0068)	(0.0063)	(0.0102)
Trust government	-0.0124	-0.0082	-0.0388	-0.0421	-0.0564	-0.0763	-0.1124
	(0.0057)	(0.0060)	(0.0080)	(0.0075)	(0.0087)	(0.0090)	(0.0119)

Notes: See the notes to Table OA-45.

OA-7 Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)

OA-7.1 Method

The basis of this method was put forward by Draca and Schwarz (2021) and draws from previous work from Gross and Manrique-Vallier (2012) on the use of Mixed-Membership models to analyse survey data and uncover latent political ideologies. It consists in applying Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), an unsupervised machine learning algorithm, to a subset of survey responses to inductively build two profiles of respondents. I focus on the subset of survey questions which are relevant for such an analysis: the survey-specific closed-ended questions, which were not subject to randomization, and which do not include numbers (e.g. questions on thresholds). Overall, I have 12 questions for the income taxation survey and 16 questions for the estate taxation survey.

The data preparation consists of combining the answers of each respondent to the questions into a "sentence" where each "word" is the answer to a given question. For example, if the respondent answered "Very important" to the question "Do you feel that U.S. federal income tax policy has important direct effects on your own life?," then the sentence of this respondent would include the "word" *"veryimportant_directeffect."* Each respondent is thus assigned a corresponding "sentence," the length of which vary across surveys depending on the number of questions we consider. This length can also vary across respondents within a survey because of the survey design: certain questions are asked conditional on the answer to a previous question. On top of that, a few respondents skipped questions. Note however, that our results are robust to the exclusion of these embedded questions, and to that of respondents who skipped a question.

Draca and Schwarz (2021) provide details for the mathematical foundation of the LDA algorithm. The LDA topic models approach is usually applied to text data to uncover latent topics underpinning the generation of texts. Each topic is modeled as a probability distribution over all words: a high probability for a given word within a profile indicates that this word is very salient for this topic. It is at its core a clustering algorithm that brings together words that often appear together into topics.

The approach of Draca and Schwarz (2021) is novel in that it applies the LDA topic model approach to discrete, non-text data. In this case, it is applied to the "sentences" as described above, and the "words" are all the corresponding answers to the selected set of questions. While Draca and Schwarz (2021) interpret the latent topics uncovered by the LDA algorithm as ideologies, we interpret them as political profiles instead. This discrepancy is due to the difference in the kind of questions examined.

Similarly, to explore the topics (here, political profiles) created, we look at the list of answers with the highest probabilities (denoted "top answers per profile"). They correspond to the answers that frequently appear together for a given profile.

I opt to create, for each survey, two profiles of respondents. Since the LDA algorithm does not provide any label for the profiles it creates, I make them up by looking at the top answers per profile.

Each respondent is then modeled by the LDA algorithm as a mixture of both profiles, where each profile weights a given share - say, 60% and 40% - in the respondent's answers, in a probabilistic manner (see Draca and Schwarz (2021) for mathematical details). Although Draca and Schwarz (2021) look directly at the shares created by the algorithm, we decided to focus on which share is the bigger. I assign each respondent to the profile whose share is bigger. This way, we divide our sample into two roughly equal shares. I report below the top six answers for each of the two profiles in the income and estate tax surveys.

Income tax survey profiles: Top 6 answers

Profile 1: pro-redistribution, highlights inequalities, unfair system. "The money and wealth in this country should be more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of the people."
"A person is rich because she or he had more advantages than others."
"People with higher incomes pay a lower share of their income in taxes than those with lower incomes."

"People pay very different shares of their incomes in taxes."
"The federal income tax policy has very important direct effects on my own life."
"The share of total U.S. income that goes to the top 1% in the U.S. increased a lot over the past 30 years."

Profile 2: fair system, downplays inequalities. "The federal income tax policy has some direct effects on my own life."
"The government has some ability/tools to reduce income differences between rich and poor people."
"A person is wealthy because she or he worked harder than others."
"People pay somewhat different shares of their income in taxes."
"The share of total U.S. income that goes to the top 1% in the U.S. increased somewhat over the past 30 years."
"People with higher incomes pay a higher share of their income in taxes than those with lower incomes."

Estate tax survey profiles: Top 6 answers

Profile 1: not concerned by the estate tax, highlights inequalities.
"I do not feel personally affected by the federal estate tax."
"The money and wealth in this country should be more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of the people."
"A person is rich because she or he had more advantages than others."
"There should be a federal estate tax in the U.S."
"The share of total U.S. income that goes to the top 1% in the U.S. increased a lot over the past 30 years."
"Not every individual's estate is subject to the federal estate tax at death."

Profile 2: Unfair estate tax system, everyone is concerned. "The federal estate tax is mostly taxing assets that have already been taxed and thus leads to "double taxation."
"I do not know what the stepped-up cost basis at death is."
"Every individual's estate is subject to the federal estate tax at death."
"there should not be a federal estate tax in the U.S."
"I am somewhat dissatisfied with the current U.S. federal estate tax system."
"The current U.S. federal estate tax system is somewhat unfair."

Figure OA-17 presents the main results from the LDA analysis. The figure shows the average share of respondents in each of the groups listed on vertical axis (sex, race, political views, etc.) that belong to Profile II. The dots represent the mean in each group and the lines are the 90% confidence intervals around the mean. The "average" dotted line is the sample average. The coefficients listed next to the characteristics represent the coefficient on that characteristic in a regression of the likelihood of belonging to Profile II on all personal characteristics included jointly. Their standard errors are in parentheses.

Figure OA-17: Respondent Profile Clustering - Share of Profile-II Respondents

(a) Income Tax



Profile I: Unfair system; highlight inequalities; pro-redistribution
Profile II: Fair system; downplay inequalities

(b) Estate Tax



Profile I: Not concerned by estate tax system; highlight inequalities
Profile II: Concerned by estate tax system; unfair system

Notes: The figure presents, for each survey, the share of respondents categorized as *Profile-II-respondents* by the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) machine learning algorithm. *Low income* (*High income*) corresponds to respondents who report a pre-tax household income below (above) 39,000 (70,000) U.S. dollar. *Knowledgeable* (*Little Knowledgeable*) corresponds to respondents who consider themselves *highly knowledgeable* or *somewhat knowledgeable* (*not very knowledgeable* or *not knowledgeable at all*) on economic policies and issues. Intervals are based on a 90% level of confidence. The algorithmic process draws upon 12 (income taxation)/16 (estate tax)/35 (health insurance)/ 32 (trade) survey-specific, closed-ended questions. Coefficients originate from a linear regression that controls for a set of other characteristics. Omitted categories in the regression: White, Low income, Age 18-29, Democrat, Student, Less than high school. Standard errors in parenthesis. A detailed explanation of the algorithmic process is presented in Section OA-7 of this document.

OA-7.2 Robustness check

I perform a robustness check by including into our subset of analysed questions the ones which are subject to a randomization. We do so by disregarding the exact formulation of the question. For instance, a respondent subject to the *Gender* randomization path who answers *"Yes"* at the question *"Do you think that a progressive federal income tax system, in which women with higher incomes pay a higher share of their income in taxes than women with lower incomes, is an important tool to reduce inequality?"* will be treated similarly to another respondent subject to the control randomization path who answered *Yes* to the same question with the general formulation *"Do you think that a progressive federal income taxation system, in which people with higher incomes pay a higher share of income in taxes than people with lower incomes, is an important tool to reduce inequality?"*. This is possible because, in most cases, the randomization only leads to minor changes in the wording of the question and of the answer.

For instance, including these extra questions to the analysis of the income taxation survey leads to highly similar results: the same two profiles come out. In particular, the top 6 answers per profile of the former profiles now appear in the top 20 of the new profiles. There is also a strong correlation between the two profiles: 73% of respondents belong to the same profile when we include randomized questions or not. The slight difference in profile assignment does not affect our regression output either.

OA-8 Robustness Checks

OA-8.1 Multiple Hypothesis Testing

This subsection addresses the issue of multiple hypothesis testing applying Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction (Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2019)) to Tables III–VII, OA-21, OA-23, OA-31, OA-34. The Romano-Wolf correction controls the familywise error rate (FWER). Such correction takes into account the dependence structure of the test statistics by resampling from the original data, thus resulting in procedure more robust than the Bonferroni and Holm corrections. All regressions include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, political affiliation, and indicator variables for all treatments; only the video course treatment effects are shown.

Table OA-47: Perceived Behavioral Responses to the Income Tax

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial	
	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Redistribution T	0.00	0.04	-0.02	0.06	-0.01	0.06	-0.04	0.07	-0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.08
	[0.909]	[0.743]	[0.892]	[0.417]	[0.892]	[0.297]	[0.761]	[0.226]	[0.892]	[0.687]	[0.892]	[0.093]
Efficiency T	0.00	0.07	0.16	0.27	-0.01	0.17	0.14	0.20	-0.02	0.12	0.14	0.19
	[0.008]	[0.041]	[0.041]	[0.001]	[0.026]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Economist T	0.06	0.05	0.17	0.28	0.04	0.17	0.12	0.22	0.04	0.11	0.15	0.18
	[0.006]	[0.192	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.192]	[0.001	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.192]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Observations	2782	2782	2783	2781	2781	2781	2783	2781	2783	2782	2782	2782

Notes: This table applies Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction (Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2019)) to the regressions in Table III. All regressions include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, and political affiliation. P-values are reported in square brackets.

Table OA-48: Perceived Behavioral Responses to the Estate Tax

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial		Save Less	
	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Redistribution T	0.05	-0.04	0.05	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.11	0.03	0.02	-0.03
	[0.553]	[0.915]	[0.705]	[1.000]	[0.341]	[0.997]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[0.022]	[0.965]	[0.997]	[0.960]
Efficiency T	0.05	-0.00	0.26	0.04	0.07	0.03	0.06	0.03	-0.01	-0.04	0.24	0.09	0.22	0.04
	[0.456]	[0.901]	[0.901]	[0.834]	[0.176]	[0.834]	[0.834]	[0.834]	[0.834]	[0.834]	[0.176]	[0.176]	[0.001]	[0.834]
Economist T	0.03	-0.03	0.27	0.07	0.12	0.07	0.10	0.06	-0.02	-0.02	0.23	0.07	0.20	0.06
	[0.372]	[0.650	[0.001]	[0.190]	[0.001]	[0.157	[0.013]	[0.194]	[0.650]	[0.650]	[0.001]	[0.161]	[0.001]	[0.280]
Observations	2357	2356	2356	2356	2357	2355	2355	2355	2356	2357	2356	2356	2356	2356

Notes: This table applies Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction (Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2019)) to the regressions in Table IV. All regressions include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, and political affiliation. P-values are reported in square brackets.

Table OA-49: Efficiency Costs of Income and Estate Taxes

	Income Tax			**Estate Tax**	
	↑ Taxes high-incomes hurt economy	Laffer effect high-incomes	Laffer effect middle class	↑ Estate tax hurt economy	Laffer effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Redistribution T	-0.01	0.00	-0.05	-0.01	0.00
	[0.868]	[0.973]	[0.372]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Efficiency T	0.14	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.05
	[0.001]	[0.537]	[0.856]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Economist T	0.06	-0.03	0.00	0.07	-0.00
	[0.025]	[0.513]	[0.991]	[0.500]	[1.000]
Observations	2782	2780	2781	2358	2356

Notes: This table applies Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction (Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2019)) to the regressions in Table V. All regressions include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, and political affiliation. P-values are reported in square brackets.

Table OA-50: Which Groups Would Mostly Win from the Following Changes in Income Taxation?

	Taxes on high-earners were cut					Overall taxes were increased					
	Poor households	Working class	Middle class	Upper-middle class	Upper class	Poor households	Working class	Middle class	Upper-middle class	Upper class	Trickle down
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Redistribution T	0.00	-0.02	-0.04	-0.07	-0.04	-0.02	0.06	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05
	[0.987]	[0.987]	[0.673]	[0.229]	[0.709]	[0.942]	[0.427]	[0.881]	[0.940]	[0.942]	[0.892]
Efficiency T	0.07	0.07	0.07	-0.05	-0.06	0.00	0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05	0.06
	[0.199]	[0.199]	[0.175]	[0.427]	[0.199]	[0.966]	[0.966]	[0.624]	[0.475]	[0.417]	[0.892]
Economist T	0.02	0.03	0.04	-0.02	-0.04	0.05	0.05	0.01	-0.08	-0.10	-0.00
	[0.884]	[0.884]	[0.479]	[0.884]	[0.479]	[0.237]	[0.343]	[0.909]	[0.009]	[0.002]	[0.892]
Observations	2762	2756	2746	2743	2765	2774	2757	2759	2757	2762	2781

Notes: This table applies Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction (Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2019)) to the regressions in Table OA-21. All regressions include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, and political affiliation. P-values are reported in square brackets.

Table OA-51: Which Groups Would Mostly Win if the Estate Tax Were Cut?

	Poor households (1)	Working Class (2)	Middle Class (3)	Upper-middle Class (4)	Upper Class (5)
Redistribution T	-0.12	-0.13	-0.14	-0.02	-0.02
	[0.500]	[0.500]	[0.500]	[0.500]	[0.500]
Efficiency T	-0.10	-0.08	-0.06	-0.04	-0.03
	[0.500]	[0.500]	[0.500]	[0.500]	[0.500]
Economist T	-0.09	-0.12	-0.15	-0.06	-0.01
	[0.500]	[0.500]	[0.500]	[0.500]	[0.500]
Observations	2329	2314	2306	2312	2304

Notes: This table applies Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction (Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2019)) to the regressions in Table OA-23. All regressions include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, and political affiliation. P-values are reported in square brackets.

Table OA-52: Fairness Considerations About the Income Tax

	Wealth distribution unfair (1)	Inequality serious issue (2)	People rich due to luck (3)	High-income entitled to keep their income (4)
Redistribution T	0.05	0.10	-0.01	-0.01
	[0.230]	[0.006]	[0.965]	[0.965]
Efficiency T	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01
	[0.773]	[0.773]	[0.773]	[0.773]
Economist T	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.00
	[0.674]	[0.042]	[0.139]	[0.903]
Observations	2781	2781	2780	2780

Notes: This table applies Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction (Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2019)) to the regressions in Table VI. All regressions include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, and political affiliation. P-values are reported in square brackets.

Table OA-53: Fairness Considerations About the Estate Tax

				Parents' side:		Children's side:		Trade-off:
	Wealth distribution unfair (1)	Inequality serious issue (2)	Person wealthy due to luck (3)	Unfair tax estates of: hard workers (4)	wealthy heirs (5)	Fair that children from wealthy families: access better amenities (6)	inherit more (7)	Parents should pass on wealth even if unequal for children (8)
Redistribution T	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.05	0.03	-0.09	-0.06
	[0.771]	[0.888]	[0.899]	[0.899]	[0.709]	[0.888]	[0.133]	[0.454]
Efficiency T	-0.06	-0.02	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.02
	[0.414]	[0.948]	[0.283]	[0.948]	[0.948]	[0.948]	[0.948]	[0.948]
Economist T	0.02	0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.05	-0.08
	[0.894]	[0.943]	[0.943]	[0.894]	[0.894]	[0.873]	[0.608]	[0.090]
Observations	2358	2358	2357	2358	2358	2357	2357	2356

Notes: This table applies Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction (Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2019)) to the regressions in Table VII. All regressions include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, and political affiliation. P-values are reported in square brackets.

Table OA-54: Policy Views on the Income Tax

	Income tax fair (1)	Satisfied income tax (2)	Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality (3)	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes (4)	increase investment (5)	Government responsible to ↓ inequality (6)
Redistribution T	0.01	0.02	0.11	0.04	0.05	0.09
	[0.827]	[0.570]	[0.001]	[0.349]	[0.284]	[0.020]
Efficiency T	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.00
	[0.996]	[0.998]	[0.998]	[0.998]	[0.649]	[0.998]
Economist T	-0.02	-0.04	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.06
	[0.303]	[0.151]	[0.066]	[0.151]	[0.066]	[0.060]
Observations	2783	2782	2784	2783	2783	2780

Notes: This table applies Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction (Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2019)) to the regressions in Table OA-31. All regressions include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, and political affiliation. P-values are reported in square brackets.

Table OA-55: Policy Views on the Estate Tax

	Estate tax system fair (1)	Satisfied with estate tax (2)	Estate tax should exist (3)	Estate tax should be increased (4)	↑ Estate tax good way to ↓ inequality (5)	Government responsible to ↓ wealth transm. (6)
Redistribution T	-0.04	-0.03	0.05	0.07	0.14	0.03
	[0.609]	[0.609]	[0.408]	[0.142]	[0.001]	[0.609]
Efficiency T	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.08	0.01
	[0.995]	[0.995]	[0.949]	[0.995]	[0.126]	[0.995]
Economist T	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.08	0.12	0.02
	[0.899]	[0.899]	[0.450]	[0.049]	[0.001]	[0.788]
Observations	2358	2356	2359	2359	2357	2355

Notes: This table applies Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction (Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2019)) to the regressions in Table OA-34. All regressions include controls for sex, age, race, income class, having children, education, having an economics-related major, employment status, self-reported policy knowledge, self-reported social class, and political affiliation. P-values are reported in square brackets.

OA-8.2 Keeping the 5% Fastest Respondents

This section replicates all the main tables of the paper including in the sample the respondents who fall in the bottom 5% of the total survey time distribution.

Table OA-56: Perceived Behavioral Responses to the Income Tax

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial	
	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Personal characteristics												
Republican	-0.03*	0.09***	0.15***	0.14***	0.10***	0.12***	0.13***	0.13***	0.10***	0.17***	0.18***	0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.05***	-0.09***	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.05***	0.02	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.06**	-0.05*	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.04	-0.05*	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.11***	-0.14***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.09***	-0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-Income	0.02	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05**	-0.01	0.00	-0.04*	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel B: Video treatment effects												
Redistribution T	0.00	0.03	-0.03	0.04	-0.03	0.04	-0.04	0.05*	-0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	0.07***	0.06**	0.15***	0.25***	0.06*	0.15***	0.13***	0.18***	0.04	0.12***	0.13***	0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	0.06***	0.04	0.15***	0.25***	0.02	0.15***	0.11***	0.20***	0.04*	0.11***	0.14***	0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics												
Control mean	0.81	0.61	0.50	0.42	0.35	0.31	0.45	0.35	0.78	0.64	0.52	0.47
Male control mean	0.84	0.66	0.52	0.43	0.37	0.34	0.44	0.35	0.80	0.63	0.54	0.47
Democrat control mean	0.84	0.55	0.46	0.38	0.35	0.28	0.43	0.32	0.75	0.60	0.43	0.41
Observations	2927	2927	2928	2925	2926	2926	2928	2926	2928	2927	2927	2927

Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table III, including into the sample the respondents in the bottom 5% of the survey time distribution. See the notes to Table III. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-57: Perceived Behavioral Responses to the Estate Tax

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial		Save Less	
	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Panel A: Personal Characteristics														
Republican	-0.01	0.01	0.07***	0.09***	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.09***	0.04*	0.07***	0.07***	0.13***	0.04*	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Female	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.07***	-0.04*	-0.05***	-0.04*	-0.07***	-0.00	-0.02	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.06**	-0.05*	-0.07**	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.05*	-0.10***	-0.04	-0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.13***	-0.16***	-0.10***	-0.18***	-0.11***	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.07**	-0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.05**	-0.04	-0.05**	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects														
Redistribution T	0.04	-0.04	0.05	0.01	0.07*	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.10***	0.02	0.01	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.04	-0.00	0.25***	0.03	0.06*	0.02	0.06	0.03	-0.06*	-0.04	0.21***	0.07**	0.20***	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.03	-0.03	0.25***	0.06*	0.11***	0.06*	0.10***	0.06**	-0.02	-0.02	0.21***	0.06*	0.19***	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics														
Control mean	0.88	0.79	0.52	0.55	0.41	0.39	0.58	0.47	0.84	0.73	0.52	0.55	0.60	0.62
Male control mean	0.89	0.75	0.55	0.54	0.48	0.43	0.59	0.49	0.86	0.74	0.57	0.54	0.61	0.61
Democrat control mean	0.88	0.77	0.53	0.53	0.44	0.35	0.57	0.40	0.80	0.68	0.50	0.43	0.61	0.58
Observations	2480	2479	2479	2479	2480	2478	2478	2478	2479	2480	2479	2479	2479	2479

Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table IV, including into the sample the respondents in the bottom 5% of the survey time distribution. See the notes to Table IV. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-58: Efficiency Costs of Income and Estate Taxes

	Income Tax			Estate Tax	
	↑ Taxes high-incomes hurt economy. (1)	Laffer effect high-incomes (2)	Laffer effect middle class (3)	↑ Estate tax hurt economy (4)	Laffer effect (5)
Panel A: Personal characteristics					
Republican	0.34***	0.16***	0.02	0.15***	0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Female	-0.04**	0.06***	0.05***	-0.03*	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	-0.05**	0.03	0.01	0.04*	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.02	0.03	0.06**	0.02	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.05**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.03	-0.03	-0.00	-0.07***	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects					
Redistribution T	-0.03	0.01	-0.05	0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.13***	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.05**	-0.02	-0.00	0.06**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics					
Control mean	0.32	0.48	0.64	0.28	0.44
Male control mean	0.36	0.46	0.62	0.33	0.40
Democrat control mean	0.18	0.39	0.60	0.23	0.32
Observations	2927	2925	2926	2481	2479

Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table V, including into the sample the respondents in the bottom 5% of the survey time distribution. See the notes to Table V. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-59: Fairness Considerations About the Income Tax

	Wealth distribution unfair	Inequality serious issue	People rich due to luck	High-income entitled to keep their income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Personal characteristics				
Republican	-0.41***	-0.37***	-0.33***	0.35***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.04**	0.00	0.05***	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	0.03	0.06**	0.04*	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 50-69	0.03	0.03	0.06**	-0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High-Income	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.06***	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel B: Video treatment effects				
Redistribution T	0.05*	0.10***	0.00	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	0.03	0.07***	0.06**	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics				
Control mean	0.68	0.47	0.59	0.32
Male control mean	0.66	0.48	0.57	0.34
Democrat control mean	0.90	0.66	0.75	0.15
Observations	2925	2926	2925	2924

Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table VI, including into the sample the respondents in the bottom 5% of the survey time distribution. See the notes to Table VI. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-60: Fairness Considerations About the Estate Tax

				Parents' side:		Children's side:		Trade-off:
	Wealth distribution unfair	Inequality serious issue	Person wealthy due to luck	Unfair tax estates of: hard workers	wealthy heirs	Fair that children from wealthy families: access better amenities	inherit more	Parents should pass on wealth even if unequal for children
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Personal Characteristics								
Republican	-0.38***	-0.44***	-0.26***	0.23***	0.24***	0.20***	0.24***	0.27***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.05***	-0.02	0.07***	0.03*	0.04*	-0.08***	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.07**	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.11***	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.01	0.00	-0.06**	0.02	0.01	0.05**	0.04	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation								
Redistribution T	0.04	0.01	-0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.01	-0.09**	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	-0.05	-0.04	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.01	-0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.05	-0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics								
Control mean	0.63	0.47	0.62	0.61	0.46	0.33	0.52	0.57
Male control mean	0.61	0.51	0.58	0.60	0.44	0.36	0.52	0.54
Democrat control mean	0.84	0.63	0.74	0.50	0.36	0.21	0.37	0.48
Observations	2481	2481	2481	2480	2481	2480	2480	2479

Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table VII, including into the sample the respondents in the bottom 5% of the survey time distribution. See the notes to Table VII. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-61: Policy Views on the Income Tax

	Income tax fair (1)	Satisfied income tax (2)	Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality (3)	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes (4)	increase investment (5)	Government responsible to ↓ inequality (6)	Policy index (7)
Panel A: Personal characteristics							
Republican	0.21***	0.22***	-0.32***	-0.40***	-0.10***	-0.34***	-0.59***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 30-49	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.00	-0.04*	-0.01	0.03	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.18***	-0.20***	-0.05*	-0.11***	-0.04	-0.08***	-0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	-0.05**	-0.05*	-0.01	-0.04*	0.01	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.07***	0.06**	-0.05**	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Panel B: Underlying mechanisms							
Republican	0.09***	0.09***	-0.06***	-0.13***	0.03	-0.10***	-0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Overestimate level & progressivity of taxes	0.16***	0.16***	0.03**	0.03*	-0.02	0.05***	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Taxes lead to changes in behaviors	0.01	0.03**	0.00	0.02*	0.02*	0.03**	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Higher taxes hurt the economy	-0.03**	-0.04***	-0.09***	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.12***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Believe in trickle-down	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.05***	-0.07***	-0.04***	-0.01	-0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Think inequality is serious problem	-0.18***	-0.19***	0.13***	0.15***	0.08***	0.17***	0.27***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Believe people are wealthy due to luck	-0.07***	-0.06***	0.02**	0.02*	-0.01	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Believe high-incomes entitled to keep their income	0.02**	0.02**	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.03***	-0.05***	-0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trust the government	0.09***	0.07***	0.09***	0.15***	0.09***	0.22***	0.28***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Panel C: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	-0.01	0.00	0.09***	0.05*	0.05	0.08***	0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.03	0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Economist T	-0.04*	-0.07***	0.05**	0.04*	0.06**	0.06**	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.34	0.34 m	0.67	0.57	0.55	0.43	-0.00
Male control mean	0.37	0.35	0.66	0.58	0.59	0.44	0.02
Democrat control mean	0.25	0.24	0.84	0.79	0.59	0.62	0.31
Observations	2926	2924	2929	2926	2926	2924	2929

Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table OA-31, including into the sample the respondents in the bottom 5% of the survey time distribution. See the notes to Table OA-31. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-62: Policy Views on the Estate Tax

	Estate tax system fair (1)	Satisfied with estate tax (2)	Estate tax should exist (3)	Estate tax should be increased (4)	↑ Estate tax good way to ↓ inequality (5)	Government responsible to ↓ wealth transm. (6)	Policy index (7)
Panel A: Personal Characteristics							
Republican	0.07***	0.07***	-0.27***	-0.26***	-0.27***	-0.17***	-0.50***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.06**	-0.09***	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 50-69	-0.15***	-0.17***	-0.07**	-0.08***	-0.14***	-0.11***	-0.21***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	0.01	0.01	0.04	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
High-Income	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Panel B: Underlying mechanisms							
Republican	0.06**	0.04	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.08***	0.01	-0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Overestimate level & progressivity of taxes	0.02	0.02	-0.05***	-0.13***	0.01	-0.05**	-0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Taxes lead to changes in behaviors	0.02	0.01	-0.03***	-0.00	0.06***	0.03**	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Higher taxes hurt the economy	-0.04***	-0.02	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.08***	0.01	-0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Believe in trickle-down	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Think inequality is serious problem	-0.12***	-0.13***	0.05***	0.09***	0.01	0.07***	0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Perceived % of wealth inherited	0.01	0.01	0.02**	0.02**	0.03***	0.03***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Believe people are rich due to luck	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.02*	-0.03***	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unfair to tax parents	-0.08***	-0.09***	-0.18***	-0.14***	-0.11***	-0.09***	-0.27***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Fair that children from wealthy families inherit more	-0.02	0.00	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.05***	-0.03**	-0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trade-off: parents should pass on wealth even if unequal for children	0.01	0.01	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trust the government	0.06***	0.06***	0.07***	0.08***	0.11***	0.14***	0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel C: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	-0.03	-0.04	0.05	0.07**	0.13***	0.02	0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.07*	-0.01	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Economist T	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.07**	0.11***	0.00	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.41	0.37	0.56	0.31	0.54	0.30	-0.00
Male control mean	0.44	0.42	0.62	0.37	0.57	0.34	0.10
Democrat control mean	0.40	0.40	0.68	0.44	0.66	0.41	0.25
Observations	2481	2479	2482	2482	2480	2478	2483

Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table OA-34, including into the sample the respondents in the bottom 5% of the survey time distribution. See the notes to Table OA-34. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

OA-8.3 Dropping the Respondents Who Fail the Screening Questions

Respondents were also asked screening questions, i.e., questions that asked them to ignore the question and select a given or several given answer options, regardless of their opinion. 27.8% and 28.3% in the income and estate tax survey respectively failed all three screening questions. This subsection replicates the main tables of the paper dropping the respondents who failed all the screening questions.

Table OA-63: Perceived Behavioral Responses to the Income Tax

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial	
	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class	High earners	Middle class
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Personal characteristics												
Republican	-0.03	0.06**	0.16***	0.12***	0.06**	0.10***	0.12***	0.13***	0.11***	0.17***	0.21***	0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.03	-0.09***	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.05**	0.02	-0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	0.01	-0.02	-0.08***	-0.07**	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.03	-0.04	-0.08***	-0.06**	-0.02	-0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	0.00	-0.00	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.05*	-0.08***	-0.07**	-0.06*	-0.11***	-0.13***	-0.04	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.02	-0.05	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	-0.05*	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects												
Redistribution T	-0.03	0.03	-0.05	0.03	-0.06*	0.04	-0.06	0.07**	-0.04	0.02	-0.04	0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.09***	0.08**	0.18***	0.30***	0.08**	0.21***	0.16***	0.22***	0.04	0.14***	0.18***	0.21***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.08***	0.04	0.17***	0.30***	0.03	0.17***	0.14***	0.22***	0.05*	0.13***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics												
Control mean	0.79	0.57	0.44	0.35	0.28	0.24	0.39	0.29	0.78	0.64	0.45	0.41
Male control mean	0.83	0.62	0.47	0.36	0.30	0.25	0.38	0.28	0.80	0.61	0.47	0.43
Democrat control mean	0.82	0.52	0.40	0.33	0.30	0.20	0.36	0.26	0.72	0.59	0.35	0.36
Observations	2013	2012	2013	2012	2013	2012	2013	2011	2013	2012	2012	2012

Notes: Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table III, restricting the sample to those who succeeded in at least one screening question. See the notes to Table III. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-64: Perceived Behavioral Responses to the Estate Tax

	Evade Taxes		Work less		Stop working		Spouse stop working		Move state		Be less entrepreneurial		Save Less	
	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young	Wealthy	Young
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Panel A: Personal Characteristics														
Republican	-0.01	0.01	0.06**	0.10***	-0.01	0.03	0.05	0.11***	0.07***	0.09***	0.08***	0.16***	0.05*	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.00	-0.03	-0.00	-0.07***	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 30-49	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.05	-0.02	-0.04	-0.05	-0.09***	-0.09**	-0.13***	-0.07*	-0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 50-69	-0.04	-0.00	-0.10***	-0.13***	-0.08**	-0.11***	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.15***	-0.12***	-0.18***	-0.17***	-0.09**	-0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05	-0.02	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.01	-0.01	-0.05	-0.08**	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04	0.04	0.02	0.00	-0.03	0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects														
Redistribution T	0.07**	-0.04	0.07	0.02	0.11**	0.04	0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.13***	0.04	0.02	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.05*	0.01	0.33***	0.08*	0.15***	0.10**	0.10**	0.05	-0.04	-0.03	0.29***	0.13***	0.30***	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.05*	-0.01	0.32***	0.09**	0.22***	0.11***	0.15***	0.07*	-0.02	-0.02	0.29***	0.09**	0.26***	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics														
Control mean	0.88	0.76	0.43	0.46	0.28	0.26	0.49	0.40	0.82	0.72	0.43	0.46	0.52	0.58
Male control mean	0.91	0.69	0.45	0.45	0.32	0.28	0.50	0.41	0.86	0.71	0.47	0.43	0.55	0.56
Democrat control mean	0.89	0.76	0.45	0.47	0.33	0.28	0.48	0.34	0.80	0.68	0.41	0.37	0.54	0.53
Observations	1691	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690	1690

Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table IV, restricting the sample to those who succeeded in at least one screening question. See the notes to Table IV. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-65: Efficiency Costs of Income and Estate Taxes

	Income Tax			Estate Tax	
	↑ Taxes high-incomes hurt economy.	Laffer effect high-incomes	Laffer effect middle class	↑ Estate tax hurt economy	Laffer effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Personal characteristics					
Republican	0.39***	0.22***	0.07***	0.19***	0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.04**	0.05**	0.05**	-0.05**	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 30-49	-0.02	0.04	0.00	0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 50-69	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	0.02	-0.05	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	0.05*	-0.02	-0.01	-0.06**	-0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects					
Redistribution T	-0.02	0.03	-0.04	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	0.15***	0.07*	-0.01	0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.07***	-0.01	0.00	0.05	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics					
Control mean	0.29	0.47	0.69	0.26	0.48
Male control mean	0.32	0.46	0.66	0.32	0.43
Democrat control mean	0.13	0.37	0.64	0.17	0.34
Observations	2012	2011	2012	1691	1690

Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table V, restricting the sample to those who succeeded in at least one screening question. See the notes to Table V. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-66: Fairness Considerations About the Income Tax

	Wealth distribution unfair (1)	Inequality serious issue (2)	People rich due to luck (3)	High-income entitled to keep their income (4)
Panel A: Personal characteristics				
Republican	-0.45***	-0.41***	-0.36***	0.41***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Female	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.07**	-0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Middle-Income	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.05**	-0.08***	-0.09***	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Video treatment effects				
Redistribution T	0.06**	0.14***	0.01	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Efficiency T	0.02	0.03	0.07*	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Economist T	0.02	0.08***	0.07**	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics				
Control mean	0.71	0.50	0.61	0.28
Male control mean	0.70	0.51	0.61	0.28
Democrat control mean	0.94	0.71	0.79	0.09
Observations	2012	2012	2010	2011

Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table VI, restricting the sample to those who succeeded in at least one screening question. See the notes to Table VI. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-67: Fairness Considerations About the Estate Tax

				Parents' side:		Children's side:		Trade-off:
	Wealth distribution unfair	Inequality serious issue	Person wealthy due to luck	Unfair tax estates of: hard workers	wealthy heirs	Fair that children from wealthy families: access better amenities	inherit more	Parents should pass on wealth even if unequal for children
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Personal Characteristics								
Republican	-0.45***	-0.50***	-0.29***	0.29***	0.28***	0.21***	0.28***	0.32***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	0.03	-0.03	0.05**	0.01	0.01	-0.07***	-0.02	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age 30-49	0.05	0.04	0.05	-0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.08**	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.03	-0.07*	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.13***	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.05	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High-Income	-0.04	-0.00	-0.07**	0.00	-0.00	0.08***	0.05	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Question formulation								
Redistribution T	0.02	0.04	-0.02	0.02	-0.05	0.00	-0.10**	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Efficiency T	-0.05	-0.00	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.05	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economist T	0.06*	0.05	0.01	-0.05	-0.06	0.01	-0.06*	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics								
Control mean	0.66	0.48	0.67	0.62	0.47	0.30	0.54	0.56
Male control mean	0.64	0.52	0.63	0.59	0.43	0.35	0.55	0.50
Democrat control mean	0.88	0.67	0.79	0.49	0.36	0.18	0.39	0.46
Observations	1691	1691	1690	1691	1691	1690	1690	1689

Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table VII, restricting the sample to those who succeeded in at least one screening question. See the notes to Table VII. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-68: Policy Views on the Income Tax

	Income tax fair	Satisfied income tax	Progressive tax important tool to ↓ inequality	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to expand programs for low-incomes	Support ↑ taxes on high incomes to increase investment	Government responsible to ↓ inequality	Policy index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Personal characteristics							
Republican	0.22***	0.23***	-0.37***	-0.48***	-0.14***	-0.41***	-0.71***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.04	-0.06**	-0.03	-0.06**	-0.02	0.01	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 50-69	-0.07**	-0.11***	-0.06**	-0.12***	-0.03	-0.09***	-0.16***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Middle-Income	-0.03	-0.04	-0.00	-0.05**	0.02	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
High-Income	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.08***	0.08***	-0.09***	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Panel B: Underlying mechanisms							
Republican	0.11***	0.11***	-0.05**	-0.15***	0.03	-0.13***	-0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Overestimate level of taxes	0.09***	0.11***	0.02	0.00	-0.03	0.04	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Taxes lead to changes in behaviors	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.04**	0.04***	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Higher taxes hurt the economy	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07***	-0.03*	-0.04**	-0.04***	-0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Believe in trickle-down	-0.03*	-0.04**	-0.05***	-0.07***	-0.05***	-0.01	-0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Think inequality is serious problem	-0.19***	-0.21***	0.10***	0.13***	0.07***	0.15***	0.23***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Believe person rich due to luck	-0.06***	-0.05***	0.03***	0.04***	0.01	0.03***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Believe high-incomes entitled to keep their income	0.01	0.01	-0.16***	-0.13***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.21***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trust the government	0.06***	0.04***	0.05***	0.11***	0.04**	0.21***	0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel C: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	-0.03	-0.00	0.12***	0.05	0.05	0.12***	0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Efficiency T	-0.03	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Economist T	-0.05*	-0.07***	0.05*	0.04	0.05	0.08***	0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.30	0.29 m	0.67	0.58	0.56	0.42	0.01
Male control mean	0.32	0.30	0.66	0.58	0.63	0.42	0.03
Democrat control mean	0.19	0.20	0.83	0.82	0.63	0.62	0.35
Observations	2012	2012	2013	2012	2012	2009	2013

Notes: Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table OA-31, restricting the sample to those who succeeded in at least one screening question. See the notes to Table OA-31. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA-69: Policy Views on the Estate Tax

	Estate tax system fair (1)	Satisfied with estate tax (2)	Estate tax should exist (3)	Estate tax should be increased (4)	↑ Estate tax good way to ↓ inequality (5)	Government responsible to ↓ wealth transm. (6)	Policy index (7)
Panel A: Personal Characteristics							
Republican	0.03	0.06**	-0.33***	-0.32***	-0.34***	-0.20***	-0.62***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age 30-49	-0.06*	-0.11***	-0.04	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Age 50-69	-0.08**	-0.13***	-0.08**	-0.05	-0.09***	-0.10***	-0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Middle-Income	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
High-Income	-0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Panel B: Underlying mechanisms							
Republican	0.03	0.03	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.09***	0.03	-0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Overestimate level of taxes	0.02	0.01	-0.05**	-0.13***	-0.00	-0.05**	-0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Taxes lead to changes in behaviors	-0.03*	-0.03	-0.03*	0.00	0.03**	0.03*	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Higher taxes hurt the economy	-0.02	-0.00	-0.04***	-0.03**	-0.07***	0.03*	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Believe in trickle-down	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Think inequality is serious problem	-0.11***	-0.12***	0.02	0.09***	0.02	0.06***	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Perceived % of wealth inherited	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Believe person wealthy due to luck	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unfair to tax parents	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.18***	-0.13***	-0.10***	-0.06***	-0.24***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Fair that children from wealthy families inherit more	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Trade-off: parents should pass on wealth even if unequal for children	0.02	0.00	-0.12***	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Trust the government	0.03	0.01	0.06***	0.06***	0.09***	0.13***	0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel C: Video treatment effects							
Redistribution T	-0.04	-0.01	0.03	0.06	0.14***	0.05	0.15**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Efficiency T	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Economist T	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.09***	0.14***	0.05	0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.37	0.33	0.58	0.31	0.51	0.25	-0.01
Male control mean	0.40	0.37	0.65	0.37	0.52	0.29	0.09
Democrat control mean	0.40	0.37	0.71	0.45	0.68	0.37	0.27
Observations	1691	1690	1692	1692	1690	1688	1693

Notes: This table replicates the regressions in Table OA-34, restricting the sample to those who succeeded in at least one screening question. See the notes to Table OA-34. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

OA-9 References

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