# Understanding of Trade*

Stefanie Stantcheva

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[*FIRST DRAFT – COMMENTS VERY WELCOME!*]

**Abstract**

I study how people understand and reason about trade, and what factors shape their views on trade policy. I design and run large-scale surveys and experiments in the U.S. to elicit respondents' knowledge and understanding of trade, their perceived economic gains and distributional impacts from it, and their views on trade restrictions and compensatory redistribution for those hurt by trade. People's understanding of trade is imperfect, and views are split on its efficiency and distributional effects. Respondents' own exposure to trade through their sector, occupation, skill, or local labor market shapes their perceptions of the impacts of trade on themselves, others and on the broader U.S. economy. The findings are also consistent with the idea of "diffuse gains and concentrated losses:" respondents' perceived benefits as consumers are non-salient and vague to them, while the perceived threats of those in at-risk jobs are very salient. Beyond material self-interest, people have broader social and economic concerns that strongly influence their views on trade policy. The belief that is most predictive of support for open trade is that trade generates a variety of efficiency gains. People who believe that those hurt by trade can be helped using other tools (compensatory redistribution) do not oppose free trade, even if they are convinced that it will entail adverse distributional consequences. The results highlight the importance of compensatory redistribution as an indissociable part of trade policy if support for free trade is to be maintained.

**Keywords**: Trade, Survey, Perceptions, Experiment, Trade policy, Protectionism.
**JEL Codes**: F1, F13, D72, D91

*Stantcheva: Harvard, CEPR, and NBER (e-mail: sstantcheva@fas.harvard.edu). I thank Beatrice Ferrario, Clément Herman, Lionel Jeanrenaud, Julia Paul-Venturine, Yannic Rehm and especially Thomas Bézy and Francesco Nuzzi for exceptional research assistance. I thank seminar participants at Princeton, Paris School of Economics, and LMU Munich, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg and Gene Grossman for feedback and comments.

# 1 Introduction

One of the areas in which there is widespread agreement among economists is trade. Many economists tend to believe that, on balance, free trade is beneficial: even though some people will win and others will lose, the overall gains from trade are large enough that "losers can be compensated."[1] Yet, consensus on free international trade is missing among citizens in the U.S. Historically, trade restrictions and barriers have been the norm rather than the exception. Even the last decade has seen intense debates about import competition and their far-ranging economic, social, and political consequences[2] and a resurgence of more protectionist proposals.

In this paper, I study two issues. First, do people understand how trade and trade policy work and how do they reason about trade policy? For instance, do they understand what the impacts of trade on prices or wages are? Second, which factors shape citizens' support for different types of trade policies? Do they support free trade purely out of material self-interest, or do they have broader social and economic concerns? Do they perceive the efficiency and distributional impacts of trade differently? How do they think about trade restrictions versus compensatory transfers to help those who are negatively impacted by trade? Understanding what factors matter most to citizens when they think of trade policy, which groups tend to hold different views, and where (potentially correctible) misperceptions lie is an important step to prevent backlash against open trade.

To answer these questions, I design and run new large-scale surveys and experiments in the U.S. Surveys are a key tool for getting a glimpse into people's minds and study otherwise invisible things such as perceptions, attitudes, reasoning, and views, which present challenges for our traditional – and often preferred– revealed preference approach.

Before describing the survey and methods used, it is helpful to consider a stylized framework to think about the drivers of trade policy views, as illustrated in Figure 1. At the top of the figure, I first distinguish between two facets of trade policy: trade restrictions (e.g., tariffs or quotas) and compensatory redistribution to mitigate adverse distributional consequences from trade (e.g., direct assistance or retraining for those hurt by trade). These two sides of trade policy can both be shaped by either self-interest (the left panel) or by broader economic and social concerns (the right panel). Self-interest can arise from respondents' benefits as consumers (box I) in terms of the prices and variety of goods that they can purchase. It can also stem from their role as workers and their exposure through their occupation, sector of work, local labor market, or human capital (box II). It is often thought that the gains to consumers are diffuse and widespread, while the losses to workers are large and concentrated (see, among others, Autor (2018), Autor et al. (2016) and Broda and Weinstein (2006)).

Focusing on material self-interest as it relates to the labor market only, the two workhorse models of trade give clear predictions about which people should oppose more open trade. The factor endowment (Heckscher-Ohlin) model assumes, among others, that factors of production are mobile across sectors within a country. Stolper and Samuelson (1941) show that in this setting, free trade will benefit the owners of the factors of production that are abundant relative to the rest of the world and hurt others. In the U.S., this has typically been taken to mean that trade would benefit higher-skilled workers and hurt lower-skilled ones. The specific-factor model (or Ricardo-Viner) is based on the idea that some factors of production cannot move across sectors, at least in the short run. In this case, free trade will hurt people working in import-competing

[1] https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/free-trade/

[2] See among others Autor et al. (2013) and Mutz (2021).

FIGURE 1: THE DETERMINANTS OF VIEWS ON TRADE POLICY




sectors and benefit workers in export-oriented sectors. From the standpoint of purely material self-interest, the factor endowments model suggests that higher-skilled workers should be more supportive of free trade. The specific factor model implies that those employed in industries with comparative advantage and that export abroad should be more supportive of open trade than those working in sectors that are subject to international competition from imports.[3]

Beyond their own material self-interest, people can also have broader social and economic concerns, represented on the right of Figure 1. They may care about the efficiency gains from trade in the form of higher competitiveness, innovation, and growth (box III). Beyond that, they may also worry about distributional consequences of trade as it impacts inequality and different groups, e.g., the middle class or the poor versus the rich (box IV). Finally, other factors such as patriotism, partisanship, and geopolitical concerns may also influence people's views on trade policy (box V). The arrows on the diagram represent possible channels. In particular, while self-interest can shape views on trade policy directly (arrow A), it can also act indirectly by influencing respondents' perceptions of the overall perceived efficiency and distributional effects (path through arrows B and C). For instance, respondents may extrapolate from their own experience to that of others.

To disentangle the role of these factors in shaping trade policy views, I design and run two large-scale surveys that elicit respondents' perceptions of each of the elements in the diagram. I start with open-ended text questions that capture people's first-order immediate concerns about trade without being primed by particular answer options. The answers to these questions are investigated using text-analysis methods.

[3]For a review of the effects of trade for distributional consequences, and, hence, individual attitudes, see Rodrik (1995).

The surveys then contain detailed questions that test respondents' understanding of trade, including even a "problem-set" style series of questions about the price, wage, and welfare effects of trade in different sectors and countries under hypothetical scenarios. I also elicit people's views about the efficiency impacts and distributional effects of trade in the U.S. (rather than in hypothetical scenarios). Respondents are further asked about their policy views on a range of possible interventions related to trade restrictions (e.g., overall trade barriers or support for protection of specific sectors) and compensatory redistribution (e.g., direct assistance, retraining, or less-targeted wage subsidies to low-income workers overall). In addition, I construct a series of objective measures of exposure to trade based on respondents' education level, sector of work, occupation, and local labor market. Thus, I have both objective and subjective measures of respondents' exposure to trade that can influence their material self-interest.

In order to test whether understanding of trade can be improved with information and to study which factors causally drive people's views on trade policy, I design two types of experimental treatments. The first type is information treatments, in the form of pedagogical videos that explain to respondents the impacts of trade policy on efficiency, distribution, or both. The second type is priming treatments that do not provide any information, but rather prompt respondents to think about the impacts trade has on them – either as consumers or as workers – through a series of questions.

The main findings are as follows. First, people's understanding of trade and trade policy is imperfect. Answers to questions about the price or wage effects of trade are only slightly more accurate than random answers. Respondents are better at predicting the impacts of tariffs or export taxes and seem to somewhat understand comparative advantage and the existence of gains from trade. When asked about the effects of trade in the U.S., many respondents believe in positive efficiency gains in the form of higher competitiveness, innovation, and growth. There is broad agreement on some of the winners from trade, namely large companies and high-income households. However, there is more pessimism and disagreement on the extent to which trade benefits workers, the poor or the middle class and on how it shapes inequality and unemployment in the U.S.

Second, respondents' own exposure to trade through their work (both actual and perceived) is significantly correlated with their support for trade restrictions. What is more surprising is that it not only shapes their assessment of how trade affects them, but also their broader perceptions of the efficiency and distributional impacts of trade on the U.S. as a whole (i.e., the path through arrows B and C in Figure 1 is empirically important). For instance, respondents who perceive themselves as made worse off from trade and those that are objectively more exposed through their sector, occupation, local labor market, or skills are less likely to believe that trade decreases prices in the U.S., that it fosters innovation or growth, and that it does not have adverse distributional impacts.

Third, respondents seem to perceive gains from trade as consumers (box I) as vague and diffuse, while the losses as workers are salient to those that are directly exposed to trade (box II). Respondents are divided on whether trade lowers the prices or increases the variety of goods in the U.S. or in their own consumption basket. Those that are experimentally prompted to think about their gains from trade as consumers do not change their views on trade. On the contrary, a minority of respondents feels directly threatened and impacted by trade in their job, but this exposure is pivotal for their views on trade. Respondents who are primed to consider the threats from trade for their job significantly reduce their support for open trade. These findings lend support to the idea that losses from trade in the labor market are concentrated and large, while consumer gains are widespread and diffuse.

Fourth, people's views on trade are strongly driven by broader economic and social concerns beyond their own material self-interest. The belief that is most predictive of support for open trade is that trade generates a variety of efficiency gains (box III). The belief that trade has adverse distributional consequences can reduce support for free trade, but only if respondents believe that losers cannot be compensated with appropriate policies (box IV). People who believe that those hurt by trade can be helped using other tools (i.e., compensatory redistribution) do not oppose free trade, even if they are convinced that it will entail adverse distributional consequences; instead, they support more redistribution. The information videos confirm these findings. Respondents that are told about the efficiency implications of free trade increase their support for it. Those that are told about potentially adverse distributional consequences of it, and possible interventions to compensate losers, do not change their views on free trade, but increase their support for compensatory redistribution.

These findings highlight that the two facets of trade policy – trade barriers and compensatory transfers – are driven by different considerations and are both indissociable in people's minds. They point to the need of providing such redistribution and making sure that citizens understand it, if support for free trade is to be maintained.

This paper is part of a broader agenda that uses social economics surveys to better understand the reasoning that shapes people's policy views. The website `understandingeconomics.org` provides the data for several other policies (such as health insurance, income taxes, and the estate tax).

**Related Literature.** In the political science and political economy literatures, attitudes toward trade have been related to various characteristics measuring self-interest and broader social attitudes. One focus has been on evaluating the relative explanatory powers of the factor endowment and the specific factor models. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Value Survey (WVS), Mayda and Rodrik (2005) proxy for human capital with educational attainment and occupational categories and find strong support for both models: individuals with higher levels of human capital exhibit higher support for trade only in countries where these skills are abundant; those in import-competing industries are more supportive of trade barriers than those in non-tradable sectors. These findings are all echoed also by O'Rourke et al. (2001) and Rodrik and Stantcheva (2021a). Beaulieu et al. (2011) build a model of intra-industry trade and show empirically that skilled workers are more supportive of such trade. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) instead mostly find evidence in favor of the factor endowment model. Owen and Johnston (2017) expand the definition of sectors threatened by trade by using the interaction of routine occupation and "offshorability." The fact that there is evidence for both models suggests that different people may have different mental models of trade, including different horizons over which they envision its effect. In the current paper, I therefore directly elicit people's understanding and perceptions of the mechanisms of trade policy.

Further evidence on the impacts of own experience comes from Mansfield et al. (2019): those that lost their jobs in import-competing sectors following the Great Recession became more anti-trade. The literature has also suggested that self-interested behavior has limited explanatory power overall (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009). I find that personal experience shapes people's policy views directly in line with material self-interest, but also indirectly by changing their perceptions of the effects of trade for the U.S. as a whole, as depicted in Figure 1.

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) emphasize the importance of education as a vehicle of new economic ideas and information that shape attitudes toward trade, not just as a proxy for factor endowment. This is aligned

with Mansfield and Mutz (2009), who find that views about the effects of trade on the U.S. as a whole and out-group anxiety matter more than pure self-interest. Margalit (2012) also confirms that people care not only about the material consequences of trade, but also about its perceived social and cultural consequences. Likewise, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find a more important role for broader factors like relative income, degrees of neighborhood attachment, and nationalism/patriotism.

Policy preferences on international trade among the U.S. public and in particular support for protectionism – the so-called "globalization backlash" – driven by concerns about its impact on labor markets have been analyzed in Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Walter (2021). Lü et al. (2012) show that support for sector-specific trade protection depends on the workers' earnings in the sector, suggesting a concern for inequality. Hanson et al. (2007) compare and contrast individual preferences for two different "globalization strategies," namely an import-based versus immigration-based one, depending on their impacts on public finances. Rho and Tomz (2017) describe a gap between trade preferences and economic self-interest, which they explain by "economic ignorance:" giving respondents information about the effects of trade on inequality increased their concern for the welfare of others, but also their support for self-serving policies.

Like the current paper, other work also provides experimental evidence for factors that shape trade attitudes. Hiscox (2006) shows that giving respondents information about job losses due to trade decreases their support for free trade; telling them that trade reduces prices does not change their views. These findings are consistent with those of my priming treatments, where I ask people to think about the effects of trade on themselves either as consumers or as workers. The interpretation of these findings calls for a more in-depth analysis of the mental models of respondents and their understanding of trade, as I do in this paper. I disentangle how respondents reason about the mechanisms, costs, and benefits of trade, and determine which considerations are salient and matter to them. For instance, respondents are not convinced that trade lowers the prices of goods they buy, and they have heterogeneous levels of worries about and exposures through their own job. Furthermore, they have much broader concerns than just their own self-interest.

I focus on two types of policy tools: trade restrictions and compensatory transfers because they go hand in hand and respondents differ in the relative importance they grant to each. Rodrik and Di Tella (2020) as well study preferences for both redistribution and trade protection for different types of shocks. They find that trade-related shocks generate more demand for protectionism, especially when in the form of outsourcing to a developing country, but not higher demand for compensatory transfers. Naoi (2020) suggests that, during the Great Recession, resentment for compensating people perceived as being less in need of help grew, leading to support for protectionism and opposition to compensation. I find that pedagogical explanations of the distributive impacts of trade policy can generate substantially more support for compensatory redistribution, suggesting that perhaps people need more information on the types and effects of compensatory policies.

The idea that voters' preferences over trade policy reflect not only their own material self-interests but also concerns for members of those groups in society with whom they identify is studied in Grossman and Helpman (2020), who build a theoretical framework around this idea. My results strongly support their premise that people care about the effects of trade on the broader economy, on inequality, and on workers, even if they themselves are not directly impacted.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the survey, data collection, and sample. Section 3 applies text analysis methods to the open-ended questions to elicit people's first-order concerns on trade policy. Section 4 analyzes respondents' knowledge and understanding of how trade and trade policy work "technically", while Section 5 focuses on people's perceived personal, efficiency, and distributive impacts

of trade and trade policy. Section 6 studies the factors that shape views on trade policy, leveraging also the experimental part of the paper. Section 7 concludes and suggests avenues for future research.

# 2 Survey Design

## 2.1 Data Collection and Final Sample

I conducted two large-scale surveys of 1,771 and 2,148 respondents each. The first survey was conducted between August and September 2019 and the second one between November and December 2020. Both were run on U.S. residents between 18 and 70 years of age. The surveys were designed using the online platform *Qualtrics*, and the survey links were then distributed by the commercial survey company *Respondi* (`https://www.respondi.com/EN/`) and its U.S.-based partners.

**How were participants enrolled?** In brief, the commercial survey company has panels of respondents who receive survey links via a dashboard. For more details on the data collection see Stantcheva (2021). Respondents were only told the length of the survey, but neither the topic nor the sender. After clicking on the link, respondents were channeled to a consent page (see Appendix Figure A-7) that informed them that they were about to take an academic research survey, destined solely for research purposes run by non-partisan researchers. They were asked to respond accurately to the best of their knowledge and assured that participation was entirely voluntary. Respondents were then guided through some screening questions that ensured that the final sample was nationally representative along gender, age, and income dimensions or, in the case of the second survey, targeted toward people who were of working age (students, respondents not looking for work and retirees were excluded from the sample). Thus, if respondents decided to drop out at some point during the survey – e.g., upon learning the topic of the survey – all their demographic and background information would be known, and I could check for differential attrition by observable characteristics such as political affiliation. Respondents were rewarded by the survey company only if they fully completed the survey. Rewards are organized by the survey company and take various forms, including cash and tokens or points, in partnership with airlines, hotels, or retail stores. The median time for completion of the surveys was 33 and 22 minutes, respectively.

**Final sample.** Table 1 shows the characteristics of the samples relative to the U.S. population. Population statistics come from the IPUMS-CPS-ASEC data set for March 2019 (Flood et al., 2020), Gallup (2019), and Leip (2019), as described in the table notes.

By construction, survey 1 is representative along the dimensions of age, gender, and income. In addition, it is also broadly representative on non-targeted dimensions such as the share of respondents who are married and those who are employed and unemployed. In both surveys, respondents were more likely to have completed high-school and be college-educated than the general population. African-American and Hispanic minorities are also underrepresented. The descriptives in Sections 3, 4, and 5 are based on the representative sample of survey 1. To address the small imbalances in the sample, one can re-weight the sample so that it is representative along the employment, education, and race dimensions as well.

Survey 2 is intentionally focusing on respondents in the labor force and thus not representative by age and income (in addition to the discrepancies by education and race mentioned above). We only use this survey in the experimental part and policy decomposition in Section 6.

## 2.2 The Survey Structure

FIGURE 2: SURVEY 1 FLOW




The full questionnaires for surveys 1 and 2 are available in Appendices A-3 and A-4, with a link which leads to the web interface of the survey. Below, text in italic represents actual survey text. Italic text in square brackets represents the answer options provided to the respondents, if any.

I now provide more details on some of these survey blocks.

### Background socio-economic questions

I collected information on respondents' gender, age, income, highest level of education achieved, sector of occupation, employment status, marital status, number of children, place of residence, and political orientation. I also asked them about their main sources of economic news, whether they try to stay informed of economic issues, their overall media and social media consumption, and their major field of study in college.

**Open-Ended Questions**

Open-ended questions are important to elicit first-order, intrinsic concerns that people have before they are prompted to think of a particular aspect of trade with the more directed survey questions (Stantcheva and Ferrario, 2022). I ask respondents about their *"main considerations"* that come to mind when they think about trade policy, what the goals of trade policy should be, what are its shortcomings, what the effects on the U.S. economy from trade restrictions are, and which groups gain or lose from changes in trade barriers. The responses to these questions are studied using text analysis methods in Section 3.

**Understanding of trade**

In the *Knowledge about trade* part, respondents are asked about factual knowledge (e.g., to which countries the U.S. mainly exports and which countries it imports from). In addition, in the *Understanding of trade* block, I walk respondents through a "problem-set" style case study to test their understanding of the price, wage, and distributional effects of trade and trade policy.

**Experimental part**

In the experimental part of survey 1, respondents are randomly split into five groups. Four treatment groups are shown one of four videos that emphasize different aspects of trade and trade policy, while the control group sees no such video. The *Distributive effects* video emphasizes the distributional impacts of trade policy on both consumers and the labor market. The *Efficiency effects* treatment shows trade's efficiency implications. The *Economist* treatment brings together both the distributional and the efficiency considerations and highlights the trade-offs, much like a simple introductory and very concise economics course on the issue might do. Finally, the *Economist U.S.-specific* treatment is identical to the *Economist* treatment but specifically refers to the U.S. instead of generic countries A and B.

The experimental part of survey 2 instead consists of priming treatments that do not provide any information, but rather ask respondents to think about the effects of trade policy on themselves. The *Own consumption* treatment asks them questions about the prices and variety of goods they buy because of trade; the *Own job risks* treatment instead asks respondents about the threats to their own job. The experimental treatments and results are covered in Section 6. Screenshots from these videos are in Figures 3, 4, and 5. Each video can be seen by following the links below the screenshots.

**Perceived distributional and efficiency impacts of trade**

In this section, respondents are asked to think in more detail about how trade policy works. What price effects and impacts on the broader economy will it trigger? What are the distributional consequences for different groups of people? These series of questions are critical because they ask respondents to be more explicit about the chains of effects and mechanisms that they have in mind when they think of how trade and trade policy work. When asking about these mechanisms, respondents are randomized into one of two branches, which feature a different formulation of these questions. The first branch sees the formulation of the questions in a "neutral" way (e.g., *"Overall, has international trade decreased the prices of goods sold in the U.S.?"*) with an impersonal formulation. Below, the terminology used will be that of the "neutral" formulation that asks about a "generic" person or people from a given income group. Respondents in the second branch receive a personal formulation of the questions that ask them about themselves. For instance,

*"Overall, has international trade decreased the prices of goods that you buy regularly?"*. In cases in which an individual-level question does not make sense, the question is asked about "your sector." For example, *"Overall, has international trade made the firms in your sector of work more competitive and improved their productivity?"*.

**Policy views**

In the final part of the survey, I ask respondents about their views on trade policy and redistribution policy to help the losers from trade, or lower-income people more generally. I also ask them a range of questions about their views of government.

**Survey 2**

Survey 2 contains similar socio-economic background questions and policy outcomes questions. However, it does not ask open-ended questions, questions about the understanding of trade or its perceived efficiency and distributional impacts, and contains different experimental treatments, as described above. It asks a range of other questions related to the labor market that are not used in the main part of the paper. Because it was run after the start of the pandemic, it also contains questions on the households' impacts from covid, government assistance, and overall income and economic insecurity.

## 2.3 Ensuring High Quality Answers

I employed several methods to ensure the highest possible quality of answers. In the survey's landing page – the consent page –, respondents are warned that low quality responses will be flagged and their payment possibly withheld. I also attempt to make them feel involved and socially responsible by emphasizing that we are non-partisan academic researchers seeking to advance social studies. I highlight that it is "very important for the success of our research that you answer honestly and read the questions very carefully before answering." Questions are also designed so as to prevent careless answers: for instance, percentages are constrained to add up to 100%, and respondents are alerted with a pop-up message if there is an inconsistency. Often, rather than using data entry boxes, I let respondents select numbers using sliders.

I also keep track of and check the time spent by the respondent on the survey as a whole, as well as on individual pages and questions, which permits flagging respondents who spend too little time on questions. For the benchmark sample, I drop respondents in the bottom 5% of the survey time distribution. None of our results are affected by trimming these outliers. A randomized subsample of respondents was also provided with financial incentives for correct responses to the policy knowledge questions. This is expected to encourage respondents to pay more attention. In addition, three screening questions are interspersed in the survey. They ask respondents to ignore the question and select a given or several given answer options. This checks for whether respondents are reading the questions carefully – a respondent who simply rushes to click through the answers is unlikely to read and understand the instructions.

Finally, respondents are asked whether they thought the survey was biased more in favor of left-wing or right-wing opinions. 80% of the respondents thought the survey was not biased. 12% thought it was left-wing biased and 8% thought it was right-wing biased.

For the rest of the analysis, all variables are defined in Appendix A-6.

# 3 People's First-Order Concerns: Text Analysis of the Open-Ended Survey Questions

The answers to the open-ended questions can help shed light on people's first-order concerns without them being prompted to think about specific answer options (Stantcheva and Ferrario, 2022). This section provides the results from the text analysis applied to the responses of several of the survey's open-ended questions (listed at the start of the paragraphs below). Appendix Figure A-1 shows simple word clouds to assess the frequency of different terms in the answers. In the main part of the paper, we focus on topic analysis.

***"When you think about trade policy and whether the U.S. should put some restrictions on trade with other countries, such as tariffs, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?"***. Panel A of Figure 6 shows the topic distribution that appears in the answers to this question, among respondents who consider themselves to lean Republican and those that consider themselves leaning Democratic. The keywords for each topic are listed below the figure (note that the words are "stems"). More details on the text analysis and example answers for each topic are in Appendix A-1. The *Price* topic includes stem keywords such as *price, inflation, afford, cost, expens*, with answers such as "*My main concern is prices going up.*" The *Distributive* topic includes keywords such as *suffer, affect, hurt, hit, lose* in combination with *farmer, business, firm, poor, sector.* An example answer is "*I don't want anybody to have to suffer like the farmers or any others with paying extra taxes for food and goods.*" The *Labor* topic includes keywords such as *labor, job, employ, wage, worker*, as in "*How it affects employment and current wages.*" The *Fair Trade & International Relations* topic includes keywords such as *fair, retaliatory, imbalances, justice, reciprocity.* For example: "*I think trade policies need to be fair for all. Tariffs must be introduced only when there is a likelihood of unfair transactions between countries. Trades should be a mutually beneficial agreement.*" The *Protectionism* topic includes keywords as *restrict, tariff* in combination with words such as *fine, good, need, reason, necessary.* An example answer is "*I believe that we need tariffs, especially with China because they have been taking advantage of this country for years.*" The *Does not Know* topic includes keywords such as *unsure, don't & (know, understand, knowledge).*

*Prices* and *Distributive* concerns are more widespread among Democrats, while *Protectionism* and *Fair Trade & International Relations* concerns are more prevalent among Republicans. Worries about *Efficiency* and *Labor* (i.e., jobs and employment) are equally split, as are answers that express a lack of knowledge about the topic.

**"*What would be the effects on the U.S. economy if barriers to trade, such as tariffs, were increased?"*** is another open-ended question analyzed in Panel B of Figure 6. Responses can be classified based on the domain they mention (e.g., *Efficiency* or *Distributive* concerns, as described above) and the direction of the effect perceived (positive vs. negative). For instance, *Negative Price* effects refer to thinking prices will go up in response to trade restrictions. *Positive Reallocation* refers to respondents' mentioning that trade restrictions will lead to a reallocation of production to the US. Democrat respondents are significantly more likely to mention negative effects of trade restrictions on prices and efficiency. Republican respondents are more likely to talk about Positive reallocation effects, with trade restrictions encouraging a shift back to domestic production and "made in the USA."

Panel B of Appendix Figure A-2 shows that those who are more knowledgeable about trade (as measured by their correct answers to the questions described in Section 4) are more likely to mention *Negative Price*, *Negative Efficiency*, and *Negative Distributive* effects from trade restrictions.

***"Which groups of people do you think would gain if trade barriers such as tariffs were increased?"***. Panel C of Figure 6 plots the frequency with which various groups, people, or entities are mentioned in response to this open-ended question about winners from trade barriers. Democrats often tend to mention the "Rich," "Government and Politicians," "Big Companies," and "Nobody" (suggestive of the view that, ultimately, everyone loses from trade barriers). On the right, beneficiaries are the "U.S." as a whole, "everyone," "workers," "manufacturers," and "domestic businesses."

# 4 Understanding of Trade

In this section, I present the results on how people understand the mechanisms and the different effects of trade and trade policy. The questions asked for this purpose are controlled and hypothetical: respondents are asked to imagine various scenarios, in a stylized "problem-set" style fashion, and holding everything else constant to the extent possible. The goal here is to see whether respondents can reason about the effects of trade in consistent and accurate ways. Section 5 instead asks respondents about their perceived effects on the U.S. economy today (not hypothetically, and not holding anything constant).

**A short "problem-set" style series of questions.** In the survey, respondents were walked through a concrete case study akin to a short problem-set. The case study presented two industries: the car and the laptop industry. It stated that *"the U.S. is a large net exporter of laptops (meaning that it sells more laptops abroad than it purchases from abroad and that U.S. laptops are a large share of all laptops sold in the world), and a large net importer of cars (meaning that it purchases more cars from abroad than it sells abroad and that cars purchased by customers in the U.S. are a large share of worldwide car purchases). The laptop sector employs many high-skilled, college-educated workers. The car sector employs many low-skilled workers. Cars are produced for cheaper abroad, while laptops are produced for cheaper in the U.S."*

Respondents were then asked to imagine what happens in several scenarios, such as an increase in car imports to the U.S. and an increase in laptop exports from the U.S. The questions are phrased carefully so as to pin down the "model," e.g., respondents are asked to imagine what happens in each sector (the "short-run" or specific factor model) and then what happens if workers can switch sectors (the "long-run" or factor endowment model).

Figure 8 shows the share of respondents who agree with each of the statements listed on the horizontal axis, split by level of education (Panel A) and by whether a respondent thinks they are made better or worse off by trade (Panel B). While there is no unambiguously correct answer under all possible assumptions and models, the answers are oriented such that agreeing with the statements listed is in line with a benchmark textbook model, e.g., Krugman et al. (2017). The gray line shows the expected share of respondents who would agree with the statements if they randomly guessed answers.

**Welfare effects.** Respondents are divided on the issue of whether consumers who purchase cars in the US benefit if car imports increase. 75% of college-educated respondents and 59% of non-college-educated ones believe that both trade partners are generally made better off by trade, rather than one country gaining at the expense of the other one. The third question in the figure considers a scenario in which the U.S. is better at producing cars than the foreign country, meaning it can produce them at a lower price. Respondents are asked whether, under some circumstances, it would still make sense to import cars from abroad. 77% of college-educated respondents against 64% of non college-educated ones agree it makes sense. This suggests

that respondents either understand the concept of comparative advantage or have in mind some love-for-variety or quality differential.

**Price and wage effects.** Respondents have very different views about the price and wage effects. In many answers under the headers of "effects on prices" and "effects on wages" respondents are almost evenly split between agreeing and disagreeing. For instance, if the U.S. started importing more cars and producing fewer cars domestically, only around one quarter of respondents believe that the price of cars in the U.S. would decrease, and just around half think that wages in the U.S. car sector would decrease. This explains why only around 55% of respondents think that households who purchase cars in the U.S. would be made better off by increases in car imports in the U.S. and is carries over to large disagreements on whether trade has increased or decreased the prices of goods in the US as a whole.

Regarding the laptop industry scenario, if the U.S. started exporting more laptops, 40% of respondents believe the price of laptops abroad would decrease. The same share also thinks that the wages of the high-skill workers in the laptop sector would increase. Finally, if some of the displaced low-skilled workers from the car sector found new jobs in the laptop sector (following the increase of imports to the car sector), around half of respondents believe that their wages would increase.

**Effects of tariffs and export taxes.** There is more widespread agreement about the effects of tariffs and export taxes. Around 70% of respondents agree that an export tax on U.S. laptops would increase prices abroad and that a car import tariff would increase prices of cars in the U.S. Nevertheless, there is still one third of respondents who foresee no such negative effect of the import tariffs.

**Heterogeneity by education and exposure to trade.** Overall, college-educated respondents are somewhat more accurate than non college-educated ones. Respondents who believe that trade has made them worse off are less accurate than those who say trade has made them better off. They are particularly less likely to believe in welfare gains from trade, that both countries may gain from it, and that the U.S. should under any circumstance import a good that it is good at producing in an absolute sense. There are no large partisan gaps in the understanding of trade policy (see Table A-2).

**Factual knowledge about trade.** I also asked respondents a series of questions on the main imports, exports, and trading partners of the U.S. Some select responses are shown in Figure 7. 71% of respondents correctly answer that the country from which the U.S. imports the most is China. Non-negligible shares of respondents (between 4% and 7%) answer Mexico, Japan, Canada, or the U.K. When asked which country the U.S. exports most to, 44% of respondents answer China again, and 19% chose the correct answer, Canada. Mexico is a close third with 14% of respondents choosing it. Close to 80% of respondents know what an import tariff is, but less than half know what a quota is.

**Heterogeneity in knowledge and willingness to pay for information about trade.** To evaluate respondents' willingness to pay for information, the following procedure was implemented. In the final part of the survey, respondents were informed that they were automatically enrolled in a lottery to win $1000 and asked whether they were willing to forfeit a randomized amount of their lottery gain (between $1, $2, $5, and $10) in order to receive the accurate answers to all the knowledge questions. They had to commit to forfeiting that amount before they knew whether they had won the lottery or not. This allows me to study the willingness to pay for information. The share of respondents who agree to pay the randomized amount proposed in exchange for accurate truthful information is 38%.

Table A-1 highlights some further heterogeneity in knowledge across respondents. The outcome variables are the share of correct answers in the case study questions (column 1) and the willingness to pay for correct answers, controlling for the randomized price of information. Women, Black respondents, Hispanic respondents, younger respondents, those without a college degree, and Republican respondents tend to answer less accurately. Those who feel that they have been made better off from trade answer more accurately and are more willing to pay for the information. More knowledgeable people are consistently more willing to pay for information, which could be one of the channels through which misinformation can persist (Alesina et al. (2018) and Alesina et al. (2022)).

**Summary.** In sum, respondents are divided about the effects of trade when asked hypothetical, precise questions about its mechanisms. There is little agreement on the effects of trade on prices or wages in different sectors. There is more alignment on the overall welfare effects of trade or the effects of trade-related taxes (import or export taxes). There are some differences by college education and own experience, but only small partisan gaps in understanding. Those made worse off by trade anticipate more negative overall effects from open trade, even in these hypothetical scenarios.

# 5 Perceived Efficiency and Distributional Effects of Trade and Trade Policy

I now turn to the perceived efficiency and distributional effects of trade and trade policy, as well as perceived personal impacts. These are summarized in Figures 9 and 10, which show the shares of respondents who agree with the statements listed. Respondents are grouped by whether they are only asked generic questions (the "control" group), and, hence, are not primed to think about their own situation, or whether they are asked a series of questions about themselves. The latter group is further split into those who answer that they are *better off from trade* and those who think they are *worse off from trade*. Appendix Tables A-3, A-4, A-5, and A-6 contain more detailed information on each of these channels. While Section 4 asked hypothetical questions in a controlled problem-set type environment, this section describes respondents' perceived (non-hypothetical) impacts from trade in the U.S.[4]

## 5.1 Perceived personal impacts from trade

Across the two surveys, several questions were asked about the respondent's own experience. Some of these questions are kept identical to the general questions, but use "you" as the subject. For instance, I ask whether trade has *"decreased the prices of the goods you buy"* instead of whether trade has *"decreased the prices of goods in the U.S."*. Panel A of Figure 9 shows the answers to these questions. 46% of all respondents think that trade has reduced the prices of goods they buy; that share is only 30% among those who consider they are made worse off by trade, and 57% among those made better off. Respondents are somewhat more convinced that trade has increased the variety of goods they can buy (66% believe so).

Less than half of all respondents (46%) agree or strongly agree that *"because of trade and the resulting competition with foreign countries that pay lower wages to their workers, my wage has not grown as fast as it*

[4]For instance, the case study explicitly asked questions conditional on workers moving across sectors versus not moving. Here, we are asking respondents to give their overall perceived impact, which will depend on the model they have in mind (e.g., a short run or longer-run model).

*would otherwise have."* Around one third of respondents think that trade is a major reason for unemployment in their sector of work. 29% think that trade with foreign countries poses a *very serious threat* to the future of their sector. When asked more specifically about their own job, 19% think it is very likely that their job will be *"outsourced, off-shored, or automated because of competition with foreign countries"* in the next 10 years. Respondents are asked to consider the extent to which their own job is negatively affected by immigration, automation, and trade on a scale of 0 to 10. Respondents rank immigration and trade similarly at below 5, suggesting that the average respondent does not ultimately believe these are major negative factors for their job. On balance, when asked about their own experience, 61% of respondents think they have been made better off, and 39% think they have been made worse off. These views are consistent with the idea that losses from trade in the labor market are concentrated, while consumer gains are diffuse and widespread.

**Subjective and objective exposure to trade.** How does respondents' perceived exposure to trade align with their objective exposure to trade, according to different measures used in the literature? First of all, following the literature using educational achievement as a measure of factor endowment, we can see that college-educated respondents are significantly less likely to feel negatively impacted as consumers or workers, and to consider their job being threatened by trade (see Appendix Table A-6). Second, I consider five primary measures: 1) whether the sector of the respondent is a *tradable sector*, based on Mayda and Rodrik (2005); 2) the extent to which the respondent's occupation is routine-intensive from Owen and Johnston (2017); 3) the extent to which the respondent's occupation is both routine-intensive and easily offshorable from Owen and Johnston (2017);[5] 4) whether the respondent's occupation is in a comparative-advantage position from the point of view of international competition, from Owen and Johnston (2017); 5) the exposure through the local labor market, as measured by the change in Chinese import exposure per worker in a region from Autor et al. (2013). I build indicators for exposure based on the above measures and also consider interactions between them.

Panel B of Figure 9 shows the correlation between respondents' perceived exposure to trade and these objective exposure measures. In general, a respondent's (objective) negative exposure to trade through their sector, occupation, or local labor market is significantly positively correlated with feeling that trade has made them worse off and that it has negatively affected their job. It is striking that objective exposure is also negatively correlated with the belief that trade has reduced the prices of goods respondents' buy, suggesting that people exposed to trade through their job also feel worse off as consumers.

Thus, there is a positive correlation between subjective and objective exposure, although it is not perfect. This points to two possible interpretations, with implications also for work using these objective exposure measures. First, sector, occupation, or local labor market measures may be too coarse to capture individual, fine-grained experience. In that sense, individuals may have more accurate and precise assessments of the threats they face. Second, individuals' subjective perceptions may be exaggerated or understated. If this is the case, then arguably perceptions matter more for policy views than objective exposure, as well will confirm in the rest of the analysis.

**Summing up.** In sum, respondents are divided in the perceived effects of trade on their consumption

[5] According to Owen and Johnston (2017), routine is characterized by repetition or rule-following procedures, which in the U.S. will be subject to competitive pressure. Offshorability measures whether job tasks are location dependent and require face-to-face interaction. Offshorability magnifies the benefits of winners from trade and the costs of losers. In countries like the U.S., they show that those in routine occupations are more anti-trade and this effect will be magnified by those in more offshorable occupations.

bundles and their jobs. Those that are in sectors, occupations, or labor markets more negatively exposed to trade or that have no college education believe they have been hurt more by trade both as workers and as consumers. On balance, more respondents think they are made better off than worse off, consistent with the idea that consumer benefits are diffuse and that direct losses (through one's job) are concentrated.

## 5.2 Perceived efficiency effects of trade

Panel A of Figure 10 focuses on the efficiency implications of trade. Views on these topics are clearly divided, though again not along political lines (see Table A-3), but generally optimistic. 61% of respondents think that international trade increases competition among firms in the U.S., 69% that it fosters innovation, and 62% that it generates more GDP growth. 53% of respondents think that more U.S. exports strengthen the value of the U.S. dollar. Around 68% of respondents think that two countries trading are both made better off (i.e., that there are mutual gains from trade).

Respondents' own experience significantly shapes their views about the effects of trade. As just described above, when asked about themselves specifically, respondents who label themselves as losers from trade are less likely to say, among others, that international trade has decreased the price of the goods they buy and that it has made firms in their sector more competitive. While it makes sense that respondents' individual experience with trade affects one's own perceived gains or losses, it is interesting that their experience also taints their view of reality for the U.S. as a whole. Those who think they are made worse off are less likely to say that trade has increased innovation, GDP growth, or the value of the U.S. dollar and that both trade partners are made better off through trade. This pattern of own experience shaping the perception of reality is consistent with the findings regarding (objective) understanding of trade in Section 4.

Measures of objective exposure to trade influence perceived efficiency effects for the U.S. as a whole as well. Respondents in sectors, occupations, or labor markets threatened by trade are typically less likely to think that trade has led to efficiency gains (see Panel C in Table A-3). Those in comparative advantage occupations are significantly more likely to think so. While objective measures of exposure have significant and sizable effects on perceptions of efficiency impacts of trade, perceived exposure has much stronger ones.

More educated respondents systematically perceive higher efficiency gains from trade. If we consider education as a proxy measure for factor endowment, this result suggests that those more likely to gain from trade also perceive higher benefits of it for the U.S. as a whole. At the same time, education can change people's views beyond their self-interest, as found by the papers reviewed in the introduction. Conditional on education, income does not have a significant effect on perceived efficiency effects.

## 5.3 Perceived distributional impacts of trade

Panels B and C of Figure 10 consider beliefs about the distributional impacts of trade.

**Perceived impacts on different groups.** Panel B of Figure 10 shows the share of respondents who believe that the groups listed have gained from trade. Around 70% of respondents agree that large corporations have gained from trade and 60% think that high-income earners have gained from trade. Only one fifth of respondents think that small businesses have benefitted and those made worse off from trade almost never think so. Respondents are three times less likely to say that the middle-class and low-income earners have gained from trade than they are to say so about high-income-earners. Republicans are slightly more positive about the benefits of trade for the less well-off (see Appendix Table A-4).

**Perceived impacts on the labor market and consumers.** Regarding impacts of trade on jobs and the labor market, Panel C of Figure 10 shows that respondents believe that low-skilled workers would have a harder time than high-skilled workers in changing sectors of work if their jobs were destroyed by trade. 63% of respondents believe that high-skilled workers could easily change sector; 37% believe so about low-skilled workers. 79% of workers think that trade is the reason for "*unemployment in some sectors and the decline of some industries in the U.S.*" When asked about the main causes of the loss of manufacturing jobs, 47% of respondents point to trade, 42% to automation, and 11% to immigration. Respondents are evenly split on whether trade has overall *helped or hurt* U.S. workers. 66% of respondents think that trade is a major reason for the "*rise in inequality*" in the U.S.

Regarding the impacts of trade on consumers, 57% of respondents believe that international trade tends to decrease the prices of goods in the U.S. These divided views presumably reflect the tension that people feel between the different ways in which trade affects the relative prices of imports versus exports and the difficulty in knowing the counterfactual prices, absent trade. Finally, and importantly, a majority (62%) of respondents believe that, in principle, trade could make everyone better off because, even though there are both winners and losers, it is possible to "*compensate those who lose from it through appropriate policies.*"

**Heterogeneous perceptions by actual and perceived exposure to trade.** The worse-off group is significantly less likely to think that trade has helped U.S. workers overall or that everyone can gain from trade because losers could be compensated appropriately. Those in sectors or occupations negatively affected by trade perceive the distributional impacts of trade more negatively. For instance, they are even less likely to think that small businesses or lower-income households have gained from trade (although the baseline belief is already low). People negatively exposed to trade are also significantly more likely to think that trade has hurt rather than helped U.S. workers, that it is harder for workers to switch sectors, and that it is not possible to compensate the losers from trade (see Appendix Table A-5). College-educated respondents are more likely to believe that it is easy for high-skilled workers to change sector, that trade overall has helped U.S. workers, that trade has decreased the price of goods sold in the U.S., that it can make all better off, and much less likely to believe that trade is a major reason for the rise in inequality or that it has adverse distributional consequences. Once again, these effects could be driven by self-interest according to the factor endowment model or by different world views by the college-educated.

**Summing up.** Overall, respondents are pessimistic about the benefits of trade for the middle class, low-income earners, and small businesses. Yet, they generally agree that high-income earners or large corporations have gained from trade. Respondents' own exposure to trade (objective and subjective) influences their assessment of the overall benefits of trade for others. There are relatively modest partisan gaps on these dimensions (see Appendix Tables A-4 and A-5). The college-educated consistently hold more positive views of trade. Own experience shapes perceived distributional impacts too: those exposed to trade through their sector, occupation, or local labor market perceive worse overall distributional consequences of trade.

# 6 Views on Trade Policy

This section analyzes the factors which shape respondents' views on trade policy. Trade policy is multi-faceted: in addition to trade restrictions that can take various forms, the government can provide compensatory transfers and general (income-targeted) redistribution to help the losers from trade. The survey thus

asks respondents about their support for trade barriers, restrictions for specific items such as food, targeting of some industries, and about a range of redistributive policies to compensate the losers from trade.

Respondents' views on the design of trade policy are presented in more detail in Appendix Table A-7. Most respondents (63%) are supportive of free trade. Nevertheless, the idea that the U.S. should protect infant industries, food imports for food security reasons, and several strategic industries is relatively widespread. Respondents are also asked about their preferred policy to help workers in declining industries. 53% believe direct assistance and retraining are the best policies; 11% prefer production subsidies in affected sectors. Finally, 36% think import restrictions are the best solution. When asked about the scope and role of the government as it pertains to trade, many respondents believe that the government should be responsible for regulating trade (61%) and ensuring the stability of the financial system (69%), and of the dollar (75%) (see Appendix Table A-9).

To summarize views on trade policy, I create two outcome variables. *Support for free trade* captures whether the respondent thinks that the U.S. should aim at reducing trade barriers. In order to buffer some of the distributional impacts of trade, the government can use targeted policies (such as providing assistance to displaced workers) but also general redistribution (e.g., help for the unemployed or the low income), which can be viewed as social insurance for a range of shocks, including trade. The *Redistribution index* measures support for these compensatory redistribution policies. It is constructed following the methodology of Kling et al. (2007). It consists of an equally-weighted average of the z-scores of several variables and is further divided by its standard deviation. More precisely, the index is higher for respondents who agree that the best tool to help workers is more generous transfers and direct assistance to the workers (rather than restricting imports or subsidizing production in their industry) and who want to increase spending on support and retraining programs for workers displaced by international competition and trade. It is also increasing in support for more general (non-trade specific) redistributive spending such as help for those out of work, better schools for children from low-income families, and wage subsidies.

Figure 11 shows the factors that shape support for free trade and for compensatory redistribution, and I will refer to it throughout this section. In Panel A, the top set of rows presents the coefficients from a regression of *Support for free trade* on the full set of individual covariates. Groups that are less supportive of free trade policies are women, older respondents, middle-income respondents, non college-educated, and Republican respondents.[6] The middle set of rows shows the coefficients on variables and indices that measure beliefs about trade. Most were already introduced in Section 5.2. *Believes in efficiency gains from trade* summarizes the belief that trade increases innovation, competition, and GDP growth. *Fears retaliatory tariffs by other countries* measures geopolitical concerns as proxied by whether a respondent thinks that retaliation by other countries is likely were the U.S. to impose trade restrictions. The final set of rows shows the treatment effects from the experimental parts described next. Panel B performs the same analysis using as the outcome variable support for redistribution policies. Higher-income, non-college-educated, and Republican respondents are less likely to support compensatory redistribution.

## 6.1 Experimental Design

I now describe the experimental components of the paper before diving into the results.

**Information treatments.** The first survey shows respondents one of three videos in a randomized manner.

[6] Hiscox and Burgoon (2004) also find that women more protectionist than men.

The control group sees no video. The *Distribution* and *Efficiency treatment* videos take the example of two countries, called A and B. A produces cars at a lower cost than B, while B produces clothing at a lower cost.

The *Distribution* video states that openness to trade can increase the flow of goods and services, but that there may be winners and losers from trade. Starting from the labor market effects, the video shows that the earnings of workers in the car sector that exports abroad are likely to rise and more jobs are created in the car sector. However, the sectors threatened by imports (clothing) may shrink, jobs may be destroyed, and workers from those sectors may see their wages fall. Focusing on consumers next, the video describes that, when there is more trade, the imported goods in country A (clothing) become cheaper, and the variety of goods increases. Thus, households who consume the imported goods gain since they can now buy the goods for cheaper, and they may also gain from the variety of goods available for purchase. The winners are thus generally a large group. Those who lose are often a smaller group, but their losses can be acute. Finally, respondents are shown that the government can help workers in the sectors hurt by trade by providing more generous unemployment benefits and targeted training programs to help them acquire new skills and find new jobs.

The *Efficiency treatment* video shows that, as trade increases exchanges between countries, it can impact the productivity and competitiveness of firms and workers. If A and B open up more to trade, then the car sector in country A will export more and generate higher profits. On the contrary, companies in the clothing sector in country A may shrink and exit the market. Trade may also increase knowledge and technological diffusion and lead to productivity gains in both countries. The market sizes for both countries increase, which may force industries to be more efficient in order to remain competitive.

The *Economist* treatment appends the *Redistribution* and *Efficiency* treatments into a longer, more comprehensive video.[7]

**Priming treatments.** The second survey contains a different type of treatment. Instead of showing information, a randomly selected subsample of respondents is walked through questions priming them to think about how their job may be affected by trade. For instance, they are asked *"How likely do you think it is that, over the next 10 years, your job will be outsourced, off-shored, or automated because of competition with foreign countries?"*. Another randomly selected subsample is made to think about how they are affected by trade as consumers. An example question is *"Can you think of some goods only produced in foreign countries that you regularly buy and consume because of trade with foreign countries?"*. The answers to these questions were summarized in Section 5.

Next, I discuss how the factors highlighted in the framework of Figure 1 shape respondents' policy views, combining correlations and experimental evidence.

## 6.2 Determinants of Policy Views on Trade

### Consumer gains

I start with the "self-interest" part of the framework and with respondents' perceived gains as consumers (Panel I in Figure 1). Section 3 showed that the topic of prices is salient and comes to people's minds

[7] This treatment itself comes in two versions, which are pooled together because their effects are broadly similar. The first version is "generic," referring to the countries as A and B. The "U.S.-specific" version explicitly refers to country A as the United States and to country B as a foreign country. The goal was to see whether there would be peculiar reactions if the treatment was about the U.S. specifically.

frequently when thinking about trade. Section 5 also highlighted that people are divided in their beliefs about whether trade has overall decreased the prices of goods in the U.S. and the prices of goods that they buy, although they are somewhat more convinced that trade increases the variety of goods available. It is understandable that the effects of trade on overall prices are hard to assess, given that the relative prices of different goods can move differently, and it is difficult to imagine the counterfactual prices without trade. It is likely easier to grasp the overall increase in the variety of goods.

Figure 11 shows that the belief that prices decrease from trade is not significantly related to either support for trade or support for redistribution. Similarly, experimentally priming people to think of their benefits as consumers, specifically of the prices and variety of goods that they purchase, does not move support for trade. This is consistent with the view that, although many people believe they gain as consumers from trade, specifically in terms of variety, these benefits are diffuse and people already take them as given. They are thus not a major predictor of support for trade.

**Own job risks**

I next consider the second "self-interest" part of the framework, which relates to respondents' exposure to trade in the labor market (Panel II of Figure 1). Figure 11 highlights that respondents who feel worse off from trade are significantly less likely to support free trade. They are also more likely to support imposing trade restrictions to help workers (see Table A-7). Those that are more negatively exposed to trade through their occupation or sector, according to the array of measures explored, are significantly less supportive of free trade; the opposite holds for those in comparative advantage sectors that benefit positively through their job. There are no such differences in support for redistribution. Respondents with a college education support both free trade and redistribution significantly more.[8]

Respondents who are experimentally primed to think about possible negative impacts of trade on their job (in the *Own job risk* treatment) reduce their support for free trade significantly. All these findings are consistent with the idea that trade creates a concentrated set of losers: although a minority of respondents feel directly impacted in their job (as shown in Section 5), these potential losses are salient and loom large. Thus, to some extent, views on trade are shaped by self-interest when it comes to one's potential job risks, which are more salient than the diffuse consumption benefits.

**Belief in the efficiency gains from trade**

Respondents broader economic and social concerns may also shape their policy views, as represented on the right side of Figure 1. I study these concerns next, starting from the perceived efficiency gains from trade (box III in that figure). Recall from Section 5 that respondents' views on the efficiency impacts of trade are divided, but overall positive.

Panel A of Figure 11 shows that beliefs in efficiency gains from trade are significantly correlated with more support for free trade. This can be seen both in the correlations in the panel "Mechanisms," and in the experimental evidence in the panel "Treatments:" the Efficiency treatment significantly improves support for free trade. Thus, the channel represented by arrow C in the framework of Figure 1 seems pertinent. Views on compensatory redistribution toward losers from trade are also correlated with views on efficiency

[8]Note that, while support for trade among the college-educated is in line with the factor endowment model (as explained in the introduction), their higher support for redistribution (even conditional on income) cannot easily be explained with narrow self-interest and rather points to the hypotheses raised in the introduction that education may shape ideas about the economy.

gains from trade. Even conditional on the full array of personal covariates, respondents who believe that trade can improve innovation, competitiveness, and GDP are more supportive of redistribution policy to help those who do not benefit from these efficiency gains.

Respondents whom themselves have had negative experiences with trade are less optimistic about efficiency gains from trade, leading to the indirect channel represented by arrow B in Figure 1.

**Perceived distributional impacts of trade and the importance of compensating losers**

Next, focus on the perceived distributional impacts of trade (panel IV in Figure 1). The strongest predictor of support for free trade is the belief that losers can be compensated. Other perceptions of the distributional impacts of trade are only weakly correlated with views on trade. Those that believe that trade is a major reason for unemployment and hurts U.S. workers are somewhat less likely to support free trade. As long as respondents believe that adverse consequences from trade on some groups can be dampened by (redistribution) policy, they will support more free trade, even if they believe that there are adverse distributional consequences from trade. The perceived distributional impacts of trade also substantially matter for support for compensatory redistribution. Respondents who believe that trade hurts low-income households and lower-skilled workers, and that it fosters inequality support much more redistribution.

Those that are materially negatively affected by trade – whether subjectively or objectively through their sector, occupation, or labor market — perceived worse overall distributional effects of trade as well. This seems to reduce their support for free trade and increase their support for compensatory transfers through this channel (represented by arrow B in Figure 1) too.

These correlational findings are confirmed experimentally. The *Distributive effects* treatment tells respondents about possible adverse consequences, but also about redistributive policies that can remedy them. The correlations just described suggest that these two pieces of information should move respondents in opposite directions when it comes to support for trade and push them toward more support for redistribution. This is consistent with the treatment effects of the *Distributive effects* video: It has no significant effect on support for trade and strongly increases support for redistribution policy. The *Economist* treatment also improves support for redistribution, as it similarly emphasizes the distributional consequences and potential solutions for them, while also showcasing its efficiency benefits.

The picture that arises is thus that, even if people understand that there could be adverse distributional impacts from trade, they will still support free trade as long as they believe that losers can be compensated. Respondents that hold this belief also support more redistribution policy to buffer some of the adverse consequences. Hence, people care both about efficiency and distributional effects, but these beliefs shape different aspects of their policy views, i.e., views on free trade itself versus views on redistribution to deal with the adverse consequences. Put simply, people believe that efficiency gains are more relevant for trade policy; distributional concerns can be "fixed" by other policies. However, absent the belief that losers can be helped, distributional worries decrease support for trade. An important lesson here is that policy has to convincingly take action to compensate those who lose in order to maintain support for free trade. This is also consistent with the discussion in Blanchard and Tirole (2021), Rodrik and Stantcheva (2021a), and Rodrik and Stantcheva (2021b), who emphasize that a backlash against openness and free trade can stem from the perception that the losers are left alone and that nothing is done to shelter them from the adverse distributional consequences.

**Direct and indirect effects from self-interest**

In line with the framework of Figure 1, the results just described show that respondents that are affected through their labor market are less likely to support free trade through two channels. First, there is the direct self-interest channel, represented by arrow A in the figure. Second, their own experience influences their broader economic and social concerns about trade, that in turn affect their policy views (the path through arrows B and C in the figure). What is the relative importance of these two channels?

To answer this question, I perform a Gelbach decomposition of the effect of own exposure (Gelbach, 2016). In essence, this method compares the coefficient from a partial regression, in which support for free trade is regressed on a measure of personal exposure and other controls to the one from a full regression, in which the controls for the "mechanisms" from Figure 11 are added. The decomposition attributes how much of the effect of personal exposure goes through these mechanisms and what part persists despite controlling for them, which is the unexplained part of the effect. The latter can be interpreted as the pure self-interest channel. Figure 12 shows the results for several measures of exposure: perceived exposure, being in a routine and offshorable occupation, being in a comparative advantage occupation, and being in a tradable sector. The unexplained part of the gap (i.e., the remaining effect of self-interest that does not go through differences in reasoning) is around 30% for the perceived measure of exposure, around 50-70% for exposure based on occupation, and 84% for exposure based on sector. While it is difficult to rigorously compared these magnitudes, a clear result is that there is a significant role for the direct self-interest channel, as well as for the indirect channel whereby exposure shapes one's broader economic and social concerns. Furthermore, the decomposition shows that the differences in views between those negatively exposed to trade and those that are not, are mainly explained by the key factors already highlighted above, namely whether they believe it is possible to compensate losers and whether they believe in the efficiency effects of trade (as well as their attitudes towards government).

**Scope of government, patriotism, and partisanship**

Some other determinants of trade policy views are shown in Appendix Tables A-7-A-9. Trust and belief in a broad scope for government are also strong predictors of support for redistribution policies, in line with earlier results (Kuziemko et al. (2015) and Stantcheva (2021)). Those who worry about geopolitical ramifications from trade restrictions, i.e., retaliatory responses, are more likely to support policies to compensate losers from trade, rather than support outright trade restrictions. Patriotism is significantly correlated with support for trade restrictions in many industries and to protect U.S. workers, as well as with lower support for compensatory transfers.

Partisanship also matters for views on free trade, but the bigger differences lie in support for compensatory transfers and redistribution. Most respondents remain supportive of free trade overall: only 28% of Democrats, as contrasted with 43% of Republicans, believe the U.S. should not aim for free trade. Restrictions of food imports to ensure food security (as opposed to providing subsidies for the food sector) are supported by 33% of Democrats and 45% of Republicans. The infant industry argument resonates across both sides of the political aisle with around 54% of all respondents, regardless of political affiliation. There are substantial partisan gaps that arise in support of tax and transfer instruments to mitigate some effects of trade. Between 38% and 46% of Democrats support higher taxation to fund transfers to the unemployed, income support for workers displaced by international trade, and wage subsidies. The share of Republicans who support such measures is consistently between 14 and 18 percentage points lower. This may reflect

broader views on taxation and redistribution, rather than views on trade policy itself, but it does have implications for the support for compensatory redistribution.

Figure 3: Distributive effects treatment


Link to the video here.

Figure 4: Efficiency effects treatment




Link to the video here.

FIGURE 5: ECONOMIST (= EFFICIENCY + DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS) TREATMENT




Link to the generic video here.
Link to the US specific video here.

# 7 Conclusion

The new survey evidence in this paper shows that people have varying degrees of understanding of how trade and trade policy work. Overall, many people believe in positive efficiency gains from trade. There is also broad consensus that large companies and high-income households benefit from trade and that lower-income or middle-class households and small businesses do not benefit as much. Views are split on how trade influences inequality, unemployment, and the labor market in the U.S.

Respondents' own experience, as measured by their exposure to trade through their sector, occupation, and local labor market (i.e., material self-interest) shapes their policy views both directly (through self-interest) and indirectly, by influencing their understanding and reasoning about the broader efficiency and distributional impacts from trade. Respondents that are or feel more negatively affected by trade appear to extrapolate from their experience and hold more negative beliefs about the effects of trade on other groups (e.g., the middle class or small businesses), inequality, prices, innovation, and competitiveness.

The evidence also confirms that the gains from trade to consumers may be diffuse, while the losses of affected workers are concentrated and salient. When respondents are experimentally prompted to think about their benefits from trade as consumers, there is no change in their support for free trade. On the contrary, respondents who are prompted to think about the impacts of trade on their job reduce their support for free trade.

Yet, people's policy views on trade do not only reflect material self-interest. Respondents care about the distributional and efficiency impacts of trade on others and on the U.S. economy. The belief that trade leads to efficiency gains is correlated with stronger support for free trade. The belief that trade has adverse distributional impacts is important too, but is modulated by the belief that losers can be compensated with

appropriate policies. Respondents who think that it is possible to have compensatory transfers support more free trade, even if they believe that there are negative distributional consequences from it, and they also support more compensatory redistribution to help those who lose. These links are confirmed experimentally by showing respondents' pedagogical videos on the efficiency or distributional impacts of trade.

Trade policy has two facets that go hand in hand: trade barriers (or lack thereof) and compensatory redistribution. The results reveal that people support more open trade because they believe there are efficiency gains from it and because they believe that appropriate policies can compensate losers. In particular, respondents who think trade has adverse distributional consequences do not necessarily support trade restrictions, but they support compensatory redistribution to help losers from trade. Conversely, respondents who think that losers from trade cannot be well-compensated support more trade barriers. This highlights the importance of providing compensatory transfers and making sure that citizens understand them. Absent such compensation and an understanding of it, the adverse distributional consequences of trade–which are, to some extent, unavoidable– can generate support for trade restrictions and a backlash against free trade.

## Table 1: Sample Characteristics

| | US Population | Trade Survey | Good Jobs Survey |
|---|---|---|---|
| Male | .48 | .5 | .49 |
| 18-29 years old | .22 | .23 | .26 |
| 30-39 years old | .21 | .21 | .22 |
| 40-49 years old | .2 | .2 | .2 |
| 50-59 years old | .19 | .18 | .21 |
| 60-69 years old | .18 | .18 | .11 |
| $0-$19,999 | .12 | .15 | .16 |
| $20,000-$39,999 | .15 | .19 | .19 |
| $40,000-$69,999 | .21 | .23 | .22 |
| $70,000-$109,999 | .21 | .19 | .18 |
| $110,000+ | .31 | .25 | .25 |
| Four-year college degree | .21 | .28 | .23 |
| High-school graduate or less | .39 | .19 | .23 |
| Employed | .71 | .68 | .9 |
| Unemployed | .02 | .05 | .09 |
| Married | .56 | .56 | .56 |
| White | .59 | .78 | .69 |
| Black/African-American | .11 | .06 | .11 |
| Hispanic/Latino | .2 | .06 | .08 |
| Asian/Asian-American | .07 | .06 | .04 |
| Democrat | .30 | .33 | .45 |
| Republican | .26 | .34 | .29 |
| Independent and other | .44 | .32 | .26 |
| Voted for Clinton at the 2016 presidential election | .48 | .39 | .46 |
| Voted for Trump at the 2016 presidential election | .46 | .45 | .45 |
| Sample size | | 1771 | 2148 |

This table displays statistics for the overall U.S. population and compares it to the characteristics of Survey 1 and Survey 2. National statistics on gender, age, income brackets, race, education, marital status, and employment status are from the IPUMS-CPS-ASEC data set for March 2019 (Flood et al., 2020). National statistics on party affiliation for March 2019 are from Gallup (2019). Statistics on the 2016 presidential election results are from Leip (2019). See Online Appendix A-5 for details on how the summary statistics are constructed.

## Figure 6: Topic Analysis of Open Ended Questions

(a) When you think about trade policy and whether the U.S. should put some restrictions on trade with other countries such as tariffs, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?




**Keywords**

| | |
|---|---|
| Price: | *cost, price, afford, pay & more, inflationa, inflat, expens, (impact, suffer, affect, hurt, effect, hit, loos, lost, pay) & (consum, citizen, peopl, american, household);* |
| Fair Trade & Int. Relations: | *fair, unfair, imbal, balanc, justic, equal, even & (share, valu), reciproc, cooper, mutual & (benefit, benefici), equit, take & advantag play & field, china, retali, retaliatori, (other, foreign, those, relat, relationship, certain) & countri, mexico, intern & trade, negoti, renegoti, advantag & us, trade & war, isol, isolation, isolationist, world & economi, pay & back, cheat;* |
| Protectionism: | *made & (usa, america, us), (buy, protect, support) & (usa, america, american, local), (restrict, tariff) & (fine, good, need, use, reason, some, necessari);* |
| Efficiency: | *effici, compet, competit, innov, technolog, ineffici, growth, gdp, tax, economi, more & varieti, stock & market;* |
| Labor: | *labor, job, unemploy, salari, union, wage, outsourc, worker, employe, employ, retrain;* |
| Distributive: | *(impact, suffer, affect, hurt, effect, hit, loos, lost, difficult, difficulti, problem, horribl) & (farmer, busi, busine, busin, firm, poor, poorer, middleclass, middl & class, industri, sector), winner, loos, corpor, workingclass, (expens, under) & (busi, busin, busine), lower & class, better & compani;* |
| Does Not Know: | *idk, unsur, know, know & enough, (dont, do & not, not) & (care, know, understand, knowledg), na, (not) & (sure, knowledg, opinion), no & (opinion, idea, comment), noth & say;* |

(b) What do you think would be the effects on the U.S. economy if barriers to trade, such as tariffs, were increased?




**Keywords**

| | |
|---|---|
| Negative Price: | *(hit, destroy, bad, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, recess, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, hit, loos, lost, damag, pay, worst, wors, fragil, pay, cost, impact) & (consumer, peopl, citizen, household, american, us), (increas, higher, high, up, rais, more, soar) & (price, cost), pay, inflationa, inflat, expens, hard & purchas, afford, less & cheap;* |
| Negative Efficiency: | *(destroy, bad, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, kill, death, shrink, declin) & (effici, compet, competit, innov, technolog, growth, economi), (increas, higher, high, up, rais, more, soar) & tax, ineffici, recess, depress, loss, economi & (collaps, down, shrink, hurt, crash, wors, slowdown, hamper, slow, hinder, negat), (slow, reduc) & growth, decreas & gdp;* |
| Negative Distributive: | *(hit, destroy, bad, affect, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, recess, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, hit, loos, lost, damag, pay, worst, wors, fragil, pay, cost, out & work) & (manufactur, farmer, busi, busine, busin, job, firm, poor, poorer, middleclass, middl & class, workingclass, compani, bottom, industri, lower & class, sector), layoff, bankrupt, bankruptci, poor & poorer;* |
| Negative Labor: | *(hit, destroy, bad, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, recess, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, hit, loos, lost, damag, pay, worst, wors, loss) & (labor, job, unemploy, salari, union, wage, outsourc, worker, employe, employ, manufactur, manufact, manufacur, manufactrur, manugfactur), (increas, high) & unemploy, retrain, (decreas, low, lower) & (salari, wage, employ), (few, fewer, lessen) & job;* |
| Positive...: | Words included: *good, posit, benefit, benefici, better, thrive, strengthen, improv, stronger, help, nice, great, bolster, improv, increas.* Words excluded: *catastroph, loss, lose, destroy, bad, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, kill, death, shrink, declin, lost, price, cost, afford, expens, (pay & more), inflat;* |
| ...Reallocation: | *own, ourselv, domest, work, job, farmer, demand, local, (product, buy, protect, support, good, posit, benefit, benefici, better, thrive, strengthen, improv, stronger, help, nice, great, economy) & (our, usa, america, american, us);* |
| ...Levelling of Trade Relations: | *fair, (other & countri), china, chines;* |
| ...without Justification: | Answers in the *Positive* section that were neither in *Reallocation* nor in *Levelling of Trade Relations;* |

(c) Which groups of people do you think would gain if trade barriers such as tariffs were increased?




Notes: The figure shows results based on the topic analysis of three open-ended policy questions shown in the sub-titles. Panels A and B show the answer distributions by political affiliation and self-reported exposure to trade. Bars represent the share of respondents in each group using one or more of the words attributed to each of the topics detailed at the bottom of the figure, together with a 90% confidence interval. Above each group of bars, I also display the coefficient of an indicator variable for political affiliation or trade exposure in a regression of an indicator variable for the relevant topic on the full set of individual covariates (gender, age, ethnicity, income, education, having children, and length of the answers). Panel C reports raw frequencies of the groups mentioned by the respondents by political affiliation. See Section 3 for a summary on the methods of analysis and Section A-1 for details on the topics.

## Figure 7: Knowledge about Trade Policy




*Notes:* Panels A and B show, respectively, the distribution of responses to the question: *"From which country does the U.S. import the most?"* and *"To which country does the U.S. export the most?"*. Wrong answers are marked in red, correct answers are marked in green. Panel C shows the share of respondent who self-report to know what an import tariff and an import quota are.

## Figure 8: Understanding of Trade and Trade Policy

### (a) By Education




### (b) By Perceived Exposure to Trade




*Note:* The figure reports the percentage of respondents who agree with each statement on the x-axis, with a 90% confidence interval. The continuous gray line represents the expected share of respondents who would agree to each statement if they were to pick answers randomly. On Panel A, the orange and grey dots are the shares computed on the subsamples of respondents respectively with and without a college degree. On Panel B, the green dots stand for the respondents who answered they were made better off from trade while the red dots stand for those who were made worse off. Answers are taken from the case study of Survey 1. The sample considered includes only respondents who did not receive any video course and who were not in the "Me" randomization group.

# Figure 9: Personal Exposure to International Trade




*Notes:* In Panel A, the bars show the share of respondents in each survey-group agreeing with the various questions in the upper region of the graph, together with 90% confidence intervals. The questions from Survey 2 were either asked as part of the "*Own job risks*" or "*Own consumption*" treatments. The other questions were asked in Survey 1. Panel B presents the correlation between some objective measures of exposure and respondents' perceived exposure to international trade. Dots represent coefficients in a regression of each outcome (y-axis) on indicators for gender, age and a specific measure of exposure, together with 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measures: *Tradable sector*, *Loc. lab. mkt x Tradable sect.*, *Routine occ. x Tradable sect.*, *Loc. lab. mkt x Routine occ. x Tradable sect.*, *Offshorable occ. x Tradable sect.* and at the commuting zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. All exposure variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 (paragraph "Exposure to Trade").

FIGURE 10: PERCEIVED EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF TRADE AND TRADE POLICY

(A) PERCEIVED EFFICIENCY EFFECTS




(B) PERCEIVED DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS: DO THESE GROUPS GAIN FROM TRADE?



(c) Perceived Distributional Impacts




*Notes:* The bars show the share of respondents in each survey-group agreeing with the various questions in the upper region of the graphs, together with 90% confidence intervals. Panel A focuses on questions concerning the efficiency mechanisms of trade policy; Panel B on whether a number of groups have gained or lost from trade; Panel C on general distributional mechanisms. I specify when a question was asked in Survey 2: in all other cases, questions were asked in Survey 1. For each survey, questions from various groups of respondents are considered: the control group of Survey 1 corresponds to respondents who did not see any video treatment and who were asked questions in a neutral way; the "Better Off" (respect. "Worse Off") group is made up by respondents in the "Me" randomization (Survey 1) who answered in such a way to the question "*On balance, would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries has made you better off or worse off?*"; the control group of Survey 2 corresponds to respondents who were not assigned to either the "*Own job risks*" or "*Own consumption*" treatments.

## Figure 11: Policy Views

### (a) Support for Free Trade




### (b) Support for Redistribution




*Note:* For Panel A, the outcome variable is always *Support for free trade*. For Panel B, the figure reports the regression coefficients where the outcome variable is always the indice of *Support for Redistribution*. Confidence intervals are at the 95% level. All variables are detailed in Appendix A-6. The coefficients related to mechanisms are taken from a regression that includes respondents of Survey 1 only. For the coefficients related to individual characteristics and treatment effects, the regression has been run on the full sample with both the first and the second surveys and does not control for mechanisms. Each measure of exposure in Panel "Exposure to Trade" was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on the specific measure of exposure and treatments. For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the measures *Comparative advantage occupation* and *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*.

## Figure 12: Gelbach Decomposition of Support for Free Trade

(a) Those who Perceive they are Worse off from Trade Support less Free Trade because they...




(b) Those who are in Routine & Offshorable Occupations Support less Free Trade because they...




(c) Those who are in Tradable Sectors Support less Free Trade because they...




(d) Those who are in Comparative Advantage Occupations Support more Free Trade because they...




*Notes:* These figures show how much of the gap in support for free trade between high and low exposed individuals can be explained by the mechanisms included in the section "Mechanisms" of Figure 11. Four different measures of exposure are considered, corresponding to each panel. Color codes are the following: *green* corresponds to efficiency mechanisms, *red* to distributional mechanisms, *blue* to trust in government and *yellow* to patriotism. *Other mechanisms* is the sum of the shares of the mechanisms that are included in the decomposition, but not displayed. I control only for being in a given treatment group as in the exposure panel of Figure 11. Figure A-6 of the Online Appendix displays the same decompositions after including a larger set of controls. Only respondents in Survey 1 are included. For more details on the methodology used for the decomposition, see Gelbach (2016).

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# APPENDIX

## A-1 Sample of Answers to the Open-ended Questions

**"*When you think about trade policy and whether the U.S. should put some restrictions on trade with other countries, such as tariffs, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?*"**

1. **Prices:**

   *"The effect on prices of goods and services I use."*

   *"The consumer has to pay for these through price hikes."*

   *"Concerns that some items will no longer be available or be priced to high for some americans to afford."*

2. **Fair Trade & International Relations:**

   *"I think it should be fair and equal going in both directions, our products to other countries and other country's products to us."*

   *"Retaliation from countries who are used to having no restrictions or tariffs."*

   *"I believe in equitable reciprocity as the guideline."*

3. **Protectionism:**

   *"I would like to see more products made in America."*

   *"I think we should support american made products and less reliant on foreign."*

   *"Generally believe in free trade but, at times such as with China, tariffs are necessary."*

4. **Efficiency:**

   *"Other countries shouldn't be able to dump cheaply made goods that make it impossible for domestic companies to compete."*

   *"Allow to US products being competitive on the market."*

   *"Of course we lose in stock market and other markets."*

   *"The economy will be hurt and we will end up in a recession."*

5. **Labor:**

   *"Tariffs should be put only on goods where it is economically responsible to create the jobs and economy in the US."*

   *"How it affects employment and current wages. Also, what price restrictions will be placed upon us."*

   *"I worked in manufacturing in the early 2000's and saw many jobs disappear overseas - tariffs are very important to even the playing field."*

**6. Distributive:**

*"How it will effect the businesses here."*

*"I don't want anybody to have to suffer like the farmers or any others with paying extra taxes for food and goods."*

*"This is a complex issue that I do not know very much about, but from what I've read and talked to others about, I'm worried that adding or raising tariffs will just past the cost onto the already struggling middle and lower classes in America. Inflation increases at a rate well above pay and we are not able to keep up."*

*"No consideration. Tariffs cause a lot of economic problems for lower classes and farmers."*

**7. Does Not Know:**

*"I don't know much about trade policy, so I have no opinion at the moment."*

*"I'm not sure."*

*"I am not knowledgeable to make an informed statement."*

**"*What would be the effects on the US economy if barriers to trade, such as tariffs, were increased?*"**

**1. Negative Price:**

*"More expensive goods for the citizens of the US."*

*"Prices of day to day products will rise."*

*"Increased prices on imported goods that we need."*

**2. Negative Efficiency:**

*"Everything would become more costly, it would be much harder to get outside products that we do not/cannot produce. It would wound our economy because we are not self sufficient and its not efficient to try to be. This would also make all of our products cost more so other countries would be less inclined to buy from us."*

*"The economy would suffer negatively."*

*"It would devastate the economy in the short term."*

*"The economy would go downhill, because without foreign competition, local prices will increase."*

*"Eventually a fair system needs to be worked out so US businesses can fairly compete at home and abroad."*

**3. Negative Distributive:**

*"It would cause a lot of small businesses that rely on exporting to fail. Sawmill rely on exporting lumber."*

*"The buying power of the population would decrease because the cost of goods would increase. The problem is that the effects of any tariffs could never be felt equally across the different areas of the population. In the current case, the farmers would be most affected since they would not be able the provide for their families. The question I would have, would be can they be able to withstand the pressure of the outstanding bills."*

*"Consumer goods will be more expensive, small businesses like mine will go bankrupt."*

**4. Negative Labor:**

*"We would lose jobs."*

*"Low wage and unemployment."*

*"Companies would go out of business because their product isn't being purchased which leads to layoffs/bankruptcies and therefore higher unemployment and eventually a recession."*

**5. Protectionism (Positive Effects):**

*"May help in the long run."*

*"It would better fund the government and more products would probably be made in the US."*

*"I think that maybe that would create more jobs in the US."*

*"It should pick up, more people buying American, more jobs"*

## A-2 Additional Tables and Figures

FIGURE A-1: WORDCLOUDS

(A) WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT TRADE POLICY AND WHETHER THE U.S. SHOULD PUT SOME RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS TARIFFS, WHAT ARE THE MAIN CONSIDERATIONS THAT COME TO YOUR MIND?


(B) WHAT WOULD BE A "GOOD" TRADE POLICY IN YOUR VIEW? WHAT WOULD BE THE GOAL OF A GOOD TRADE POLICY?


(C) WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE ISSUES WITH OR SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT U.S. TRADE POLICY?


*Notes:* The figure shows word clouds based on the text analysis of the open-ended questions of Survey 1. Each panel refers to the open-ended question indicated in the caption. Raw answers are processed by removing *stop* words and the words explicitly used in the text of the questions and all *don't know* answers. See Stantcheva and Ferrario (2022) for a summary on the methods of analysis.

## Figure A-2: Topic Analysis of Open Ended Questions by Share of Correct Answers to the Case Study

### (a) When you think about trade policy and whether the U.S. should put some restrictions on trade with other countries such as tariffs, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?




### (b) What do you think would be the effects on the U.S. economy if barriers to trade, such as tariffs, were increased?




*Note:* The figure shows the share of respondents who mentioned the topics enumerated on the x axis. The green bars correspond to the respondents who answered correctly to more than two thirds of the questions in the "problem set" of Survey 1. The gray bars correspond to the other respondents. See Figure 6 for more details on how the topics were designed.

## Figure A-3: Understanding of Trade by Political Affiliation




*Note:* The figure reports the percentage of respondents who agree with each statement on the x-axis, with 90% confidence intervals. The gray line represents the expected share of respondents who would agree with each statement if they were to pick answers randomly. The blue and red dots are the shares computed on the subsamples of democrats and republicans respondents, respectively. Answers are taken from to the case study of Survey 1. The sample considered includes only respondents who were not in any video course and who were not in the "Me" randomization group.

## Figure A-4: Support for Current Trade and Support for Free Trade




*Note:* The figure reports the percentage of respondents who agree with each statement on the x-axis, with 90% confidence intervals. The gray line represents the expected share of respondents who would agree to each statement if they were to pick answers randomly. The blue dots are based on an index summarizing the answers to the questions *"Do you support the current trade policy?"* and *"Do you think the current trade policy is fair?"*. This index increases with support for *current* trade policy. We then split respondents between those have an index value above the median (dark blue dots) and those who are below the median (clear blue dots). On the other hand, dark green dots correspond to respondents who agree with the statement *"the U.S. should aim at increasing trade and reducing barriers,"* while light green dots stand for the respondents who disagree with the previous statement. Answers are taken from the case study of Survey 1. The sample considered includes only respondents who were not in any video course and who were not in the "Me" randomization group.

## Figure A-5: Effects of Personal Impacts on Support for Free Trade




*Note:* The figure shows the correlation between measures of personal impact from trade and support for free trade or protectionist policies. Diamonds represent the coefficient in a regression of each outcome (y-axis) on a specific measure of subjective exposure and controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, together with 90% confidence intervals.

## Figure A-6: Gelbach Decomposition of Support for Free Trade - Full Set of Controls

(a) Those who Perceive they are Worse off from Trade Support less Free Trade because they...




(b) Those who are in Routine & Offshorable Occupations Support less Free Trade because they...




(c) Those who are in Tradable Sectors Support less Free Trade because they...




(d) Those who are in Comparative Advantage Occupations Support more Free Trade because they...




*Notes:* These figures show how much of the gap in support for free trade between high and low exposed individuals can be explained by the mechanisms included in the section "Mechanisms" of Figure 11. Four different measures of exposure are considered, corresponding to each panel. Color codes are the following: *green* corresponds to efficiency mechanisms, *red* to distributional mechanisms, *blue* to trust in government and *yellow* to patriotism. *Other mechanisms* is the sum of the shares of the mechanisms that are included in the decomposition, but not displayed. I control only for being in a given treatment group as in the exposure panel of Figure 11. Only respondents in Survey 1 are included. For more details on the methodology used for the decomposition, see Gelbach (2016).

## Table A-1: Understanding of Trade and Willingness to Pay

| | Correct Answers to the Case Study (1) | Willingness to Pay (2) | Willingness to Pay (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Individual Characteristics** | | | |
| Female | -0.04*** | -0.11*** | -0.09*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Has children | 0.02 | 0.09*** | 0.09*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Black | -0.06*** | 0.00 | 0.03 |
| | (0.02) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Hispanic | -0.06*** | -0.02 | 0.01 |
| | (0.02) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Other | -0.02 | -0.07* | -0.06 |
| | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Age 30-49 | -0.00 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Age 50-69 | 0.03** | 0.05 | 0.03 |
| | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Middle-Income | 0.01 | -0.05 | -0.05* |
| | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| High-Income | 0.02 | -0.03 | -0.04 |
| | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| College Degree | 0.07*** | 0.05* | 0.02 |
| | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Republican | -0.04*** | -0.03 | -0.02 |
| | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Independent and others | -0.04*** | -0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Correct Answers to the Case Study | | | 0.38*** |
| | | | (0.05) |
| **Panel B: Effect of Trade** | | | |
| Better off from Trade | 0.09*** | 0.10* | 0.06 |
| | (0.02) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| **Panel C: Summary Statistics** | | | |
| Control mean | 0.51 | 0.38 | 0.38 |
| Democrat control mean | 0.52 | 0.39 | 0.39 |
| Observations | 1771 | 1771 | 1771 |

For column (1), the dependent variable is the share of correct answers to the case study of Survey 1. For columns (2) and (3), the outcome variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is willing to pay at the end of the survey to obtain the correct answers to the case study. Respondents were asked if they would pay either 1, 2, 5 or 10 dollars. I control for the amount that was proposed to the respondent. Regressions also include controls for employment status, video treatments and question formulation (either 'Me' or 'Generic'). The sample includes only the respondents of Survey 1. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

# Table A-2: Understanding of Trade: Problem Set Style Questions

| | Consumers benefit if imports ↑ | Both countries better off from trade | Justifiable to import even if US more productive | U.S. prices ↓ if U.S. cars imports ↑ | Prices abroad ↓ if U.S. laptop exports ↑ | U.S. wages ↓ if U.S. cars imports ↑ | U.S. wages ↑ if U.S. laptop exports ↑ | Wages of car workers moving to laptop sector ↑ if car imports ↑ | Your wage ↓ if U.S. imports in your sector ↑ | Your wage ↑ if U.S. exports in your sector ↑ | Prices abroad ↑ if export tax ↑ | U.S. prices ↑ if import tax ↑ | Share of correct answers |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) |
| **Panel A: Personal characteristics** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.10*** | -0.09*** | -0.14*** | -0.06*** | -0.06** | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.04 | -0.12*** | 0.05* | -0.01 | -0.04*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Age 30-49 | -0.03 | 0.00 | -0.05* | -0.05 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.05 | -0.01 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Age 50-69 | -0.12*** | 0.01 | -0.05 | -0.07** | 0.02 | 0.08** | -0.03 | 0.09** | 0.11*** | -0.06* | 0.16*** | 0.20*** | 0.03* |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.02) |
| College | 0.04 | 0.11*** | 0.09*** | 0.07*** | 0.06** | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.12*** | 0.04 | 0.11*** | 0.03 | 0.06** | 0.07*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.01) |
| Republican | 0.04 | -0.05* | -0.05* | -0.06** | -0.06** | -0.07** | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.08*** | 0.02 | -0.07** | -0.06** | -0.04*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.01) |
| Middle-income | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.03 | 0.04 | 0.06* | 0.02 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.01) |
| High-income | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.05* | 0.05* | 0.04 | -0.01 | 0.03 | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.01) |
| **Panel B: Video treatment effects** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Efficiency Effects | -0.01 | -0.03 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.06 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.02 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.02) |
| Distributive Effects | -0.03 | -0.10*** | -0.05 | 0.07* | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.02) |
| Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive) | 0.05* | -0.09*** | -0.04 | 0.10*** | 0.03 | 0.09*** | 0.04 | 0.06* | 0.08** | 0.11*** | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.04*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.01) |
| **Panel C: Exposure** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade) | -0.19*** | -0.31*** | -0.19*** | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.03 | -0.08 | -0.14*** | -0.01 | -0.15*** | -0.02 | 0.03 | -0.10*** |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.02) |
| Routine occupation | -0.10*** | -0.07*** | -0.10*** | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.07*** | -0.00 | -0.03 | 0.08*** | -0.08*** | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.02 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Routine & offshorable occupation | -0.08*** | -0.01 | -0.04 | 0.04* | 0.07 | 0.10*** | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.11*** | -0.04** | 0.06** | 0.06** | 0.02 |
| | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Local labor market | 0.01 | -0.03 | -0.03 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.07* | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.07*** | 0.01 | 0.08*** | 0.00 | 0.02* |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.01) |
| Tradable sector | -0.05 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.10*** | -0.07*** | -0.13*** | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.05** | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.06 | -0.06*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.02) |
| Comparative advantage occupation | 0.02* | 0.00 | 0.03*** | 0.03** | 0.01 | -0.00 | -0.01** | -0.00 | -0.01 | 0.02** | -0.01 | -0.02** | 0.00 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.00) |
| **Panel D: Descriptive statistics** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Control mean | 0.55 | 0.68 | 0.71 | 0.26 | 0.40 | 0.50 | 0.41 | 0.46 | 0.38 | 0.44 | 0.65 | 0.66 | 0.51 |
| Democrat control mean | 0.53 | 0.72 | 0.74 | 0.26 | 0.38 | 0.52 | 0.40 | 0.51 | 0.40 | 0.43 | 0.66 | 0.68 | 0.52 |
| Observations (Panels A and B) | 1761 | 1761 | 1760 | 1762 | 1762 | 1761 | 1762 | 1761 | 1763 | 1763 | 1763 | 1762 | 1754 |
| Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure) | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 389 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 389 |
| Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation) | 1707 | 1707 | 1706 | 1708 | 1708 | 1707 | 1708 | 1707 | 1709 | 1709 | 1709 | 1708 | 1700 |

*Note:* The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 and they refer to questions asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and B include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for all treatments in Survey 1 and for question formulation (either 'Me' or 'Generic'). Each measure of exposure in Panel C was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the commuting zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel D provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

# Table A-3: Perceived Efficiency Effects

| | Trade ↑ competition in the U.S. (1) | Trade ↑ innovation in the U.S. (2) | Trade ↑ GDP growth of the U.S. (3) | If U.S. exports ↑ value of $ ↑ (4) | Both countries better off from trade (5) | Believes in efficiency gains (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Personal characteristics** | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.14*** | -0.11*** | -0.10*** | -0.17*** | -0.09*** | -0.36*** |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) |
| Age 30-49 | -0.08** | -0.04 | -0.07* | 0.04 | 0.00 | -0.17** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.07) |
| Age 50-69 | -0.12*** | -0.03 | -0.12*** | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.28*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.07) |
| College | 0.10*** | 0.11*** | 0.10*** | 0.10*** | 0.11*** | 0.31*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) |
| Republican | 0.01 | 0.05* | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.05* | 0.04 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| Middle-income | 0.08*** | 0.02 | 0.03 | -0.02 | 0.01 | 0.12** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| High-income | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.08 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| **Panel B: Video treatment effects** | | | | | | |
| Efficiency Effects | 0.06 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.04 | -0.03 | 0.01 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.08) |
| Distributive Effects | 0.04 | -0.06 | 0.01 | 0.03 | -0.10*** | 0.01 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.08) |
| Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive) | 0.09*** | 0.06** | 0.04 | 0.03 | -0.09*** | 0.20*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| **Panel C: Exposure** | | | | | | |
| Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade) | -0.24*** | -0.24*** | -0.32*** | -0.07 | -0.31*** | -0.74*** |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.10) |
| Routine occupation | -0.12*** | -0.11*** | -0.07 | -0.09*** | -0.07*** | -0.29*** |
| | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.07) |
| Routine & offshorable occupation | -0.08*** | -0.07*** | -0.05* | -0.07*** | -0.01 | -0.18** |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| Local labor market | -0.09*** | -0.04 | 0.02 | 0.01 | -0.03 | -0.09 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.07) |
| Tradable sector | -0.04 | -0.05** | -0.06* | -0.08** | -0.04 | -0.16** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| Comparative advantage occupation | 0.03** | 0.01 | 0.02** | 0.02** | 0.00 | 0.05** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| **Panel D: Descriptive statistics** | | | | | | |
| Control mean | 0.61 | 0.69 | 0.62 | 0.53 | 0.68 | -0.00 |
| Democrat control mean | 0.60 | 0.66 | 0.61 | 0.52 | 0.72 | -0.03 |
| Observations (Panels A and B) | 1762 | 1763 | 1763 | 1763 | 1761 | 1765 |
| Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure) | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 |
| Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation) | 1708 | 1709 | 1709 | 1709 | 1707 | 1711 |

*Note:* The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 and refer to questions asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and B include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for all treatments in Survey 1 and for question formulation. Each measure of exposure in Panel C was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel D provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

## Table A-4: Perceived Distributional Impacts: Do these Groups Gain from Trade?

| | Large Corporations (1) | Small Businesses (2) | High Incomes (3) | Middle Incomes (4) | Low Incomes (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Personal characteristics** | | | | | |
| Female | -0.04 | -0.13*** | -0.05 | -0.12*** | -0.09*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Age 30-49 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.12*** | -0.02 | -0.05* |
| | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Age 50-69 | 0.11*** | -0.11*** | 0.10** | -0.16*** | -0.21*** |
| | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| College | 0.10*** | 0.06*** | 0.08*** | 0.07*** | 0.06** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Republican | -0.07** | 0.03 | -0.11*** | 0.04 | 0.05** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Middle-income | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.07** | -0.03 | -0.05 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| High-income | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.06* | -0.03 | -0.03 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| **Panel B: Video treatment effects** | | | | | |
| Efficiency Effects | 0.06 | -0.00 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Distributive Effects | 0.02 | -0.04 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.02 |
| | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive) | 0.03 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.05* |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| **Panel C: Exposure** | | | | | |
| Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade) | -0.08 | -0.19*** | | | |
| | (0.05) | (0.04) | | | |
| Routine occupation | -0.07** | -0.14*** | -0.04 | -0.15*** | -0.13*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Routine & offshorable occupation | -0.04 | -0.14*** | -0.00 | -0.13*** | -0.13*** |
| | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Local labor market | -0.01 | -0.07*** | 0.00 | -0.06* | -0.00 |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Tradable sector | 0.02 | -0.02 | -0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Comparative advantage occupation | 0.00 | 0.03** | 0.01 | 0.03** | 0.03** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| **Panel D: Descriptive statistics** | | | | | |
| Control mean | 0.67 | 0.19 | 0.61 | 0.23 | 0.20 |
| Democrats control mean | 0.72 | 0.17 | 0.64 | 0.21 | 0.17 |
| Observations | 1372 | 1372 | 1372 | 1372 | 1372 |
| Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure) | 390 | 390 | | | |
| Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation) | 1708 | 1708 | 1328 | 1328 | 1328 |

*Note:* The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 and refer to questions asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and B include respondents who were asked questions in a neutral way and controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for all treatments in Survey 1. Each measure of exposure in Panel C was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Columns (3)-(5) include respondents who were asked questions in a neutral way only. Panel D provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

# Table A-5: Perceived Distributional Effects

| | It's easy to change sector x low-skilled workers | It's easy to change sector x high-skilled workers | Trade is a major reason x unemployment and & decline of industries | Automation | Major reason x job loss in manufacturing is: Trade | Immigration | Overall trade helped U.S. workers | Trade is a major reason for rise in inequality | Trade ↓ prices of goods sold in the U.S. | More trade can make all better off | Believes Trade has adverse distributional impacts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| **Panel A: Personal characteristics** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.13*** | -0.11*** | -0.07** | -0.06** | 0.02 | 0.04** | -0.16*** | -0.04 | -0.10*** | -0.09*** | 0.27*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| Age 30-49 | 0.01 | -0.06* | 0.06 | 0.01 | -0.05* | 0.05** | -0.05 | 0.05 | -0.01 | -0.04 | 0.17** |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.08) |
| Age 50-69 | -0.10*** | -0.06 | -0.05 | -0.07** | 0.06* | 0.02 | -0.15*** | -0.13*** | -0.07* | -0.09** | 0.33*** |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.08) |
| College | 0.02 | 0.08*** | 0.04 | 0.06** | -0.02 | -0.04** | 0.15*** | 0.01 | 0.14*** | 0.10*** | -0.12** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| Republican | 0.16*** | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.03** | 0.02 | -0.06** | -0.01 | -0.12*** | -0.32*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.07) |
| Middle-income | -0.04 | -0.02 | -0.08** | 0.06** | -0.04 | -0.02 | -0.04 | -0.09** | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.08 |
| | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.07) |
| High-income | 0.01 | -0.06* | -0.10*** | 0.09*** | -0.05 | -0.04* | 0.01 | -0.07* | -0.00 | 0.03 | -0.15** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.07) |
| **Panel B: Video treatment effects** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Efficiency Effects | -0.01 | 0.08** | 0.03 | | | | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.01 | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | | | | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.08) |
| Distributive Effects | -0.03 | 0.04 | 0.04 | | | | -0.04 | -0.01 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | | | | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.08) |
| Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive) | -0.02 | 0.07** | 0.02 | | | | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.08*** | -0.00 | 0.01 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | | | | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| **Panel C: Exposure** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade) | | | | | | | -0.35*** | 0.08* | | -0.21*** | 0.62*** |
| | | | | | | | (0.05) | (0.05) | | (0.05) | (0.07) |
| Routine occupation | -0.12*** | -0.10*** | -0.15*** | -0.04 | 0.04* | 0.00 | -0.12*** | -0.16*** | -0.09*** | -0.10*** | 0.14 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.08) |
| Routine & offshorable occupation | -0.13*** | -0.10*** | -0.14*** | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.00 | -0.08** | -0.15*** | -0.03 | -0.08*** | 0.13** |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.05) |
| Local labor market | -0.03 | -0.01 | 0.04 | -0.02 | 0.03 | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.04 | 0.01 | -0.02 | 0.10 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.09) |
| Tradable sector | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.04 | -0.04 | -0.02 | 0.06*** | 0.01 | 0.09* | -0.04 | -0.09*** | 0.10 |
| | (0.11) | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.15) |
| Comparative advantage occupation | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02** | -0.01** | -0.00 | 0.04*** | 0.02 | 0.02* | 0.03*** | -0.07*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| **Panel D: Descriptive statistics** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Control mean | 0.37 | 0.63 | 0.45 | 0.42 | 0.47 | 0.11 | 0.50 | 0.38 | 0.57 | 0.62 | 0.00 |
| Democrat control mean | 0.32 | 0.60 | 0.48 | 0.47 | 0.44 | 0.09 | 0.49 | 0.46 | 0.58 | 0.71 | 0.18 |
| Observations (Panels A and B) | 1373 | 1372 | 1372 | 2148 | 2148 | 2148 | 1373 | 1372 | 1372 | 1369 | 1374 |
| Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 390 | 390 | 0 | 390 | 390 |
| Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation) | 1329 | 1328 | 1328 | 2140 | 2140 | 2140 | 1329 | 1328 | 1328 | 1325 | 1330 |

*Note:* The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 and refer to questions asked in Survey 1, except for variables in columns (4)-(6), which refer to Survey 2. Regressions of columns (1), (2), (3) and (9) are based on the control group of survey 1 and thus excluded respondents in the "Me" randomization group. Regressions in Panels A and B include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for the treatments in both surveys. Each measure of exposure in Panel C was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and relevant treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel D provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

# Table A-6: Personal Impacts from Trade

| | Trade ↓ prices of goods you buy (1) | Trade ↑ varieties of goods you buy (2) | Easy x you to find a job in a different sector (3) | Your wage has not grown as fast due to competition (4) | Trade ↑ unemployment in your sector (5) | Trade threat x future of your sector (6) | Your job likely to be offshored, outsourced or automated (7) | Automation had a negative impact on your job (8) | Trade had a negative impact on your job (9) | Immigration had a negative impact on your job (10) | You are worse off from trade (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Personal characteristics** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.26*** | -0.05 | -0.12** | -0.12*** | -0.08 | -0.00 | -0.08*** | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.16*** |
| | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.05) |
| Age 30-49 | -0.22*** | 0.02 | -0.04 | 0.02 | 0.14* | 0.11** | 0.00 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.02 | 0.07 |
| | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.08) |
| Age 50-69 | -0.29*** | 0.06 | -0.13 | -0.11** | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.11*** | 0.01 | 0.08*** | 0.12*** | 0.13 |
| | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.08) |
| College | 0.08 | 0.11*** | 0.05 | 0.07 | -0.05 | -0.02 | 0.03 | -0.05*** | -0.09*** | -0.06** | -0.12** |
| | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.05) |
| Republican | -0.03 | -0.05 | 0.14** | -0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.00 | 0.02 | 0.05* | -0.05 |
| | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.06) |
| Middle-income | 0.15** | 0.10** | 0.13** | 0.01 | -0.07 | -0.05 | -0.06 | -0.04** | -0.02 | -0.04 | -0.11 |
| | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.07) |
| High-income | 0.20*** | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 0.07 | 0.01 | -0.04* | -0.03 | -0.07** | -0.00 |
| | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.07) |
| **Panel B: Exposure** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade) | -0.22*** | | -0.13** | | 0.06 | | | | | | |
| | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | | | | | |
| Routine occupation | -0.17*** | -0.10* | -0.06 | -0.10*** | 0.05 | -0.00 | -0.03* | 0.09*** | 0.12*** | 0.12*** | -0.02 |
| | (0.02) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.01) | (0.07) | (0.04) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Routine & offshorable occupation | -0.12*** | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.11*** | 0.04 | 0.01 | -0.02 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.07*** | -0.00 |
| | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Local labor market | -0.10 | -0.00 | -0.08 | -0.00 | 0.09 | -0.05 | 0.03 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.04 |
| | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| Tradable sector | -0.17** | -0.01 | 0.04 | 0.14*** | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.07*** | 0.06*** | 0.03 | 0.12*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.10) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Comparative advantage occupation | 0.04** | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.02 | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.02*** | -0.02** | -0.02** | -0.02** | -0.00 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| **Panel C: Descriptive statistics** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Control mean | 0.46 | 0.66 | 0.57 | 0.46 | 0.33 | 0.29 | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.25 | 0.32 | 0.39 |
| Democrat control mean | 0.45 | 0.70 | 0.52 | 0.55 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.23 | 0.13 | 0.20 | 0.27 | 0.42 |
| Observations (Panels A and B) | 390 | 720 | 390 | 708 | 390 | 708 | 707 | 2127 | 2120 | 2092 | 390 |
| Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure) | 390 | 0 | 390 | 0 | 390 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation) | 380 | 718 | 380 | 704 | 380 | 704 | 703 | 2119 | 2113 | 2085 | 380 |

*Note:* The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6. Variables in columns (1), (3), (5) and (11) refer to questions asked in Survey 1. All other variables refer to questions asked in Survey 2. Regressions in Panel A include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for the treatments in both surveys. Each measure of exposure in Panel B was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and relevant treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel C provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

# Table A-7: Policy Views on Free Trade

| | The U.S. should aim at reducing barriers and increasing trade (1) | The U.S. should restrict food imports to ensure food security (2) | The U.S. should protect their infant industries (3) | Restrict imports best way to help U.S. workers (4) | Transfers & retraining best way to help U.S. workers (5) | Subsidize production best way to help U.S. workers (6) | The U.S. should protect minerals and metals, petroleum, chemicals or machinery sectors (7) | The U.S. should protect from trade more than 3 types of goods (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Personal characteristics** | | | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.13*** | -0.05*** | 0.02 | -0.00 | 0.02 | -0.02* | -0.09*** | -0.00 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Age 30-49 | 0.02 | -0.05** | -0.03 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.00 | 0.02 | 0.09** |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Age 50-69 | -0.07*** | 0.04 | -0.07*** | 0.09*** | -0.05** | -0.04** | -0.04 | 0.05 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| College | 0.15*** | -0.05*** | -0.01 | -0.08*** | 0.05*** | 0.03** | -0.05* | -0.06** |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Republican | -0.15*** | 0.12*** | 0.07*** | 0.15*** | -0.12*** | -0.03** | 0.08*** | 0.03 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Middle-income | 0.03 | 0.06*** | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.06* | -0.06* |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| High-income | 0.08*** | 0.01 | -0.00 | -0.02 | -0.00 | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.07** |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| **Panel B: Mechanisms** | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness and GDP | 0.08*** | -0.02 | -0.00 | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.02 |
| | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Trade decreases prices of consumer goods | 0.03 | 0.06** | 0.03 | -0.04 | 0.06** | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.04 |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Large Companies won more than small ones | 0.01 | -0.05 | -0.02 | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 | -0.02 | 0.03 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs | 0.03 | -0.03 | -0.05* | -0.08** | 0.06* | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.06** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Sector switch easier if high skill | 0.03 | -0.10*** | -0.02 | -0.05* | 0.06** | -0.02 | -0.06** | 0.02 |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Trade major reason for rise in inequality | 0.02 | -0.03 | 0.07** | 0.03 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.07** | -0.01 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts US workers | -0.03** | 0.07*** | 0.05*** | 0.03* | -0.02 | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.06*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Possible to compensate losers through policies | 0.12*** | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.06** | 0.04 | 0.02 | -0.08*** | -0.04 |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Supports government intervention | 0.03*** | -0.06*** | 0.04** | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.00 | 0.03** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Is patriotic | 0.02 | 0.08*** | 0.06*** | 0.07*** | -0.07*** | 0.01 | 0.08*** | 0.07*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| **Panel C: Video treatment effects** | | | | | | | | |
| Efficiency Effects | 0.13*** | 0.00 | 0.11*** | -0.01 | -0.03 | 0.03 | -0.07* | -0.02 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Distributive Effects | 0.00 | -0.02 | 0.05 | -0.03 | 0.05 | -0.02 | 0.04 | -0.01 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive) | 0.04 | 0.05* | 0.08** | -0.04 | 0.05* | -0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Own Job Risks | -0.07*** | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.03 | -0.02 | -0.01 | | |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | | |
| Own Consumption | 0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | 0.01 | -0.05* | 0.03* | | |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | | |
| **Panel D: Exposure** | | | | | | | | |
| Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade) | -0.22*** | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.11** | -0.05 | -0.06* | 0.09* | 0.11** |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Routine occupation | -0.14*** | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.03 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.05 | -0.03 |
| | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Routine & offshorable occupation | -0.09** | -0.02*** | -0.04* | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.09*** | -0.06** |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Local labor market | -0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 | -0.00 | 0.01 | -0.00 | -0.01 | -0.04 |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Tradable sector | -0.07** | 0.04 | -0.01 | 0.02* | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.06 | 0.01 |
| | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| Comparative advantage occupation | 0.03*** | 0.01** | -0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01** | 0.01*** | 0.01 | -0.01 |
| | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| **Panel E: Descriptive statistics** | | | | | | | | |
| Control mean | 0.63 | 0.39 | 0.54 | 0.36 | 0.53 | 0.12 | 0.49 | 0.53 |
| Democrat control mean | 0.72 | 0.33 | 0.52 | 0.28 | 0.57 | 0.14 | 0.46 | 0.53 |
| Observations (Panels A and C) | 3911 | 3905 | 3908 | 3912 | 3912 | 3912 | 1765 | 1765 |
| Observations (Panel B) | 1368 | 1366 | 1368 | 1368 | 1368 | 1368 | 1368 | 1368 |
| Observations (Panel D - Perceived Exposure) | 390 | 390 | 389 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 |
| Observations (Panel D - Exposure by Occupation) | 3849 | 3843 | 3846 | 3850 | 3850 | 3850 | 1711 | 1711 |

*Note:* The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6. Variables in columns (1)-(6) refer to questions asked both surveys. Variables in columns (7)-(8) refer to questions asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and C include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for the treatments in both surveys. Regressions in panel B also include the mechanisms listed in the table and only include observations from Survey 1. Each measure of exposure in Panel D was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and relevant treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel E provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

# Table A-8: Policy Views on Redistribution

| | Support for redistribution index | The government should provide: more transfers to those out of work | better schools for low income children | income support for workers displaced by international trade | subsidies to pay health insurance | wage subsidies to working poor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| **Panel A: Personal characteristics** | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.00 | -0.07*** | 0.04** | -0.03* | -0.00 | -0.01 |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Age 30-49 | 0.04 | 0.05** | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.05** | 0.02 |
| | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Age 50-69 | -0.06 | -0.03* | -0.04* | -0.03 | 0.00 | -0.01 |
| | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| College | 0.17*** | 0.08*** | 0.05** | 0.05*** | 0.05*** | 0.03 |
| | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Republican | -0.56*** | -0.14*** | -0.15*** | -0.13*** | -0.24*** | -0.18*** |
| | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Middle-income | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.02 |
| | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| High-income | -0.06 | 0.00 | -0.04 | -0.01 | -0.07*** | -0.07*** |
| | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| **Panel B: Mechanisms** | | | | | | |
| Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness and GDP | 0.09*** | 0.04*** | 0.04*** | 0.03** | 0.04*** | 0.01 |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Trade decreases prices of consumer goods | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.03 | 0.03 | -0.02 | -0.00 |
| | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Large Companies won more than small ones | 0.07 | -0.04 | 0.12*** | 0.11*** | 0.04 | 0.06* |
| | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs | 0.14** | -0.01 | 0.09*** | -0.00 | 0.07** | 0.02 |
| | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Sector switch easier if high skill | 0.18*** | -0.01 | 0.08*** | 0.09*** | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Trade major reason for rise in inequality | 0.28*** | 0.20*** | 0.06** | 0.10*** | 0.13*** | 0.16*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts US workers | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.04*** | -0.01 | 0.03** |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Possible to compensate losers through policies | 0.26*** | 0.06** | -0.00 | 0.06** | 0.07*** | 0.08*** |
| | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Supports government intervention | 0.26*** | 0.08*** | 0.07*** | 0.06*** | 0.10*** | 0.09*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Is patriotic | -0.21*** | -0.02 | -0.10*** | -0.03** | -0.07*** | -0.06*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| **Panel C: Video treatment effects** | | | | | | |
| Efficiency Effects | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.08** | 0.08* | 0.04 |
| | (0.08) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Distributive Effects | 0.30*** | 0.07* | 0.05 | 0.15*** | 0.07* | 0.07* |
| | (0.08) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive) | 0.18*** | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.09*** | 0.05 | 0.04 |
| | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Own Job Risks | -0.02 | -0.00 | 0.04* | 0.03 | -0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Own Consumption | -0.04 | -0.02 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.02 |
| | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| **Panel D: Exposure** | | | | | | |
| Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade) | -0.05 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.12** |
| | (0.10) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Routine occupation | -0.06 | -0.06*** | 0.03* | -0.03* | -0.02 | -0.02 |
| | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Routine & offshorable occupation | -0.03 | -0.05*** | 0.05*** | -0.02* | -0.01 | -0.03** |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Local labor market | -0.02 | -0.04* | -0.01 | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.02 |
| | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Tradable sector | -0.08 | -0.04** | -0.01 | -0.08*** | 0.00 | -0.03 |
| | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Comparative advantage occupation | 0.01 | 0.02** | -0.01 | 0.01** | -0.00 | 0.00 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| **Panel E: Descriptive statistics** | | | | | | |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.29 | 0.47 | 0.37 | 0.37 | 0.37 |
| Democrat control mean | 0.31 | 0.38 | 0.55 | 0.44 | 0.51 | 0.46 |
| Observations (Panels A and C) | 3913 | 3905 | 3903 | 3902 | 3905 | 3902 |
| Observations (Panel B) | 1368 | 1367 | 1365 | 1367 | 1367 | 1366 |
| Observations (Panel D - Perceived Exposure) | 390 | 390 | 390 | 388 | 390 | 389 |
| Observations (Panel D - Exposure by Occupation) | 3851 | 3843 | 3841 | 3840 | 3843 | 3840 |

*Note:* The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 and refer to questions which were asked in both surveys. Regressions in Panels A and C include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for the treatments in both surveys. Regressions in panel B also include the mechanisms listed in the table and only include observations from Survey 1. Each measure of exposure in Panel D was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and relevant treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel E provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

# Table A-9: Scope of Government

| | Government should be responsible for: | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Reducing income differences (1) | Reducing wealth transmission (2) | Ensuring health care (3) | Reducing opportunity differences (4) | Regulating trade (5) | Stabilizing financial system (6) | Stabilizing dollar (7) | Providing minimum living (8) |
| **Panel A: Personal characteristics** | | | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.05** | -0.10*** | 0.01 | -0.04* | 0.04* | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.00 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Age 30-49 | 0.02 | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.05 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.03 | -0.03 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Age 50-69 | -0.17*** | -0.19*** | -0.05 | -0.16*** | 0.02 | 0.07** | 0.06* | -0.13*** |
| | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| College | 0.02 | 0.05** | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.06** | 0.04 | -0.02 |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Republican | -0.31*** | -0.15*** | -0.34*** | -0.31*** | -0.06* | -0.12*** | -0.07*** | -0.32*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Middle-income | -0.07** | -0.05 | -0.03 | -0.10*** | -0.09*** | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.04 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| High-income | -0.09*** | -0.05* | -0.05* | -0.06* | -0.02 | 0.00 | -0.02 | -0.03 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| **Panel B: Mechanisms** | | | | | | | | |
| Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness and GDP | 0.01 | 0.02* | 0.03** | 0.03* | 0.01 | 0.04*** | 0.04*** | 0.02 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Trade decreases prices of consumer goods | -0.05* | -0.01 | -0.07*** | -0.03 | -0.09*** | -0.02 | -0.06** | -0.03 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Large Companies won more than small ones | 0.05* | -0.03 | 0.05* | 0.02 | 0.12*** | 0.14*** | 0.17*** | 0.05 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.13*** | 0.07** | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.05* | 0.06** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Sector switch easier if high skill | -0.04* | -0.07*** | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.02 | 0.05* | -0.00 | 0.03 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Trade major reason for rise in inequality | 0.20*** | 0.17*** | 0.14*** | 0.15*** | 0.13*** | 0.09*** | 0.08*** | 0.15*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts US workers | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.03** | 0.02 | 0.03** | 0.03** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Possible to compensate losers through policies | 0.06** | 0.03 | 0.06** | 0.05* | -0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.06** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Supports government intervention | 0.15*** | 0.11*** | 0.16*** | 0.16*** | 0.11*** | 0.09*** | 0.08*** | 0.16*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Is patriotic | -0.04*** | 0.02 | -0.06*** | -0.05*** | 0.04** | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.04*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| **Panel C: Video treatment effects** | | | | | | | | |
| Efficiency Effects | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Distributive Effects | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.03 | 0.05 | 0.03 | -0.03 | -0.05 | 0.05 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive) | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.03 | -0.04 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.06** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| **Panel D: Exposure** | | | | | | | | |
| Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade) | 0.06 | -0.07 | -0.03 | -0.07 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.01 | -0.04 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Routine occupation | -0.07** | -0.12*** | -0.06** | -0.05** | -0.09** | -0.08*** | -0.07** | -0.05* |
| | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Routine & offshorable occupation | -0.08*** | -0.11*** | -0.04*** | -0.06** | -0.08*** | -0.08*** | -0.05*** | -0.06** |
| | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Local labor market | -0.03 | -0.08*** | -0.04 | -0.03 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.02 | -0.03 |
| | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Tradable sector | 0.06* | -0.00 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.06) |
| Comparative advantage occupation | 0.02* | 0.01 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| **Panel E: Descriptive statistics** | | | | | | | | |
| Control mean | 0.44 | 0.31 | 0.66 | 0.49 | 0.61 | 0.69 | 0.75 | 0.56 |
| Democrat control mean | 0.62 | 0.38 | 0.84 | 0.66 | 0.69 | 0.77 | 0.80 | 0.73 |
| Observations (Panels A and C) | 1761 | 1760 | 1761 | 1761 | 1760 | 1761 | 1760 | 1760 |
| Observations (Panel B) | 1367 | 1366 | 1367 | 1367 | 1366 | 1367 | 1367 | 1366 |
| Observations (Panel D - Perceived Exposure) | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 389 | 390 |
| Observations (Panel D - Exposure by Occupation) | 1707 | 1706 | 1707 | 1707 | 1706 | 1707 | 1706 | 1706 |

*Note:* The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix A-6 and refer to questions which were asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and C include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for the treatments in both surveys. Regressions in panel B also include the mechanisms listed in the table and only include observations from Survey 1. Each measure of exposure in Panel D was part of a different regression of an independent outcome on a reduced set of controls (gender, age, question formulation and relevant treatments). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel E provides descriptive statistics on control means and on the sample size of different regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

## A-3 Questionnaire First Survey

The questionnaire is available here: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0qhj8nbFK7k2NA9.

### A-3.1 Consent Form

FIGURE A-7: CONSENT PAGE



**Academic Research Survey** We are a non-partisan group of academic researchers from the Economics Department at Harvard University. Our goal is to learn about people's attitudes on several issues. Please read the information below before consenting to begin the research study.

• This survey is voluntary. You have the right to not answer any question, and to stop the survey at any time or for any reason (to exit the survey, simply close this window). We expect that it will take about 20 minutes. You will likely learn a lot!

• Your name will never be recorded by researchers. Results may include summary data, but you will never be identified. The data will be stored on Harvard servers and will be kept confidential. The collected anonymous data may be made available to other researchers for replication purposes.

• You will be compensated for this interview conditional upon (i) completing the survey and (ii) passing our survey quality checks, which use sophisticated statistical control methods to detect incoherent and rushed responses. **Responding without adequate effort may result in your responses being flagged for low quality and you may not receive your payment.**

Please note that it is very important for the success of our research that you **answer honestly** and **read the questions very carefully** before answering. If at any time you don't know an answer, please give your best guess **without consulting any external sources**. However, please be sure to spend enough time reading and understanding the questions.

You are encouraged to print or take a screenshot of this page for your records. If you have any questions about this study, you may contact us at studysocialsciences2018@gmail.com.

This research has been reviewed and approved by the Harvard University Area Institutional Review Board ("IRB"). You may talk to them at (617) 496-2847 or cuhs@harvard.edu if:

• Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team.
• You cannot reach the research team.
• You want to talk to someone besides the research team.
• You have questions about your rights as a research subject.
• You want to get information or provide input about this research.

○ Yes, I would like to take part in this study, and confirm that I LIVE IN THE U.S., and I am 18 or older

○ No, I would not like to participate

### A-3.2 Background Questions

1. What is your gender?
   *Male; Female*
2. What is your age?
3. What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year?
   *$0-$9999; $10000-$14999; $15000-$19999; $20000-$29999; $30000-39999; $40000-$49999; $50000-$69999; $70000-$89999; $90000-$109999; $110000-$149999; $150000-$199999; $200000+*
4. Were you born in the United States?
   *Yes; No*
5. In which ZIP code do you live?
6. Please indicate your marital status
   *Single; Married; Legally separated or divorced; Widowed*

7. How many children do you have?

   *I do not have children; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more*

8. *Screening Question 1.* Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both strongly agree and strongly disagree among the alternatives below, no matter what your opinion is.

   Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "It is easy to find accurate and reliable information in the media these days."

   *Strongly agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly disagree*

9. How would you describe your ethnicity/race?

   *European American/White; African American/Black; Hispanic/Latino; Asian/Asian American; Mixed race; Other (please specify)*

10. Which category best describes your highest level of education?

    *Primary education or less; Some High School; High School degre/GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)*

11. (If highest level of education superior to "High School" to 10) What is/was your field of study in college? If multiple degrees apply, please select the field corresponding to your last degree.

    *Accounting/bookkeeping; Administrative science/public administration; Advertising; Agriculture/ horticulture; Allied health; Anthropolgy; Architecture; Art; Aviation/aeronatics; Biology; Business administration; Chemistry; Child/human/family development; Comm. disorders; Communications/speech; Computer science; Counseling; Criminology/criminal justice; Dance; Dentistry; Economics; Education; Educational administration; Electronics; Engineering; English; Environmental science/ecology; Ethnic studies; Fashion; Finance; Fine arts; Food science/nutrition/culinary arts; Foreign language; Forestry; General sciences; General studies; Geography; Geology; Gerontology; Health; History; Home economics; Human services/human resources; Humanities; Industrial relations; Industry and techn; Information technology; Journalism; Law; Law enforcement; Liberal arts; Library science; Marketing; Mathematics; Mechanics/machine trade; Medicine; Music; Nursing; Other; Other vocational; Parks and recreation; Pharmacy; Philosophy; Physical education; Physics; Political science/international relations; Psychology; Public relations; Social sciences; Social work: Sociology; Special education; Statistics/biostatistics; Television/film; Textiles/cloth; Theater arts; Theology; Urban and regional planning; Veterinary medicine; Visual arts/graphic design/design and drafting; Other*

12. What is your current employment status?

    *Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner; Unemployed and looking for work; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree*

13. (If "Full-time employee", "Part-time employee", or "Self-employed or small business owner" to 12) Which category best describes your main occupation?

    *Managers; Professionals; Technicians and associate professionals; Clerical support workers; Service and sales workers; Agricultural workers; Craft and related trades workers; Platnt and machine operators, and assemblers; Elementary occupations; Armed forces occupations*

14. *[For health and trade surveys only]* (If "Full-time employee", "Part-time employee", or "Self-employed or small business owner" to 12) Are you employed in one of the following sectors? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

    *Agriculture, plantations, other rural sectors; Basic metal production; Chemical industries; Commerce; Construction; Education; Financial services, professional services; Food, drink, tobacco; Forestry, wood; Health services; Hotels, tourism, catering; Mining; Mechanical and electrical engineering; Media, culture, graphical; Oil and gas production, oil refining; Postal and telecommunications services;*

*Public service; Shipping, ports, fisheries, inland waterways; Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear; Transport (including civil aviation, railways, road transport); Transport equipment manufacturing; Utilities (water, gas, electricity); None of the above*

15. (If "Unemployed and looking for work', "Not currently working and not looking for work", or "Retiree" to 12) Even if you are not currently working, which category best describes your latest occupation? Check the one that applies. If you have had multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

    *Same options as above*

16. *[For health and trade surveys only]* (If "Unemployed and looking for work", "Not currently working and not looking for work", or "Retiree" to 12) Even if you are not currently working, in what sector does your latest occupation fall into? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

    *Same options as above*

17. Are you covered by Medicaid, Medical Assistance, or Medicaid?

    *Yes; No*

18. Did you, or anyone in your household, receive food stamps or use a food stamp benefit card at any time during 2018?

    *Yes; No*

19. At any time during 2018, even for one month, did you or anyone in your household receive any cash assistance from a state or county welfare program such as welfare or welfare to work, TANF, general assistance, diversion payments or refugee cash?

    *Yes; No*

20. If you had to use one of these five commonly-used names to describe your social class, which one would it be?

    *Lower Class or Poor; Working Class; Middle Class; Upper-middle Class; Upper Class*

21. On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?

    *Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very conservative*

22. What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

    *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

23. (If respondent answered "Other" to previous question) Please specify your political affiliation.

24. Did you vote in the last presidential election?

    *Yes; No*

25. (If "Yes" to 24) In the last presidential election, supported:

    *Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump; Jill Stein; Gary Johnson; Other*

    (If "No" to 24) Even if you dit NOT vote, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your vies more closely.

    *Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump; Jill Stein; Gary Johnson; Other*

26. Are you registered to vote at your current address?

    *Yes; No*

27. There are many types of elections such as federal elections for president and members of Congress, primary elections where voters choose party nominees, local elections for city council and school boards, and special elections when vacancies arise in between scheduled elections.

    Which best describes how often you vote, since you became eligible?

    *Every election without exception; Almost every election, may have missed one or two; Some elections; Rarely; Don't vote in elections*

28. Did you vote in the November midterms elections?

    *Yes; No*

29. (If "Yes" to 28) Which party did you vote for?

    *Republican Party; Democratic Party; Other*

30. (If "No" to 28) Which party would you have liked to support?

    *Republican Party; Democratic Party; Other*

31. Thinking about various sources of news available today, what would you say is your main source of news about current events in the U.S. and around the world?

    *TV; Newspaper (print); Magazine; Radio; Internet; Word of mouth; Other; None, I don't follow the news*

32. Please specify

33. (If respondent gets their news mostly from online newspapers) Would you say that you access most of the articles you read through a social media like Facebook or Twitter or by going directly on the website of the newspaper?

    *Mostly through social media; Mostly through the newspaper's website*

34. In general, how important do you think it is to stay informed about economic policy?

    *Very important; Somewhat important; Not very important; Not important at all*

35. (If "Very important" or "Somewhat important" at 34) What would you say are the main reasons why you wish to be well informed about economic policy?

    You may select several options.

    *Affects personal finances; Affects business or profession; Relevant to stock market and investments; Economic issues are important politically and might affect my vote; To be a responsible citizen, I like to keep informed*

36. How knowledgeable do you consider yourself on economic policies and issues?

    *Highly knowledgeable; Somewhat knowledgeable; Not very knowledgeable; Not knowledgeable at all*

37. For the following sources of information, how often would you say you use them to stay informed about economic policy?

    *Often; Regularly; Occasionally; Rarely; Never*

    - TV
    - Newspapers (print)
    - (online)
    - Magazines
    - Radio
    - Internet
    - Word of mouth

### A-3.3 Patriotism

1. How proud are you to be an American?

   *Extremely proud; Very proud; Moderately proud; Only a little proud; Not at all proud*

2. How important do you believe it is to have been born in the United States or to have an American family background to be truly American?

   *Very important; Somewhat important; Not important at all*

3. Do you agree with the following statement: "Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others"?

   *Completely agree; Mostly agree; Mostly disagree; Completely disagree*

### A-3.4 Open-ended questions

We now want to ask you a few broader questions. Please use the text boxes below and write as much as you feel like. Your opinion and thoughts are important to us! There is no right or wrong answer.

1. When you think about trade policy and whether the U.S. should put some restrictions on trade with other countries such as tariffs, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?
2. What would be a "good" trade policy in your view? What would be the goal of a good trade policy?
3. What do you think are the issues with or shortcomings of the current U.S. trade policy?
4. What do you think would be the effects on the U.S. economy if barriers to trade, such as tariffs, were increased?
5. Which groups of people do you think would gain if trade barriers such as tariffs were increased?

### A-3.5 Personal Exposure

1. Do you feel that U.S. trade policy has important, direct effects on your own life?

   *Yes; No*

### A-3.6 Knowledge about policy

In this section, all respondents will receive the following screening question.

- In order to facilitate our research on decision making we are interested in knowing certain factors about you, the decision maker. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then some of our manipulations that rely on changes in the instructions will be ineffective. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question below. Instead, simply put the slider to 98. Thank you very much.

  Out of 100 adults in the U.S., how many are currently paying any income tax at all?

1. Do you know what an import tariff is?

   *Yes; No*

2. Do you know what an import quota is?

   *Yes; No*

3. The U.S. imports both industrial (i.e., non-agricultural) and agricultural goods. What share of the goods that the U.S. imports do you think are agricultural goods?

   *Slider going from 0 to 100*

4. Of all the goods that the U.S. imports, what share do you think is subject to a tariff or import duty?

   *Slider going from 0 to 100*

5. To which country does the U.S. export the most, in terms of the net dollar value?

   *Brazil, Canada; China; France; Germany; India; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Mexico; Netherlands; South Korea; Switzerland; Taiwan; United Kingdom*

6. From which country does the U.S. import the most, in terms of the net dollar value?

   *Brazil, Canada; China; France; Germany; India; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Mexico; Netherlands; South Korea; Switzerland; Taiwan; United Kingdom*

7. Over time, do you think trade between the U.S. and other countries has decreased, stayed more or less the same, or increased?

   *It has decreased; It has stayed more or less the same; It has increased*

### A-3.7 Videos Treatments

Randomized groups of respondents see one of three videos. In each case, the videos introduced by the following:

- Recent academic research has studied what the effects of trade policy are. We will now show you one short video (with sound) that summarizes some key ideas of these studies. Please pay attention to the information provided as you will be asked questions about it later. Do not skip forward or close the page while the video is running.

  Please proceed to the next page when you are ready. Note that you will not be able to move forward with the survey before the end of the short video. The video lasts about 2 and a half minutes.

- Links to the videos can be found here: Redistributional treatment, Efficiency treatment, Economist treatment, US-specific economist treatment.

### A-3.8 Mechanisms

1. *CONTROL GROUP.* As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it? Please rate on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being "lost a lot" and 5 "gained a lot".

   - Large corporations
   - Small businesses
   - High-income households
   - Middle-income households
   - Low-income households

   *"ME" RANDOMIZATION.* As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following firms have lost or gained from it? Please rate on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being "lost a lot" and 5 "gained a lot".

   - Large corporations
   - Small businesses

2. *"ME" RANDOMIZATION.* On balance, would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries has made you better off or worse off?

   *Better off; Worse off*

   *"ME" RANDOMIZATION.* Please specify the extent to which you think you have lost or won as trade with other countries has increased, on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being "lost a lot" and 5 "gained a lot").

3. Which statement comes closest to your view?

   *CONTROL GROUP. More international trade can make everyone in the U.S. better off. Even if some people lose from it, it creates sufficient gains so that even those who lose from it can be compensated through appropriate policies; Free trade will entail winners and losers and it will be impossible to compensate those who lose from it.*

   *"ME" RANDOMIZATION. (If "Worse off" to 2) More international trade can make everyone in the U.S. better off. Even if people like me may lose from it, it creates sufficient gains so that even we who lose from it can be compensated through appropriate policies; Free trade will entail winners and losers and it will be impossible to compensate people like me who may lose from it*

   *"ME" RANDOMIZATION. (If "Better off" to 2) More international trade can make everyone in the U.S. better off. Even if certain people may lose from it, appropriate policies can enable them to be compensated through the sufficient gains made by people like me; Free trade will entail winners and losers and it will be impossible to compensate people who, unlike me, may lose from it*

4. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you feel that most American jobs are being affected by US trade policy?

   *"ME" RANDOMIZATION.* Do you feel that your own job is being affected by U.S. trade policy?

   *Yes; No*

5. *O*verall, has international trade helped or hurt U.S. workers?

   *Helped U.S. workers; Hurt U.S. workers*

6. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you think it is easy for low-skilled workers to find a job in a different sector from the one they are currently working in?

   *Yes; No*

7. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you think it is easy for high-skilled workers to find a job in a different sector from the one they are currently working in?

   *Yes; No*

8. *"ME" RANDOMIZATION.* Would it be be easy for you to find a job in a different sector from the one you are currently working in?

   *Yes; No*

9. To what extent do you think that trade with other countries is a major reason for:

   *A great deal; A lot; A moderate amount; A little; None at all*

   - *CONTROL GROUP.* Unemployment in some sectors and the decline of some industries in the U.S.
   - *"ME" RANDOMIZATION.*Unemployment in your sector and the decline of some industries in the U.S.
   - A rise of inequality in the U.S.

10. *CONTROL GROUP.* Overall, has international trade decreased the prices of goods sold in the U.S.?

    *"ME" RANDOMIZATION.* Overall, has international trade decreased the prices of goods that you buy regularly?

    *Yes; No*

11. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you think that international trade has made firms in the U.S. more competitive and improved their productivity?

    *"ME" RANDOMIZATION.* Overall, has international trade made the firms in your sector of work more competitive and improved their productivity?

    *Yes; No*

12. Do you think that the competitive pressure from international trade has increased innovation in the U.S.?

    *Yes; No*

13. Overall, do you think that international trade has increased the growth of the GDP in the U.S.?

    *Yes; No*

14. If the U.S. exports more goods abroad, what do you think will happen to the value of the dollar?

    *It will increase; It will not change; It will decrease*

15. When two countries trade with each other, would you say that, in general, both are made better off from the trade or that one gains at the expense of the other one?

    *In general, both countries are better off; In general, one country gains, the other one loses; In general, both countries lose*

16. Imagine the U.S. was better at producing cars than Germany, meaning that it is able to produce better cars at a lower price. Would it still make sense under some circumstances for the U.S. to import cars from Germany?

    *Yes, it makes sense for the U.S. to import cars from Germany under some circumstances; No, the U.S. should not import cars from Germany if it's better at producing them*

17. Let us now consider the following simplified example of what happens economically when there is more trade in some goods. Take for instance the car industry and the laptop industry.

    The U.S. is a large net exporter of laptops (meaning that it sells more laptops abroad than it purchases from abroad and that U.S. laptops are a large share of all laptops sold in the world), and a large net importer of cars (meaning that it purchases more cars from abroad than it sells abroad and that cars purchased by customers in the U.S. are a large share of worldwide car purchases).

    The laptop sector employs many high-skilled, college-educated workers. The car sector employs many low-skilled workers. Cars are produced for cheaper abroad, while laptops are produced for cheaper in the U.S.

    Imagine now that the U.S. starts importing even more cars and producing less cars domestically.

    What will happen to the price of cars in the U.S.?

    *It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase*

18. Would you say that households who purchase cars in the U.S. are now better off?

    *Yes; No*

19. What will happen to the wages of low-skilled workers working in the car sector?

    *Wages will decrease; Wages will remain the same; Wages will increase*

20. Imagine also that the U.S. starts producing and exporting more laptops.

    What will happen to the price of U.S. laptops abroad, i.e., in the countries where the U.S. sells laptops?

    *It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase*

21. What will happen to the wages of high-skilled workers working in the laptop sector?

    *Wages will decrease; Wages will remain the same; Wages will increase*

22. Imagine now that over time, some low-skilled workers from the car sector are able to quit their jobs and find new jobs in the laptop sector.

    What will happen to their wages now if the U.S. exports more laptops?

    *Wages will decrease; Wages will remain the same; Wages will increase*

23. If the U.S. were to impose an export tax on laptops, what would happen to the price of laptops abroad?

    *It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase*

24. If the U.S. were to impose an import tariff on cars sold in the U.S, what would happen to the price of cars in the U.S?

    *It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase*

25. If exports from your sector to other countries would increase, what do you think will happen to your wage?

    *It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase*

26. If the U.S. started to import more of the goods produced in your sector, what do you think would happen to your wage?

    *It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase*

## A-3.9 Policy Views

In this section, all respondents get the following screening question:

- When a big news story breaks people often go online to get up-to-the-minute details on what is going on. We want to know which websites people trust to get this information. We also want to know if people are paying attention to the question. To show that you've read this much, please ignore the question and select ABC News and The Drudge Report as your two answers.

  When there is a big news story, which is the one news website that you would visit first? (Please only choose one)

1. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

   "Increasing trade with other countries and reducing barriers to trade is something the U.S. should aim for."

   *Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree*

2. How fair would you rate the current U.S. trade policy?

   *Very fair; Somewhat fair; Somewhat unfair; Very unfair*

3. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current U.S. trade policy?

   *Very satisfied; Somewhat satisfied; Somewhat dissatisfied; Very dissatisfied*

4. Do you think some industries should be protected from foreign competition using tariffs or other import restrictions? Select all that apply:

   *Dairy products; Agricultural products (fruit, vegetables, plants); Beverages and tobaccos; Minerals and metals; Petroleum; Chemicals; Animal products (meat, fish); Textiles, clothing leather and footwear; Machinery, transport, equipment and cars; Manufactured goods*

5. Do you think particular goods should be protected from foreign competition using tariffs or other import restrictions? Select all that apply.

   *Cars; Washing machines; Solar panels; Shoes; Machinery; Oil; Vegetables; Fruits; Toys; Meat; Fish; Milk; Steel; Textiles; Clothing; Coffee and tea; Chemicals*

6. CONTROL GROUP: In your view, what is the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that's declining and threatened by foreign competition? Please rank the following options from best (1) to worst (3).

   *Restrict imports in that industry; Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs; Subsidize production in the sector*

   "ME" RANDOMIZATION: In your view, what is the best policy tool to help workers in your industry against the threat of foreign competition? Please rank the following options from best (1) to worst (3).

   *Restrict imports in your industry; Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs; Subsidize production in your sector*

7. What do you think is the best policy tool to ensure national food security?

   *Restrict food imports from abroad; Provide more production subsidies in the food sector*

8. If the U.S. starts imposing tariffs on many goods that it imports, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that other countries follow suit and also impose tariffs?

   *Very likely, likely; Unlikely; Very unlikely*

9. CONTROL GROUP: Let us consider a given relatively new industry in which other countries are currently able to produce goods for cheaper than American firms.

   In your opinion, does it make sense to protect the American firms in this industry by using tariffs or import restrictions (even if this means higher prices for consumers) or is it better to let the American firms immediately face foreign competition, forcing them to become more competitive?

   *It makes sense to protect for a while; It makes sense to let these firms face foreign competition to become more competitive*

   "ME" RANDOMIZATION: Imagine that the goods or services currently produced in your sector or industry can actually be produced in a cheaper way in another country.

   In your opinion, would it make sense to protect the American firms in your sector or industry by using tariffs or import restrictions (even If this means higher prices for consumers) or would it be better to let the American firms in your sector or industry immediately face foreign competition, forcing them to become more competitive?

   *It makes sense to protect for a while; It makes sense to let the firms in my sector face foreign competition to become more competitive*

10. For these different groups, please tell me if you think that they're are paying their fair share in federal taxes, paying too much, or paying too little?

    *... pay much more than their fair share in income taxes; ... pay more than their fair share in income taxes; ... pay their fair share in income taxes; ... pay less than their fair share in income taxes; ... pay much less than their fair share in income taxes*

    - High-income households...
    - Middle-class households...

11. Take the following government services. For each of them, say if would you like it to receive increased funding (even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas), decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere) or would you like for its funding to be left unchanged?

    - Transfers and income support programs for those out of work
    - Better schools for children from low-income families

- Income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade
- Subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care
- Wage subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages

  *More of this service, more taxes; Service and taxes as now; Less of this service, reduced taxes.*

## A-3.10 Government Questions

1. Which groups of people do you think oppose free trade?

   *Text Box*

2. Which statement comes closest to your views about more trade between the US and other countries? "When there is more trade between the US and other countries...

   *... most people gain, but a few people lose a lot."; ... most people lose, but a few gain a lot."*

3. How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right?

   *Almost always; A lot of the time; Not very often; Almost never*

4. Some people think the government is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and businesses. Others think that government should do more to solve our country's problems. Which come closer to your own view?

   *Government is doing too much; Government is doing just the right amount; Government should do more*

5. Next, we'd like you to think more broadly about the purposes of government.

   Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens?

   You may use any number from 1 to 5.

   *1; 2; 3; 4; 5*

6. Of every tax dollar that goes to the federal government in Washington, D.C., how many cents would you say are wasted?

   *Slider going from 0 to 100*

7. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way the federal government in Washington is dealing with the problems the country is facing today?

   *Very satisfied; Somewhat satisfied; Somewhat dissatisfied; Very dissatisfied*

8. Consider now a list of functions the federal government could serve.

   On a 1 to 5 scale, please say how much responsibility you think the government should have for each — with 1 meaning the government should have no responsibility at all and 5 meaning the government should have total responsibility in this area:

   - Reducing income differences between the rich and the poor
   - Reducing the transmission of wealth from one generation to the other
   - Making sure Americans have adequate health care
   - Reducing the differences in opportunities between children from wealthy and poor families

- Regulating trade to and from the U.S. to protect American producers and consumers
- Maintaining a stable financial system and ensuring that credit markets work
- Ensuring a stable dollar
- Providing a minimum standard of living for all

### A-3.11 Willingness to pay for information

By taking this survey, you are automatically enrolled in a lottery to win $1000. In a few days you will know whether you won the $1000. The payment will be made to you in the same way as your regular survey pay, so no further action is required on your part.
Are you are interested in learning the correct answers to all the questions about trade policy in the U.S.? If you are, you can forfeit part of your gain (should you win the lottery) in exchange for the correct answers. If you select that option, you will be given the right answers on the next page. You will only pay the amount selected if you do, in fact, win the lottery.
Note: This information would be very hard to find online on your own. It is the result of a lot of careful research and you cannot easily find the correct answers.
In case you win the lottery are you willing to give up ($1 / $2 / $5 / $10 [9]) to receive all the correct answers to the questions about trade policy in the U.S.?

*No, I am not willing to pay anything (We will not provide you with the correct answers); Yes, I am willing to pay $1 / $2 / $5 / $10 (We will provide you with all the correct answers on the next page. You will only pay this amount out of your lottery earnings if you do win the lottery).*

### A-3.12 Self-reported questions

1. It is vital to our study that we only include responses from people that devoted their full attention to this study. Otherwise years of effort (the researchers' and the time of other participants) could be wasted. You will receive credit for this study no matter what, however, please tell us how much effort you put forth towards this study.

   *I put forth almost no effort; I put forth very little effort; I put forth some effort; I put forth quite a bit of effort; I put forth a lot of effort*

2. Also, often there are several distractions present during studies (other people, TV, music, etc.). Please indicate how much attention you paid to this study. Again, you will receive credit no matter what. We appreciate your honesty!

   *I gave this study almost no attention; I gave this study very little attention; I gave this study some of my attention; I gave this study most of my attention; I gave this study my full attention*

### A-3.13 Feedback

1. Do you feel that this survey was biased?

   *Yes, left-wing bias; Yes, right-wing bias; No, it did not feel bias*

2. Please feel free to give us any feedback or impression regarding this survey.

[9] Note: the amount is randomized among participants.

## A-4 Questionnaire Second Survey

The questionnaire is available here: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bO6NvZAXlJKePHL.

### A-4.1 Background questions

1. What is your gender?
   *Male; Female*
2. What is your age?
3. Do you live in the US?
4. In which state do you currently reside?
5. In which zip code do you live?
6. Were you born in the United States?
   *Yes; No*
7. Please indicate your marital status
   *Single; Married; Legally separated or divorced; Widowed*
8. How many children do you have?
   *I do not have children; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more*
9. How would you describe your ethnicity/race?
   *European American/White; African American/Black; Hispanic/Latino; Asian/Asian American; Mixed race; Other (please specify)*
10. What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year?
    *$0-$9999; $10000-$14999; $15000-$19999; $20000-$29999; $30000-$39999; $40000-$49999; $50000-$69999; $70000-$89999; $90000-$109999; $110000-$149999; $150000-$199999; $200000+*
11. CAPTCHA
12. Which category best describes your highest level of education?
    *Primary education or less; Some High School; High School degree / GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)*
13. *Screening Question 1* Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both strongly agree and strongly disagree among the alternatives below, no matter what your opinion is. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "It is easy to find accurate and reliable information in the media these days."
14. *Screening Question 2* This is a question to check whether you are paying attention and reading the questions carefully. Please select both "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree" to move forward.
15. On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?
    *Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very conservative*
16. What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?
    *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

17. Did you vote during the 2016 presidential election?

18. *IF YES TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* In the 2016 presidential election, you supported:

    *Clinton, Trump, Stein, Johnson, Other*

19. *IF NO TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* Even if you did NOT vote, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views more closely.

    *Clinton, Trump, Stein, Johnson, Other*

20. Did you vote during the 2020 presidential election?

    *Yes ; No*

21. IF YES TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION Who did you vote for?

    *Joe Biden, Donald Trump, Other*

22. IF NO TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION Even if you did NOT vote, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views more closely

    *Joe Biden, Donald Trump, Other*

23. What is your current employment status?

    *Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or business owner; Temporarily furloughed; Unemployed and looking for work; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree*

24. *IF "FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE","PART-TIME EMPLOYEE" OR "SELF-EMPLOYED OR BUSINESS OWNER* What is the title of your job?

    *[text]*

25. *IF "UNEMPLOYED AND LOOKING FOR WORK", "NOT CURRENTLY WORKING AND NOT LOOKING FOR WORK", OR "RETIREE"* What was the title of your latest job?

    *[text]*

26. *IF "FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE","PART-TIME EMPLOYEE" OR "SELF-EMPLOYED OR BUSINESS OWNER* Which category best describes your main occupation?

    *Managers; Professionals; Technicians and associate professionals; Clerical support workers; Service and sales workers; Agricultural workers; Craft and related trades workers; Plant and machine operators, and assemblers; Elementary occupations; Armed forces occupations*

27. *IF "FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE","PART-TIME EMPLOYEE" OR "SELF-EMPLOYED OR BUSINESS OWNER* Are you employed in one of the following sectors? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

    *Agriculture, plantations, other rural sectors; Basic metal production; Chemical industries; Commerce; Construction; Education; Financial services, professional services; Food, drink, tobacco; Forestry, wood; Health services; Hotels, tourism, catering; Mining; Mechanical and electrical engineering; Media, culture, graphical; Oil and gas production, oil refining; Postal and telecommunications services; Public service; Shipping, ports, fisheries, inland waterways; Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear; Transport (including civil aviation, railways, road transport); Transport equipment manufacturing; Utilities (water, gas, electricity); None of the above*

28. *IF "UNEMPLOYED AND LOOKING FOR WORK", "NOT CURRENTLY WORKING AND NOT LOOKING FOR WORK", OR "RETIREE"* Even if you are not currently working, which category best describes your latest occupation? Check the one that applies. If you have had multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

    *Same options as above*

29. *IF "UNEMPLOYED AND LOOKING FOR WORK", "NOT CURRENTLY WORKING AND NOT LOOKING FOR WORK", OR "RETIREE"* Even if you are not currently working, in what sector does your latest occupation fall into? Check the one that applies. If you have had multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

    *Same options as above*

30. *IF UNEMPLOYED* How many months have you been unemployed?

31. *IF UNEMPLOYED* Did you become unemployed during the COVID-19 crisis?

32. *IF YES* Do you expect to be rehired once the pandemic is over?

## A-4.2 Views on economic insecurity

### A-4.2.1 Current situation

Please respond to the following questions based on your/your household's current financial situation.

1. Please select the option that best describes your financial situation, where basic expenses include housing, bills and food:

    - I am often unable to meet by basic expenses
    - I can afford my basic expenses, but just barely and with little to no money left over
    - I can meet my basic expenses, and have some money left over for discretionary spending and savings
    - I can meet my basic expenses, and have a significant portion of my income left over for discretionary spending and savings

2. *IF NOT MARRIED* Suppose that you lost your income next month. Please tell us how you would deal with the lost income (Check all that apply)

    - Borrowing from a family member
    - Borrowing from friends
    - Government assistance (unemployment or social assistance benefits)
    - Temporary "gig" employment
    - Savings
    - Selling something
    - Paying with credit card
    - Community assistance
    - Other (please specify)

3. IF NOT MARRIED: Suppose that you have an emergency expense that costs $400. Which of the following best describes how you would pay for this expense?

    - Using my income flow
    - Borrowing from a family member
    - Borrowing from friends
    - Temporary "gig" employment
    - Savings
    - Selling something
    - Paying with credit card

- Community assistance
- I wouldn't be able to pay for the expense right now
- Other (please specify)

4. *IF MARRIED* Suppose that you or your partner lost your income next month. Please tell us how you would deal with the lost income (Check all that apply)

   - Relying on spouse's income only
   - Borrowing from a family member
   - Borrowing from friends
   - Government assistance (unemployment or social assistance benefits)
   - Temporary "gig" employment
   - Savings
   - Selling something
   - Paying with credit card
   - Community assistance
   - Other (please specify)

5. *IF MARRIED* Suppose that you have an emergency expense that costs $400. Which of the following best describes how you would pay for this expense?

   - Using my household's income flow
   - Borrowing from a family member
   - Borrowing from friends
   - Temporary "gig" employment
   - Savings
   - Selling something
   - Paying with credit card
   - Community assistance
   - I wouldn't be able to pay for the expense right now
   - Other (please specify)

#### A-4.2.2 COVID

1. Did your household benefit from any COVID-19 related measures implemented by the federal or state government in the last months? Please select all that apply.

   - Business Assistance Programs
   - Tax reliefs (deferment of tax payments)
   - Enhanced employment benefits (paid leave)
   - Other social help than healthcare (education, food, direct financial aid)
   - Unemployment insurance
   - Help on unavoidable expenditures (ex: moratorium on utility bills, delaying mortgages, eviction, insurance)
   - Other
   - My household did not benefit from any federal or state COVID-19 related measure.

### A-4.2.3 Expectations

1. Over the next 6-12 months, do you expect your income to

   *Decrease/Stay the same/increase*

2. *IF MARRIED/DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP* Over the next 6-12 months, do you expect your partner's income to

   *Decrease/Stay the same/increase*

3. *IF NOT MARRIED* How likely do you think the following events are *[sliding scale from "not likely at all" to "extremely probable"]*

   - Losing your job in the next month
   - Losing your job in the next 6 months

4. *IF MARRIED* How likely do you think the following events are *[sliding scale from "not likely at all" to "extremely probable"]*

   - Losing your job in the next month
   - Losing your job in the next 6 months
   - Your partner losing his/her job in the next month
   - Your partner losing his/her job in the next 6 months

5. How much would your sense of economic security change if the government implemented more measures to provide the following? *[1- Same, 2 - Slightly better, 3 - Much better]*

   - Increased unemployment benefits and other social benefits
   - Access to good job opportunities
   - Better education for my children so they have the right skills for the future
   - Better job-seeking and skills training support
   - More generous retirement pensions
   - More affordable housing (e.g., public housing, support for renters or home-buyers)
   - Better access to funds to start a business
   - A guaranteed transfer sufficient to cover my basic needs (e.g., government payment of basic income)
   - Better healthcare

6. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "I think that the government would (or does) provide my family and me with adequate income support in the case of income loss due to" *[from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree]*

   - Unemployment
   - Illness/disability
   - Becoming a parent
   - Old age

7. Over the next 10 years, do you expect your economic situation to be

   *Much worse; Slightly worse; Same; Slightly better; Much better*

8. IF HAS CHILDREN Relative to the life opportunities you have had, do you expect your children's life opportunities to be

   *Much worse; Slightly worse; Same; Slightly better; Much better*

#### A-4.2.4 Past Experiences

1. Looking back over your life, how often have there been times in your life when you think you have lived in poverty by the standards of that time?

   *Never; Sometimes; Often; Always*

2. How many times have you been unemployed in your life?

   *0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5+*

3. *IF MORE THAN 0 TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* During those times when you were unemployed, did you ever make use of a public job search assistance program?

4. *IF YES TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* On a scale from 0-10, how satisfactory was your experience with the public job search assistance program? *[Scale from 0 to 10]*

   - Could you tell us why? [text]

5. Do you feel that your own efforts in life have paid off?

### A-4.3 Views on Good Jobs

#### A-4.3.1 Ideal Job

1. What do you consider to be a "good job"? You can describe features including, but not limited to the hours worked, benefits, compensation, use of skills, and more.

   *[text]*

2. What do you consider to be a "bad job"?

   *[text]*

3. What would be your ideal occupation?

   *[text]*

4. When looking for a new job, how important are the following factors? [Likert scale from Not important at all" to "extremely important"]

   - Compensation, including bonuses.
   - Benefits, including retirement benefits, child and health care benefits
   - Not too long work hours and sufficient time off
   - Ability to have flexible work hours
   - Ability to work remotely
   - Good relationship with colleagues
   - Good relationship with manager or boss
   - Using my skills well
   - Autonomy and creativity
   - Opportunities for professional development and career growth
   - Passion for the work
   - Contributing to society
   - Safe physical environment

5. How important are the following factors in determining who currently has access to "good jobs"? [Likert scale from "Not important at all" to "extremely important"]

- Educational attainment
- Experience in the labor market
- Being able to live in the areas that have those jobs
- Rich family background
- Personal connections to people in those jobs
- Information about which jobs are available and how to successfully apply for those jobs
- Gender
- Race and/or being an immigrant
- Innate ability

6. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: [1- Strongly disagree; 5- Strongly agree]
    - "My job is better than the jobs my parents had when they were my age"
    - "I can access "good jobs" within commuting distance of where I live."
7. Which statement best describes where "good jobs" are located?
    - "good jobs" are concentrated in and around most large cities
    - "good jobs" are concentrated in and around some large cities
    - "good jobs" are concentrated only in some regions of the United States
    - There are "good jobs" everywhere
8. IF SINGLE Have you ever moved to a different part of the country for work-related reasons? Please check all that apply.
    - Yes, for a new job
    - Yes, because my employer relocated me
    - No, I have never moved for work-related reasons
9. IF NOT SINGLE Have you ever moved to a different part of the country for work-related reasons? (Check all that apply)
    - Yes, For a new job
    - Yes, Because my employer relocated me
    - Yes, For my spouse's job
    - No, I have never moved for work-related reasons
10. IF NO Have you ever considered relocation?
11. IF NO Which of the following best describes the barriers to your relocation? (Check all that apply)
    - Members of my household would be unable to find a job if we relocated
    - I don't want to live far away from my family, friends and community
    - I take care of family members and friends in this area
    - I enjoy where I live, even if the job opportunities are limited
    - I am afraid I would be unable to find a job even if I relocated
    - I couldn't afford to relocate
    - Other (please specify) *[text]*

### A-4.3.2 Job Characteristics

Again, we will ask you some questions about your main paid job, meaning the job where you spend most hours. For all questions referring to your job, please answer with regards to your main paid job. If you are currently temporarily furloughed or unemployed, please answer with respect to your last main job in mind. If you are self-employed, please answer with respect to your main work activity.

1. What are the best features of your job?

   *[text]*

2. What features of your job could be improved?

   *[text]*

3. How many hours do you usually work per week in your main job?

   *1-9; 10-19; 20-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; 60+*

4. Considering everything about your job, including things like pay, fringe benefits, working conditions and the kind of work you do, how would you rate your job on a scale from 0–10?

5. IF SELF EMPLOYED: Check all the reasons why you became self-employed:

   - Wanted to start my own business
   - Too low pay
   - Lack of career progression
   - No other alternatives for work
   - To acquire different skills
   - Too many work hours
   - Too much work-related stress
   - Lack of flexibility in work hours
   - Inability to work remotely
   - Health and safety risks
   - Work too physically demanding

6. In the past 12 months, have you considered getting a new job?

7. *IF YES* Check all the reasons why you considered getting a new job

   - To start my own business
   - Too low pay
   - Career progression
   - To gain a different experience and acquire different skills
   - Too many work hours
   - Too much work-related stress
   - Lack of flexibility in work hours
   - Inability to work remotely
   - Health and safety risks
   - Work too physically demanding
   - Other (please specify)

8. *IF NO* Check all the reasons why you have not considered getting a new job

- I like my current job
- Pay and fringe benefits offset the downsides of my job
- I don't have time to search for a new job
- I don't know how to look for another job
- Other (please specify)

9. Relative to other workers in the US, my job is:
   *"Far below average" to "Far above average"*
10. Relative to workers with my level of education and background, my job is:
    *"Much worse" to "Much better*
11. Relative to workers with jobs similar to mine, my level of skills and qualifications is:
    *"Much worse" to "Much better"*
12. Would you rather have:
    - a job with low risk of dismissal but with few opportunities of finding another job a in case of dismissal
    - a job with fairly high risk of dismissal but with a lot of opportunities of finding a new job in case of dismissal
13. In January 2020, before the covid-19 outbreak, the unemployment rate among young people between 20 and 24 years old was more than twice as high as the unemployment rate among people above 35 years older.. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? *[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*
    - The young do not have adequate skills to get jobs
    - There are not enough good jobs for the young
    - Young people are not very interested in employment or in building careers
    - Young people do not try hard enough to get jobs

## A-4.4 Trust in government

1. How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right?
   *Almost never; Not very often; A lot of time; Almost always*
2. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: *[from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*
   - "Policy decisions in American politics are transparent, meaning that everyone can see how they were made"
   - "I trust the government to design policies that benefit people like me."

## A-4.5 Treatment Questions

### A-4.5.1 Jobs Treatment

1. What are the main considerations that come to your mind when you think about the U.S. trading with foreign countries and how your job has been affected by it?
   *[text]*

2. Since 2000, more than 5 million jobs in the manufacturing sectors have been lost. One of the causes behind this decline is the increased competition with foreign countries that pay lower wages to their workers. How serious of a threat do you think trade with foreign countries pose for the future of your sector?

   *Not serious at all; Not very serious; Somewhat serious; Very serious*

3. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Because of trade and the resulting competition with foreign countries that pay lower wages to their workers, my wage has not grown as fast as it would otherwise have."

   *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree or disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree*

4. How likely do you think it is that, over the next 10 years, your job will be outsourced, offshored, or automated because of competition with foreign countries?

   *Very unlikely; Somewhat unlikely; Somewhat likely; Very likely*

#### A-4.5.2 Consumers Treatment

1. Imagine the U.S. did not trade goods and services with other countries. What are the main things you feel like you'd be missing?

   *[text]*

2. Can you think of some goods only produced in foreign countries that you regularly buy and consume because of trade with foreign countries? Please describe.

   *[text]*

3. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? *[from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*

   - Trade with other countries has decreased the prices of the goods I regularly buy by increasing competition among firms.
   - Trade with other countries has increased the variety of the goods I have access to in ordinary stores.

### A-4.6 Policy Views

1. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Increasing trade with other countries and reducing barriers to trade is something the U.S. should aim for."

   *Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree*

2. How fair would you rate the current U.S. trade policy?

   *Very fair; Somewhat fair; Somewhat unfair; Very unfair*

3. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current U.S. trade policy?

   *Very satisfied; Somewhat satisfied; Somewhat dissatisfied; Very dissatisfied*

4. In your view, what is the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that is declining and threatened by foreign competition? Please rank the following options from best (1) to worst (3).

   *Restrict imports in that industry; Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs; Subsidize production in the sector*

5. What do you think is the best policy tool to ensure national food security?

   *Restrict food imports from abroad; Provide more production subsidies in the food sector*

6. If the U.S. starts imposing tariffs on many goods that it imports, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that other countries follow suit and also impose tariffs?

   *Very unlikely, unlikely; Likely; Very likely*

7. Let us consider a given relatively new industry in which other countries are currently able to produce goods for cheaper than American firms. In your opinion, does it make sense to protect the American firms in this industry by using tariffs or import restrictions (even if this means higher prices for consumers) or is it better to let the American firms immediately face foreign competition, forcing them to become more competitive?

   *It makes sense to protect for a while; It makes sense to let these firms face foreign competition to become more competitive*

8. Take the following government services. For each of them, say if would you like it to receive increased funding (even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas), decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere) or would you like for its funding to be left unchanged?

   - Transfers and income support programs for those out of work
   - Better schools for children from low-income families
   - Income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade
   - Subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care
   - Wage subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages More of this service, more taxes; Service and taxes as now; Less of this service, reduced taxes.

## A-4.7 Role of government in ensuring economic security

We would now like to ask you about your views on what role the government should play in providing good jobs and ensuring a certain level of economic security. We define good jobs as "a stable formal-sector position that comes with core labor protections and enables provides income for housing, food, transportation, education, and other family expenses, as well as some savings."

1. Do you agree with the following statement? "The government has the ability and the tools to stimulate the creation of more good jobs"

   *[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*

2. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: *[1- Strongly disagree, 5- Strongly agree]*

   - "Government should prioritize the quantity of jobs available, even if that means giving up minimum standards of pay and quality."
   - "Government should guarantee all jobs meet a minimum standard of quality and pay, even if that means that some people stay unemployed"

3. Do you support or oppose the following proposals: *[Strongly oppose to Strongly support]*

   - Government should raise the minimum wage.
   - Government should design additional regulations to improve work conditions.
   - Government should provide or subsidize the provision of continuing education and training programs.
   - Government should provide subsidies for businesses to create and provide more good jobs.

4. Do you support or oppose the following policies to improve access to good jobs for more people: *[Strongly oppose; Slightly oppose; neither support nor oppose; slightly support; strongly support]*

    - Providing more dual education programs, which provide formal academic training as well as job experience, in partnership between local universities and employers
    - Expanding social insurance and benefits, including unemployment benefits, so that everyone can benefit from them regardless of whether they are on part-time work contracts, alternative work arrangements, or the gig economy.
    - Improving publicly provided job search assistance
    - Implementing a job search assistance program that coordinates with local employers specifically.

5. There has been considerable concern in recent years about the loss of manufacturing jobs in the US. What do you think these job losses are mainly due to?

    - Technological changes (e.g., automation)
    - Globalization, trade and outsourcing
    - Immigration

6. How about your job? Please tell us to what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job.

    - Technological developments
    - Globalization and trade
    - Immigration

7. Suppose a large firm that employs 30,000 people in the US is closing permanently because foreign competitors can produce the goods more cheaply. Do you agree or disagree that the government should do the following: *[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*

    - Provide transfers to unemployed workers
    - Provide training and job placement services to unemployed workers
    - Raise import tariffs on foreign goods
    - Try to create good jobs in other sectors/firms
    - Do nothing

8. Now suppose instead the firm is closing permanently because it's moving production to a country outside the US. Do you agree or disagree that the government should do the following: *[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*

    - Provide transfers to unemployed workers
    - Provide training and job placement services to unemployed workers
    - Raise import tariffs on foreign goods
    - Try to create good jobs in other sectors/firms
    - Nationalize/take over production
    - Do nothing

9. Now suppose instead the firm is closing permanently because of management failure. Do you agree or disagree that the government should do the following: *[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*

    - Provide transfers to unemployed workers
    - Provide training and job placement services to unemployed workers

- Raise import tariffs on foreign goods
- Try to create good jobs in other sectors/firms
- Nationalize/take over production
- Do nothing

10. Now suppose instead the firm is not closing permanently, but it's employing new technologies and replacing workers with robots. Do you agree or disagree that the government should do the following: *[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*

    - Provide transfers to unemployed workers
    - Provide training and job placement services to unemployed workers
    - Raise import tariffs on foreign goods
    - Try to create good jobs in other sectors/firms
    - Nationalize/take over production
    - Do nothing

11. Are you a member of a union?

### A-4.8 Feedbacks

1. Do you feel that this survey was biased?

   *Yes, left-wing bias; Yes, right-wing bias; No, it did not feel bias*

2. Please feel free to give us any feedback or impression regarding this survey.

   *[text]*

## A-5 Data to Assess Sample Representativeness

To compute the population characteristics in Table 1, we use the IPUMS-CPS, ASEC data from March 2019 (Flood et al., 2020). We construct variables and categories that are as comparable as possible between our sample data and the population statistics. The shares computed are based on the following IPUMS-CPS, ASEC data:

- **Age bracket**: AGE variable divided in brackets
- **Household income bracket**: FTOTVAL variable divided in brackets
- **Education**: EDUC variable split into categories as follows

  **High School or Less**: "none or preschool," "grades 1, 2, 3, or 4," "grades 5 or 6," "grades 7 or 8," "grade 9," "grade 10," "grade 11," "12th grade, no diploma."

  **4-Year College or More**: "bachelor's degree."

- **Employment**: the variable is built as follows

  **Employed**: It is the sum of employed and self-employed. For self-employed, CLASSWKR is "self-employed, not incorporated" and "self-employed, incorporated". For employed workers, EMPSTAT is "armed forces," "at work," "has job, not at work last week" but CLASSWKR is not "unpaid family worker."

  **Unemployed**: EMPSTAT is "unemployed, experienced worker," "unemployed, new worker" and CLASSWKR not "self-employed, not incorporated," "self-employed, incorporated," "unpaid family worker."

- **Marital status**:

  **Married**: MARST is "married, spouse present," "married, spouse absent."

  **Not Married**: MARST is "separated," "divorced," "widowed," "never married/single."

- **Race and ethnicity**:

  **Black/African-American**: RACE = "black", HISPAN="not hispanic."

  **White**: RACE = "white", HISPAN="not hispanic."

  **Asian/Asian-American**: RACE = "asian", HISPAN="not hispanic."

  **Hispanic/Latino**: HISPAN is not equal to "not hispanic."

For party affiliation, data is taken from Gallup (2019). In particular, the question asked was *"In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or an independent?."* The share of "Independent" respondents in the samples is computed aggregating the "Independent" and the "Non-affiliated." Finally, the data for the 2016's Presidential election were taken from Leip (2019).

## A-6 Variables Definition

**Core respondents characteristics**
*Female:* respondent is female.
*Male:* respondent is male.
*Age 18-29:* respondent's age is between 18 and 29 years.
*Age 30-49:* respondent's age is between 30 and 49 years.
*Age 50-69:* respondent's age is between 50 and 69 years.
*White:* respondent's ethnicity is European American/White.
*Black/African-American:* respondent's ethnicity is African American/Black.
*Hispanic/Latino:* respondent's ethnicity is Hispanic/Latino.
*Asian/Asian-American:* respondent's ethnicity is Asian/Asian American.
*Other races:* respondent's ethnicity is not among those listed above.
*Kids:* respondent has children.
*Low-Income:* respondent's household income is below $39,000.
*Middle-Income:* respondent's household income is between $40,000 - $69,000.
*High-Income:* respondent's household income is above $70,000.
*Student:* respondent is student.
*Working:* respondent is full-time or part-time employee, or self-employed, or small business owner.
*Not working:* respondent is unemployed and looking for work or not currently working and not looking for work.
*Retiree:* respondent is retiree.
*Married:* respondent is married.
*Republican:* respondent's political affiliation is Republican.
*Democrat:* respondent's political affiliation is Democrat (usually omitted category in the regressions).
*Independent and others:* respondent's political affiliation is independent or other or non-affiliated.
*Economics related major:* respondent has a college degree with an economics-related major.
*College (degree):* respondent has at least a 4-year college degree.

**Treatments**
*Distributive Effects:* in Survey 1, respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on the distributional impacts of trade and trade policy.
*Efficiency Effects:* in Survey 1, respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on the efficiency effects of trade and trade policy.
*Economist (= Efficiency + Distributive):* in Survey 1, respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on both efficiency effects and distributional impacts of trade and trade policy.
*Own consumption:* in Survey 2, respondent was randomized to be primed to think about the effects of trade on consumers.
*Own job risks:* in Survey 2, respondent was randomized to be primed to think about the effects of trade on jobs.

**Mechanisms**

Efficiency.
*Trade ↑ competition in the U.S.:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that international trade has made firms in the U.S. more competitive and improved their productivity (*Yes/No* Question).
*Trade ↑ competition in your sector:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade made firms in their sector of work more competitive and improved their productivity (*Yes/No* Question).
*Trade ↑ innovation in the U.S.:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the competitive pressure from trade has increased innovation in the U.S. (*Yes/No* Question).
*Trade ↑ GDP growth of the U.S.:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that international trade has increased the U.S.'s GDP growth (*Yes/No* Question).

*If U.S. exports ↑ value of $ ↑:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the value of the dollar will increase (as opposed to "will decrease" and "will not change") if the U.S. exports more goods abroad.
*Both countries better off when trading:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent answers "both countries are better off" (as opposed to "one country gains, the other one loses" and "both countries lose") to the question "When two countries trade with each other, would you say that, in general, both are made better off from trade or that one gains at the expense of the other one?"

Distributional (General).
*Large corporations gained from trade:* indicator variable equal to one if, when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?," respondent rated "Large corporations" 4 or more on a scale from 1 ("lost a lot") to 5 ("gained a lot").
*Small businesses gained from trade:* indicator variable equal to one if, when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?," respondent rated "Small businesses" 4 or more on a scale from 1 ("lost a lot") to 5 ("gained a lot").
*High-income households gained from trade:* indicator variable equal to one if, when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?," respondent rated "High-income households" 4 or more on a scale from 1 ("lost a lot") to 5 ("gained a lot").
*Middle-income households gained from trade:* indicator variable equal to one if, when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?," respondent rated "Middle-income households" 4 or more on a scale from 1 ("lost a lot") to 5 ("gained a lot").
*Low-income households gained from trade:* indicator variable equal to one if, when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?," respondent rated "Low-income households" 4 or more on a scale from 1 ("lost a lot") to 5 ("gained a lot").
*It's easy to change sector x low-skilled workers:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it is easy for low-skilled workers to find a job in a different sector from the one they are currently working in (*Yes/No* question).
*It's easy to change sector x high-skilled workers:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it is easy for high-skilled workers to find a job in a different sector from the one they are currently working in (*Yes/No* question).
*Trade major reason x unemployment & decline of industries:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is a major reason for unemployment in some sectors and the decline of some industries in the U.S. from "A moderate amount" to "A great deal."
*Main cause x loss of manufacturing jobs (S2): Automation*: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that job losses of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. are mainly due to "Technological changes (e.g., automation)" (as opposed to "Globalization, trade and outsourcing" and "Immigration").
*Main cause x loss of manufacturing jobs (S2): Trade*: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that job losses of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. are mainly due to "Globalization, trade and outsourcing" (as opposed to "Technological changes (e.g., automation)" and "Immigration").
*Main cause x loss of manufacturing jobs (S2): Immigration*: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that job losses of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. are mainly due to "Immigration" (as opposed to "Globalization, trade and outsourcing" and "Technological changes (e.g., automation)").
*Overall trade helped U.S. workers:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that, overall, trade has helped U.S. workers (as opposed to "Hurt U.S. workers").
*Trade major reason x rise in inequality:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is a major reason for a rise of inequality in the U.S. from "A moderate amount" to "A great deal."
*Trade ↓ prices of goods sold in the U.S.:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade decreased the prices of goods sold in the U.S. (*Yes/No* question).
*More trade can make all better off (Losers can be compensated):* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that more international trade can make everyone better off by compensating those who lose with

transfers (as opposed to "it will be impossible to compensate those who lose from it").
*Large companies won more than small ones*: indicator variable equal to one if respondent assigns a higher value to "Large corporations" with respect to "Small businesses," on a scale from 1 ("Lost a lot") to 5 ("Gained a lot"), when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?."
*High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs*: indicator variable equal to one if respondent assigns a higher value to "High-income households" with respect to "Low-income households," on a scale from 1 ("Lost a lot") to 5 ("Gained a lot"), when asked "As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?."
*Sector switch easier if high-skill*: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it is easy to find a job in a different sector for high-skill workers, but not for low skill workers.

Distributional (Personal).
*Trade ↓ prices of goods they buy:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent agrees with the statement that trade decreased the prices of goods they regularly buy.
*Trade ↑ varieties of goods they buy:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that trade has increased the variety of the goods they have access to in ordinary stores.
*Own wage not grown as fast due to foreign competition:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that, because of trade and the resulting competition with foreign countries that pay lower wages to their workers, their wage has not grown as fast as it would otherwise have.
*Trade is a major reason x unemployment in their sector:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is a major reason for the rise of unemployment in their sector from "*A great deal*" to "*A moderate amount*."
*Trade is a threat x future of their sector:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is a "Very serious" threat for the future of their sector.
*Own job likely to be outsourced or offshored:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it is "Very likely" that, over the next 10 years, their job will be outsourced, offshored, or automated because of competition with foreign countries.
*Extent to which job negatively affected by: Automation*: sample average of values selected by respondents to the question "To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?" for the option "Automation," where 0 indicates a positive impact and 10 a negative impact.
*Automation had a negative impact on their job*: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected a value from 0 to 4 as answer to the question "To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?" for the option "Automation," where 0 indicates a negative impact and 10 a positive impact.
*Extent to which job negatively affected by: Trade*: sample average of values selected by respondents to the question "To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?" for the option "Globalization and trade," where 0 indicates a positive impact and 10 a negative impact.
*Trade had a negative impact on their job*: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected a value from 0 to 4 as answer to the question "To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?" for the option "Trade," where 0 indicates a negative impact and 10 a positive impact.
*Extent to which job negatively affected by: Immigration*: sample average of values selected by respondents to the question "To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?" for the option "Immigration," where 0 indicates a positive impact and 10 a negative impact.
*Immigration had a negative impact on their job*: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected a value from 0 to 4 as answer to the question "To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?" for the option "Immigration," where 0 indicates a negative impact and 10 a positive impact.
*They are better off (or worse off) from trade:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent answered "Better off" (respect. "Worse off") to the question "Would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries has made you better off or worse off?"

General knowledge of the mechanisms of trade policy.
The variables in this block refer to questions asked after the following preamble: ''*The U.S. is a large net exporter of laptops (meaning that it sells more laptops abroad than it purchases from abroad and that U.S. laptops are a large share of all laptops sold in the world), and a large net importer of cars (meaning that it purchases more cars from abroad than it sells abroad and that cars purchased by customers in the U.S. are a large share of worldwide car purchases). The laptop sector employs many high-skilled, college-educated workers. The car sector employs many low-skilled workers. Cars are produced for cheaper abroad, while laptops are produced for cheaper in the U.S. Imagine now that the U.S. starts importing even more cars and producing less cars domestically.*"
*Consumers benefit if imports ↑:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that households who purchase cars in the U.S. are better off after the U.S. starts importing more cars (*Yes/No* question).
*Justifiable to import even if U.S. more productive:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it makes sense for the U.S. to import cars from Germany under some circumstances, even though the U.S. was better at producing them, i.e., able to produce them at a lower price (*Yes/No* question).
*U.S. prices ↓ if U.S. cars imports ↑:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the price of cars in the U.S. will decrease (as opposed to "It will remain the same" and "It will increase") if the U.S. starts producing less and importing more cars.
*Prices abroad ↓ if U.S. laptop exports ↑:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the price of U.S. laptops abroad will decrease (as opposed to "It will remain the same" and "It will increase") if the U.S. starts producing and exporting more laptops.
*U.S. wages ↓ if U.S. cars imports ↑:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that wages of low-skilled workers working in the car sector will decrease (as opposed to "Wages will remain the same" and "Wages will increase") if the U.S. starts importing more cars.
*U.S. wages ↑ if U.S. laptop exports ↑:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that wages of high-skilled workers working in the laptop sector will increase (as opposed to "Wages will remain the same" and "Wages will decrease") if the U.S. starts importing more laptops.
*Wages of car workers moving to laptop sector ↑ if car imports ↑:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that wages of those low-skilled workers moving to the laptop sector will increase (as opposed to "Wages will remain the same" and "Wages will decrease").
*Your wage ↓ if U.S. imports in your sector ↑:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that their wage will decrease (as opposed to "It will remain the same" and "It will increase") if imports in their sector increase.
*Your wage ↑ if U.S. exports in your sector ↑:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that their wage will increase (as opposed to "It will remain the same" and "It will decrease") if exports from their sector to other countries increase.
*Prices abroad ↑ if export tax ↑:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the price of laptops sold abroad will increase (as opposed to "It will remain the same" and "It will decrease") if the U.S. were to impose an export tax on laptops.
*U.S. prices ↑ if import tax ↑:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the price of cars sold in the U.S. will increase (as opposed to "It will remain the same" and "It will decrease") if the U.S. were to impose an import tariffs on cars.
*Correct answers to the case study:* share of correct answers to the trade case study in Survey 1. The questions considered are all the ones in this block + the variable *Both countries better off when trading.*

**Policy views**
*The U.S. should aim at ↓ barriers and ↑ trade:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that "Increasing trade with other countries and reducing barriers to trade is something the U.S. should aim for."
*Support for free trade:* same as the above variable.
*The U.S. should restrict food imports to ensure food security:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the best policy to ensure national food security is restricting imports (as opposed to"Provide more subsidies").

*The U.S. should protect their infant industries:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent thinks it makes sense to protect infant industries for a while by means of tariffs or import restrictions (as opposed to "let these firms immediately face foreign competition to become more competitive").
*Restrict imports best way to help U.S. workers:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that is declining and threatened by foreign competition is restricting imports in that industry (as opposed to "Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs" and "Subsidize production in the sector").
*Transfers & retraining best way to help U.S. workers:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that is declining and threatened by foreign competition is providing more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs (as opposed to "Restrict imports in that industry" and "Subsidize production in the sector").
*Subsidize production best way to help U.S. workers:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that is declining and threatened by foreign competition is subsidizing production in the sector (as opposed to "Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs" and"Restrict imports in that industry").
*The U.S. should protect minerals and metals, petroleum, chemicals or machinery sectors:* indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent believes that the U.S. should provide protection against foreign competition to either of the following options: "minerals and metals," "petroleum," "chemicals or machinery" when asked "Do you think some industries should be protected from foreign competition using tariffs or other import restrictions? Select all that apply."
*The U.S. should protect from trade more than 3 types of goods:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the U.S. should protect more than 3 types of goods from foreign competition when asked whether "particular goods should be protected from foreign competition using tariffs or other import restrictions."

**Views on government**
*Trust government:* respondent answers "Almost always" or "A lot of the time" to the question "How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right?."
*Government purposes:* respondent says the "Government should do more" to solve their country's problems (as opposed to "Government is doing too much" and "Government is doing just the right amount").
*Government involvement:* respondent rates theirselves 4 or more following the question "Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens?".
*Transfers to those out of work:* indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service "Transfers and income support programs for those out of work" should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to "decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)" or "funding to be left unchanged."
*Better schools for low-income children:* indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service "Better schools for children from low-income families" should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to "decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)" or "funding to be left unchanged."
*Income support and retraining for workers displaced by int. trade:* indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service "Income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade" should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to "decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)" or "funding to be left unchanged."
*Subsidies to pay health insurance:* indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service "Subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care" should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to "decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)" or "funding to be left unchanged."
*Wage subsidies to working poor:* indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service "Wage

subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages" should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to "decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)" or "funding to be left unchanged."
The next variables are defined out of the following question: "Consider now a list of functions the federal government could serve. On a 1 to 5 scale, please say how much responsibility you think the government should have for each — with 1 meaning the government should have no responsibility at all and 5 meaning the government should have total responsibility in this area."
*Government should be responsible for reducing income differences:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Reducing income differences between the rich and the poor."
*Government should be responsible for reducing wealth transmission:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Reducing the transmission of wealth from one generation to the other"
*Government should be responsible for ensuring health care:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Making sure Americans have adequate health care."
*Government should be responsible for reducing opportunity differences:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Reducing the differences in opportunities between children from wealthy and poor families."
*Government should be responsible for regulating trade:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Regulating trade to and from the U.S. to protect American producers and consumers."
*Government should be responsible for stabilizing financial system:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Maintaining a stable financial system and ensuring that credit markets work."
*Government should be responsible for stabilizing dollar:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Ensuring a stable dollar."
*Government should be responsible for providing minimum living:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option "Providing a minimum standard of living for all."

**Patriotism**
*Proud to be American:* variable summarizing how proud the respondent is to be American, with values from 1 ("Not at all proud"), to 5 ("Extremely proud").
*Important to be born in the U.S.:* variable summarizing how important it is for the respondent to be born in the U.S., with values from 1 ("Not important at all") to 5 ("Very important").
*Own culture superior:* variable summarizing how much the respondent agrees with the statement that their own culture is superior to others, with values from 1 ("Completely disagree") to 4 ("Completely agree").

**Exposure to Trade**
*Objective Exposure Based on Tradable Sector:* The indicator of exposure to trade based on sector follows the specification of Mayda and Rodrik (2005). We split respondents' sectors into 2 categories: tradables and non-tradables. Tradable sectors are manufacturing sectors that are included in Table 9 of Mayda and Rodrik (2005).
*Objective Exposure Based on Routine Occupation:* The measured exposure depending on routine occupation is based on a measure of routine (Autor et al. (2003), Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and David and Dorn (2013)). Data is taken from the replication packet of Owen and Johnston (2017), based on the definition of RTI (Routine Task Intensity Index) of Blinder et al. (2009). In order to aggregate the detailed classification of occupations, I compute a weighted mean of RTI across occupations. The weights are the ones given in the dataset. I then create an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent is in the top 50th percentile in terms of RTI. This indicator variable is used to build interaction variables. I also create three indicator variables for low, middle and high routine occupations. Low routine occupations are those in the bottom 33th percentile, middle routine occupations are between the 33th percentile and the 66th percentile and high routine occupations are in the top 66th percentile. When the coefficient for routine occupation is displayed, it corresponds to the indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is above 66th percentile. I also control for middle routine occupations, so that the coefficient corresponds to the differential between high routine

and low routine occupations.
*Objective Exposure Based on Routine x Offshorable Occupation:* First, I determine the level of offshorability for each occupation. The methogology is analogous to the *Measured exposure based on routine occupation* and data also comes from Owen and Johnston (2017). Then I define an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent has an occupation above the median both in terms of offshorability and routine. The coefficient that is used in regressions corresponds to this indicator variable that I just described. I also control for being in a non-offshorable and routine occupation and also for being in a non-offshorable and non-routine occupation, so that the displayed coefficient captures the effect of routine in offshorable occupations only.
*Objective Exposure Based on Comparative Advantage Occupation:* Data is taken from the replication packet of Owen and Johnston (2017). This index is a continuous measure of comparative advantage and comparative disadvantage by occupation (see section *Research Design* of Owen and Johnston (2017) for more details on the computations of comparative advantages by occupation). The methodology is analogous to the *Measured Exposure Based on Routine Occupation*, except that I include the continuous measure into the regressions.
*Objective Exposure Based on Local Labor Market:* The measured exposure based on local labor market follows the methodology of Autor et al. (2013). The replication package is available on David Dorn's website section P3, so that I obtain an index by commuting zone from 1991 to 2007. Then, I run the first stage regression, which consists in regressing imports penetration in the U.S. on imports penetration in other countries.[10] Based on the predicted values, I determine an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent is in a commuting zone that is in the top 50th percentile in terms of exposure. As for the routine index, I also determine three indicator variables for low, middle and high exposed commuting zones. Low exposed areas are those below the 50th percentile, middle exposed are between the 50th and the 80th percentiles and high exposed are above the 80th percentile.
*Interactions of Objective Measures:* I also obtain further measures of exposure by interacting indices. I consider four interactions: (1) high labor market exposure and being in a tradable sector[11], (2) being in a tradable sector and in a high routine occupation[12], (3) being in a tradable sector, in a routine occupation and in a highly exposed labor market, (4) being in an offshorable occupation and in a tradable sector[13].
*Better off from trade*: indicator variable equal to one if respondent answered "Better off" to the question "*On balance, would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries has made you better off or worse off?*"
*Worse off from trade:* indicator variable equal to one if respondent answered "Worse off" to the question "would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries has made you better off or worse off?"
*Feels impacted by trade:* indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent believes that "U.S. trade policy has important, direct effects" on their own life ( *Yes/No* question).

**Willingness to pay**
*Willingness to pay:* indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is willing to pay either \$1, \$2, \$5 or \$10, according to which branch he was randomized into, to learn the correct answers to various questions (payment is conditional on winning the \$1,000 lottery in which the respondent is automatically enrolled by taking the survey).

**Indices**
The summary indices that aggregate information over the same domain are constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007). Each indice consists of an equally weighted average of the z-scores of its components with signs oriented consistently within domain. Variables are transformed into z-scores by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation, so that each z-score has mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the control group. To further ease interpretation, the resulting indice is itself standardized by subtracting the mean in the control group and dividing by the standard deviation, so that

[10] See Autor et al. (2013) for more details on the instrumental variable procedure and how the index is built.
[11] In regressions, I also control for being both in a tradable sector and in a low exposed labor market, so that I capture the difference with non tradable sectors.
[12] In regressions, I also control for being both in a tradable sector and in a low routine occupation, so that I capture the difference with non tradable sectors.
[13] In regressions, I also control for being both in a tradable sector and in a low offshorable occupation, so that I capture the difference with non tradable sectors.

each index has mean zero and standard deviation one.

*Believes in efficiency gains:* indice capturing whether the respondents believes in efficiency gains for the U.S. in terms of decreased prices, competition, innovation and GPD growth. It combines the variables *Trade ↓ prices of goods sold in the U.S.*, *Trade ↑ competition in the U.S.*, *Trade ↑ innovation in the U.S.* and *Trade ↑ GDP growth of the U.S.*.
*Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness and GDP:* index capturing whether the respondents believes in efficiency gains for the U.S. in terms of competition, innovation and GPD growth. It combines the variables *Trade ↑ competition in the U.S.*, *Trade ↑ innovation in the U.S.* and *Trade ↑ GDP growth of the U.S.*.

*Believes trade has adverse distributional impacts:* indice summarizing how much the respondent believes that trade has adverse distributional impacts. It includes the variables *Large corporations gained from trade*, *Small businesses gained from trade*, *High-income households gained from trade*, *Middle-income households gained from trade*, *Low-income households gained from trade*, *Trade major reason x unemployment & decline of industries*, *Trade major reason x rise in inequality*, *More Trade can make all better off (Losers can be compensated)*, *Overall trade helped U.S. workers*, *It's easy to change sector x low-skilled workers*. The sign of the variables entering the index is oriented so that a higher index means that trade had more adverse distributional impacts.
*Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts U.S. workers:* indice capturing whether the respondent believes that trade is a major reason for unemployment and hurts U.S. workers. It combines the variables *Trade major reason x unemployment & decline of industries* and *Overall trade helped U.S. workers*. The sign is oriented so that a higher index means that trade had a greater detrimental effect on U.S. workers.

*Supports government intervention:* indice capturing the respondent's support for government intervention. It includes the variables *Trust government*, *Government purposes* and *Government involvement*.
*Is patriotic:* indice summarizing the extent to which the respondent is patriotic. It includes the variables *Proud to be American*, *Important to be born in the U.S.*, *Own culture superior*.
*Support for redistribution:* indice summarizing the respondent's support for redistribution programs. It includes the variables *Transfers to those out of work*, *Better schools for low-income children*, *Income support and retraining for workers displaced by int. trade*, *Subsidies to pay health insurance*, *Wage subsidies to working poor* and *Transfers & retraining best way to help U.S. workers*.

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