

Understanding of Trade*

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Abstract

This paper sheds new light on two questions: How do people perceive and understand trade and trade policy, and what shapes their support for different trade policies? Despite extensive research documenting the efficiency gains from trade and its distributional impacts on different groups of workers, firms, and consumers, we still need to uncover how people perceive these various effects of trade. Trade involves many trade-offs. When forming their views on trade policy, people have to balance their roles as consumers and workers, consider both personal and broader economic and societal impacts, and evaluate concerns of efficiency and equity. Which of these considerations matters most? Using new large-scale surveys and experiments, I highlight three main findings. First, while earlier work has established that consumer gains from trade are diffuse and job losses are concentrated, I directly show the impact of these two considerations on people's views about trade. I find that perceived job risks matter more for policy views than perceived consumer gains. Second, beyond their own material self-interest, people care about the broader efficiency gains and adverse distributional consequences from trade. Support for free trade is best predicted by the belief that trade generates efficiency gains. Concerns about the adverse distributional consequences of trade do not necessarily reduce support for free trade: instead, they increase support for compensatory redistribution. These results also highlight the importance of compensatory redistribution as an indissociable part of trade policy in people's minds. Third, personal exposure to trade shapes policy views in two ways: directly (through self-interest) and indirectly by changing people's perceptions of trade's broader efficiency and distributional implications.

Keywords: Trade, Surveys, Perceptions, Experiment, Trade policy, Protectionism.

JEL Codes: F1, F13, D72, D91


*Stantcheva: Harvard, CEPR, and NBER (e-mail: sstantcheva@fas.harvard.edu). The materials in this paper were originally part of the longer (not intended for publication) working paper "Understanding Economic Policies: What do People Know and Learn?" I thank Beatrice Ferrario, Clément Herman, Lionel Jeanrenaud, Julia Paul-Venturine, Yannic Rehm and especially Thomas Bézy, Alberto Binetti, and Francesco Nuzzi for exceptional research assistance. I thank seminar participants at Princeton, Paris School of Economics, and LMU Munich, for feedback and comments. I am indebted to Pol Antras, Arnaud Costinot, Dave Donaldson, Elhanan Helpmann, Gene Grossman, Marc Melitz, Steve Redding, Ken Rogoff, and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg for valuable inputs. The study received IRB Approval from Harvard under Protocol IRB18-1918 and was pre-registered as AEARCTR-0003991.

1 Introduction

While economists often diverge in their views on various topics, there exists a striking consensus that free trade is generally beneficial. Notably, none of the economists interrogated in the IGM Poll on free trade disagreed with the statement “Freer trade improves productive efficiency and offers consumers better choices, and in the long run these gains are much larger than any effects on employment.”¹ The prevailing sentiment among economists is generally that free trade, despite creating both winners and losers, tends to produce net gains significant enough that those adversely affected can be compensated.

Yet, public perception in the US remains more fragmented. Historically, the tendency has skewed towards trade restrictions and barriers. The last decade has seen intense debates about import competition and its far-ranging economic, social, and political consequences and a resurgence of protectionist proposals.² According to Gallup, nearly one-third of Americans in 2021 believed that “trade is a threat to the US economy,” and negative views have become more prevalent over time.³ Consistent with these statistics, support for trade is high but declining also in the three waves of new survey data that I collected for this paper, from 2019 to 2023, as illustrated in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1: SHARE OF RESPONDENTS WHO AGREE THAT “INCREASING TRADE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND REDUCING BARRIERS TO TRADE IS SOMETHING THE U.S. SHOULD AIM FOR”



Extensive empirical evidence shows how deeply trade and trade policy influence the economy and people’s lives, impacting individuals both as workers and consumers. In the new surveys presented in this paper, three-quarters of respondents say that trade has important effects on their life. People’s views on trade policy, which can ultimately shape its design and evolution, are therefore critical to study.

In this paper, I shed new light on two questions: How do people perceive and understand trade and trade policy, and which factors shape their support for different trade policies? Regarding the first question, the theoretical and empirical literatures have documented the efficiency gains from trade and its distributional impacts on different groups of workers, firms, and consumers. But what do people know and perceive about these various impacts of trade? On the second question, trade involves many trade-offs, which people need to balance when forming their views on trade policy. They need to weigh the impacts on themselves

¹<https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/free-trade/>

²See, among others, Autor et al. (2013a) and Mutz (2021) as well as the papers reviewed in more detail below.

³Gallup’s 2021 World Affairs survey, results available here: <https://news.gallup.com/poll/342419/sharply-fewer-views-foreign-trade-opportunity.aspx>

as consumers and workers, their self-interest and broader impacts on others and society, efficiency and distributional outcomes. Which of these considerations matters most to people? To answer these questions, I design and run new large-scale surveys and experiments in the US.

To clarify the goals and contribution of the paper, and before describing the methods and results, consider a stylized organizing framework to think about the drivers of trade policy views in Figure 2. At the top of the figure, I first distinguish between two facets of trade policy: The first is trade restrictions per se, such as tariffs and quotas, which can be general or targeted to specific goods or sectors. The second is redistribution to mitigate adverse distributional consequences from trade. Redistribution can be general or compensatory, i.e., targeted directly at those hurt by trade, for instance in the form of direct assistance or retraining. It is important to take this broader view of trade policy to include redistribution, which plays a key role, as we will see below. These multiple dimensions of trade policy can be shaped by self-interest (the left panel) or broader economic and social concerns (the right panel).

In turn, self-interest can arise from respondents' benefits as consumers (Box I) regarding the prices and variety of goods they can purchase. It can also stem from their role as workers and their exposure through their occupation, sector of work, local labor market, or human capital (Box II). It is often thought that the gains of consumers are diffuse and widespread, while the losses of workers are large and concentrated (see, among others, Autor (2018), Autor et al. (2016) and Broda and Weinstein (2006)).

Focusing exclusively on self-interest concerns, two workhorse trade models predict which people should oppose open trade more. The factor endowment (Heckscher-Ohlin) model makes several assumptions, including that factors of production are mobile across sectors within a country. Stolper and Samuelson (1941) show that, in this setting, free trade will benefit the owners of the factors of production that are abundant relative to the rest of the world and hurt others. In the US, this has typically been taken to mean that trade would benefit higher-skilled workers and hurt lower-skilled ones. The specific-factor model (or Ricardo-Viner) is based on the idea that some factors of production cannot move across sectors, at least in the short run. In this case, free trade will hurt those working in import-competing sectors and benefit those in export-oriented sectors. From the standpoint of pure material self-interest, the factor endowments model suggests that higher-skilled workers should be more supportive of free trade. The specific factor model implies that those employed in industries with comparative advantage and that export abroad should be more supportive of open trade than those working in sectors that are subject to international competition from imports.⁴

However, people can also have broader social and economic concerns beyond their material self-interest, represented in the right part of Figure 2. They may care about the efficiency gains from trade in the form of higher competitiveness, innovation, and growth, highlighted by extensive theoretical and empirical work (Box III). They may also worry about the distributional consequences of trade as it impacts inequality and different groups, such as the middle class, the rich, or different types of firms (Box IV). Finally, other factors such as patriotism, partisanship, and geopolitical concerns may influence people's views on trade policy (Box V). The arrows in the diagram represent possible channels. In particular, while self-interest can directly shape views on trade policy (Arrow A), it can also indirectly influence respondents' perceptions of the overall perceived efficiency and distributional effects (Arrows B and C).

This paper makes two main contributions: First, it measures each of these individual components in Figure 2 thanks to new and original survey data. This provides novel, systematic, and comprehensive

⁴For a review of the effects of trade for distributional consequences, and, hence, individual attitudes, see Rodrik (1995).

measurement of understanding, reasoning, attitudes, and beliefs that can be analyzed jointly. Second, the paper brings these pieces together to study which ones most strongly predict people’s views on trade policy. Despite the abundant literature on trade policy views, we have not yet pieced together a full understanding of how people balance these various impacts of trade on themselves and others when forming their policy views.

To measure and disentangle the role of these factors in shaping trade policy views, I designed and ran three large-scale surveys that elicit respondents’ perceptions of each of the elements in the diagram. The surveys start with open-ended questions that capture people’s first-order concerns about trade without being primed by particular answer options. I investigate the answers to these questions using text analysis methods.

The surveys then ask detailed questions that test respondents’ understanding of trade, their views on the efficiency and distributional impacts of trade in the US, and their personal gains and losses. Respondents are further asked about their policy views on various possible interventions related to trade restrictions (e.g., overall trade barriers or support for the protection of specific sectors) and compensatory redistribution (e.g., direct assistance, retraining, or wage subsidies to low-income workers). In addition, I construct a series of objective measures of exposure to trade based on respondents’ education level, sector of work, occupation, and local labor market. Thus, I have both objective and subjective measures of respondents’ exposure to trade that can influence their material self-interest.

To establish causality regarding which factors drive people’s views on trade policy, I designed two types of experiments embedded in the surveys. The first type consists of information treatments in the form of pedagogical videos that explain to respondents the impacts of trade policy on efficiency, distribution, or both. The second type is priming treatments that do not provide any information but rather prompt respondents to think about the impacts that trade has on them – as consumers or workers – through a series of questions.


Surveys are a key tool for getting into people’s minds and studying otherwise invisible things such as perceptions, attitudes, reasonings, and views. Economists tend to be skeptical of surveys, and we often prefer a revealed preference approach. Nevertheless, our traditional approach faces many challenges when trying to uncover the reasoning underlying people’s policy preferences. Surveys allow us to measure and analyze people’s thinking more directly.

One may worry that self-reported survey answers may not reflect people’s true attitudes. I show that self-reported policy views on trade and redistribution are significantly correlated with real political behavior, namely signing petitions to be sent to the government that are in line with the policy views expressed. This aligns with a growing body of research highlighting that survey-elicited attitudes are correlated with real-world behaviors (see the review in [Stantcheva \(2022\)](#), as well as [Fehr et al. \(2020\)](#), [Tannenbaum et al. \(2020\)](#), [Funk \(2016\)](#), and [Hainmueller et al. \(2015\)](#)). Furthermore, to ensure that the data is of high quality and the survey results are credible and robust, I employ many techniques described in Section 2 and Appendix C and in-depth in [Stantcheva \(2022\)](#).⁵

The main findings are organized around three key results, each in one separate section of the paper. The first set of results, in Section 4, relates to the importance of consumer gains versus job losses from trade. While research has highlighted the consumer gains and job losses from trade and found that the former are diffuse, whereas the latter are concentrated, I directly show the impact of these two considerations on people’s views about trade. Respondents perceive consumer gains from trade (Box I) as vague and diffuse. They are

⁵This paper is part of a broader agenda that uses social economics surveys to better understand the reasoning that shapes people’s policy views. The website understandingeconomics.org provides the data for several other policies (such as health insurance, the income tax, and the estate tax).

FIGURE 2: THE FACTORS SHAPING VIEWS ON TRADE POLICY



divided on whether trade lowers prices or increases the variety of goods in the US or their own consumption basket. Those that are experimentally prompted to think about their gains from trade as consumers do not change their views on trade. On the contrary, respondents who feel impacted as workers (Box II) perceive the threats and costs as salient. Although a minority of respondents feels directly threatened by trade via their job, this exposure is pivotal for their views on trade. Furthermore, when a randomly selected subsample of respondents is primed to consider the threats from trade for their job, they significantly reduce their support for open trade. My findings confirm that perceived job risks matter more for policy views than potential consumer gains.

The second set of results coalesces around how much people care about the broader efficiency gains and adverse distributional consequences from trade beyond their own material self-interest (in Section 5). I show that people’s views on trade are strongly driven by these economic and social concerns. These findings lend empirical support to the recent theoretical model of voters’ preferences over trade policy that reflects their concerns for members of those groups in society with whom they identify in [Grossman and Helpman \(2020\)](#). When asked about the effects of trade in the US, many respondents believe in positive efficiency gains in the form of higher competitiveness, innovation, and growth. Respondents also understand that trade can have adverse distributional consequences. Thus, there is substantial agreement on some of the winners from trade, namely large companies and high-income households. There is more pessimism and disagreement on how trade benefits workers, people with low incomes, and the middle class and how it shapes inequality and unemployment in the US.

The belief that is most predictive of support for open trade is that trade generates a variety of efficiency

gains (Box III). The belief that trade has adverse distributional consequences (Box IV) can reduce support for free trade, but only if respondents believe that losers cannot be compensated with appropriate policies. People who believe that those hurt by trade can be helped using other tools (i.e., compensatory redistribution) do not oppose free trade, even if they are convinced that it will entail adverse distributional consequences. Instead, they support more redistribution. The information treatments confirm these findings. Respondents who see explanations about the efficiency implications of free trade increase their support for it. Those told about potentially adverse distributional consequences and possible interventions to compensate losers do not change their views on free trade but increase their support for compensatory redistribution.

These findings highlight that the two facets of trade policy – trade barriers and compensatory transfers – are driven by different considerations and are indissociable in people’s minds. They point to the need to provide such redistribution and ensure citizens understand it if support for free trade is to be maintained.

The third set of results relates to the direct and indirect roles of exposure to trade (Section 6). Respondents’ trade-related experiences, as captured by their subjective and objective exposures through their work (their sector, occupation, and local labor market), are significantly correlated with their support for trade restrictions. Furthermore, this personal exposure shapes not only respondents’ assessment of how trade affects them but also their perceptions of the broader efficiency and distributional impacts of trade on others and the US. For instance, respondents who perceive themselves as made worse off by trade and those who are objectively more exposed to trade are less likely to believe that trade decreases prices in the US, that it fosters innovation or growth, or that it does not have adverse distributional impacts. This suggests that the path through Arrows B and C in Figure 2 is empirically relevant. A formal decomposition shows that this indirect exposure effect is essential for policy views.

Related literature. This paper contributes to the literature on attitudes toward trade by providing new and comprehensive measures of people’s reasoning about trade and showing which factors matter for policy views.

The existing literature relates attitudes toward trade to various characteristics measuring exposure through the labor market, focusing on the relative explanatory powers of the factor endowment and the specific factor models. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Value Survey (WVS), [Mayda and Rodrik \(2005\)](#) proxy for human capital with educational attainment and occupational categories and find strong support for both models: individuals with higher levels of human capital exhibit higher support for trade only in countries where these skills are abundant; those in import-competing industries are more supportive of trade barriers than those in non-tradable sectors. [O’Rourke et al. \(2001\)](#) echoes these findings. Like [Hainmueller and Hiscox \(2006\)](#), I highlight why it might be problematic to use education as a proxy for factor endowment, since it also is likely to have an independent impact on attitudes.

[Beaulieu et al. \(2011\)](#) build a model of intra-industry trade and show empirically that skilled workers are more supportive of such trade. [Scheve and Slaughter \(2001\)](#) mostly find evidence in favor of the factor endowment model, using education and earnings as proxy for skill and comparative advantage of the industry as a proxy for specific factor. Further evidence on the impacts of people’s experience on trade attitudes comes from [Mansfield et al. \(2019\)](#): those who lost their jobs in import-competing sectors following the Great Recession became more anti-trade. I show that respondents’ objective and subjective exposures are positively correlated. Furthermore, personal experience shapes people’s policy views directly in line with material self-interest and indirectly by changing their perceptions of the effects of trade on others and the

US more generally.

By eliciting detailed perceptions about the many components that can inform policy views, I can also highlight the importance of broader concerns beyond material self-interest. A series of papers focuses on the factors in Box V in Figure 2, which I cover in Section 3.1. Thus, [Mansfield and Mutz \(2009\)](#) find that out-group anxiety matters more than self-interest. [Margalit \(2012\)](#) also confirms that people care not only about the material consequences of trade but also its perceived social and cultural consequences. Likewise, [Mayda and Rodrik \(2005\)](#) find a more critical role for broader factors like relative income, degrees of neighborhood attachment, nationalism, and patriotism.

Concerns about the labor market (which are a subset of the factors I consider in Box IV) as drivers of support for protectionism and a “globalization backlash” are highlighted in [Scheve and Slaughter \(2001\)](#), [Walter \(2021\)](#), and [Lü et al. \(2012\)](#). I show that efficiency and distributional concerns related to trade drive different aspects of trade policy views. Importantly, respondents concerned about adverse distributional consequences of trade support compensatory redistribution to help those affected but do not necessarily support more trade restrictions.

My work is also related to several papers providing experimental evidence on factors that shape trade attitudes. [Hiscox \(2006\)](#) shows that giving respondents information about job losses due to trade decreases their support for free trade; telling them that trade reduces prices does not change their views. These findings are replicated by [Chatruc et al. \(2021\)](#) for Latin American countries. [Alfaro et al. \(2022\)](#) show that telling respondents about research findings on the job losses or gains from trade or price effects of trade or tariffs can change people’s views on trade. [Rodrik and Di Tella \(2020\)](#) ask respondents to imagine different types of shocks that cause job loss and find that trade-related shocks, especially when in the form of outsourcing to a developing country, generate more demand for protectionism.

I take a different approach in the current paper: to design a treatment for each of the main factors in Figure 2 that can help tease out its causal impacts on trade policy views. Because I have questions related to the elements in each “box,” I can identify which specific perceptions move in response to each treatment and better interpret the treatment effects. The information treatments shift people’s perceptions of trade’s efficiency and distributional impacts. The priming treatments instead ask people to think about the impacts on themselves – either as consumers or workers – without providing any information about these impacts on others. This allows me to directly test how people perceive trade through the lens of consumers versus workers (which is the effect of interest) rather than how they would react to new information about others. The priming treatment effects can be interpreted through the answers to various essential survey questions. Thus, respondents are generally not convinced that trade has lowered the prices of goods they buy, and many are not worried about the impacts of trade on their job.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the survey, data collection, and sample. Section 3 provides key statistics on respondents’ knowledge about trade and trade policy views. It also considers the role of patriotism, geopolitical concerns and the identity of the trade partner, and the link between self-reported policy views and real political behaviors. The following three sections each focus on a key result about trade policy views: Section 4 considers the personal impacts from trade and shows that consumer gains do not appear to matter, whereas job threats are salient; Section 5 analyzes respondents’ broader concerns about the efficiency and distributional implications of trade and highlights the importance of compensatory distribution; Section 6 emphasizes that exposure to trade shapes respondents’ views directly and indirectly. Section 7 concludes and discusses some policy implications. The Appendix contains additional

deep-dives, related to knowledge about and understanding of trade (Appendix E) and narratives about trade through open-ended questions (Appendix B).

2 Surveys and Sample

This section briefly describes the survey, the data collection process, and the sample. Appendix C provides additional information on important aspects of the survey and response quality.⁶

2.1 Data collection and final sample

Data collection. I conducted two main surveys of US residents between 18 and 70 years of age. The first survey (1,771 respondents) took place between August and September 2019 and the second one (2,148 respondents) between November and December 2020. Both surveys were designed using the online platform *Qualtrics*. Participants were enrolled by the commercial survey company *Bilendi* (<https://www.bilendi.co.uk/>) and its US-based partners and receive survey links via a dashboard and email. For more information on recruiting respondents, see Appendix C.

I also conducted a validation survey in July 2023 that contains the same questions as the first survey minus the treatments, with additional questions to probe the robustness of the results to alternative question phrasings and test specific hypotheses. I will refer to the results from this survey in various parts of the paper.

Final sample. Table 1 shows the characteristics of the samples relative to those of the US population in 2019.⁷ Survey 1 is representative of the US population (column 1) along the dimensions that were specifically targeted—age, gender, and income—as well as along non-targeted dimensions such as marital and employment status. Survey 2 intentionally focuses on respondents in the labor force only and is broadly representative of that population (column 3) along the dimensions of gender, age, income, employment, marital status, and college education. In both surveys, respondents are more likely to have completed high-school (and, in the case of Survey 1, to be college-educated) and to be unemployed than the general population (which likely reflects the fact that people have more time to take surveys during unemployment spells). African-American and Hispanic people are underrepresented. To address the small imbalances in the sample, I reweigh the sample so that it is representative along the unemployment, education, and race dimensions as well. This does not change any of the results in significant ways. Therefore, I use the unweighted sample for all results in the paper.

2.2 The surveys' structure

The survey structure for Surveys 1 and 2 is illustrated in Figure 3 and the full questionnaires are available in Appendices H and I,⁸ with links leading to the web interfaces. Below, text in italics and quotes represents

⁶I provide an in-depth overview of large-scale online surveys and answers to common concerns, which cannot be covered here due to space constraints, in Stantcheva (2022).

⁷For details on how population characteristics are defined and constructed, see Appendix C.3. For the representativeness of the validation survey, see Appendix Table A-11.

⁸In the full version of the Online Appendix https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/stantcheva/files/understanding_trade_stantcheva.pdf?1.

the actual survey text as seen by respondents. The order of these question blocks was randomized in order to test for framing effects on policy views and survey fatigue, which I do in Appendix C.⁹ I now provide more details on some of these blocks.

2.2.1 Background socio-economic questions

I collected information on respondents’ gender, age, income, highest level of education achieved, sector of occupation, employment status, marital status, number of children, place of residence, and political leaning. I also asked them about their main sources of economic news, whether they try to stay informed of economic issues, their overall media and social media consumption, and their field of study in college.

2.2.2 Open-ended questions

Open-ended questions are important to elicit first-order, intrinsic concerns that people have before they are prompted to think of a particular aspect of trade with more directed survey questions (Ferrario and Stantcheva, 2022). I ask respondents about the “*main considerations*” that come to their mind when they think about trade policy, what the “*goals*” of trade policy should be, what its “*shortcomings*” are, what the effects on the US economy from trade restrictions are, and which groups gain or lose from changes in trade barriers. Due to space constraints, I only include the results from the text analysis in the Appendix B.

2.2.3 Experimental parts


In the experimental part of Survey 1, respondents are randomly split into five groups. Four treatment groups are shown one of four videos that emphasize different aspects of trade and trade policy, whereas the control group does not see any video. Screenshots from these videos are in Figures 5-7. Each video can be watched by clicking the links below the screenshots.

- The *Distributive effects* video emphasizes the distributional impacts of trade policy on both consumers and the labor market. More precisely, it states that openness to trade can increase the flow of goods and services, but that there may be winners and losers from trade. Starting from the labor market effects, the video shows that, in the exporting car sector, workers’ earnings and the number of jobs could increase. However, in the sectors threatened by imports (clothing), the number of jobs and wages may decrease. Turning to the consumer side, the video describes that when there is more trade, the imported goods in country A (clothing) become cheaper, and the variety of goods increases. Therefore, households who consume the imported goods benefit and consumers overall may also gain from the variety of goods available for purchase. The winners from trade are thus generally a large group. Those who lose are often a smaller group, but their losses can be acute. Finally, respondents are shown that the government can help workers in the sectors hurt by trade by providing more generous unemployment benefits and targeted training programs to help them acquire new skills and find new jobs.
- The *Efficiency effects* treatment shows trade’s efficiency implications. It demonstrates that trade can impact the productivity and competitiveness of firms and workers. If A and B open up more to trade, then the car sector in country A will export more and generate higher profits. Trade may also increase knowledge and technological diffusion and lead to productivity gains in both countries.


⁹As I discuss below, there was no effect of the order of blocks on policy views and no evidence for survey fatigue.

FIGURE 3: OUTLINE OF SURVEYS

(A) OUTLINE OF SURVEY 1



(B) OUTLINE OF SURVEY 2



Notes. The figure shows the blocks of each survey and different treatment branches. The numbers next to the arrows represent the shares of the sample in each branch. In Survey 1, the order of the questions related to Efficiency and Distributional impacts inside the *Reasoning about trade* block and the *Policy views* block was randomized.

The market sizes for both countries increase, which may force industries to be more efficient in order to remain competitive.

- The *Economist* treatment brings together both the distributional and the efficiency considerations and highlights the trade-offs.¹⁰

The experimental part of Survey 2 consists of priming treatments that do not provide any information, but rather ask respondents to think about the effects of trade policy on themselves.

- The *Own consumption* treatment specifically asks respondents questions about the effects of trade on the prices and variety of goods they buy. For instance: “*Can you think of some goods only produced in foreign countries that you regularly buy and consume because of trade with foreign countries?*”
- The *Own job risks* treatment instead asks respondents about the threats to their own job. For instance, they are asked “*How likely do you think it is that, over the next 10 years, your job will be outsourced, off-shored, or automated because of competition with foreign countries?*”

2.2.4 Reasoning about trade

In this block, I first ask some factual knowledge questions about trade (e.g., to which countries the US mainly exports and from which countries it imports).

Respondents are then asked to think in more detail about how trade and trade policy work, and especially about its efficiency and distributional effects. What price effects and impacts on the broader economy will they trigger? What are the distributional consequences for different groups of people? These series of questions are critical because they explicitly elicit the chains of effects and mechanisms that respondents have in mind when they think about trade and trade policy.

When asking about these mechanisms, respondents are randomized into one of two branches, which feature a different phrasing of some of these questions. The “generic” branch asks questions about the US as a whole or about other people (e.g., “*Overall, has international trade decreased the prices of goods sold in the U.S.?*”) with an impersonal formulation. Respondents in the second branch see a “personalized” phrasing for some questions only. For instance, “*Overall, has international trade decreased the prices of goods that you buy regularly?*” or “*Overall, has international trade made the firms in your sector of work more competitive and improved their productivity?*” Respondents in the personalized branch are also asked whether they feel that they have been made worse off or better off from trade, which will be used as one measure of their perceived exposure to trade.

In the third (validation) survey, I also include a detailed “problem-set” style series of questions that asks respondents to think through the various effects of trade in a controlled, “all-else-equal” environment. I discuss the findings based on this more technical series of questions in Appendix E and summarize them in Section 3.3.

¹⁰This treatment came in two versions that are pooled together because their effects are very similar. The first version is “generic,” referring to the countries as A and B. The “US-specific” version explicitly refers to country A as the United States and to country B as a foreign country. The goal was to see whether there would be particular reactions if the treatment was about the US specifically but this turned out not to be the case.

2.2.5 Policy views

In the final part of the survey, I ask respondents about their views on trade policy, compensatory redistribution (targeted at those who lose from trade) and general redistribution policy (aimed at lower-income people more generally). I also ask them a range of questions about their views on government.

2.2.6 Survey 2

Survey 2 asks similar socio-economic background and policy views questions. It contains different experimental treatments, as described above.

2.3 Data quality

Appendix C discusses the sample recruiting, survey completion times, and methods adopted to ensure high data quality. I briefly cover three aspects here.

Framing and survey fatigue. First, the order of survey questions can influence respondents. Therefore, I randomized the order of the distributional impacts, efficiency effects, and policy view blocks, which is also helpful in testing for survey fatigue. Appendix C shows that there is no evidence for survey fatigue. Furthermore, the order of these blocks did not significantly affect responses.

Real-stakes questions and revealed preferences. In the validation survey, I add two real-stakes questions that I can correlate with self-reported policy views so as to check whether the latter measure respondents' true views. The questions gauge respondents' willingness to sign one or both of two petitions to be sent to Congress (see Appendix C.4 for the exact phrasing). The first petition expresses support for implementing "*stronger trade barriers to safeguard the U.S. economy.*" The second petition supports increasing assistance for U.S. workers affected by international trade. Section 3.1 shows that self-reported policy views are consistently and significantly correlated with the willingness to sign a petition in line with these views.

Financial incentives for accurate answers. In the third survey, I provided respondents with financial incentives for accurate answers to the knowledge questions, which have a single correct answer. Appendix C.5 shows that there are no significant effects on correct answers, which suggests that respondents are already answering carefully and to the best of their knowledge.

3 Descriptive Statistics: Knowledge and Policy Views

In this section, I lay the ground for the subsequent analysis by providing key descriptive facts about trade policy views and trade-related knowledge.

3.1 Views on trade policy

Trade policy is multifaceted. First, there are trade restrictions, which can be general (i.e., overall trade openness) or targeted (i.e., protection of specific goods or sectors). Second, there are redistributive policies, which can also be general (i.e., not directly targeted to losers or winners from trade) or compensatory (i.e., directly targeted at those affected by trade).

Compensatory and general redistribution. Compensatory redistribution involves policies targeted to those displaced by trade in the form of, e.g., direct assistance, retraining, or transfers. An example in the US is the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. General redistribution consists of income-targeted policies such as transfers to the unemployed or the poor and wage subsidies. It is an indirect way to help those affected by trade because provides insurance against shocks to income, including trade shocks. None of these policies are akin to the textbook “lump-sum” transfers compensation. Instead, they are all, to some extent, distortionary and costly in efficiency terms.

In the survey, I ask respondents about a range of realistic and existing redistribution policies and, specifically, about their preferred policy to help workers in declining industries. Table A-7 shows that 53% of respondents believe direct assistance and retraining are the best policies; 11% prefer production subsidies in affected sectors. 37% of respondents are in favor of direct income support for workers displaced by international trade.

General and strategic trade restrictions. Most respondents (63%) are supportive of more free trade and decreasing trade restrictions in general (see Appendix Table A-6). Only 36% believe that import restrictions are the best way to help U.S. workers.

Nevertheless, there is support for more targeted trade restrictions. 40% of respondents believe the US should restrict food imports to ensure food security. 54% think the US should protect their “infant” industries. 78% support protection of key consumer products, namely food items and cars. 50% believe the US should restrict trade in key sectors, such as oil and machinery.¹¹

Identity of the trade partner and geopolitical concerns. A potential issue for trade policy is that respondents may care about the identity of the trade partner for geopolitical or other reasons. I explore this question in Appendix F. Most respondents consider the identity of the trade partner to be somewhat important (44%) or very important (52%) (Figure A-12). When asked whether there are specific countries that the US should be cautious about trading with, 69% of respondents mention China, 46% Russia, 12% Iran. Note also that many respondents believe the US’ main trade partner is China (see Section 3.3).

I then consider how these attitudes towards the identity of the trade partner correlate with beliefs and trade policy views in Figure A-13. Respondents who mention “Russia” do not hold significantly different views on trade or trade policy, which suggests that their concerns might be primarily political or geopolitical. However, respondents who mention “China” are significantly more concerned about the distributional impacts of trade, are more likely to believe that large corporations have benefitted more than small businesses, that US workers are largely hurt by trade, and that losers from trade cannot be compensated. They are also more likely to perceive that they have personally been negatively affected by trade and more likely to objectively have been negatively exposed to trade with China, according to the measure from Autor et al. (2013b). These are the economic concerns that I will explore in-depth in this paper.

Also related to geopolitical concerns, I find that those who worry about geopolitical ramifications from trade restrictions, i.e., retaliatory responses, are more likely to support policies to compensate losers from trade rather than support outright trade restrictions. Patriotism is significantly correlated with support for trade restrictions in many industries and to protect U.S. workers, as well as with lower support for compensatory transfers (see Tables A-6 and A-7).

¹¹These variables are based on questions asking respondents to select sectors and goods among a wide variety that they would like to see protected from foreign competition. See the phrasing in Appendix H.

Summarizing policy views. To summarize views on trade policy, I create two outcome variables: *Support for more free trade and lower trade restrictions* captures whether the respondent thinks that the US should aim to reduce trade barriers. Because of space constraints, I will not focus on targeted trade restrictions for specific sectors, but analogous results for them are shown in Table A-6. *Support for Redistribution* measures support for redistribution policy. It is constructed following the methodology of Kling et al. (2007), which consists of an equally weighted average of the z-scores of all redistribution-related variables and is further divided by its standard deviation.¹²

3.2 Correlation of survey-elicited views and real political behaviors

One may wonder whether self-reported policy views truly reflect respondent’s views. To test this, the survey offered respondents the possibility to sign one or two petitions closely related to the core policy views studied, namely support for more trade restrictions and more compensatory redistribution for those affected by trade (see Appendix C.4 for the text of the petitions).

Figure 4 shows that there are significant correlations between the willingness to sign a petition on a given issue and the corresponding self-reported policy views. Respondents who are willing to sign the petition for stronger trade barriers are more likely to say that policymakers should not encourage free trade with other countries and that restricting imports is the best way to help US workers. They also support many more targeted trade restrictions. As expected, there is no significant correlation with support for redistribution. On the contrary, respondents who are willing to sign the petition for more assistance to those impacted by trade are significantly more likely to express support for redistribution in the survey.

3.3 Knowledge about trade policy

Figure 8 reports some summary statistics related to respondents’ factual knowledge about trade.¹³ Panels A and B focus on the main US trading partners: 71% of respondents correctly answer that the country from which the US imports the most is China. Smaller shares of respondents (between 4% and 7%) answer Mexico, Japan, Canada, or the U.K. When asked to which country the US exports the most, 44% of respondents answer China again, and 19% chose the correct answer, Canada. Mexico is a close third with 14% of respondents choosing it.

Panel C shows that almost 80% of respondents know what an import tariff is, but just around half know what an import quota is. Two-thirds of respondents appear to understand the basic price effects of tariffs and export taxes, i.e., that an import tariff on imported goods will likely raise the price of that good and that an export tax will increase the price of the taxed good abroad. The final question in the figure considers a scenario in which the US can produce a good (“cars”) at a lower cost than the foreign country. Respondents are asked whether, under some circumstances, it would still make sense to import cars from abroad. 68% of respondents agree that it could make sense. This suggests that respondents either understand the concept of comparative advantage or have in mind some model of love-for-variety or quality differential.


¹²More precisely, the index is higher for respondents who agree that the best tools to help workers are more generous transfers and direct assistance to workers (rather than restricting imports or subsidizing production in their industry) and who want to increase spending on support and retraining programs for workers displaced by international competition and trade. It is also increasing in support for more general (non-trade specific) redistributive spending such as help for those out of work, better schools for children from low-income families, and wage subsidies.

¹³For the exact phrasing of the questions, see the questionnaire in Appendix H. Appendix Table A-1 provides more detailed summary statistics and correlations related to knowledge about trade.


Appendix E discusses the results of a more in-depth and technical “problem-set” style series of questions, in which respondents are asked to think through the effects of specific productivity shocks in the US and Germany on prices, imports, production, wages, and welfare.

FIGURE 4: DO SURVEY-ELICITED POLICY VIEWS REFLECT REAL POLITICAL BEHAVIORS?

(A) CORRELATION BETWEEN WILLINGNESS TO SIGN PETITION FOR STRONGER TRADE BARRIERS AND POLICY VIEWS



(B) CORRELATION BETWEEN WILLINGNESS TO SIGN PETITION FOR MORE SUPPORT TO THOSE IMPACTED BY TRADE AND POLICY VIEWS



Notes. The figure reports regression coefficients where the outcome variables are “Support petition for stronger trade barriers” (in Panel A) and “Support petition for more compensation” (in Panel B). The variables depicted are grouped by topic, related to either “General restrictions on Trade” or “Targeted restrictions on Trade” or “Policy Views on Redistribution.” All variables are detailed in Appendix G. Each dot is a coefficient of a different regression, where controls are the relevant variable and the full set of individual covariates (age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, race, political leaning). 95% confidence intervals are depicted.

4 Diffuse Consumer Gains and Concentrated Job Losses

I next turn to the determinants of trade policy views, starting with the “self-interest” part of the framework in Figure 2, namely with respondents’ perceived gains as consumers (Box I) and their perceived losses or gains as workers (Box II).

4.1 Perceived exposure to trade

Panel A of Figure 9 shows how respondents perceive the impacts of trade on themselves as consumers and workers.¹⁴ When respondents think about their personal impacts of trade as consumers, they are divided on whether trade has decreased the prices of goods they buy. They are somewhat more convinced that trade has increased the variety of goods available. The effects of trade on overall prices may be hard to assess, given that the relative prices of different goods can move differently, and it is not easy to imagine the counterfactual prices without trade. It is probably easier to grasp the overall increase in the variety of goods.

Regarding their labor market experience, a minority of respondents think that trade is a serious threat to their sector or job (29%), that trade has negatively impacted their job (24%), or that their job is likely to be outsourced or off-shored (19%). On balance, when asked about their own experience, 61% of respondents think they have been made better off, and 39% think they have been made worse off. These views are consistent with the idea that losses from trade in the labor market are concentrated, while consumer gains are diffuse and widespread.

4.2 The link between perceived and actual exposure to trade

I now show a significant positive correlation between respondents’ perceived (subjective) exposure to trade and their actual (objective) exposure to trade, according to different measures used in the literature.

I consider six primary measures: 1) whether the sector of the respondent is a *tradable sector*, like in Mayda and Rodrik (2005); 2) the extent to which the respondent’s occupation is routine-intensive, as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Autor and Dorn (2013), and Goos et al. (2014); 3) the extent to which the respondent’s occupation is both routine-intensive and easily offshorable from Owen and Johnston (2017);¹⁵ 4) whether the respondent’s occupation is in a position of comparative advantage from the point of view of international competition, following Owen and Johnston (2017); 5) the exposure through the local labor market, as measured by the change in Chinese import exposure per worker in a region from Autor et al. (2013a); and 6) whether the respondent is college-educated since educational achievement is often used as a measure of factor endowment. Using these measures, I build indicators for exposure and interactions between them.

Panel B of Figure 9 shows the correlation between respondents’ perceived exposure to trade and these objective exposure measures, controlling for age and gender and clustering at the relevant level (occupation, sector, or commuting zone). In general, a respondent’s (objective) negative exposure to trade through their sector, occupation, or local labor market is significantly positively correlated with a feeling that trade has

¹⁴Appendix Table A-2 provides more details on perceived personal impacts from trade.

¹⁵According to Owen and Johnston (2017), routine is characterized by repetition or rule-following procedures, which in the US will be subject to competitive pressure. Offshorability measures whether job tasks are location-dependent and require face-to-face interaction. In countries like the US, they show that those in routine occupations are more anti-trade, and this effect will be magnified by those in more offshorable occupations.

made them worse off and that it has negatively affected their job. People exposed to trade through their job also feel worse off as consumers and are less likely to believe that trade has reduced the prices of goods they buy, perhaps because they feel that their purchasing power is lower than it would otherwise be. Furthermore, college-educated respondents are significantly less likely to feel negatively impacted in their role as consumers and workers.

There is, thus, a positive correlation between subjective and objective exposure, but it is not perfect. This lack of perfect correlation points to two possible interpretations, with implications for work using these objective exposure measures. First, sector, occupation, or local labor market measures may be too coarse to capture fine-grained individual experience. Individuals may have more accurate and precise assessments of the threats they face. Second, individuals' subjective perceptions may be exaggerated or understated. If this is the case, perceptions arguably matter more for policy views than objective exposure, as will be discussed in the rest of the analysis.

4.3 Perceptions of consumer gains are not correlated with support for more free trade and lower trade restrictions

To what extent does respondents' own exposure matter for their policy views? I start with the role of consumer gains (Box I of Figure 2).

Before diving into these findings, I add a note on the exposition of the results. For clarity, in this section and the next one, I present results related to policy views in a condensed form in Figures 10 and 12. I extract the coefficients represented in the figures from the exhaustive Tables A-6 and A-7 and organize them by topic to highlight the key patterns. These regressions have as outcomes policy views, controlling for the full set of individual covariates (age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, race, political leaning), all treatment indicators, and all beliefs. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix G. Beliefs include whether the respondent believes that trade increases innovation, competitiveness, and GDP, trade decreases the prices of consumer goods, large companies gain more than small ones from trade, high-income households benefit more than low-income households, switching sector of work is easier for high-skilled workers than low-skilled ones, trade is major cause of the rise in inequality, trade is a major reason for unemployment and hurts US workers, it is possible to compensate losers from trade through appropriate policies. Also included but not depicted in the figures or tables are controls for how patriotically-minded a respondent is and how much they trust the government and generally support government intervention.¹⁶ There are two exceptions to this standard : The coefficients on exposure variables come from a simpler regression where exposure measures are included one at a time and that do not control for beliefs (which are endogenous to exposure) or socioeconomic characteristics beyond age or gender. Coefficients on treatment effects come from regressions that do not control for beliefs (which are endogenous to the treatment).

In Figure 10, the outcome variables are *Support for more free trade and lower trade restrictions* in Panel A and *Support for redistribution* in Panel B (both as defined in Section 2).¹⁷ The coefficients and confidence

¹⁶The specific variable names used in the figures and tables are: *Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness, and GDP, Trade decreases prices of consumer goods, Large Companies won more than small ones, High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs, Sector switch easier if high skill, Trade major reason for rise in inequality, Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts US workers, Possible to compensate losers through policies.* How patriotic a respondent is is captured by the index *Is patriotic*, with components *Proud to be American, Important to be born in the U.S., Own culture superior.* *Support for government intervention* is an index based on the variables *Trust government, Government purposes* and *Government involvement.*

¹⁷For a version of the figure without any controls, see Figure A-1

intervals on variables in each row are from regressions controlling for all individual covariates and beliefs, as just described, with detailed results in Tables A-6 and A-7.

Figure 10 shows that the belief that prices decrease from trade is not significantly related to either support for trade or redistribution. Consistent with this lack of correlation, the experiment priming people to think of their benefits as consumers (precisely, the prices and variety of goods they purchase) does not move their support for trade either. These results can be interpreted in light of the findings in Section 4.1, namely that respondents are divided in their beliefs about whether trade has decreased the prices of goods in the US or goods they buy although they are somewhat more convinced that trade has increased the variety of goods available. These patterns align with the view that, although many believe they gain as consumers – at least in the form of increased variety – these benefits are diffuse and not salient. They are thus not a major predictor of support for more free trade and lower trade restrictions.

4.4 Own job risks are significantly correlated with support for more free trade and lower trade restrictions

I next consider the second channel of personal exposure to trade, namely through the labor market (Box II of Figure 2).

Figure 10 highlights that respondents who feel worse off from trade and who are more negatively exposed to trade through their occupation or sector are significantly less likely to support free trade.¹⁸ The opposite holds for those in comparative advantage sectors. There are no differences in support for redistribution between these groups.

The experimental evidence confirms these patterns: respondents who are primed to think about possible negative impacts of trade on their job (in the *Own job risk* treatment) reduce their support for free trade significantly. These findings are consistent with the idea that trade creates a concentrated set of losers: Although a minority of respondents feel directly impacted in their job (as shown in Section 4.1), these potential losses are salient and loom large.

Thus, to some extent, views on trade are shaped by self-interest when it comes to one’s potential job risks, which are more salient than the diffuse consumption benefits.

5 Efficiency versus Equity Concerns and the Importance of Compensatory Redistribution

Respondents’ broader economic and social concerns can also influence their policy views, as represented on the right side of Figure 2. In this section, I discuss the importance of the perceived efficiency gains (Box III) and the distributional impacts from trade (Box IV). These perceptions are summarized in Figure 11, which shows the shares of respondents who agree with the statements listed. In addition, Appendix Tables A-3 to A-5 contain more detailed information on each channel.

5.1 The role of perceived efficiency effects of trade

Perceptions. The first rows of Figure 11 focus on the perceived efficiency effects of trade. Respondents are generally optimistic about these effects. For instance, 61% of respondents think that international trade

¹⁸They are also more likely to support imposing trade restrictions to help workers (see Table A-6).

increases competition among firms in the US, 69% that it fosters innovation, and 62% that it generates more GDP growth. Two-thirds of respondents believe that both countries are better off when trading. Differences in perceived efficiency effects are not primarily along political lines (see Table A-3).

Effect on policy views. Figure 12 shows that beliefs in efficiency gains from trade are significantly associated with more support for free trade.¹⁹ This relation can be seen in the correlations and the experimental effects: the *Efficiency* treatment significantly improves support for free trade. Thus, the channel represented by Arrow C in the framework of Figure 2 is pertinent. Views on compensatory redistribution are also correlated with views on efficiency gains from trade. Respondents who believe that trade can improve innovation, competitiveness, and GDP are more supportive of redistribution policy to help those who do not benefit from these efficiency gains.

5.2 The role of perceived distributional impacts of trade

Perceptions. The second group of rows of Figure 11 consider beliefs about the distributional impacts of trade, split into impacts through the labor market and impacts on inequality. Overall, respondents know that trade can have adverse distributional consequences through the labor market. Just around half of all respondents believe that trade has, on balance, helped US workers. 79% of people think that trade is the reason for “*unemployment in some sectors and the decline of some industries in the U.S.*” More respondents (63%) believe that high-skilled workers could easily change their work sector if their jobs were destroyed by trade than that low-skilled workers could switch sectors (37%). Trade and automation are tied as the main perceived cause of the loss of manufacturing jobs, more so than immigration.²⁰

Figure 11 also shows the share of respondents who believe that various groups have gained from trade. Around 70% of respondents agree that large corporations have gained from trade, and 61% think that high-income earners have gained. Only one-fifth of respondents think that small businesses have benefitted. Interestingly, these perceptions about the impacts of trade on large versus small firms align with the predictions of Melitz (2003). Respondents are three times less likely to say that middle-class and low-income earners have gained from trade than they are to say so about high-income earners. Consequently, around two-thirds of respondents think that trade is a major reason for the “*rise in inequality*” in the US. Notably, despite being aware of the potential adverse distributional consequences of trade, a majority (62%) of respondents believe that, in principle, trade could make everyone better off because it is possible to “*compensate those who lose from it through appropriate policies.*” Thus, respondents are, on balance, pessimistic about the benefits of trade for the middle class, low-income earners, and small businesses. Nevertheless, they generally agree that high-income earners or large corporations have gained from trade.

Effect on policy views and the importance of compensating losers. Figure 12 shows that the strongest predictor of support for free trade is the belief that, in principle, losers can be compensated.

¹⁹For a version of the figure without any controls, see Figure A-2

²⁰The empirical evidence on the distributional effects of trade is mixed. While the literature is too abundant for an exhaustive review, a few recent papers focus on estimating the overall distributional effects arising from the consumption (“expenditure”) and the labor market (“earnings”) channels. Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) find that the gains from trade on the consumption side seem skewed toward poorer households because a higher share of their consumption baskets is made of traded goods. On the contrary, Borusyak and Jaravel (2021) find that the expenditure channel of trade is close to distributively neutral for the US. The earnings channel yields overall small effects on income inequality because trade generates within-income rather than across-income deciles distributional effects. For Ecuador, Adão et al. (2022) find that earnings inequality is higher than in the absence of trade, with the largest gains from trade occurring at the top of the income distribution.

Other perceptions of the distributional impacts of trade are only weakly correlated with views on trade. Those who believe that trade is a major reason for unemployment and hurts US workers are somewhat less likely to support free trade. As long as respondents believe that adverse consequences from trade on some groups can be dampened by redistributive policy, they are likely to support more free trade, even if they believe that there are adverse distributional consequences. The perceived distributional impacts of trade also substantially matter for support for compensatory redistribution. Respondents who believe that trade hurts low-income and low-skilled workers and that it fosters inequality support redistribution much more.

These correlational findings are confirmed experimentally. The *Distributive effects* treatment tells respondents about possible adverse consequences and redistributive policies that could remedy them. The correlations described above suggest that these two pieces of information should move respondents in opposite directions regarding support for trade (so that the sign of the net effect is theoretically ambiguous) yet push them toward more support for redistribution. This predicted pattern is consistent with the treatment effects of the *Distributive effects* video: It has no significant effect on support for trade and strongly increases support for redistribution policy. The *Economist* treatment also improves support for redistribution, as it similarly emphasizes the distributional consequences of trade and potential solutions for them while showcasing trade’s efficiency benefits. Thus, the effect from perceived distributional impacts of trade to views on trade policy – represented by arrow C in Figure 2 – is important.

The picture that arises is thus that even if people understand that trade can have adverse distributional impacts, they will still support free trade as long as they believe that losers can be compensated. Respondents who hold this belief also support more redistribution policy to buffer some adverse consequences. Hence, people care both about efficiency and distributional effects. However, these beliefs shape different aspects of their policy views, i.e., views on free trade itself versus views on redistribution to deal with the adverse consequences. People believe that efficiency gains are more relevant for trade policy; distributional concerns can be “fixed” by other policies. However, absent the belief that losers can be helped, distributional concerns decrease support for trade. An important lesson here is that policy has to convincingly take action to compensate those who lose in order to maintain support for free trade. This lesson is also consistent with the discussion in [Blanchard and Tirole \(2021\)](#), [Rodrik and Stantcheva \(2021a\)](#), and [Rodrik and Stantcheva \(2021b\)](#), who emphasize that a backlash against openness and free trade can stem from the perception that the losers are left alone and that nothing is done to shelter them from the adverse distributional consequences.

6 The Direct and Indirect Roles of Exposure to Trade

In this section, I study the extent to which exposure to trade plays a role directly versus indirectly. Figure 10 shows that a higher (objective) exposure to trade through the labor market, sector, and occupation is correlated with significantly lower support for free trade. Similarly, those who (subjectively) think that they are worse off from trade also support less free trade.²¹ The framework in Figure 2 shows that self-interest can play a role through two channels. The direct channel is represented by Arrow A in the figure: respondents who are more negatively exposed to trade support less free trade because it is bad for them. The path represents the indirect channel through Arrows B and C: respondents who feel more negatively exposed to trade will also have more negative broader economic and social concerns about trade (e.g., its efficiency

²¹However, neither objective nor perceived exposure affects support for redistribution.

and distributional impacts) and therefore support less free trade. This conceptual discussion leads to the question: what is the relative importance of these two channels?

6.1 Exposure to trade shapes beliefs about broader impacts of trade

I start with the indirect effects of exposure, specifically the ones captured by Arrow B. The results confirm that this channel is relevant and that exposure to trade is significantly correlated with respondents' perceived efficiency and distributional effects of trade.

Perceived efficiency effects. Figure 13 shows that those who think they are made worse off are significantly less likely to say that trade has increased innovation, GDP growth or that both trade partners are made better off thanks to trade. Measures of objective exposure to trade are also correlated with perceived efficiency effects for the US, although the correlation is somewhat weaker than for perceived exposure (see Panel C in Table A-3). Respondents in sectors, occupations, or labor markets threatened by trade are typically less likely to think that trade has led to efficiency gains. Those in comparative advantage occupations are significantly more likely to think so.

Perceived distributional impacts. Respondents who perceive that they have been made worse off by trade and those in sectors or occupations negatively affected by trade are significantly less likely to think that trade has helped US workers overall, that small businesses have gained from trade, and that losers from trade can be appropriately compensated. They are more likely to believe that large corporations have gained from trade and that trade is a major reason for the rise in inequality.

Possible explanations for the link between personal experience and broader perceptions. Why do respondents who feel worse off from trade have more negative perceptions about the overall efficiency and distributional impacts of trade? One potential explanation is that the direction of causality is from broader perceptions to perceived personal impacts. Thus, respondents who believe that trade has been detrimental to efficiency and equity in the US infer that they must have been made worse off, too, regardless of whether that is the case. However, Section 4.2 showed that perceived personal impacts from trade are strongly correlated with objective exposure measures, suggesting that respondents ground their perceptions in the reality of their situation. Another explanation is that respondents extrapolate from their own experience to others. Respondents who feel worse off may infer that others have been made worse off too. These beliefs may be genuine extrapolations or, instead, self-serving. Self-serving beliefs could arise if respondents made worse off by trade feel better if they believe that everyone else and the economy is made worse off from trade too, and this may help them justify their opposition to free trade. It is challenging to design an experiment to disentangle self-interested beliefs from genuine extrapolation, especially since respondents may not be aware of why they hold certain beliefs. Furthermore, these two motives may coexist and matter to different extents for different respondents. Regardless of the exact reason, the finding remains that respondents' own experience is strongly correlated with their broader beliefs.

6.2 Direct and indirect effects from self-interest

Next, I turn to the direct effect of exposure. To assess its importance, I perform a Gelbach decomposition of the effect of own exposure (Gelbach, 2016). In essence, this method compares the coefficient from a

partial regression, in which support for free trade is regressed on a measure of personal exposure and other controls, to the coefficient from a full regression, in which the controls for the “beliefs” about efficiency and distributional effects from Figure 12 are added. The decomposition shows how much of the effect of personal exposure goes through these beliefs versus how much of the effect persists despite controlling for them, which is the unexplained part of the effect of exposure. The latter can be interpreted as the direct self-interest channel (arrow A). Figure 14 shows the results for several measures of exposure: perceived exposure, being in a routine and offshorable occupation, being in a comparative advantage occupation, and being in a tradable sector. The direct self-interest channel (i.e., the unexplained part of the gap) is around 30% for the perceived measure of exposure, around 50-70% for exposure based on occupation, and 84% for exposure based on sector. While it is difficult to compare these magnitudes rigorously, an apparent result is that there is a significant role for the direct self-interest channel and the indirect channel whereby exposure shapes one’s broader economic and social concerns. Furthermore, the decomposition shows that the differences in views between those negatively exposed to trade and those not are mainly explained by the key factors already highlighted above, namely whether they believe it is possible to compensate losers and believe in the efficiency effects of trade.

A note on the special role of education. College-educated respondents systematically perceive higher efficiency gains from trade (see Panel A in Table A-3) and less adverse distributional effects from trade (see Table A-5). They also support free trade and redistribution significantly more (see Figure 10). Higher support for trade among the college-educated is in line with the factor endowment model (and self-interest) if education is taken as a proxy for human capital. However, higher support for redistribution among the college-educated, even conditional on income, cannot easily be explained with narrow self-interest. Instead, it may be that education shapes views about the economy, as suggested by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006). Note also that, conditional on education, income does not have a significant effect on perceived efficiency or distributional effects or support for free trade or redistribution.

7 Conclusion

The new survey evidence in this paper highlights three key results. First, respondents perceive gains from trade as consumers to be vague and unclear but perceive potential losses as workers to be concentrated and salient. Actual and perceived exposure to trade through the labor market is significantly associated with policy views. When respondents are experimentally prompted to think about their benefits from trade as consumers, there is no change in their support for free trade. On the contrary, respondents who are prompted to think about the impacts of trade on their job reduce their support for free trade. In a nutshell, consumer gains matter less than job impacts for views on trade.

Second, people’s policy views on trade do not only reflect self-interest. Respondents also care about trade’s distributional and efficiency impacts on others and the US economy. The belief that trade leads to efficiency gains is correlated with stronger support for free trade. The belief that trade has adverse distributional impacts is important, too but is modulated by the belief that losers can be compensated with appropriate policies. Respondents who think it is possible to have compensatory transfers support more free trade, even if they believe that it has negative distributional consequences. They also support more compensatory redistribution to help those who have been hurt. These links are confirmed experimentally by

showing respondents' pedagogical videos on the efficiency or distributional impacts of trade.

Third, respondents' experience, as measured by their exposure to trade through their sector, occupation, and local labor market, shapes their policy views directly (through self-interest) and indirectly by influencing their understanding and reasoning about the broader efficiency and distributional impacts of trade. Respondents who are or feel more negatively affected by trade appear to extrapolate from their experience and hold more negative beliefs about the effects of trade on other groups (e.g., the middle class or small businesses), inequality, prices, innovation, and competitiveness. A Gelbach decomposition shows that both the direct and indirect channels matter substantially.

Trade policy has two facets that go hand in hand: trade barriers (or lack thereof) and compensatory redistribution. The results reveal that people support more open trade because they believe there are efficiency gains from it and that appropriate policies can compensate losers. In particular, respondents who think trade has adverse distributional consequences do not necessarily support trade restrictions, but they support compensatory redistribution to help losers from trade. Conversely, respondents who think that losers from trade cannot be well-compensated support more trade barriers. These findings highlight the importance of compensating transfers and ensuring people understand them. Absent such compensation and an understanding of it, the adverse distributional consequences of trade—which are, to some extent, unavoidable—can generate support for trade restrictions and a backlash against free trade.

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TABLE 1: SAMPLE AND US POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

	US Population	Survey 1	US Population in the Labor Force	Survey 2
Male	.48	.5	.52	.49
18-29 years old	.22	.23	.21	.26
30-39 years old	.21	.21	.24	.22
40-49 years old	.2	.2	.23	.2
50-59 years old	.19	.18	.2	.21
60-69 years old	.18	.18	.12	.11
\$0-\$19,999	.12	.15	.07	.16
\$20,000-\$39,999	.15	.19	.14	.19
\$40,000-\$69,999	.21	.23	.21	.22
\$70,000-\$109,999	.21	.19	.23	.18
\$110,000+	.31	.25	.35	.25
Four-year college degree	.21	.28	.24	.23
High-school graduate or less	.39	.19	.34	.23
Employed	.71	.68	.96	.9
Unemployed	.02	.05	.03	.09
Married	.56	.56	.58	.56
White	.59	.78	.6	.69
Black/African-American	.11	.06	.11	.11
Hispanic/Latino	.2	.06	.2	.08
Asian/Asian-American	.07	.06	.06	.04
Democrat	.30	.33	.30	.45
Republican	.26	.34	.26	.29
Independent and other	.44	.32	.44	.26
Voted for Clinton at the 2016 presidential election	.48	.39	.48	.46
Voted for Trump at the 2016 presidential election	.46	.45	.46	.45
Sample size		1771		2148

Notes. The table displays statistics for the overall U.S. population, as compared to the samples of respondents for Surveys 1 and 2. Survey 1 was aimed to be nationally representative. Survey 2 was targeted towards respondents in the labor force. The third column shows the statistics only for the population in the labor force, in order to be comparable with Survey 2. For this column, the statistics related to political affiliation and vote during the 2016 election are computed on the overall U.S. population, as this data is not available for the subsample of U.S. citizens in the labor force. See Online Appendix C.3 for details on how the summary statistics on the U.S. population are constructed using IPUMS-CPS-ASEC data for March 2019.

FIGURE 5: DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS TREATMENT

There are often both **winners** and **losers** from trade.



When there is more trade, all **households who consume** the imported goods can gain from it. The benefits from increased trade can be perceived by a **large group**, throughout the country.



The losers from trade are generally a **smaller group**, often concentrated in one place or industry. However, their losses can be very large, and therefore more **visible**.



Notes. The figure shows screenshots from the information treatment on the distributive effects of trade. Link to the videos: <https://socialeconomicslab.org/understanding-of-trade-videos>.

FIGURE 6: EFFICIENCY EFFECTS TREATMENT

When there is more trade between the two countries, companies in the car sector from country A will be able to **export more** of the goods and services they produce and increase their profits.



Firms in the clothing sectors will not be able to export much because they cannot produce as cheaply as the firms in country B. In these sectors, companies may **close down** because of the new foreign competition.



More trade can also increase **learning** between firms and people in countries A and B as well as the diffusion of **knowledge and technology**. This can make all firms and people more productive.




In a larger market, domestic industries have to be more efficient to remain competitive.



Notes. The figure shows screenshots from the information treatment on the efficiency effects of trade. Link to the videos: <https://socialeconomicslab.org/understanding-of-trade-videos>.


FIGURE 7: ECONOMIST (= EFFICIENCY + DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS) TREATMENT




Notes. The figure shows screenshots from the information treatment on the distributive and efficiency effects of trade (the “Economist” treatment). Link to the videos: <https://socialeconomicslab.org/understanding-of-trade-videos>.

FIGURE 8: KNOWLEDGE ABOUT TRADE POLICY


(A) FROM WHICH COUNTRY DOES THE U.S. IMPORT THE MOST?



(B) FROM WHICH COUNTRY DOES THE U.S. EXPORT THE MOST?




(C) SHARE OF CORRECT ANSWERS TO TRADE-RELATED KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONS



Notes. Panels A and B show, respectively, the distribution of responses to the question: “From which country does the U.S. import the most?” and “To which country does the U.S. export the most?” Correct answers are in green. Panel C displays the share of respondents who say they know what a quota and import tariff are (first two rows) and who answered correctly to trade knowledge questions (last three rows), with 90% confidence intervals.


FIGURE 9: PERSONAL EXPOSURE TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE




Notes. Panel A depicts the share of respondents who agree with each of the statements, together with 90% confidence intervals. Panel B shows the correlation between the objective measures of exposure and respondents' perceived exposure to international trade, controlling for gender and age, with 90% confidence intervals. All exposure variables are defined in Section 4 and Appendix G (paragraph "Exposure to Trade").

FIGURE 10: PERCEIVED IMPACTS AS CONSUMERS VERSUS WORKERS

(A) SUPPORT FOR MORE FREE TRADE AND LOWER TRADE RESTRICTIONS



(B) SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION



Notes. The figure reports regression coefficients where the outcome variables are “Support for more free trade and lower trade restrictions” (in Panel A) and “Support for Redistribution” (in Panel B). The variables depicted are grouped by topic, related to either “Consumption gains” or “Job impacts.” All variables are detailed in Appendix G. Dots of different colors refer to different regression specifications. Orange dots come from regressions which control for the full set of individual covariates (age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, race, political leaning), treatment indicators, and all beliefs about trade, as described in Section 4. Green dots show the effects of the priming treatments, controlling for the full set of individual covariates. Finally, brown dots show coefficients on perceived and objective exposure measures (included one at a time). For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the measures “Comparative advantage occupation” and “Routine x Offshorable occupation” and at the sector level for the measure “Tradable sector.” 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Exhaustive results from these various regressions are in Tables A-6 and A-7.


FIGURE 11: PERCEIVED EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF TRADE AND TRADE POLICY




Notes. The bars show the share of respondents who agree with the statements listed and 90% confidence intervals.

FIGURE 12: BROADER EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS

(A) SUPPORT FOR MORE FREE TRADE AND LOWER TRADE RESTRICTIONS




(B) SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION



Notes. The figure reports regression coefficients where the outcome variables are “Support for more free trade and lower trade restrictions” (in Panel A) and “Support for Redistribution” (in Panel B). All variables are detailed in Appendix G and are grouped by topic. Dots of different colors refer to different regression specifications. The blue and red dots show the coefficients on variables that measures the perceived efficiency or distributional effects of trade, controlling for the full set of individual covariates (age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, race, political leaning), treatment indicators, and beliefs about trade, as described in Section 4. Green dots show the effects of the informational treatments, controlling for the full set of individual covariates. 95% confidence intervals are depicted. Exhaustive results are in Tables A-6 and A-7.


FIGURE 13: EXPOSURE TO TRADE, SELF-INTEREST, AND BELIEFS ABOUT TRADE




Notes. The figure shows the share of respondents who agree with the statements listed, along with 90% confidence intervals. Respondents are split into two groups, depending on whether they think they have been made worse-off (darker colors) or better-off (lighter colors) by trade. Compared to Figure 10, some statements, namely “The main cause for loss of manufacturing jobs is...” “immigration”, “trade”, and “automation”, as well as “Low-”, “Medium-” and “High-” “income households gained from trade” are missing because they were not asked to respondents in the personalized branch. We can therefore not report these views based on whether respondents believe they are made better or worse off from trade.

FIGURE 14: DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE ON SUPPORT FOR MORE FREE TRADE AND LOWER TRADE RESTRICTIONS (GELBACH DECOMPOSITION)


(A) THOSE WHO PERCEIVE THEY ARE WORSE OFF FROM TRADE SUPPORT LESS FREE TRADE BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE...




(B) THOSE WHO ARE IN ROUTINE & OFFSHORABLE OCCUPATIONS SUPPORT LESS FREE TRADE BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE...



(C) THOSE WHO ARE IN TRADABLE SECTORS SUPPORT LESS FREE TRADE BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE...



(D) THOSE WHO ARE IN COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OCCUPATIONS SUPPORT MORE FREE TRADE BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE...



Notes. These figures show the results from a Gelbach decomposition. The bars represent how much of the gap in support for free trade between individuals that are negatively exposed to trade and those that are not can be explained by differences in beliefs related to trade. Each panel considers a different measure of exposure. For more details on the methodology used for the decomposition, see Section 6 and Gelbach (2016). The black bars represent the unexplained variation in views between those negatively exposed to trade and those who are not. It can be interpreted as the direct effect of exposure, i.e., self-interest, that is not mediated through the beliefs.

ONLINE APPENDIX for

“Understanding of Trade” by Stefanie Stantcheva

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A Additional Tables and Figures

TABLE A-1: KNOWLEDGE ABOUT TRADE AND TRADE POLICY

	US imports most from China (1)	US exports most to Canada (2)	Knows what quota is (3)	Knows what an import tariff is (4)	Believe prices abroad ↑ if export tax ↑ (5)	Believe US prices ↑ if import tariff ↑ (6)	Even if US can produce goods at lower cost, may still make sense to import (7)
Panel A: Personal characteristics							
Female	0.11*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.02)
Age 30-49	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)
Age 50-69	0.09*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)
College	-0.04 (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.02)
Republican	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)
Middle-income	0.07** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
High-income	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)
Panel B: Exposure							
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	0.11** (0.05)	-0.06* (0.04)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.05)
Routine occupation	0.07*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.18*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)
Routine & offshorable occupation	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.04)
Local labor market	0.06* (0.03)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Tradable sector	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.03)
Comparative advantage occupation	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics							
Control mean	0.71	0.19	0.48	0.80	0.65	0.66	0.71
Democrat control mean	0.72	0.20	0.48	0.84	0.66	0.68	0.74
Observations (Panel A)	1761	1761	1564	1765	1763	1762	1760
Observations (Panel B - Perceived Exposure)	389	389	189	390	390	390	390
Observations (Panel B - Exposure by Occupation)	1707	1707	1515	1711	1709	1708	1706

Notes. All variables are detailed in Appendix G. The sample is respondents from Survey 1 (since knowledge-related questions were asked in Survey 1 only). The regression in Panel A controls for the full set of individual covariates (age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, race, political leaning), and treatment indicators. In Panel B, each row shows the estimates from a separate regression which controls for treatment indicators, age, and gender. For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel C provides descriptive statistics and sample sizes for the different panels. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-2: PERSONAL IMPACTS FROM TRADE

	Trade ↓ prices of goods you buy (1)	Trade ↑ varieties of goods you buy (2)	Easy x you to find a job in a different sector (3)	Your wage has not grown as fast due to competition (4)	Trade ↑ unemployment in your sector (5)	Trade threat x future of your sector (6)	Your job likely to be offshored, outsourced or automated (7)	Automation had a negative impact on your job (8)	Trade had a negative impact on your job (9)	Immigration had a negative impact on your job (10)	You are worse off from trade (11)
Panel A: Personal characteristics											
Female	-0.26*** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.10* (0.06)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.08*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.16*** (0.05)
Age 30-49	-0.22*** (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.08)	0.11** (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.07 (0.08)
Age 50-69	-0.29*** (0.08)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.11*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.13 (0.08)
College	0.08 (0.05)	0.11*** (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.12** (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.12** (0.05)
Republican	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.14** (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	-0.05 (0.06)
Middle-income	0.15** (0.07)	0.10** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.11 (0.07)
High-income	0.20*** (0.07)	0.04 (0.05)	0.01 (0.07)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.07)	0.07 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.00 (0.07)
Panel B: Exposure											
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	-0.22*** (0.05)		-0.13** (0.05)		0.10** (0.05)						
Routine occupation	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.01)	0.06* (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.03* (0.01)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)	0.07*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)
Local labor market	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.06)
Tradable sector	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.10)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.04 (0.08)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.12*** (0.04)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.04** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics											
Control mean	0.46	0.66	0.57	0.46	0.60	0.29	0.19	0.15	0.25	0.32	0.39
Democrat control mean	0.45	0.70	0.52	0.55	0.63	0.32	0.23	0.13	0.20	0.27	0.42
Observations (Panels A and B)	390	720	390	708	390	708	707	2127	2120	2092	390
Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure)	390	0	390	0	390	0	0	0	0	0	
Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation)	380	718	380	704	380	704	703	2119	2113	2085	380

Notes. All variables are detailed in Appendix G. Variables in columns (1), (3), (5) and (11) refer to questions asked in Survey 1; the other columns refer to questions asked in Survey 2. Regressions in Panel A control for the full set of individual covariates (age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, race, political leaning), and treatment branch indicators. In Panel B, each row shows the estimates from a separate regression which controls for treatment indicators, age, and gender. For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel C provides descriptive statistics and sample sizes for the different panels. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-3: PERCEIVED EFFICIENCY EFFECTS FROM TRADE

	Trade ↑ competition in the U.S. (1)	Trade ↑ innovation in the U.S. (2)	Trade ↑ GDP growth of the U.S. (3)	If U.S. exports ↑ value of \$ ↑ (4)	Both countries better off from trade (5)	Believes in efficiency gains (6)
Panel A: Personal characteristics						
Female	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.36*** (0.05)
Age 30-49	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.17** (0.07)
Age 50-69	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.28*** (0.07)
College	0.10*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.05)
Republican	0.01 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.04 (0.06)
Middle-income	0.08*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.12** (0.06)
High-income	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.08 (0.06)
Panel B: Treatment effects						
Efficiency Effects	0.06 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.08)
Distributive Effects	0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.08)
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.06)
Panel C: Exposure						
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	-0.24*** (0.05)	-0.24*** (0.05)	-0.32*** (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.31*** (0.05)	-0.74*** (0.10)
Routine occupation	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.29*** (0.07)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.18** (0.06)
Local labor market	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.09 (0.07)
Tradable sector	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.16** (0.06)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics						
Control mean	0.61	0.69	0.62	0.53	0.68	-0.00
Democrat control mean	0.60	0.66	0.61	0.52	0.72	-0.03
Observations (Panels A and B)	1762	1763	1763	1763	1761	1765
Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure)	390	390	390	390	390	390
Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation)	1708	1709	1709	1709	1707	1711

Notes. All variables are detailed in Appendix G and refer to questions asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and B control for the full set of individual covariates (age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, race, political leaning) and treatment branch indicators. In Panel C, each row shows the estimates from a separate regression which controls for treatment indicators, age, and gender. For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel D provides descriptive statistics and sample sizes for the different panels. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-4: PERCEIVED DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS: DO THESE GROUPS GAIN FROM TRADE?

	Large Corporations (1)	Small Businesses (2)	High Incomes (3)	Middle Incomes (4)	Low Incomes (5)
Panel A: Personal characteristics					
Female	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)		
Age 30-49	0.12*** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)		
Age 50-69	0.10** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.03)		
College	0.08*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)		
Republican	-0.11*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05** (0.03)		
Middle-income	-0.07** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)		
High-income	-0.06* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)		
Panel B: Treatment effects					
Efficiency Effects	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)		
Distributive Effects	0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)		
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)		
Panel C: Exposure					
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.04)			
Routine occupation	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.13*** (0.02)
Local labor market	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Tradable sector	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.00 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics					
Control mean	0.67	0.19	0.61	0.23	0.20
Democrats control mean	0.72	0.17	0.64	0.21	0.17
Observations (Panel A)	1762	1762	1372	1372	1372
Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure)	390	390			
Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation)	1708	1708	1328	1328	1328

Notes. The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix G and refer to questions asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and B control for the full set of individual covariates (age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, race, political leaning) and treatment branch indicators. In Panel C, each row shows the estimates from a separate regression which controls for treatment indicators, age, and gender. For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel D provides descriptive statistics and sample sizes for the different panels. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-5: PERCEIVED DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS

	It's easy to change sector x low-skilled workers (1)	It's easy to change sector x high-skilled workers (2)	Trade is a major reason x unemployment and & decline of industries (3)	Automation (4)	Major reason x job loss in manufacturing is: Trade (5)	Immigration (6)	Overall trade helped U.S. workers (7)	Trade is a major reason for rise in inequality (8)	Trade ↓ prices of goods sold in the U.S. (9)	More trade can make all better off (10)	Believes Trade has adverse distributional impacts (11)
Panel A: Personal characteristics											
Female	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.06)
Age 30-49	0.01 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.17** (0.08)
Age 50-69	-0.10*** (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	0.33*** (0.08)
College	0.02 (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.12** (0.06)
Republican	0.16*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03** (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.32*** (0.07)
Middle-income	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.08** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.07)
High-income	0.01 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.15** (0.07)
Panel B: Treatment effects											
Efficiency Effects	-0.01 (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)				-0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.08)
Distributive Effects	-0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)				-0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.08)
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)				0.05 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.06)
Panel C: Exposure											
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)							-0.35*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)		-0.21*** (0.05)	0.62*** (0.07)
Routine occupation	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.03)	0.14 (0.08)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.02)	0.13** (0.05)
Local labor market	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.10 (0.09)
Tradable sector	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	0.10 (0.15)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.03 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics											
Control mean	0.37	0.63	0.79	0.42	0.47	0.11	0.50	0.66	0.57	0.62	0.00
Democrat control mean	0.32	0.60	0.79	0.47	0.44	0.09	0.49	0.72	0.58	0.71	0.18
Observations (Panels A and B)	1373	1372	1372	2148	2148	2148	1373	1372	1372	1369	1374
Observations (Panel C - Perceived Exposure)	0	0	0	0	0	0	390	390	0	390	390
Observations (Panel C - Exposure by Occupation)	1329	1328	1328	2140	2140	2140	1329	1328	1328	1325	1330

Notes. The dependent variables are detailed in Appendix G and refer to questions asked in Survey 1, except for variables in columns (4)-(6), which refer to Survey 2. Regressions in Panels A and B control for the full set of individual covariates (age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, race, political leaning) and treatment branch indicators. In Panel C, each row shows the estimates from a separate regression which controls for treatment indicators, age, and gender. For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel D provides descriptive statistics and sample sizes for the different panels. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-6: POLICY VIEWS ON FREE TRADE

	General trade restrictions		Targeted trade restrictions			
	Support for free trade (1)	Restrict imports best way to help U.S. workers (2)	The U.S. should restrict food imports to ensure food security (3)	The U.S. should protect their infant industries (4)	The U.S. should protect minerals and metals, petroleum, chemicals or machinery sectors (5)	The U.S. should protect from trade food and cars (6)
Panel A: Personal characteristics						
Female	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Age 30-49	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)
College	0.15*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)
Republican	-0.15*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Middle-income	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
High-income	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Panel B: Beliefs						
Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness and GDP	0.08*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)
Trade decreases prices of consumer goods	0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)
Large Companies won more than small ones	0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs	0.03 (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Sector switch easier if high skill	0.03 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
Trade major reason for rise in inequality	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts US workers	-0.03** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)
Possible to compensate losers through policies	0.12*** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Supports government intervention	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Is patriotic	0.02 (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Panel C: Treatment effects						
Efficiency Effects	0.13*** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.11*** (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)
Distributive Effects	0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Own Job Risks	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)		
Own Consumption	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)		
Panel D: Exposure						
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	-0.22*** (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)
Routine occupation	-0.14*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.09** (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
Local labor market	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Tradable sector	-0.07** (0.03)	0.02* (0.01)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.07** (0.03)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)
Panel E: Descriptive statistics						
Control mean	0.63	0.36	0.39	0.54	0.49	0.78
Democrat control mean	0.72	0.28	0.33	0.52	0.46	0.77
Observations (Panels A and C)	3911	3912	3905	3908	1765	1674
Observations (Panel B)	1368	1368	1366	1368	1368	1303
Observations (Panel D - Perceived Exposure)	390	390	390	389	390	368
Observations (Panel D - Exposure by Occupation)	3849	3850	3843	3846	1711	1622

Notes. All variables are detailed in Appendix G. Variables in columns (1)-(6) refer to questions asked in both surveys. Variables in columns (7)-(8) refer to questions asked in Survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and C include controls for the full set of individual covariates (age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, race, political leaning) and treatment indicators. Regressions in panel B also include controls for all beliefs (depicted in the panel and as explained in Section ??) and only include respondents from survey 1 (in which detailed beliefs about trade were elicited). Panel C shows the coefficients on treatment indicators from regressions which control for the full set of individual covariates. In Panel D, each row shows the estimates from a separate regression which controls for treatment indicators, age, and gender. For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel E provides descriptive statistics and sample sizes for all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-7: POLICY VIEWS ON REDISTRIBUTION

	General redistribution					Compensatory redistribution		
	Support for redistribution index	more transfers to those out of work	better schools for low income children	The government should provide subsidies to pay health insurance	wage subsidies to working poor	income support for workers displaced by international trade	Subsidize production best way to help U.S. workers	Transfers & retraining best way to help U.S. workers
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Personal characteristics								
Female	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Age 30-49	0.04 (0.04)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Age 50-69	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
College	0.17*** (0.04)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.02)
Republican	-0.56*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.24*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.12*** (0.02)
Middle-income	-0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
High-income	-0.06 (0.04)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)
Panel B: Beliefs								
Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness and GDP	0.09*** (0.03)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Trade decreases prices of consumer goods	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Large Companies won more than small ones	0.08 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)
High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs	0.13** (0.06)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)
Sector switch easier if high skill	0.17*** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Trade major reason for rise in inequality	0.20*** (0.06)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)
Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts US workers	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Possible to compensate losers through policies	0.27*** (0.05)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Is patriotic	-0.20*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Supports government intervention	0.26*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Panel C: Treatment effects								
Efficiency Effects	0.07 (0.08)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)
Distributive Effects	0.30*** (0.08)	0.07* (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)
Own Job Risks	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.04* (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)
Own Consumption	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.03)
Panel D: Exposure								
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	-0.05 (0.10)	0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)
Routine occupation	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Local labor market	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Tradable sector	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.08*** (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)
Panel E: Descriptive statistics								
Control mean	0.01	0.29	0.47	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.12	0.53
Democrat control mean	0.31	0.38	0.55	0.44	0.51	0.46	0.14	0.57
Observations (Panels A and C)	3913	3905	3903	3902	3905	3902	3912	3912
Observations (Panel B)	1368	1367	1365	1367	1367	1366	1368	1368
Observations (Panel D - Perceived Exposure)	390	390	390	388	390	389	390	390
Observations (Panel D - Exposure by Occupation)	3851	3843	3841	3840	3843	3840	3850	3850


Notes. All variables are detailed in Appendix G and were asked in both surveys. Regressions in Panels A and C include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for the treatments in both surveys. Regressions in Panels A and C include controls for the full set of individual covariates (age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, race, political leaning) and treatment indicators. Regressions in panel B also include controls for all beliefs (depicted in the panel and as explained in Section ??) and only include respondents from survey 1 (in which detailed beliefs about trade were elicited). Panel C shows the coefficients on treatment indicators from regressions which control for the full set of individual covariates. In Panel D, each row shows the estimates from a separate regression which controls for treatment indicators, age, and gender. For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel E provides descriptive statistics and sample sizes for all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-8: SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT

Government should be responsible for:								
	Reducing income differences (1)	Reducing wealth transmission (2)	Ensuring health care (3)	Reducing opportunity differences (4)	Regulating trade (5)	Stabilizing financial system (6)	Stabilizing dollar (7)	Providing minimum living (8)
Panel A: Personal characteristics								
Female	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.03)	0.04* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)
Age 30-49	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Age 50-69	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.07** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.04)
College	0.02 (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)
Republican	-0.31*** (0.03)	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.34*** (0.03)	-0.31*** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.03)	-0.32*** (0.03)
Middle-income	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
High-income	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Panel B: Beliefs								
Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness and GDP	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Trade decreases prices of consumer goods	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Large Companies won more than small ones	0.06* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)
Sector switch easier if high skill	-0.04* (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Trade major reason for rise in inequality	0.11*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)
Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts US workers	0.03** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Possible to compensate losers through policies	0.07*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
Supports government intervention	0.15*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.01)
Is patriotic	-0.03** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Panel C: Treatment effects								
Efficiency Effects	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Distributive Effects	0.00 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)
Panel D: Exposure								
Perceived Exposure (Being worse off from trade)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)
Routine occupation	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.05* (0.03)
Routine & offshorable occupation	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.02)
Local labor market	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)
Tradable sector	0.06* (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.06)
Comparative advantage occupation	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Panel E: Descriptive statistics								
Control mean	0.44	0.31	0.66	0.49	0.61	0.69	0.75	0.56
Democrat control mean	0.62	0.38	0.84	0.66	0.69	0.77	0.80	0.73
Observations (Panels A and C)	1761	1760	1761	1761	1760	1761	1760	1760
Observations (Panel B)	1367	1366	1367	1367	1366	1367	1367	1366
Observations (Panel D - Perceived Exposure)	390	390	390	390	390	390	389	390
Observations (Panel D - Exposure by Occupation)	1707	1706	1707	1707	1706	1707	1706	1706

Notes. All variables are detailed in Appendix G and were asked in survey 1 only. Regressions in Panels A and C include controls for gender, age, ethnicity, income class, having children, education, political affiliation and employment status, as well as indicator variables for the treatments in both surveys. Regressions in Panels A and C include controls for the full set of individual covariates (age, gender, education, number of children, income, employment status, race, political leaning) and treatment indicators. Regressions in panel B also include controls for all beliefs (depicted in the panel and as explained in Section ??) and only include respondents from survey 1 (in which detailed beliefs about trade were elicited). Panel C shows the coefficients on treatment indicators from regressions which control for the full set of individual covariates. In Panel D, each row shows the estimates from a separate regression which controls for treatment indicators, age, and gender. For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the regressions including the measures: *Routine occupation*, *Routine x Offshorable occupation* and *Comparative advantage occupation*; at the sector level for the measure *Tradable sector*; and at the Commuting Zone level for the measure *Local labor market*. Panel E provides descriptive statistics and sample sizes for all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

FIGURE A-1: PERCEIVED IMPACTS AS CONSUMERS VERSUS WORKERS WITHOUT CONTROLS





Notes. The figure reports regression coefficients where the outcome variables are “Support for more free trade and lower trade restrictions” (in Panel A) and “Support for Redistribution” (in Panel B). The variables depicted are grouped by topic, related to either “Consumption gains” or “Job impacts.” All variables are detailed in Appendix G. Coefficients associated to “Treatment: Own Job Risks”, “High-income”, “College” and “Treatment: Own Consumption” come from a single regression where also a control accounting for the different survey waves is included. All other coefficients come from regressions having as control only the relevant variable and one accounting for the different survey waves. Note also that brown dots show coefficients on perceived and objective exposure measures. For these regressions only, standard errors are clustered at the occupation level for the measures “Comparative advantage occupation” and “Routine x Offshorable occupation” and at the sector level for the measure “Tradable sector.” 95% confidence intervals are depicted.

FIGURE A-2: BROADER EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS WITHOUT CONTROLS

(A) SUPPORT FOR MORE FREE TRADE AND LOWER TRADE RESTRICTIONS

(B) SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION

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Notes. The figure reports regression coefficients where the outcome variables are “Support for more free trade and lower trade restrictions” (in Panel A) and “Support for Redistribution” (in Panel B). All variables are detailed in Appendix G. Coefficients associated to “Efficiency effects treatment”, “Distributional treatment”, “Economist (=Efficiency + Distributive)” and “Treatment: Own Consumption” come from a single regression where also a control accounting for the different survey waves is included. All other coefficients come from a single regression (that also has controls for treatments and one accounting for the different survey waves). 95% confidence intervals are depicted.

B People’s First-Order Concerns and Narratives: Text Analysis of the Open-Ended Survey Questions

The answers to the open-ended questions can help shed light on people’s first-order concerns and narratives without them being prompted to think about specific answer options (Ferrario and Stantcheva, 2022). This section provides the results from the topic analysis applied to the responses of several of the survey’s open-ended questions (listed at the start of the paragraphs below). Figure A-6 shows word clouds to assess the frequency of different terms in the answers. More precisely, Panel A reports frequencies for the first question detailed below, Panel B asks about what a “good” trade policy would be and do, and Panel C asks about the shortcomings of current U.S. trade policy.

“When you think about trade policy and whether the U.S. should put some restrictions on trade with other countries, such as tariffs, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?”

There are six different topics that arise from the text analysis. The keywords for each topic are listed below Figure A-3. Words are defined by their “stems” i.e., words with the same root, such as “policy” and “policies” or “be” and “was” are treated identically. The topics are detailed below with some example answers.

1. Prices:

“The effect on prices of goods and services I use.”

“The consumer has to pay for these through price hikes.”

“Concerns that some items will no longer be available or be priced too high for some Americans to afford.”

2. Fair Trade & International Relations:

“I think it should be fair and equal going in both directions, our products to other countries and other country’s products to us.”

“Retaliation from countries who are used to having no restrictions or tariffs.”

“I believe in equitable reciprocity as the guideline.”

3. Protectionism:

“I would like to see more products made in America.”

“I think we should support American made products and less reliant on foreign.”

“Generally believe in free trade but, at times such as with China, tariffs are necessary.”

4. Efficiency:

“Other countries shouldn’t be able to dump cheaply made goods that make it impossible for domestic companies to compete.”

“Allow for US products being competitive on the market.”

“Of course we lose in stock market and other markets.”

“The economy will be hurt and we will end up in a recession.”

5. Labor:

“Tariffs should be put only on goods where it is economically responsible to create the jobs and economy in the US.”

“How it affects employment and current wages. Also, what price restrictions will be placed upon us.”

“I worked in manufacturing in the early 2000’s and saw many jobs disappear overseas - tariffs are very important to even the playing field.”

6. Distributive:

“How it will effect the businesses here.”

“I don’t want anybody to have to suffer like the farmers or any others with paying extra taxes for food and goods.”

“This is a complex issue that I do not know very much about, but from what I’ve read and talked to others about, I’m worried that adding or raising tariffs will just past the cost onto the already struggling middle and lower classes in America. Inflation increases at a rate well above pay and we are not able to keep up.”

“No consideration. Tariffs cause a lot of economic problems for lower classes and farmers.”

7. Does Not Know:

“I don’t know much about trade policy, so I have no opinion at the moment.”


“I’m not sure.”

“I am not knowledgeable to make an informed statement.”

Figure A-3 shows the topic distribution that appears in the answers to this question, segmented by respondents’ political leaning (Republican versus Democratic). *Prices* and *Distributive* concerns are more widespread among Democrats, while *Protectionism* and *Fair Trade & International Relations* concerns are more prevalent among Republicans. Worries about *Efficiency* and *Labor* (i.e., jobs and employment) are equally represented in both political groups, as are answers that express a lack of knowledge about the topic.

FIGURE A-3: TOPIC ANALYSIS OF OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS

WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT TRADE POLICY AND WHETHER THE U.S. SHOULD PUT SOME RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, SUCH AS TARIFFS, WHAT ARE THE MAIN CONSIDERATIONS THAT COME TO YOUR MIND?



Keywords

<u>Price:</u>	<i>cost, price, afford, pay & more, inflationa, inflat, expens, (impact, suffer, affect, hurt, effect, hit, loos, lost, pay) & (consum, citizen, peopl, american, household);</i>
<u>Fair Trade & Int. Relations:</u>	<i>fair, unfair, imbal, balanc, justic, equal, even & (share, valu), reciproc, cooper, mutual & (benefit, benefici), equit, take & advantag play & field, china, retali, retaliatori, (other, foreign, those, relat, relationship, certain) & countri, mexico, intern & trade, negoti, rene-goti, advantag & us, trade & war, isol, isolation, isolationist, world & economi, pay & back, cheat;</i>
<u>Protectionism:</u>	<i>made & (usa, america, us), (buy, protect, support) & (usa, america, american, local), (restrict, tariff) & (fine, good, need, use, reason, some, necessari);</i>
<u>Efficiency:</u>	<i>effici, compet, competit, innov, technolog, ineffici, growth, gdp, tax, economi, more & varieti, stock & market;</i>
<u>Labor:</u>	<i>labor, job, unemploy, salari, union, wage, outsourc, worker, employe, employ, retrain;</i>
<u>Distributive:</u>	<i>(impact, suffer, affect, hurt, effect, hit, loos, lost, difficult, difficulti, problem, horribl) & (farmer, busi, busine, busin, firm, poor, poorer, middleclass, middl & class, industri, sector), winner, loos, corpor, workingclass, (expens, under) & (busi, busin, busine), lower & class, better & compani;</i>
<u>Does Not Know:</u>	<i>idk, unsur, know, know & enough, (dont, do & not, not) & (care, know, understand, knowledg, na, (not) & (sure, knowledg, opinion), no & (opinion, idea, comment), noth & say.</i>

Notes. The question is verbatim in the panel's title. Bars represent the share of respondents in each group using one or more of the keywords attributed to each topic, with associated 90% confidence intervals. The keywords for each topic are listed below the figure. Above each pair of bars, I also display the coefficient and standard error of an indicator variable for political affiliation in a regression that has as outcome a topic indicator (equal to 1 if the topic is mentioned), controlling also for the full set of individual covariates (gender, age, ethnicity, income, education, having children, political leaning) and length of the answer.

“What would be the effects on the U.S. economy if barriers to trade, such as tariffs, were increased?”

Responses can be classified based on the domain they mention (e.g., *Efficiency* or *Distributive* concerns, as described above) and the direction of the effect perceived (positive vs. negative). There are seven different topics that arise from the text analysis that are detailed below with some example answers.

1. Negative Price:

“More expensive goods for the citizens of the US.”

“Prices of day to day products will rise.”

“Increased prices on imported goods that we need.”

2. Negative Efficiency:

“Everything would become more costly, it would be much harder to get outside products that we do not/cannot produce. It would wound our economy because we are not self sufficient and its not efficient to try to be. This would also make all of our products cost more so other countries would be less inclined to buy from us.”

“The economy would suffer negatively.”

“It would devastate the economy in the short term.”

“The economy would go downhill, because without foreign competition, local prices will increase.”

“Eventually a fair system needs to be worked out so US businesses can fairly compete at home and abroad.”

3. Negative Distributive:

“It would cause a lot of small businesses that rely on exporting to fail. Sawmill rely on exporting lumber.”

“The buying power of the population would decrease because the cost of goods would increase. The problem is that the effects of any tariffs could never be felt equally across the different areas of the population. In the current case, the farmers would be most affected since they would not be able to provide for their families. The question I would have, would be can they be able to withstand the pressure of the outstanding bills.”

“Consumer goods will be more expensive, small businesses like mine will go bankrupt.”

4. Negative Labor:

“We would lose jobs.”

“Low wage and unemployment.”

“Companies would go out of business because their product isn’t being purchased which leads to layoffs/bankruptcies and therefore higher unemployment and eventually a recession.”

5. Positive Reallocation:

“It might increase opportunities for businesses in our own country.”

“I think it would be better for our economy. That way maybe it would encourage businesses not to take jobs & money to other countries.”

“If we started to manufacture the products here that we are importing from elsewhere, it would strengthen our economy and create jobs.”

6. Positive Levelling of Trade Relations:

“If our trade agreements aren’t fair, then we should increase tariffs to offset the difference.”

“I think when we get China and other major countries that we trade with to treat us respectfully and fairly we will all benefit.”

“I think that it could be positive for the economy if we don’t make them too high. If they are too high that could discourage other countries from doing business with us.”

7. Positive without Justification:

“Very good.”


“It might be not so good on the short term but much better on the long term.”

“May help in the long run.”

Figure A-4 shows the topic distribution that appears in the answers to this question, segmented by respondents’ political leaning (Republican versus Democratic). Democratic respondents are significantly more likely to mention negative effects of trade restrictions on prices and efficiency. Republican respondents are more likely to talk about *Positive reallocation* effects, with trade restrictions encouraging a shift back to domestic production and supporting the idea of “made in the USA.”

FIGURE A-4: TOPIC ANALYSIS OF OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS

WHAT DO YOU THINK WOULD BE THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY IF BARRIERS TO TRADE, SUCH AS TARIFFS, WERE INCREASED?



Negative Price:

(hit, destroy, bad, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, recess, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, hit, loos, lost, damag, pay, worst, wors, fragil, pay, cost, impact) & (consumer, peopl, citizen, household, american, us), (increas, higher, high, up, rais, more, soar) & (price, cost), pay, inflationa, inflat, expens, hard & purchas, afford, less & cheap;

Negative Efficiency:

(destroy, bad, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, kill, death, shrink, declin) & (effici, compet, competit, innov, technolog, growth, economi), (increas, higher, high, up, rais, more, soar) & tax, ineffici, recess, depress, loss, economi & (collaps, down, shrink, hurt, crash, wors, slowdown, hamper, slow, hinder, negat), (slow, reduc) & growth, decreas & gdp;

Negative Distributive:

(hit, destroy, bad, affect, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, recess, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, hit, loos, lost, damag, pay, worst, wors, fragil, pay, cost, out & work) & (manufactur, farmer, busi, busine, busin, job, firm, poor, poorer, middleclass, middl & class, workingclass, compani, bottom, industri, lower & class, sector), layoff, bankrupt, bankruptci, poor & poorer;

Negative Labor:

(hit, destroy, bad, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, recess, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, hit, loos, lost, damag, pay, worst, wors, loss) & (labor, job, unemploy, salari, union, wage, outsourc, worker, employe, employ, manufactur, manufact, manu-facur, manufactrur, manugfactor), (increas, high) & unemploy, retrain, (decreas, low, lower) & (salari, wage, employ), (few, fewer, lessen) & job;

Positive...:

Words included: good, posit, benefit, benefici, better, thrive, strengthen, improv, stronger, help, nice, great, bolster, improv, increas;

Words excluded: catastroph, loss, lose, destroy, bad, negat, suffer, disast, disastr, downfal, detriment, depress, troubl, unhappi, hurt, harm, kill, death, shrink, declin, lost, price, cost, afford, expens, (pay & more), inflat;

...Reallocation:

own, ourselv, domest, work, job, farmer, demand, local, (product, buy, protect, support, good, posit, benefit, benefici, better, thrive, strengthen, improv, stronger, help, nice, great, economy) & (our, usa, america, american, us);

...Levelling of Trade Relations:

fair, (other & countri), china, chines;

...without Justification:

Answers in the *Positive* section that were neither in *Reallocation* nor in *Levelling of Trade Relations*.

“Which groups of people do you think would gain if trade barriers such as tariffs were increased?”

Figure A-5 plots the frequency with which various groups, people, or entities are mentioned in response to this open-ended question about those who would benefit from trade barriers. Democrats often tend to mention “the Rich,” “Government and Politicians,” “Big Companies,” and “Nobody” (suggestive of the view that, ultimately, everyone loses from trade barriers). Among Republicans, mentions include “the U.S.,” “everyone,” “workers,” “manufacturers,” and “domestic businesses.”

FIGURE A-5: TOPIC ANALYSIS OF OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS

WHICH GROUPS OF PEOPLE DO YOU THINK WOULD GAIN IF TRADE BARRIERS SUCH AS TARIFFS WERE INCREASED?




FIGURE A-6: WORDCLOUDS

(A) WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT TRADE POLICY AND WHETHER THE U.S. SHOULD PUT SOME RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS TARIFFS, WHAT ARE THE MAIN CONSIDERATIONS THAT COME TO YOUR MIND?



(B) WHAT WOULD BE A “GOOD” TRADE POLICY IN YOUR VIEW? WHAT WOULD BE THE GOAL OF A GOOD TRADE POLICY?



(C) WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE ISSUES WITH
OR SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT U.S.
TRADE POLICY?



Notes. The figure shows word clouds based on the text analysis of the open-ended questions of Survey 1. Each panel refers to the open-ended question indicated in the caption. Raw answers are processed by removing *stop* words and the words explicitly used in the text of the questions and all *don't know* answers. See Ferrario and Stantcheva (2022) for a summary on the methods of analysis.

C Survey and Data Quality

This Appendix is based on the more detailed explanation of the survey data collection in [Stantcheva \(2021\)](#).

C.1 Ensuring high quality answers

I employed several methods to ensure the highest possible quality of answers. In the survey’s landing page – the consent page – respondents are warned that low quality responses will be flagged and their payment possibly withheld. I also attempt to make them feel involved and socially responsible by emphasizing that we are non-partisan academic researchers seeking to advance social studies. I highlight that it is “very important for the success of our research that you answer honestly and read the questions very carefully before answering.” Questions are also designed so as to prevent careless answers: for instance, percentages are constrained to add up to 100%, and respondents are alerted with a pop-up message if there is an inconsistency. Often, rather than using data entry boxes, I let respondents select numbers using sliders.

I also keep track of and check the time spent by the respondent on the survey as a whole, as well as on individual pages and questions, which permits flagging respondents who spend too little time on questions. For the benchmark sample, I drop respondents in the bottom 5% of the survey time distribution. None of our results are affected by trimming these outliers. A randomized subsample of respondents was also provided with financial incentives for correct responses to the policy knowledge questions. This is expected to encourage respondents to pay more attention. In addition, three screening questions are interspersed in the survey. They ask respondents to ignore the question and select a given or several given answer options. This checks for whether respondents are reading the questions carefully – a respondent who simply rushes to click through the answers is unlikely to read and understand the instructions.

Finally, respondents are asked whether they thought the survey was biased more in favor of left-wing or right-wing opinions. 80% of the respondents thought the survey was not biased. 12% thought it was left-wing biased and 8% thought it was right-wing biased.

C.2 Sample

Response rates and composition of the panel. The commercial survey company that distributed the surveys sets projects live on the dashboard in their platform for respondents who receive an invite through various channels, including email. They set quotas based on the need of the sample (e.g., “nationally representative”) and define how many clicks are needed in each one of the quotas to reach the targets. Furthermore, their invitations can be targeted sample for the demographic profile required on my end (nationally representative). Indeed, the survey company can pre-target income, age, and gender (as well as other characteristics, which I did not target). To compute the average response rate, they take a ratio of the people who completed the study over the number of people that opened the invite (regardless of how they received it). For a nationally representative sample, with invitations that are targeted, it is reasonable to expect to have 8,000 to 10,000 exposures to achieve 2000 completes. The values per group vary with males, ages 16-24, and high-income earners being the hardest groups to reach: they had varying response rates below 10%. Hence, these groups needed to receive more targeted invites in order to meet the quotas.


The demographic breakdown for whole U.S. panel (the largest pool of respondents available to take any survey) is as follows:

- Gender: 65% female / 35% male.
- Age: 6% 13-17 / 23% 18-24 years old / 25% 25-34 years old / 20% 35-44 years old / 21% 45-64 years old / 5% 65+ years old.
- Income: 26% Less than \$25,000 income / 25% \$25,000-\$49,000 / 21% \$50,000-\$74,000 / 13% \$75,000 - \$99,000 / 15% \$100,000 or more.

How are respondents initially recruited by the survey company and how do they become members of the panel? The respondents are recruited through a variety of channels: databases of potential participants who declare that they will cooperate for future data collection if selected, generally in exchange for a reward or incentive. This includes traditional access panels, co-branded panels, or opt-in databases of individuals who agreed to complete research projects and undertake other non-market research activities (watch ads, download an app, complete marketing offers, etc., also known as loyalty programmes, or rewards communities within GPT (Get paid to) sites.) The databases are formed via social media, online and offline advertising (connected TV, radio, online, through mobile apps), member referrals, as well as through partnerships with firms such as United Airlines, Hilton Hotels and more (which also contribute to offering rewards in the form of “points” for their loyalty programs). The recruitment process is ‘open to all’ through any of the marketing channels in which they are recruiting from and they encourage members to refer people from their network to join.

Selection into the survey and attrition. Respondents were only told the length of the survey, but neither the topic nor the sender. After clicking on the link, respondents were channeled to a consent page (see Appendix Figure A-14) that informed them that they were about to take an academic research survey, destined solely for research purposes run by non-partisan researchers. They were asked to respond accurately to the best of their knowledge and assured that participation was entirely voluntary. Respondents were then guided through some screening questions that ensured that the final sample was nationally representative along gender, age, and income dimensions or, in the case of the second survey, targeted toward people who were of working age (students, respondents not looking for work and retirees were excluded from the sample). Thus, if respondents decided to drop out at some point during the survey – e.g., upon learning the topic of the survey – all their demographic and background information would be known, and I could check for differential attrition by observable characteristics such as political affiliation. Respondents were rewarded by the survey company only if they fully completed the survey. Rewards are organized by the survey company and take various forms, including cash and tokens or points, in partnership with airlines, hotels, or retail stores. The median time for completion of the surveys was 33 and 22 minutes, respectively.

FIGURE A-7: DISTRIBUTION OF TIME SPENT ON THE SURVEYS



Notes. The figures show the distribution of the time (in minutes) spent by respondents to complete the Survey 1. The mean is represented by a vertical blue line, and the median by a vertical red line.

TABLE A-9: MINUTES SPENT PER BLOCK, PER PAGE, AND PER QUESTION

	Survey 1		
	Block (1)	Page (2)	Question (3)
Open-ended Questions	5.19	1.04	1.04
Knowledge about Trade	2.62	26.4sec	15.6sec
Reasoning about Trade	2.8	28.2sec	13.8sec
Understanding of Trade	3.14	37.8sec	15.6sec
Policy Views	5.17	39sec	24sec
Views on Government	3.13	31.2sec	23.4sec

Notes. The table shows how many minutes on average respondents spent per block (column 1), per page (column 2), and per question (column 3) for Survey 1.

Testing for survey fatigue. Table A-10 tests for survey fatigue in Survey 1, leveraging the fact that the order of some blocks was randomized. The blocks are the policy views block, the set of questions asking about distributional impacts, and the set of questions asking about efficiency effects. In the table, each column has as outcome variable the time (in minutes) spent per survey page in each block. The explanatory variables include indicators for whether the block was seen earlier or later on in the survey. Because these indicators are insignificant, the takeaway is that there is no significant difference in the time per page spent based on the order, suggesting that survey fatigue is not a big issue for this survey.

TABLE A-10: TEST FOR SURVEY FATIGUE BASED ON RANDOMIZATION OF BLOCK ORDER

	Minutes spent per page on Distributional Impacts (1)	Minutes spent per page on Efficiency Effects (2)	Minutes spent per page on Policy Views (3)
Order: Distributional First	0.50 (0.38)		
Order: Efficiency First	0.36 (0.38)	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.11)
Order: Efficiency Second		-0.15 (0.13)	
Order: Policy Views First			-0.19* (0.11)
Women	0.19 (0.35)	0.12 (0.12)	0.07 (0.10)
Has children	-0.09 (0.33)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.09)
Black	-0.04 (0.68)	-0.16 (0.23)	0.03 (0.20)
Hispanic	1.85*** (0.64)	-0.16 (0.22)	-0.21 (0.18)
Other	-0.07 (0.56)	-0.10 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.16)
Annual Income: 40k-69k	0.48 (0.44)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.13)
Annual Income: 70k+	0.06 (0.42)	0.02 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.12)
Republican	0.04 (0.39)	-0.10 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.11)
Democrat	0.22 (0.39)	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.11)
College Degree	0.40 (0.37)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.19* (0.11)
Economics related major	-0.59 (0.56)	0.24 (0.19)	0.01 (0.16)
Working	0.35 (0.92)	-0.27 (0.31)	0.20 (0.26)
Not working	0.08 (0.97)	0.08 (0.33)	0.31 (0.28)
Retiree	0.09 (0.99)	-0.25 (0.34)	0.26 (0.28)
Knowledgeable	-0.53 (0.37)	0.06 (0.13)	0.05 (0.11)
Upper Class (self-reported)	0.44 (0.46)	-0.07 (0.16)	-0.07 (0.13)
Sample mean	0.70	0.49	0.63
Observations	569	569	569

Notes. The dependent variables are the average number of minutes spent per page on the Distributional Impacts part in block Reasoning about Trade (column 1), the Efficiency Effects part in block Reasoning about Trade (column 2) and on the Policy Views block. The independent variables “Order: Distributional first” and “Order: Efficiency first” are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent was randomly assigned to the group that saw respectively the Distributional Impacts part or the Efficiency Effects part first. Other respondents saw the Policy Views block first. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.3 Data to assess sample representativeness

To compute the population characteristics in Table ??, we use the IPUMS-CPS, ASEC data from March 2019 (Flood et al., 2020). We construct variables and categories that are as comparable as possible between our sample data and the population statistics. The shares computed are based on the following IPUMS-CPS, ASEC data:

- **Age bracket:** AGE variable divided in brackets

- **Household income bracket:** FTOTVAL variable divided in brackets
- **Education:** EDUC variable split into categories as follows

High School or Less: “none or preschool,” “grades 1, 2, 3, or 4,” “grades 5 or 6,” “grades 7 or 8,” “grade 9,” “grade 10,” “grade 11,” “12th grade, no diploma.”

4-Year College or More: “bachelor’s degree.”

- **Employment:** the variable is built as follows

Employed: It is the sum of employed and self-employed. For self-employed, CLASSWKR is “self-employed, not incorporated” and “self-employed, incorporated”. For employed workers, EMPSTAT is “armed forces,” “at work,” “has job, not at work last week” but CLASSWKR is not “unpaid family worker.”

Unemployed: EMPSTAT is “unemployed, experienced worker,” “unemployed, new worker” and CLASSWKR not “self-employed, not incorporated,” “self-employed, incorporated,” “unpaid family worker.”

- **Marital status:**

Married: MARST is “married, spouse present,” “married, spouse absent.”

Not Married: MARST is “separated,” “divorced,” “widowed,” “never married/single.”

- **Race and ethnicity:**

Black/African-American: RACE = “black”, HISPAN=“not hispanic.”

White: RACE = “white”, HISPAN=“not hispanic.”

Asian/Asian-American: RACE = “asian”, HISPAN=“not hispanic.”

Hispanic/Latino: HISPAN is not equal to “not hispanic.”

For party affiliation, data is taken from [Gallup \(2019\)](#). In particular, the question asked was “*In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or an independent?*.” The share of “Independent” respondents in the samples is computed aggregating the “Independent” and the “Non-affiliated.” Finally, the data for the 2016 Presidential election were taken from [Leip \(2019\)](#).

TABLE A-11: SAMPLE AND US POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

	US Population	Survey 3
Male	.49	.48
18-29 years old	.23	.22
30-39 years old	.21	.21
40-49 years old	.19	.2
50-59 years old	.19	.19
60-69 years old	.18	.19
\$0-\$19,999	.13	.14
\$20,000-\$39,999	.16	.17
\$40,000-\$69,999	.20	.21
\$70,000-\$99,999	.15	.15
\$100,000-\$124,999	.9	.09
\$125,000+	.26	.24
Four-year college degree	.23	.28
High-school graduate or less	.38	.22
Employed	.7	.66
Unemployed	.03	.03
Married	.51	.49
White	.76	.73
Black/African-American	.13	.13
Hispanic/Latino	.19	.07
Asian/Asian-American	.06	.04
Democrat	.25	.43
Republican	.26	.28
Independent and other	.47	.29
Voted for Clinton at the 2016 presidential election	.48	.44
Voted for Trump at the 2016 presidential election	.46	.45
Sample size		967

Notes. The table displays statistics for the overall U.S. population, as compared to the samples of respondents for Survey 3. See Online Appendix C.3 for details on how the summary statistics on the U.S. population are constructed using IPUMS-CPS-ASEC data for 2022.

C.4 Real-stakes questions

In the third survey, I ask respondents two real-stakes questions that measure their willingness to engage in a real-stakes action – namely support one of two petitions to be sent to Congress.

The first petition reads as follows:

*“Now, we would like to ask you about **two petitions that we will send to the federal government.** When the survey is complete, we will **send the results to Congress**, informing them what share of people who took this survey were willing to support each petition. **You will not be asked to provide your name and your answer will remain anonymous.**”*

Respondents then see two petitions, which they can choose to support or not. The text of the first one is:

*“We, the undersigned, urge the Federal Government to **implement stronger trade barriers to safeguard the U.S. economy.** We believe that increased protection is necessary to shield domestic industries from intense international competition. By doing so, we can ensure the stability of our economy and protect American jobs.”*

The second one is similar in tone but asks instead about increasing efforts in assisting U.S. workers affected by international trade.

“We, the undersigned, urge the Federal Government to intensify efforts in assisting U.S. workers affected by international trade and those in industries experiencing decline due to global competition. We urge the implementation of comprehensive policies that provide retraining, job placement, and financial support to these displaced workers.”

TABLE A-12: REAL-STAKES AND POLICY VIEWS

	Support petition for stronger trade barriers (1)	Support petition for more compensation (2)
Panel A: Personal characteristics		
Female	0.10*** (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)
Age 30-49	0.09** (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)
Age 50-69	0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)
College Degree	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.02)
Republican	0.06* (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)
Middle-income	-0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)
High-income	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Panel B: Policy views on free trade		
The U.S. should increase the level of trade with other countries	-0.13*** (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)
The U.S. should restrict food imports to ensure food security	0.08*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)
The U.S. should protect their infant industries	0.16*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Restrict imports best way to help U.S. workers	0.12*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)
The U.S. should protect minerals and metals, petroleum, chemicals or machinery	0.16*** (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)
The U.S. should protect more than 3 types of goods	0.21*** (0.03)	0.06*** (0.02)
Panel C: Policy views on Redistribution		
Support for redistribution index	0.01 (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
Subsidize production best way to help U.S. workers	-0.10*** (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)
Transfers & retraining best way to help U.S. workers	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)
Panel D: Descriptive statistics		
Control mean	0.80	0.86
Democrat control mean	0.79	0.91
Observations (Panel A)	967	967
Observations (Panel B)	967	967
Observations (Panel C)	960	960

Notes. All variables are detailed in Appendix G. Regressions in Panel A control for some individual covariates (age, gender, education, income, number of children, employment status, race and political leaning). In Panel B and C, each row shows the estimates from a separate regressions which controls for the same individual covariates and the variable associated to the relevant line. Panel D provides descriptive statistics and sample sizes for the different panels. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.5 Role of financial incentives

In the third survey, respondents were provided financial incentives with the following wording: *“You are about to answer a series of questions related to the effects of international trade. Some questions may be challenging, but we encourage you to respond to the best of your knowledge. The respondents who provide the highest number of accurate answers will be rewarded with a \$200 bonus added to their survey payment. The payment will be made to you in the same way as your regular survey pay, so no further action is required on your part. Good luck!”*. Table A-13 analyzes the answers to incentivized questions for those who received financial incentives and those who did not. Overall, there is no systematic effect on the number of correct answers. While financial incentives make it more likely respondents will answer correctly to the question in column 2, they make them less likely to answer correctly to the one in column 1.

TABLE A-13: FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND KNOWLEDGE OF TRADE

	Justifiable to import even if U.S. more productive (1)	Prices abroad ↑ if export tax ↑ (2)	U.S. prices ↑ if import tax ↑ (3)	N. of correct answers (4)
Incentivized	-0.123*** (0.041)	0.124*** (0.039)	0.065 (0.040)	0.066 (0.080)
Control mean	0.64	0.72	0.71	2.07
Democrats control mean	0.64	0.72	0.73	2.10
Observations	935	935	935	935

Notes. All variables are detailed in Appendix G. The regressions control for respondent age, gender, number of children, political leaning, employment status, race, income, education and measures of objective exposures (i.e., “Tradable sector”, “Comparative advantage occupation” and “Routine & offshorable occupation”). The variable “N. of correct answers” refers to the number of correct answers to the 3 questions included in the table.

D Classifications of Sectors and Occupations

TABLE A-14: CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONS

Occupation	Sample Share	RTI (Normalized)	RTI (Indicator Variable)	Offshorability (Normalized)	Offshorability (Indicator Variable)	Comparative Advantage (Normalized)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Agriculture	.5%	29	1	0	0	100
Armed forces	.8%	7	0	12	0	0
Clericals	10.9%	90	1	100	1	35
Craft and trade	3%	77	1	34	0	30
Elementary occupations	2.4%	85	1	21	0	34
Managers	32.3%	0	0	37	0	39
Plant and machine operators	2.6%	100	1	70	1	41
Professionals	23.8%	13	0	56	1	32
Service and sales	13.6%	42	1	4	0	0
Technicians	8.4%	46	1	38	1	23
Unknown	1.6%					

Notes. This table presents summary statistics on the occupations included in the survey. The first column displays the share of respondents in each occupation. The normalized indexes (second, fourth and sixth columns) are computed so that the occupation with the highest index has a value of 100 and the one with the lowest index has a value of 0. The indicator variables (third and fifth columns) are the ones included in regressions. All measures are taken from the replication package of [Owen and Johnston \(2017\)](#).

TABLE A-15: CLASSIFICATION OF SECTORS

Sector	Sample Share (1)	Tradable Sector (2)
Agriculture, plantations and other rural sectors	2.1%	0
Basic metal production	1.3%	1
Chemical industries	1.1%	1
Commerce	2.4%	0
Construction	6.5%	0
Education	8.5%	0
Financial and professional services	10%	0
Food, drink, tobacco	7%	1
Forestry, wood	.3%	1
Health services	10.9%	0
Hotel, tourism, catering	2%	0
Mechanical and electrical engineering	1.7%	0
Media, culture, graphical	1.8%	0
Mining	.2%	1
Public Services	4.9%	0
Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear	.9%	1
Transport	1.7%	0
Transport equipment manufacturing	.9%	1
Utilities (water, gas, electricity)	.9%	0
Unknown	35.1%	

Notes. This table presents summary statistics on the sectors included in the survey. The first column displays the share of respondents in each occupation. The column *Tradable Sector* corresponds to an indicator variable equal to 1 if the sector is a tradable one according to the classification of [Mayda and Rodrik \(2005\)](#). More precisely, tradable sectors include manufacturing and agricultural sectors.

E Knowledge about and Understanding of Trade

In the first and third surveys, the respondent answers some questions in a “problem-set” style. The purpose of these questions is to understand the ability to reason on more technical questions. Some of these questions have unambiguously correct answers, given the setting, while others do not have a clear-cut correct answer.

The questions are as follows:

“Let us now consider the following simplified example of what happens economically when there is more trade in some goods. Take for instance the car industry and the laptop industry. On one hand, the U.S. is a large net exporter of laptops (meaning that it sells more laptops abroad than it purchases from abroad and that U.S. laptops are a large share of all laptops sold in the world), and a large net importer of cars (meaning that it purchases more cars from abroad than it sells abroad and that cars purchased by customers in the U.S. are a large share of worldwide car purchases). On the other hand, Germany is a large net exporter of cars and a large net importer of laptops. The laptop sector employs many high-skilled, college-educated workers. The car sector employs many low-skilled workers. Cars are produced for cheaper in Germany, while laptops are produced for cheaper in the U.S. Imagine now that there is an improvement in the production process of cars in Germany so that the costs of producing them decrease.”

What will happen to the price of cars in the U.S.? (answers: ‘It will decrease’/‘It will remain the same’/‘It will increase’)

What will happen to the number of cars the U.S. imports from Germany? (answers: ‘It will decrease’/‘It will remain the same’/‘It will increase’)

What will happen to the number of cars that are produced in the U.S.? (answers: ‘It will decrease’/‘It will remain the same’/‘It will increase’)

After the increase in productivity in the German car sector, to what extent do you think that wages of low-skilled workers in the car sector in the U.S. will increase, remain the same, or decrease? (answers: ‘Wages will decrease a lot’/‘Wages will somewhat decrease’/‘Wages will stay the same’/‘Wages will somewhat increase’)

Overall, after the increase in productivity in the German car sector, to what extent would you say that households in the U.S. are better or worse off? (answers: ‘Much worse off’/‘Somewhat worse off’/‘Neither better nor worse off’/‘Somewhat better off’/‘Much better off’)

“Imagine now that there is also an improvement in the production process in the U.S. so that the costs of producing laptops are lower than before.”

What will happen to the number of laptops produced in the U.S.? (answers: “It will decrease”/“It will remain the same”/“It will increase”)

What will happen to the price of U.S. laptops in Germany? (answers: “It will decrease”/“It will remain the same”/“It will increase”)

What will happen to the number of laptops Germany imports from the U.S.? (answers: “It will decrease”/“It will remain the same”/“It will increase”)

After the increase in productivity in the American laptop sector, to what extent do you think that wages of high-skilled workers in the laptop sector in the U.S. will increase, remain the same, or decrease? (answers: “Wages will decrease a lot”/“Wages will somewhat decrease”/“Wages will stay the same”/“Wages will somewhat increase”)

Overall, after the increase in productivity in the American laptop sector, to what extent would you say that households in the U.S. are better or worse off? (answers: “Much worse off”/“Somewhat worse off”/“Neither better nor worse off”/“Somewhat better off”/“Much better off”)

If the U.S. were to impose an export tax on laptops, what would happen to the price of laptops abroad? (answers: “It will decrease”/“It will remain the same”/“It will increase”)

If the U.S. were to impose an import tariff on cars sold in the U.S., what would happen to the price of cars in the U.S.? (answers: “It will decrease”/“It will remain the same”/“It will increase”)

Figures A-8 to A-10 summarize the findings. They show the share of respondents who agree with the statements listed on the vertical axis. The gray vertical lines indicate the expected shares of respondents


if respondents were answering randomly. Respondents seem to understand the effects on prices, imports, and production. The impacts on wages and welfare, which are ambiguous theoretically, show an interesting pattern whereby respondents perceive generally positive effects from productivity increases in the laptop sector in the US on the wages of workers in the laptop sector and the overall welfare of US households. When the productivity improvement is in the German car sector, respondents give answers that are close to random, reflecting uncertainty in their views.

Figure A-9 plots the shares separately for respondents who believe they have been made better off versus worse off from trade. Respondents who believe they have been made better off are not significantly more accurate for questions which have a correct answer, and are more optimistic regarding the welfare implications (which are theoretically ambiguous).

Figure A-10 plots the shares separately for those with a college education and those without. College educated respondents are somewhat more accurate on questions which have an unambiguous answer and are more optimistic regarding the welfare implications (which are theoretically ambiguous).


There were no detectable partisan effects in the answers to these questions (not shown).

FIGURE A-8: KNOWLEDGE ABOUT TRADE POLICY: SHARE OF CORRECT ANSWERS TO TRADE-RELATED KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONS




Notes. The figure depicts the share of respondents who agree with each of the statements, together with 90% confidence intervals.

FIGURE A-9: KNOWLEDGE ABOUT TRADE POLICY: SHARE OF CORRECT ANSWERS TO TRADE-RELATED KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONS BY SUBJECTIVE EXPOSURE



Notes. The figure depicts the share of respondents who agree with each of the statements, together with 90% confidence intervals. The shares are depicted separately for respondents who feel they have been made better off by trade and those who feel they have been made worse off.

FIGURE A-10: KNOWLEDGE ABOUT TRADE POLICY: SHARE OF CORRECT ANSWERS TO TRADE-RELATED KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONS BY EDUCATION




Notes. The figure depicts the share of respondents who agree with each of the statements, together with 90% confidence intervals. The shares are depicted separately for respondents with a college education and those without.

Figure A-9 shows the correlation between various measures of knowledge about trade from the aforementioned questions and trade policy views. Respondents with a higher number of correct answers (regarding questions with an unambiguously correct answer) are somewhat more supportive of free trade and do not believe that import restrictions are the best way to help US workers. They are also somewhat more likely to support compensatory redistribution. Those who are more optimistic about the welfare effects from

productivity gains are also more supportive of free trade.

FIGURE A-11: CORRELATION OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT TRADE AND POLICY VIEWS




Notes. The figure reports regression coefficients together with 90% confidence intervals where the outcome variables are listed on the left axis. All variables are detailed in Appendix G. The regressions control for age, gender, number of children, political leaning, employment status, race and income. The variable “N. of correct questions” is an integer from 0 to 6 that measures the number of correct answers to questions in the ‘problem-set’ with correct answers (out of those questions that do have an unambiguous answer).

F The Role of the Identity of the Trade Partner

In the third survey, respondents were asked a series of questions related to the identity of the trade partner. The first question reads: *“How important is the identity of a country that is a trade partner of the U.S.?”* with answer options *[Not important at all, Somewhat important, Very important]*. The second question reads: *“Are there specific countries with which the US should approach trade more cautiously or limit trade? If your answer is yes, could you please name these countries?”* followed by an empty text entry field.


FIGURE A-12: IMPORTANCE OF THE IDENTITY OF THE TRADE PARTNER




Notes. The top panel depicts the share of respondents who think the trade partner identity is “Somewhat Important” or “Very Important.” The bottom panel shows the share of respondents who mention the countries in response to the open-ended question “Are there specific countries with which the US should approach trade more cautiously or limit trade? If your answer is yes, could you please name these countries?”, among all respondents who answered “Somewhat Important” or “Very Important” to the question about the importance of the trade partner identity in the top panel. Note that respondents are allowed to list more than one country. 90% confidence intervals are depicted.

FIGURE A-13: IDENTITY OF THE TRADE PARTNER, BELIEFS, AND POLICY VIEWS

(A) CORRELATION BETWEEN COUNTRY WITH WHICH TO LIMIT TRADE, BELIEFS ABOUT TRADE, AND EXPOSURE TO TRADE



(B) CORRELATION BETWEEN COUNTRY WITH WHICH TO LIMIT TRADE AND POLICY VIEWS



Notes. The figure shows the correlation between mentioning a specific country with which to limit trade or saying that the trade partner identity is important and beliefs about trade and exposure to trade (Panel A) or policy views (panel B). 90% confidence intervals are depicted. All exposure variables are defined in Appendix G (paragraph “Exposure to Trade”). The correlations in Panel B control for age, gender, number of children, political leaning, employment status, race and income. All policy views variables are defined in Appendix G (paragraph “Exposure to Trade”). Variables “Mention China” and “Mention Russia” are indicators for the respondent mentioning China and Russia, respectively, as answer to the open-ended question “Are there specific countries with which the US should approach trade more cautiously or limit trade? If your answer is yes, could you please name these countries?”. The variable “Mention trade partner is very important in general” is an indicator equal to one for answering “Very important” (vs “Not important at all” and “Somewhat important”) to the question “How important is the identity of a country that is a trade partner of the U.S.?”

G Variable Definition

Core respondents characteristics

Female: respondent is female.

Male: respondent is male.

Age 18-29: respondent's age is between 18 and 29 years.

Age 30-49: respondent's age is between 30 and 49 years.

Age 50-69: respondent's age is between 50 and 69 years.

White: respondent's ethnicity is European American/White.

Black/African-American: respondent's ethnicity is African American/Black.

Hispanic/Latino: respondent's ethnicity is Hispanic/Latino.

Asian/Asian-American: respondent's ethnicity is Asian/Asian American.

Other races: respondent's ethnicity is not among those listed above.

Kids: respondent has children.

Low-Income: respondent's household income is below \$39,000.

Middle-Income: respondent's household income is between \$40,000 - \$69,000.

High-Income: respondent's household income is above \$70,000.

Upper Class (self-reported): respondent's self-reported social class is upper-middle class or upper class.

Student: respondent is student.

Working: respondent is full-time or part-time employee, or self-employed, or small business owner.

Not working: respondent is unemployed and looking for work or not currently working and not looking for work.

Retiree: respondent is retiree.

Married: respondent is married.

Republican: respondent's political affiliation is Republican.

Democrat: respondent's political affiliation is Democratic (usually omitted category in the regressions).

Independent and others: respondent's political affiliation is independent or other or non-affiliated.

Economics related major: respondent has a college degree with an economics-related major.

College (degree): respondent has at least a 4-year college degree.

Treatments

Distributive Effects: in Survey 1, respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on the distributional impacts of trade and trade policy.

Efficiency Effects: in Survey 1, respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on the efficiency effects of trade and trade policy.

Economist (= Efficiency + Distributive): in Survey 1, respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on both efficiency effects and distributional impacts of trade and trade policy.

Own consumption: in Survey 2, respondent was randomized to be primed to think about the effects of trade on consumers.

Own job risks: in Survey 2, respondent was randomized to be primed to think about the effects of trade on jobs.

Beliefs

Efficiency.

Trade ↑ competition in the U.S.: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that international trade has made firms in the U.S. more competitive and improved their productivity (*Yes/No* Question).

Trade ↑ competition in your sector: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade made firms in their sector of work more competitive and improved their productivity (*Yes/No* Question).

Trade ↑ innovation in the U.S.: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the competitive pressure from trade has increased innovation in the U.S. (*Yes/No* Question).

Trade ↑ GDP growth of the U.S.: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that international trade has increased the U.S.'s GDP growth (*Yes/No* Question).

If U.S. exports ↑ value of \$ ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the value of the dollar will increase (as opposed to “will decrease” and “will not change”) if the U.S. exports more goods abroad.

Both countries better off when trading: indicator variable equal to one if respondent answers “both countries are better off” (as opposed to “one country gains, the other one loses” and “both countries lose”) to the question “When two countries trade with each other, would you say that, in general, both are made better off from trade or that one gains at the expense of the other one?”

Distributional (General).

Large corporations gained from trade: indicator variable equal to one if, when asked “As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?,” respondent rated “Large corporations” 4 or more on a scale from 1 (“lost a lot”) to 5 (“gained a lot”).

Small businesses gained from trade: indicator variable equal to one if, when asked “As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?,” respondent rated “Small businesses” 4 or more on a scale from 1 (“lost a lot”) to 5 (“gained a lot”).

High-income households gained from trade: indicator variable equal to one if, when asked “As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?,” respondent rated “High-income households” 4 or more on a scale from 1 (“lost a lot”) to 5 (“gained a lot”).

Middle-income households gained from trade: indicator variable equal to one if, when asked “As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?,” respondent rated “Middle-income households” 4 or more on a scale from 1 (“lost a lot”) to 5 (“gained a lot”).

Low-income households gained from trade: indicator variable equal to one if, when asked “As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?,” respondent rated “Low-income households” 4 or more on a scale from 1 (“lost a lot”) to 5 (“gained a lot”).

It's easy to change sector x low-skilled workers: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it is easy for low-skilled workers to find a job in a different sector from the one they are currently working in (*Yes/No* question).

It's easy to change sector x high-skilled workers: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it is easy for high-skilled workers to find a job in a different sector from the one they are currently working in (*Yes/No* question).

Trade major reason x unemployment & decline of industries: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is a major reason for unemployment in some sectors and the decline of some industries in the U.S. from “A moderate amount” to “A great deal.”

Main cause x loss of manufacturing jobs (S2): Automation: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that job losses of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. are mainly due to “Technological changes (e.g., automation)” (as opposed to “Globalization, trade and outsourcing” and “Immigration”).

Main cause x loss of manufacturing jobs (S2): Trade: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that job losses of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. are mainly due to “Globalization, trade and outsourcing” (as opposed to “Technological changes (e.g., automation)” and “Immigration”).

Main cause x loss of manufacturing jobs (S2): Immigration: indicator variable equal to one if respondent

believes that job losses of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. are mainly due to “Immigration” (as opposed to “Globalization, trade and outsourcing” and “Technological changes (e.g., automation)”).

Overall trade helped U.S. workers: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that, overall, trade has helped U.S. workers (as opposed to “Hurt U.S. workers”).

Trade major reason x rise in inequality: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is a major reason for a rise of inequality in the U.S. from “A moderate amount” to “A great deal.”

Trade not a major reason x rise in inequality: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is not a major reason for a rise of inequality in the U.S. from “A moderate amount” to “A great deal.”

Trade ↓ prices of goods sold in the U.S.: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade decreased the prices of goods sold in the U.S. (Yes/No question).

More trade can make all better off (Losers can be compensated): indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that more international trade can make everyone better off by compensating those who lose with transfers (as opposed to “it will be impossible to compensate those who lose from it”).

Large companies won more than small ones: indicator variable equal to one if respondent assigns a higher value to “Large corporations” with respect to “Small businesses,” on a scale from 1 (“Lost a lot”) to 5 (“Gained a lot”), when asked “As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?”

High-income HHs benefit more than low-income HHs: indicator variable equal to one if respondent assigns a higher value to “High-income households” with respect to “Low-income households,” on a scale from 1 (“Lost a lot”) to 5 (“Gained a lot”), when asked “As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it?”

Sector switch easier if high-skill: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it is easy to find a job in a different sector for high-skill workers, but not for low skill workers.

Distributional (Personal).

Trade ↓ prices of goods they buy: indicator variable equal to one if respondent agrees with the statement that trade decreased the prices of goods they regularly buy.

Trade ↑ varieties of goods they buy: indicator variable equal to one if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that trade has increased the variety of the goods they have access to in ordinary stores.

Your wage has not grown as fast due to competition: indicator variable equal to one if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that, because of trade and the resulting competition with foreign countries that pay lower wages to their workers, their wage has not grown as fast as it would otherwise have.

Trade ↑ unemployment in your sector: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is a major reason for the rise of unemployment in their sector from “A great deal” to “A moderate amount.”

Trade threat x future of your sector: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that trade is a “Very serious” threat for the future of their sector.

Your job likely to be offshored, outsourced or automated: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it is “Very likely” that, over the next 10 years, their job will be outsourced, offshored, or automated because of competition with foreign countries.

Automation had a negative impact on your job: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected a value from 0 to 4 as answer to the question “To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?” for the option “Automation,” where 0 indicates a negative impact and 10 a positive impact.

Trade had a negative impact on your job: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected a value from 0 to 4 as answer to the question “To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?” for the option “Trade,” where 0 indicates a negative impact and 10 a positive impact.

Immigration had a negative impact on your job: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected a value from 0 to 4 as answer to the question “To what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job?” for the option “Immigration,” where 0 indicates a negative impact and 10 a positive impact.

You are better off (or worse off) from trade: indicator variable equal to one if respondent answered “Better off” (respect. “Worse off”) to the question “Would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries

has made you better off or worse off?”

General knowledge of the mechanisms of trade policy.

The variables in this block refer to questions asked after the following preamble: “*The U.S. is a large net exporter of laptops (meaning that it sells more laptops abroad than it purchases from abroad and that U.S. laptops are a large share of all laptops sold in the world), and a large net importer of cars (meaning that it purchases more cars from abroad than it sells abroad and that cars purchased by customers in the U.S. are a large share of worldwide car purchases). The laptop sector employs many high-skilled, college-educated workers. The car sector employs many low-skilled workers. Cars are produced for cheaper abroad, while laptops are produced for cheaper in the U.S. Imagine now that the U.S. starts importing even more cars and producing less cars domestically.*”

Consumers benefit if imports ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that households who purchase cars in the U.S. are better off after the U.S. starts importing more cars (Yes/No question).

Justifiable to import even if U.S. more productive: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that it makes sense for the U.S. to import cars from Germany under some circumstances, even though the U.S. was better at producing them, i.e., able to produce them at a lower price (Yes/No question).

U.S. prices ↓ *if U.S. cars imports* ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the price of cars in the U.S. will decrease (as opposed to “It will remain the same” and “It will increase”) if the U.S. starts producing less and importing more cars.

Prices abroad ↓ *if U.S. laptop exports* ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the price of U.S. laptops abroad will decrease (as opposed to “It will remain the same” and “It will increase”) if the U.S. starts producing and exporting more laptops.

U.S. wages ↓ *if U.S. cars imports* ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that wages of low-skilled workers working in the car sector will decrease (as opposed to “Wages will remain the same” and “Wages will increase”) if the U.S. starts importing more cars.

U.S. wages ↑ *if U.S. laptop exports* ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that wages of high-skilled workers working in the laptop sector will increase (as opposed to “Wages will remain the same” and “Wages will decrease”) if the U.S. starts importing more laptops.

Wages of car workers moving to laptop sector ↑ *if car imports* ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that wages of those low-skilled workers moving to the laptop sector will increase (as opposed to “Wages will remain the same” and “Wages will decrease”).

Your wage ↓ *if U.S. imports in your sector* ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that their wage will decrease (as opposed to “It will remain the same” and “It will increase”) if imports in their sector increase.

Your wage ↑ *if U.S. exports in your sector* ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that their wage will increase (as opposed to “It will remain the same” and “It will decrease”) if exports from their sector to other countries increase.

Prices abroad ↑ *if export tax* ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the price of laptops sold abroad will increase (as opposed to “It will remain the same” and “It will decrease”) if the U.S. were to impose an export tax on laptops.

U.S. prices ↑ *if import tax* ↑: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the price of cars sold in the U.S. will increase (as opposed to “It will remain the same” and “It will decrease”) if the U.S. were to impose an import tariffs on cars.

Correct answers to the case study: share of correct answers to the trade case study in Survey 1. The questions considered are all the ones in this block + the variable *Both countries better off when trading*.

Policy views

Support for more free trade and lower trade restrictions: indicator variable equal to one if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that “Increasing trade with other countries and reducing barriers to trade is something the U.S. should aim for.”

The U.S. should restrict food imports to ensure food security: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the best policy to ensure national food security is restricting imports (as opposed to “Provide more subsidies”).

The U.S. should protect their infant industries: indicator variable equal to one if respondent thinks it makes sense to protect infant industries for a while by means of tariffs or import restrictions (as opposed to “let these firms immediately face foreign competition to become more competitive”).

Restrict imports best way to help U.S. workers: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that is declining and threatened by foreign competition is restricting imports in that industry (as opposed to “Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs” and “Subsidize production in the sector”).

Transfers & retraining best way to help U.S. workers: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that is declining and threatened by foreign competition is providing more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs (as opposed to “Restrict imports in that industry” and “Subsidize production in the sector”).

Subsidize production best way to help U.S. workers: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that is declining and threatened by foreign competition is subsidizing production in the sector (as opposed to “Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs” and “Restrict imports in that industry”).

The U.S. should protect minerals and metals, petroleum, chemicals or machinery sectors: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent believes that the U.S. should provide protection against foreign competition to either of the following options: “minerals and metals,” “petroleum,” “chemicals or machinery” when asked “Do you think some industries should be protected from foreign competition using tariffs or other import restrictions? Select all that apply.”

The U.S. should protect from trade food and cars: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the U.S. should protect any good among: cars, vegetables, fruits, meat, fish, and milk.

The U.S. should protect more than 3 types of goods: indicator variable equal to one if respondent believes that the U.S. should protect more than 3 types of goods from foreign competition when asked whether “particular goods should be protected from foreign competition using tariffs or other import restrictions.”

Views on government

Trust government: respondent answers “Almost always” or “A lot of the time” to the question “How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right?”

Government purposes: respondent says the “Government should do more” to solve their country’s problems (as opposed to “Government is doing too much” and “Government is doing just the right amount”).

Government involvement: respondent rates themselves 4 or more following the question “Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens?”

Transfers to those out of work: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service “Transfers and income support programs for those out of work” should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to “decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)” or “funding to be left unchanged.”

Better schools for low-income children: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service “Better schools for children from low-income families” should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to “decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)” or “funding to be left unchanged.”

Income support and retraining for workers displaced by int. trade: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service “Income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade” should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to “decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)” or “funding to be left unchanged.”

Subsidies to pay health insurance: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service “Subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care” should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to “decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)” or “funding to be left unchanged.”

Wage subsidies to working poor: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the service “Wage subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages” should receive increased funding even if this means more taxes or reducing spending in other areas, as opposed to “decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere)” or “funding to be left unchanged.”

The next variables are defined out of the following question: “Consider now a list of functions the federal government could serve. On a 1 to 5 scale, please say how much responsibility you think the government should have for each — with 1 meaning the government should have no responsibility at all and 5 meaning the government should have total responsibility in this area.”

Government should be responsible for reducing income differences: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option “Reducing income differences between the rich and the poor.”

Government should be responsible for reducing wealth transmission: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option “Reducing the transmission of wealth from one generation to the other”

Government should be responsible for ensuring health care: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option “Making sure Americans have adequate health care.”

Government should be responsible for reducing opportunity differences: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option “Reducing the differences in opportunities between children from wealthy and poor families.”

Government should be responsible for regulating trade: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option “Regulating trade to and from the U.S. to protect American producers and consumers.”

Government should be responsible for stabilizing financial system: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option “Maintaining a stable financial system and ensuring that credit markets work.”

Government should be responsible for stabilizing dollar: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option “Ensuring a stable dollar.”

Government should be responsible for providing minimum living: indicator variable equal to one if respondent selected values 4 or 5 for the option “Providing a minimum standard of living for all.”

Patriotism

Proud to be American: variable summarizing how proud the respondent is to be American, with values from 1 (“Not at all proud”), to 5 (“Extremely proud”).

Important to be born in the U.S.: variable summarizing how important it is for the respondent to be born in the U.S., with values from 1 (“Not important at all”) to 5 (“Very important”).

Own culture superior: variable summarizing how much the respondent agrees with the statement that their own culture is superior to others, with values from 1 (“Completely disagree”) to 4 (“Completely agree”).

Exposure to trade

Objective Exposure Based on Tradable Sector: The indicator of exposure to trade based on sector follows the specification of [Mayda and Rodrik \(2005\)](#). We split respondents’ sectors into 2 categories: tradables and non-tradables. Tradable sectors are manufacturing sectors that are included in Table 9 of [Mayda and Rodrik \(2005\)](#).

Objective Exposure Based on Routine Occupation: The measured exposure depending on routine occupation is based on a measure of routine ([Autor et al. \(2003\)](#), [Acemoglu and Autor \(2011\)](#) and [Autor and Dorn \(2013\)](#)). Data is taken from the replication packet of [Owen and Johnston \(2017\)](#), based on the definition of RTI (Routine Task Intensity Index) of [Goos et al. \(2014\)](#). In order to aggregate the detailed classification of occupations, I compute a weighted mean of RTI across occupations. The weights are the ones given in the dataset. I then create an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent is in the top 50th percentile in terms of RTI. This indicator variable is used to build interaction variables. I also create three indicator variables for low, middle, and high routine occupations. Low routine occupations are those in the bottom 33th percentile, middle routine occupations are between the 33th percentile and the 66th percentile and high routine occupations are in the top 66th percentile. When the coefficient for routine occupation is displayed, it corresponds to the indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is above 66th percentile. I also control

for being being in a middle routine occupation (between the 33th and the 66th percentiles).

Objective Exposure Based on Routine x Offshorable Occupation: First, I determine the level of offshorability for each occupation. The methodology is analogous to the *Measured exposure based on routine occupation* and data also comes from Owen and Johnston (2017) and is based on the methodology of Blinder et al. (2009). Then I define an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent has an occupation above the median both in terms of offshorability and routine. The coefficient that is used in regressions corresponds to this indicator variable that I just described. I also control for being in a non-offshorable and routine occupation and also for being in a non-offshorable and non-routine occupation, so that the displayed coefficient captures the effect of routine in offshorable occupations only.

Objective Exposure Based on Comparative Advantage Occupation: Data is taken from the replication packet of Owen and Johnston (2017). This index is a continuous measure of comparative advantage and comparative disadvantage by occupation (see section *Research Design* of Owen and Johnston (2017) for more details on the computations of comparative advantages by occupation). The methodology is analogous to the *Measured Exposure Based on Routine Occupation*, except that I include the continuous measure into the regressions.

Objective Exposure Based on Local Labor Market: The measured exposure based on local labor market follows the methodology of Autor et al. (2013). The replication package is available on David Dorn’s website section P3, so that I obtain an index by commuting zone from 1991 to 2007. Then, I run the first stage regression, which consists in regressing imports penetration in the U.S. on imports penetration in other countries.¹ Based on the predicted values, I determine an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent is in a commuting zone that is in the top 50th percentile in terms of exposure. As for the routine index, I also determine three indicator variables for low, middle and high exposed commuting zones. Low exposed areas are those below the 50th percentile, middle exposed are between the 50th and the 80th percentiles and high exposed are above the 80th percentile.

Interactions of Objective Measures: I also obtain further measures of exposure by interacting indices. I consider four interactions: (1) high labor market exposure and being in a tradable sector,² (2) being in a tradable sector and in a high routine occupation,³ (3) being in a tradable sector, in a routine occupation and in a highly exposed labor market, (4) being in an offshorable occupation and in a tradable sector.⁴

Better off from trade: indicator variable equal to one if respondent answered “Better off” to the question “On balance, would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries has made you better off or worse off?”

Worse off from trade: indicator variable equal to one if respondent answered “Worse off” to the question “would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries has made you better off or worse off?”

Feels impacted by trade: indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent believes that “U.S. trade policy has important, direct effects” on their own life (Yes/No question).

Willingness to pay

Willingness to pay: indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is willing to pay either \$1, \$2, \$5 or \$10, according to which branch he was randomized into, to learn the correct answers to various questions (payment is conditional on winning the \$1,000 lottery in which the respondent is automatically enrolled by taking the survey).

Indices

The summary indices that aggregate information over the same domain are constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007). Each indice consists of an equally weighted average of the z-scores of its components with signs oriented consistently within domain. Variables are transformed into z-scores by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation, so that each z-score has mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the control group. To further ease interpretation, the resulting index is itself

¹See Autor et al. (2013) for more details on the instrumental variable procedure and how the index is built.

²In regressions, I also control for being both in a tradable sector and in a low exposed labor market, so that I capture the difference with non tradable sectors.

³In regressions, I also control for being both in a tradable sector and in a low routine occupation, so that I capture the difference with non tradable sectors.

⁴In regressions, I also control for being both in a tradable sector and in a low offshorable occupation, so that I capture the difference with non tradable sectors.

standardized by subtracting the mean in the control group and dividing by the standard deviation, so that each index has mean zero and standard deviation one.

Believes in efficiency gains: index capturing whether the respondents believes in efficiency gains for the U.S. in terms of decreased prices, competition, innovation and GDP growth. It combines the variables *Trade ↓ prices of goods sold in the U.S.*, *Trade ↑ competition in the U.S.*, *Trade ↑ innovation in the U.S.* and *Trade ↑ GDP growth of the U.S.*

Trade Increases Innovation, Competitiveness and GDP: index capturing whether the respondents believes in efficiency gains for the U.S. in terms of competition, innovation and GDP growth. It combines the variables *Trade ↑ competition in the U.S.*, *Trade ↑ innovation in the U.S.* and *Trade ↑ GDP growth of the U.S.*

Believes trade has adverse distributional impacts: index summarizing how much the respondent believes that trade has adverse distributional impacts. It includes the variables *Large corporations gained from trade*, *Small businesses gained from trade*, *High-income households gained from trade*, *Middle-income households gained from trade*, *Low-income households gained from trade*, *Trade major reason x unemployment & decline of industries*, *Trade major reason x rise in inequality*, *More Trade can make all better off (Losers can be compensated)*, *Overall trade helped U.S. workers*, *It's easy to change sector x low-skilled workers*. The sign of the variables entering the index is oriented so that a higher index means that trade had more adverse distributional impacts.

Trade major reason for unempl. and hurts U.S. workers: index capturing whether the respondent believes that trade is a major reason for unemployment and hurts U.S. workers. It combines the variables *Trade major reason x unemployment & decline of industries* and *Overall trade helped U.S. workers*. The sign is oriented so that a higher index means that trade had a greater detrimental effect on U.S. workers.

Supports government intervention: index capturing the respondent's support for government intervention. It includes the variables *Trust government*, *Government purposes* and *Government involvement*.

Is patriotic: index summarizing the extent to which the respondent is patriotic. It includes the variables *Proud to be American*, *Important to be born in the U.S.*, *Own culture superior*.

Support for redistribution: index summarizing the respondent's support for redistribution programs. It includes the variables *Transfers to those out of work*, *Better schools for low-income children*, *Income support and retraining for workers displaced by int. trade*, *Subsidies to pay health insurance*, *Wage subsidies to working poor* and *Transfers & retraining best way to help U.S. workers*.

H Questionnaire of the First Survey

The questionnaire is available at: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0qhj8nbFK7k2NA9.

H.1 Consent form

FIGURE A-14: CONSENT PAGE

Academic Research Survey We are a non-partisan group of academic researchers from the Economics Department at Harvard University. Our goal is to learn about people's attitudes on several issues. Please read the information below before consenting to begin the research study.

- This survey is voluntary. You have the right to not answer any question, and to stop the survey at any time or for any reason (to exit the survey, simply close this window). We expect that it will take about 20 minutes. You will likely learn a lot!

- Your name will never be recorded by researchers. Results may include summary data, but you will never be identified. The data will be stored on Harvard servers and will be kept confidential. The collected anonymous data may be made available to other researchers for replication purposes.

- You will be compensated for this interview conditional upon (i) completing the survey and (ii) passing our survey quality checks, which use sophisticated statistical control methods to detect incoherent and rushed responses. **Responding without adequate effort may result in your responses being flagged for low quality and you may not receive your payment.**

Please note that it is very important for the success of our research that you **answer honestly** and **read the questions very carefully** before answering. If at any time you don't know an answer, please give your best guess **without consulting any external sources**. However, please be sure to spend enough time reading and understanding the questions.

You are encouraged to print or take a screenshot of this page for your records. If you have any questions about this study, you may contact us at studysocialsciences2018@gmail.com.

This research has been reviewed and approved by the Harvard University Area Institutional Review Board ("IRB"). You may talk to them at (617) 496-2847 or cuhs@harvard.edu if:

- Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team.
- You cannot reach the research team.
- You want to talk to someone besides the research team.
- You have questions about your rights as a research subject.
- You want to get information or provide input about this research.

☐ Yes, I would like to take part in this study, and confirm that I LIVE IN THE U.S., and I am 18 or older

☐ No, I would not like to participate

H.2 Background Questions

1. What is your gender?

Male; Female

2. What is your age?

3. What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year?

\$0-\$9999; \$10000-\$14999; \$15000-\$19999; \$20000-\$29999; \$30000-\$39999; \$40000-\$49999; \$50000-\$69999; \$70000-\$89999; \$90000-\$109999; \$110000-\$149999; \$150000-\$199999; \$200000+

4. Were you born in the United States?

Yes; No

5. In which ZIP code do you live?

6. Please indicate your marital status

Single; Married; Legally separated or divorced; Widowed

7. How many children do you have?

I do not have children; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

8. *Screening Question 1.* Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both strongly agree and strongly disagree among the alternatives below, no matter what your opinion is.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "It is easy to find accurate and reliable information in the media these days."

Strongly agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly disagree

9. How would you describe your ethnicity/race?

European American/White; African American/Black; Hispanic/Latino; Asian/Asian American; Mixed race; Other (please specify)

10. Which category best describes your highest level of education?

Primary education or less; Some High School; High School degree/GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)

11. (If highest level of education superior to "High School" to 10) What is/was your field of study in college? If multiple degrees apply, please select the field corresponding to your last degree.

Accounting/bookkeeping; Administrative science/public administration; Advertising; Agriculture/ horticulture; Allied health; Anthropology; Architecture; Art; Aviation/aeronautics; Biology; Business administration; Chemistry; Child/human/family development; Comm. disorders; Communications/speech; Computer science; Counseling; Criminology/criminal justice; Dance; Dentistry; Economics; Education; Educational administration; Electronics; Engineering; English; Environmental science/ecology; Ethnic studies; Fashion; Finance; Fine arts; Food science/nutrition/culinary arts; Foreign language; Forestry; General sciences; General studies; Geography; Geology; Gerontology; Health; History; Home economics; Human services/human resources; Humanities; Industrial relations; Industry and techn; Information technology; Journalism; Law; Law enforcement; Liberal arts; Library science; Marketing; Mathematics; Mechanics/machine trade; Medicine; Music; Nursing; Other; Other vocational; Parks and recreation; Pharmacy; Philosophy; Physical education; Physics; Political science/international relations; Psychology; Public relations; Social sciences; Social work: Sociology; Special education; Statistics/biostatistics; Television/film; Textiles/cloth; Theater arts; Theology; Urban and regional planning; Veterinary medicine; Visual arts/graphic design/design and drafting; Other

12. What is your current employment status?

Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner; Unemployed and looking for work; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree

13. (If "Full-time employee", "Part-time employee", or "Self-employed or small business owner" to 12) Which category best describes your main occupation?

Managers; Professionals; Technicians and associate professionals; Clerical support workers; Service and sales workers; Agricultural workers; Craft and related trades workers; Plant and machine operators, and assemblers; Elementary occupations; Armed forces occupations

14. *[For health and trade surveys only]* (If "Full-time employee", "Part-time employee", or "Self-employed or small business owner" to 12) Are you employed in one of the following sectors? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

Agriculture, plantations, other rural sectors; Basic metal production; Chemical industries; Commerce; Construction; Education; Financial services, professional services; Food, drink, tobacco; Forestry, wood; Health services; Hotels, tourism, catering; Mining; Mechanical and electrical engineering; Media, culture, graphical; Oil and gas production, oil refining; Postal and telecommunications services;

Public service; Shipping, ports, fisheries, inland waterways; Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear; Transport (including civil aviation, railways, road transport); Transport equipment manufacturing; Utilities (water, gas, electricity); None of the above

15. (If “Unemployed and looking for work”, “Not currently working and not looking for work”, or “Retiree” to 12) Even if you are not currently working, which category best describes your latest occupation? Check the one that applies. If you have had multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

Same options as above

16. *[For health and trade surveys only]* (If “Unemployed and looking for work”, “Not currently working and not looking for work”, or “Retiree” to 12) Even if you are not currently working, in what sector does your latest occupation fall into? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

Same options as above

17. Are you covered by Medicaid, Medical Assistance, or Medicare?

Yes; No

18. Did you, or anyone in your household, receive food stamps or use a food stamp benefit card at any time during 2018?

Yes; No

19. At any time during 2018, even for one month, did you or anyone in your household receive any cash assistance from a state or county welfare program such as welfare or welfare to work, TANF, general assistance, diversion payments or refugee cash?

Yes; No

20. If you had to use one of these five commonly-used names to describe your social class, which one would it be?

Lower Class or Poor; Working Class; Middle Class; Upper-middle Class; Upper Class

21. On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?

Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very conservative

22. What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated

23. (If respondent answered “Other” to previous question) Please specify your political affiliation.

24. Did you vote in the last presidential election?

Yes; No

25. (If “Yes” to 24) In the last presidential election, supported:

Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump; Jill Stein; Gary Johnson; Other

(If “No” to 24) Even if you did NOT vote, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views more closely.

Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump; Jill Stein; Gary Johnson; Other

26. Are you registered to vote at your current address?

Yes; No

27. There are many types of elections such as federal elections for president and members of Congress, primary elections where voters choose party nominees, local elections for city council and school boards, and special elections when vacancies arise in between scheduled elections.
Which best describes how often you vote, since you became eligible?
Every election without exception; Almost every election, may have missed one or two; Some elections; Rarely; Don't vote in elections
28. Did you vote in the November midterms elections?
Yes; No
29. (If “Yes” to 28) Which party did you vote for?
Republican Party; Democratic Party; Other
30. (If “No” to 28) Which party would you have liked to support?
Republican Party; Democratic Party; Other
31. Thinking about various sources of news available today, what would you say is your main source of news about current events in the U.S. and around the world?
TV; Newspaper (print); Magazine; Radio; Internet; Word of mouth; Other; None, I don't follow the news
32. Please specify
33. (If respondent gets their news mostly from online newspapers) Would you say that you access most of the articles you read through a social media like Facebook or Twitter or by going directly on the website of the newspaper?
Mostly through social media; Mostly through the newspaper's website
34. In general, how important do you think it is to stay informed about economic policy?
Very important; Somewhat important; Not very important; Not important at all
35. (If “Very important” or “Somewhat important” at 34) What would you say are the main reasons why you wish to be well informed about economic policy?
You may select several options.
Affects personal finances; Affects business or profession; Relevant to stock market and investments; Economic issues are important politically and might affect my vote; To be a responsible citizen, I like to keep informed
36. How knowledgeable do you consider yourself on economic policies and issues?
Highly knowledgeable; Somewhat knowledgeable; Not very knowledgeable; Not knowledgeable at all
37. For the following sources of information, how often would you say you use them to stay informed about economic policy?
Often; Regularly; Occasionally; Rarely; Never
- TV
 - Newspapers (print)
 - (online)
 - Magazines
 - Radio
 - Internet
 - Word of mouth

H.3 Patriotism

1. How proud are you to be an American?

Extremely proud; Very proud; Moderately proud; Only a little proud; Not at all proud

2. How important do you believe it is to have been born in the United States or to have an American family background to be truly American?

Very important; Somewhat important; Not important at all

3. Do you agree with the following statement: “Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others”?

Completely agree; Mostly agree; Mostly disagree; Completely disagree

H.4 Open-ended questions

We now want to ask you a few broader questions. Please use the text boxes below and write as much as you feel like. Your opinion and thoughts are important to us! There is no right or wrong answer.

1. When you think about trade policy and whether the U.S. should put some restrictions on trade with other countries such as tariffs, what are the main considerations that come to your mind?
2. What would be a “good” trade policy in your view? What would be the goal of a good trade policy?
3. What do you think are the issues with or shortcomings of the current U.S. trade policy?
4. What do you think would be the effects on the U.S. economy if barriers to trade, such as tariffs, were increased?
5. Which groups of people do you think would gain if trade barriers such as tariffs were increased?

H.5 Personal Exposure

1. Do you feel that U.S. trade policy has important, direct effects on your own life?

Yes; No

H.6 Knowledge about policy

In this section, all respondents will receive the following screening question.

- In order to facilitate our research on decision making we are interested in knowing certain factors about you, the decision maker. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then some of our manipulations that rely on changes in the instructions will be ineffective. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question below. Instead, simply put the slider to 98. Thank you very much.

Out of 100 adults in the U.S., how many are currently paying any income tax at all?

1. Do you know what an import tariff is?

Yes; No

2. Do you know what an import quota is?

Yes; No

3. The U.S. imports both industrial (i.e., non-agricultural) and agricultural goods. What share of the goods that the U.S. imports do you think are agricultural goods?

Slider going from 0 to 100

4. Of all the goods that the U.S. imports, what share do you think is subject to a tariff or import duty?
Slider going from 0 to 100
5. To which country does the U.S. export the most, in terms of the net dollar value?
Brazil; Canada; China; France; Germany; India; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Mexico; Netherlands; South Korea; Switzerland; Taiwan; United Kingdom
6. From which country does the U.S. import the most, in terms of the net dollar value?
Brazil; Canada; China; France; Germany; India; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Mexico; Netherlands; South Korea; Switzerland; Taiwan; United Kingdom
7. Over time, do you think trade between the U.S. and other countries has decreased, stayed more or less the same, or increased?
It has decreased; It has stayed more or less the same; It has increased

H.7 Videos Treatments

Randomized groups of respondents see one of three videos. In each case, the videos introduced by the following:

- Recent academic research has studied what the effects of trade policy are. We will now show you one short video (with sound) that summarizes some key ideas of these studies. Please pay attention to the information provided as you will be asked questions about it later. Do not skip forward or close the page while the video is running.

Please proceed to the next page when you are ready. Note that you will not be able to move forward with the survey before the end of the short video. The video lasts about 2 and a half minutes.

- Links to the videos can be found here: [Redistributional treatment](#), [Efficiency treatment](#), [Economist treatment](#), [US-specific economist treatment](#).

H.8 Mechanisms

1. *CONTROL GROUP*. As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following groups have lost or gained from it? Please rate on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being “lost a lot” and 5 “gained a lot”.

- Large corporations
- Small businesses
- High-income households
- Middle-income households
- Low-income households

“ME” RANDOMIZATION. As trade with other countries has increased, to what extent do you think the following firms have lost or gained from it? Please rate on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being “lost a lot” and 5 “gained a lot”.

- Large corporations
- Small businesses

2. “ME” RANDOMIZATION. On balance, would you say that trade between the U.S. and other countries has made you better off or worse off?

Better off; Worse off

“ME” RANDOMIZATION. Please specify the extent to which you think you have lost or won as trade with other countries has increased, on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being ”lost a lot” and 5 ”gained a lot”).

3. Which statement comes closest to your view?

CONTROL GROUP. More international trade can make everyone in the U.S. better off. Even if some people lose from it, it creates sufficient gains so that even those who lose from it can be compensated through appropriate policies; Free trade will entail winners and losers and it will be impossible to compensate those who lose from it.

“ME” RANDOMIZATION. (If “Worse off” to 2) More international trade can make everyone in the U.S. better off. Even if people like me may lose from it, it creates sufficient gains so that even we who lose from it can be compensated through appropriate policies; Free trade will entail winners and losers and it will be impossible to compensate people like me who may lose from it

“ME” RANDOMIZATION. (If “Better off” to 2) More international trade can make everyone in the U.S. better off. Even if certain people may lose from it, appropriate policies can enable them to be compensated through the sufficient gains made by people like me; Free trade will entail winners and losers and it will be impossible to compensate people who, unlike me, may lose from it

4. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you feel that most American jobs are being affected by US trade policy?

“ME” RANDOMIZATION. Do you feel that your own job is being affected by U.S. trade policy?

Yes; No

5. Overall, has international trade helped or hurt U.S. workers?

Helped U.S. workers; Hurt U.S. workers

6. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you think it is easy for low-skilled workers to find a job in a different sector from the one they are currently working in?

Yes; No

7. *CONTROL GROUP.* Do you think it is easy for high-skilled workers to find a job in a different sector from the one they are currently working in?

Yes; No

8. “ME” RANDOMIZATION. Would it be be easy for you to find a job in a different sector from the one you are currently working in?

Yes; No

9. To what extent do you think that trade with other countries is a major reason for:

A great deal; A lot; A moderate amount; A little; None at all

- *CONTROL GROUP.* Unemployment in some sectors and the decline of some industries in the U.S.
- “ME” RANDOMIZATION. Unemployment in your sector and the decline of some industries in the U.S.
- A rise of inequality in the U.S.

10. *CONTROL GROUP.* Overall, has international trade decreased the prices of goods sold in the U.S.?

“ME” RANDOMIZATION. Overall, has international trade decreased the prices of goods that you buy regularly?

Yes; No

11. *CONTROL GROUP*. Do you think that international trade has made firms in the U.S. more competitive and improved their productivity?
"ME" RANDOMIZATION. Overall, has international trade made the firms in your sector of work more competitive and improved their productivity?
Yes; No
12. Do you think that the competitive pressure from international trade has increased innovation in the U.S.?
Yes; No
13. Overall, do you think that international trade has increased the growth of the GDP in the U.S.?
Yes; No
14. If the U.S. exports more goods abroad, what do you think will happen to the value of the dollar?
It will increase; It will not change; It will decrease
15. When two countries trade with each other, would you say that, in general, both are made better off from the trade or that one gains at the expense of the other one?
In general, both countries are better off; In general, one country gains, the other one loses; In general, both countries lose
16. Imagine the U.S. was better at producing cars than Germany, meaning that it is able to produce better cars at a lower price. Would it still make sense under some circumstances for the U.S. to import cars from Germany?
Yes, it makes sense for the U.S. to import cars from Germany under some circumstances; No, the U.S. should not import cars from Germany if it's better at producing them
17. Let us now consider the following simplified example of what happens economically when there is more trade in some goods. Take for instance the car industry and the laptop industry.
 The U.S. is a large net exporter of laptops (meaning that it sells more laptops abroad than it purchases from abroad and that U.S. laptops are a large share of all laptops sold in the world), and a large net importer of cars (meaning that it purchases more cars from abroad than it sells abroad and that cars purchased by customers in the U.S. are a large share of worldwide car purchases).
 The laptop sector employs many high-skilled, college-educated workers. The car sector employs many low-skilled workers. Cars are produced for cheaper abroad, while laptops are produced for cheaper in the U.S.
 Imagine now that the U.S. starts importing even more cars and producing less cars domestically.
 What will happen to the price of cars in the U.S.?
It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase
18. Would you say that households who purchase cars in the U.S. are now better off?
Yes; No
19. What will happen to the wages of low-skilled workers working in the car sector?
Wages will decrease; Wages will remain the same; Wages will increase
20. Imagine also that the U.S. starts producing and exporting more laptops.
 What will happen to the price of U.S. laptops abroad, i.e., in the countries where the U.S. sells laptops?
It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase
21. What will happen to the wages of high-skilled workers working in the laptop sector?
Wages will decrease; Wages will remain the same; Wages will increase

22. Imagine now that over time, some low-skilled workers from the car sector are able to quit their jobs and find new jobs in the laptop sector.
What will happen to their wages now if the U.S. exports more laptops?
Wages will decrease; Wages will remain the same; Wages will increase
23. If the U.S. were to impose an export tax on laptops, what would happen to the price of laptops abroad?
It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase
24. If the U.S. were to impose an import tariff on cars sold in the U.S, what would happen to the price of cars in the U.S?
It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase
25. If exports from your sector to other countries would increase, what do you think will happen to your wage?
It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase
26. If the U.S. started to import more of the goods produced in your sector, what do you think would happen to your wage?
It will decrease; It will remain the same; It will increase

H.9 Policy Views

In this section, all respondents get the following screening question:

- When a big news story breaks people often go online to get up-to-the-minute details on what is going on. We want to know which websites people trust to get this information. We also want to know if people are paying attention to the question. To show that you've read this much, please ignore the question and select ABC News and The Drudge Report as your two answers.

When there is a big news story, which is the one news website that you would visit first? (Please only choose one)

1. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
"Increasing trade with other countries and reducing barriers to trade is something the U.S. should aim for."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree
2. How fair would you rate the current U.S. trade policy?
Very fair; Somewhat fair; Somewhat unfair; Very unfair
3. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current U.S. trade policy?
Very satisfied; Somewhat satisfied; Somewhat dissatisfied; Very dissatisfied
4. Do you think some industries should be protected from foreign competition using tariffs or other import restrictions? Select all that apply:
Dairy products; Agricultural products (fruit, vegetables, plants); Beverages and tobaccos; Minerals and metals; Petroleum; Chemicals; Animal products (meat, fish); Textiles, clothing leather and footwear; Machinery, transport, equipment and cars; Manufactured goods
5. Do you think particular goods should be protected from foreign competition using tariffs or other import restrictions? Select all that apply.
Cars; Washing machines; Solar panels; Shoes; Machinery; Oil; Vegetables; Fruits; Toys; Meat; Fish; Milk; Steel; Textiles; Clothing; Coffee and tea; Chemicals

6. CONTROL GROUP: In your view, what is the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that's declining and threatened by foreign competition? Please rank the following options from best (1) to worst (3).

Restrict imports in that industry; Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs; Subsidize production in the sector

"ME" RANDOMIZATION: In your view, what is the best policy tool to help workers in your industry against the threat of foreign competition? Please rank the following options from best (1) to worst (3).

Restrict imports in your industry; Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs; Subsidize production in your sector

7. What do you think is the best policy tool to ensure national food security?

Restrict food imports from abroad; Provide more production subsidies in the food sector

8. If the U.S. starts imposing tariffs on many goods that it imports, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that other countries follow suit and also impose tariffs?

Very likely, likely; Unlikely; Very unlikely

9. CONTROL GROUP: Let us consider a given relatively new industry in which other countries are currently able to produce goods for cheaper than American firms.

In your opinion, does it make sense to protect the American firms in this industry by using tariffs or import restrictions (even if this means higher prices for consumers) or is it better to let the American firms immediately face foreign competition, forcing them to become more competitive?

It makes sense to protect for a while; It makes sense to let these firms face foreign competition to become more competitive

"ME" RANDOMIZATION: Imagine that the goods or services currently produced in your sector or industry can actually be produced in a cheaper way in another country.

In your opinion, would it make sense to protect the American firms in your sector or industry by using tariffs or import restrictions (even if this means higher prices for consumers) or would it be better to let the American firms in your sector or industry immediately face foreign competition, forcing them to become more competitive?

It makes sense to protect for a while; It makes sense to let the firms in my sector face foreign competition to become more competitive

10. For these different groups, please tell me if you think that they're are paying their fair share in federal taxes, paying too much, or paying too little?

... pay much more than their fair share in income taxes; ... pay more than their fair share in income taxes; ... pay their fair share in income taxes; ... pay less than their fair share in income taxes; ... pay much less than their fair share in income taxes

- High-income households...
- Middle-class households...

11. Take the following government services. For each of them, say if would you like it to receive increased funding (even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas), decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere) or would you like for its funding to be left unchanged?

- Transfers and income support programs for those out of work
- Better schools for children from low-income families

- Income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade
 - Subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care
 - Wage subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages
- More of this service, more taxes; Service and taxes as now; Less of this service, reduced taxes.*

H.10 Government Questions

1. Which groups of people do you think oppose free trade?

Text Box

2. Which statement comes closest to your views about more trade between the US and other countries?
“When there is more trade between the US and other countries...

... most people gain, but a few people lose a lot.”; ... most people lose, but a few gain a lot.”

3. How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right?

Almost always; A lot of the time; Not very often; Almost never

4. Some people think the government is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and businesses. Others think that government should do more to solve our country’s problems. Which come closer to your own view?

Government is doing too much; Government is doing just the right amount; Government should do more

5. Next, we’d like you to think more broadly about the purposes of government.

Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens?

You may use any number from 1 to 5.

1; 2; 3; 4; 5

6. Of every tax dollar that goes to the federal government in Washington, D.C., how many cents would you say are wasted?

Slider going from 0 to 100

7. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way the federal government in Washington is dealing with the problems the country is facing today?

Very satisfied; Somewhat satisfied; Somewhat dissatisfied; Very dissatisfied

8. Consider now a list of functions the federal government could serve.

On a 1 to 5 scale, please say how much responsibility you think the government should have for each — with 1 meaning the government should have no responsibility at all and 5 meaning the government should have total responsibility in this area:

- Reducing income differences between the rich and the poor
- Reducing the transmission of wealth from one generation to the other
- Making sure Americans have adequate health care
- Reducing the differences in opportunities between children from wealthy and poor families

- Regulating trade to and from the U.S. to protect American producers and consumers
- Maintaining a stable financial system and ensuring that credit markets work
- Ensuring a stable dollar
- Providing a minimum standard of living for all

H.11 Willingness to pay for information

By taking this survey, you are automatically enrolled in a lottery to win \$1000. In a few days you will know whether you won the \$1000. The payment will be made to you in the same way as your regular survey pay, so no further action is required on your part.

Are you are interested in learning the correct answers to all the questions about trade policy in the U.S.? If you are, you can forfeit part of your gain (should you win the lottery) in exchange for the correct answers. If you select that option, you will be given the right answers on the next page. You will only pay the amount selected if you do, in fact, win the lottery.

Note: This information would be very hard to find online on your own. It is the result of a lot of careful research and you cannot easily find the correct answers.

In case you win the lottery are you willing to give up (\$1 / \$2 / \$5 / \$10 ⁵) to receive all the correct answers to the questions about trade policy in the U.S.?

No, I am not willing to pay anything (We will not provide you with the correct answers); Yes, I am willing to pay \$1 / \$2 / \$5 / \$10 (We will provide you with all the correct answers on the next page. You will only pay this amount out of your lottery earnings if you do win the lottery).

H.12 Self-reported questions

1. It is vital to our study that we only include responses from people that devoted their full attention to this study. Otherwise years of effort (the researchers' and the time of other participants) could be wasted. You will receive credit for this study no matter what, however, please tell us how much effort you put forth towards this study.

I put forth almost no effort; I put forth very little effort; I put forth some effort; I put forth quite a bit of effort; I put forth a lot of effort

2. Also, often there are several distractions present during studies (other people, TV, music, etc.). Please indicate how much attention you paid to this study. Again, you will receive credit no matter what. We appreciate your honesty!

I gave this study almost no attention; I gave this study very little attention; I gave this study some of my attention; I gave this study most of my attention; I gave this study my full attention

H.13 Feedback

1. Do you feel that this survey was biased?
Yes, left-wing bias; Yes, right-wing bias; No, it did not feel bias
2. Please feel free to give us any feedback or impression regarding this survey.

⁵Note: the amount is randomized among participants.

I Questionnaire of the Second Survey

The questionnaire is available at: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_b06NvZAX1JKePHL.

I.1 Background questions

1. What is your gender?
Male; Female
2. What is your age?
3. Do you live in the US?
4. In which state do you currently reside?
5. In which zip code do you live?
6. Were you born in the United States?
Yes; No
7. Please indicate your marital status
Single; Married; Legally separated or divorced; Widowed
8. How many children do you have?
I do not have children; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more
9. How would you describe your ethnicity/race?
European American/White; African American/Black; Hispanic/Latino; Asian/Asian American; Mixed race; Other (please specify)
10. What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year?
\$0-\$9999; \$10000-\$14999; \$15000-\$19999; \$20000-\$29999; \$30000-\$39999; \$40000-\$49999; \$50000-\$69999; \$70000-\$89999; \$90000-\$109999; \$110000-\$149999; \$150000-\$199999; \$200000+
11. CAPTCHA
12. Which category best describes your highest level of education?
Primary education or less; Some High School; High School degree / GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)
13. *Screening Question 1* Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both strongly agree and strongly disagree among the alternatives below, no matter what your opinion is. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "It is easy to find accurate and reliable information in the media these days."
14. *Screening Question 2* This is a question to check whether you are paying attention and reading the questions carefully. Please select both "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree" to move forward.
15. On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?
Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very conservative
16. What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?
Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated

17. Did you vote during the 2016 presidential election?
18. *IF YES TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* In the 2016 presidential election, you supported:
Clinton, Trump, Stein, Johnson, Other
19. *IF NO TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* Even if you did NOT vote, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views more closely.
Clinton, Trump, Stein, Johnson, Other
20. Did you vote during the 2020 presidential election?
Yes ; No
21. *IF YES TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* Who did you vote for?
Joe Biden, Donald Trump, Other
22. *IF NO TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* Even if you did NOT vote, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views more closely
Joe Biden, Donald Trump, Other
23. What is your current employment status?
Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or business owner; Temporarily furloughed; Unemployed and looking for work; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree
24. *IF "FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE","PART-TIME EMPLOYEE" OR "SELF-EMPLOYED OR BUSINESS OWNER* What is the title of your job?
[text]
25. *IF "UNEMPLOYED AND LOOKING FOR WORK", "NOT CURRENTLY WORKING AND NOT LOOKING FOR WORK", OR "RETIREE"* What was the title of your latest job?
[text]
26. *IF "FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE","PART-TIME EMPLOYEE" OR "SELF-EMPLOYED OR BUSINESS OWNER* Which category best describes your main occupation?
Managers; Professionals; Technicians and associate professionals; Clerical support workers; Service and sales workers; Agricultural workers; Craft and related trades workers; Plant and machine operators, and assemblers; Elementary occupations; Armed forces occupations
27. *IF "FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE","PART-TIME EMPLOYEE" OR "SELF-EMPLOYED OR BUSINESS OWNER* Are you employed in one of the following sectors? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.
Agriculture, plantations, other rural sectors; Basic metal production; Chemical industries; Commerce; Construction; Education; Financial services, professional services; Food, drink, tobacco; Forestry, wood; Health services; Hotels, tourism, catering; Mining; Mechanical and electrical engineering; Media, culture, graphical; Oil and gas production, oil refining; Postal and telecommunications services; Public service; Shipping, ports, fisheries, inland waterways; Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear; Transport (including civil aviation, railways, road transport); Transport equipment manufacturing; Utilities (water, gas, electricity); None of the above
28. *IF "UNEMPLOYED AND LOOKING FOR WORK", "NOT CURRENTLY WORKING AND NOT LOOKING FOR WORK", OR "RETIREE"* Even if you are not currently working, which category best describes your latest occupation? Check the one that applies. If you have had multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.
Same options as above

29. *IF "UNEMPLOYED AND LOOKING FOR WORK", "NOT CURRENTLY WORKING AND NOT LOOKING FOR WORK", OR "RETIREE"* Even if you are not currently working, in what sector does your latest occupation fall into? Check the one that applies. If you have had multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

Same options as above

30. *IF UNEMPLOYED* How many months have you been unemployed?
31. *IF UNEMPLOYED* Did you become unemployed during the COVID-19 crisis?
32. *IF YES* Do you expect to be rehired once the pandemic is over?

I.2 Views on economic insecurity

I.2.1 Current situation

Please respond to the following questions based on your/your household's current financial situation.

1. Please select the option that best describes your financial situation, where basic expenses include housing, bills and food:
 - I am often unable to meet by basic expenses
 - I can afford my basic expenses, but just barely and with little to no money left over
 - I can meet my basic expenses, and have some money left over for discretionary spending and savings
 - I can meet my basic expenses, and have a significant portion of my income left over for discretionary spending and savings
2. *IF NOT MARRIED* Suppose that you lost your income next month. Please tell us how you would deal with the lost income (Check all that apply)
 - Borrowing from a family member
 - Borrowing from friends
 - Government assistance (unemployment or social assistance benefits)
 - Temporary "gig" employment
 - Savings
 - Selling something
 - Paying with credit card
 - Community assistance
 - Other (please specify)
3. *IF NOT MARRIED:* Suppose that you have an emergency expense that costs \$400. Which of the following best describes how you would pay for this expense?
 - Using my income flow
 - Borrowing from a family member
 - Borrowing from friends
 - Temporary "gig" employment
 - Savings
 - Selling something
 - Paying with credit card

- Community assistance
 - I wouldn't be able to pay for the expense right now
 - Other (please specify)
4. *IF MARRIED* Suppose that you or your partner lost your income next month. Please tell us how you would deal with the lost income (Check all that apply)
- Relying on spouse's income only
 - Borrowing from a family member
 - Borrowing from friends
 - Government assistance (unemployment or social assistance benefits)
 - Temporary "gig" employment
 - Savings
 - Selling something
 - Paying with credit card
 - Community assistance
 - Other (please specify)
5. *IF MARRIED* Suppose that you have an emergency expense that costs \$400. Which of the following best describes how you would pay for this expense?
- Using my household's income flow
 - Borrowing from a family member
 - Borrowing from friends
 - Temporary "gig" employment
 - Savings
 - Selling something
 - Paying with credit card
 - Community assistance
 - I wouldn't be able to pay for the expense right now
 - Other (please specify)

I.2.2 COVID

1. Did your household benefit from any COVID-19 related measures implemented by the federal or state government in the last months? Please select all that apply.
- Business Assistance Programs
 - Tax reliefs (deferment of tax payments)
 - Enhanced employment benefits (paid leave)
 - Other social help than healthcare (education, food, direct financial aid)
 - Unemployment insurance
 - Help on unavoidable expenditures (ex: moratorium on utility bills, delaying mortgages, eviction, insurance)
 - Other
 - My household did not benefit from any federal or state COVID-19 related measure.

I.2.3 Expectations

1. Over the next 6-12 months, do you expect your income to
Decrease/Stay the same/increase
2. *IF MARRIED/DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP* Over the next 6-12 months, do you expect your partner's income to
Decrease/Stay the same/increase
3. *IF NOT MARRIED* How likely do you think the following events are [*sliding scale from "not likely at all" to "extremely probable"*]
 - Losing your job in the next month
 - Losing your job in the next 6 months
4. *IF MARRIED* How likely do you think the following events are [*sliding scale from "not likely at all" to "extremely probable"*]
 - Losing your job in the next month
 - Losing your job in the next 6 months
 - Your partner losing his/her job in the next month
 - Your partner losing his/her job in the next 6 months
5. How much would your sense of economic security change if the government implemented more measures to provide the following? [*1- Same, 2 - Slightly better, 3 - Much better*]
 - Increased unemployment benefits and other social benefits
 - Access to good job opportunities
 - Better education for my children so they have the right skills for the future
 - Better job-seeking and skills training support
 - More generous retirement pensions
 - More affordable housing (e.g., public housing, support for renters or home-buyers)
 - Better access to funds to start a business
 - A guaranteed transfer sufficient to cover my basic needs (e.g., government payment of basic income)
 - Better healthcare
6. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "I think that the government would (or does) provide my family and me with adequate income support in the case of income loss due to" [*from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree*]
 - Unemployment
 - Illness/disability
 - Becoming a parent
 - Old age
7. Over the next 10 years, do you expect your economic situation to be
Much worse; Slightly worse; Same; Slightly better; Much better
8. *IF HAS CHILDREN* Relative to the life opportunities you have had, do you expect your children's life opportunities to be
Much worse; Slightly worse; Same; Slightly better; Much better

I.2.4 Past Experiences

1. Looking back over your life, how often have there been times in your life when you think you have lived in poverty by the standards of that time?
Never; Sometimes; Often; Always
2. How many times have you been unemployed in your life?
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5+
3. *IF MORE THAN 0 TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* During those times when you were unemployed, did you ever make use of a public job search assistance program?
4. *IF YES TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION* On a scale from 0-10, how satisfactory was your experience with the public job search assistance program? *[Scale from 0 to 10]*
 - Could you tell us why? [text]
5. Do you feel that your own efforts in life have paid off?

I.3 Views on Good Jobs

I.3.1 Ideal Job

1. What do you consider to be a “good job”? You can describe features including, but not limited to the hours worked, benefits, compensation, use of skills, and more.
[text]
2. What do you consider to be a “bad job”?
[text]
3. What would be your ideal occupation?
[text]
4. When looking for a new job, how important are the following factors? [Likert scale from Not important at all” to “extremely important”]
 - Compensation, including bonuses.
 - Benefits, including retirement benefits, child and health care benefits
 - Not too long work hours and sufficient time off
 - Ability to have flexible work hours
 - Ability to work remotely
 - Good relationship with colleagues
 - Good relationship with manager or boss
 - Using my skills well
 - Autonomy and creativity
 - Opportunities for professional development and career growth
 - Passion for the work
 - Contributing to society
 - Safe physical environment
5. How important are the following factors in determining who currently has access to “good jobs”? [Likert scale from “Not important at all” to “extremely important”]

- Educational attainment
 - Experience in the labor market
 - Being able to live in the areas that have those jobs
 - Rich family background
 - Personal connections to people in those jobs
 - Information about which jobs are available and how to successfully apply for those jobs
 - Gender
 - Race and/or being an immigrant
 - Innate ability
6. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: [1- Strongly disagree; 5- Strongly agree]
- “My job is better than the jobs my parents had when they were my age”
 - “I can access “good jobs” within commuting distance of where I live.”
7. Which statement best describes where “good jobs” are located?
- “good jobs” are concentrated in and around most large cities
 - “good jobs” are concentrated in and around some large cities
 - “good jobs” are concentrated only in some regions of the United States
 - There are “good jobs” everywhere
8. IF SINGLE Have you ever moved to a different part of the country for work-related reasons? Please check all that apply.
- Yes, for a new job
 - Yes, because my employer relocated me
 - No, I have never moved for work-related reasons
9. IF NOT SINGLE Have you ever moved to a different part of the country for work-related reasons? (Check all that apply)
- Yes, For a new job
 - Yes, Because my employer relocated me
 - Yes, For my spouse’s job
 - No, I have never moved for work-related reasons
10. IF NO Have you ever considered relocation?
11. IF NO Which of the following best describes the barriers to your relocation? (Check all that apply)
- Members of my household would be unable to find a job if we relocated
 - I don’t want to live far away from my family, friends and community
 - I take care of family members and friends in this area
 - I enjoy where I live, even if the job opportunities are limited
 - I am afraid I would be unable to find a job even if I relocated
 - I couldn’t afford to relocate
 - Other (please specify) *[text]*

I.3.2 Job Characteristics

Again, we will ask you some questions about your main paid job, meaning the job where you spend most hours. For all questions referring to your job, please answer with regards to your main paid job. If you are currently temporarily furloughed or unemployed, please answer with respect to your last main job in mind. If you are self-employed, please answer with respect to your main work activity.

1. What are the best features of your job?

[text]

2. What features of your job could be improved?

[text]

3. How many hours do you usually work per week in your main job?

1-9; 10-19; 20-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; 60+

4. Considering everything about your job, including things like pay, fringe benefits, working conditions and the kind of work you do, how would you rate your job on a scale from 0–10?

5. IF SELF EMPLOYED: Check all the reasons why you became self-employed:

- Wanted to start my own business
- Too low pay
- Lack of career progression
- No other alternatives for work
- To acquire different skills
- Too many work hours
- Too much work-related stress
- Lack of flexibility in work hours
- Inability to work remotely
- Health and safety risks
- Work too physically demanding

6. In the past 12 months, have you considered getting a new job?

7. IF YES Check all the reasons why you considered getting a new job

- To start my own business
- Too low pay
- Career progression
- To gain a different experience and acquire different skills
- Too many work hours
- Too much work-related stress
- Lack of flexibility in work hours
- Inability to work remotely
- Health and safety risks
- Work too physically demanding
- Other (please specify)

8. IF NO Check all the reasons why you have not considered getting a new job

- I like my current job
 - Pay and fringe benefits offset the downsides of my job
 - I don't have time to search for a new job
 - I don't know how to look for another job
 - Other (please specify)
9. Relative to other workers in the US, my job is:
"Far below average" to "Far above average"
10. Relative to workers with my level of education and background, my job is:
"Much worse" to "Much better"
11. Relative to workers with jobs similar to mine, my level of skills and qualifications is:
"Much worse" to "Much better"
12. Would you rather have:
- a job with low risk of dismissal but with few opportunities of finding another job a in case of dismissal
 - a job with fairly high risk of dismissal but with a lot of opportunities of finding a new job in case of dismissal
13. In January 2020, before the covid-19 outbreak, the unemployment rate among young people between 20 and 24 years old was more than twice as high as the unemployment rate among people above 35 years older.. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? *[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*
- The young do not have adequate skills to get jobs
 - There are not enough good jobs for the young
 - Young people are not very interested in employment or in building careers
 - Young people do not try hard enough to get jobs

I.4 Trust in government

1. How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right?
Almost never; Not very often; A lot of time; Almost always
2. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: *[from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*
- "Policy decisions in American politics are transparent, meaning that everyone can see how they were made"
 - "I trust the government to design policies that benefit people like me."

I.5 Treatment Questions

I.5.1 Jobs Treatment

1. What are the main considerations that come to your mind when you think about the U.S. trading with foreign countries and how your job has been affected by it?
[text]

2. Since 2000, more than 5 million jobs in the manufacturing sectors have been lost. One of the causes behind this decline is the increased competition with foreign countries that pay lower wages to their workers. How serious of a threat do you think trade with foreign countries pose for the future of your sector?

Not serious at all; Not very serious; Somewhat serious; Very serious

3. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Because of trade and the resulting competition with foreign countries that pay lower wages to their workers, my wage has not grown as fast as it would otherwise have.”

Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree or disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

4. How likely do you think it is that, over the next 10 years, your job will be outsourced, offshored, or automated because of competition with foreign countries?

Very unlikely; Somewhat unlikely; Somewhat likely; Very likely

I.5.2 Consumers Treatment

1. Imagine the U.S. did not trade goods and services with other countries. What are the main things you feel like you'd be missing?

[text]

2. Can you think of some goods only produced in foreign countries that you regularly buy and consume because of trade with foreign countries? Please describe.

[text]

3. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? *[from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]*

- Trade with other countries has decreased the prices of the goods I regularly buy by increasing competition among firms.
- Trade with other countries has increased the variety of the goods I have access to in ordinary stores.

I.6 Policy Views

1. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Increasing trade with other countries and reducing barriers to trade is something the U.S. should aim for.”

Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree

2. How fair would you rate the current U.S. trade policy?

Very fair; Somewhat fair; Somewhat unfair; Very unfair

3. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current U.S. trade policy?

Very satisfied; Somewhat satisfied; Somewhat dissatisfied; Very dissatisfied

4. In your view, what is the best policy tool to help workers in an industry that is declining and threatened by foreign competition? Please rank the following options from best (1) to worst (3).

Restrict imports in that industry; Provide more generous transfers and direct assistance to these workers, such as retraining programs; Subsidize production in the sector

5. What do you think is the best policy tool to ensure national food security?

Restrict food imports from abroad; Provide more production subsidies in the food sector

6. If the U.S. starts imposing tariffs on many goods that it imports, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that other countries follow suit and also impose tariffs?

Very unlikely, unlikely; Likely; Very likely

7. Let us consider a given relatively new industry in which other countries are currently able to produce goods for cheaper than American firms. In your opinion, does it make sense to protect the American firms in this industry by using tariffs or import restrictions (even if this means higher prices for consumers) or is it better to let the American firms immediately face foreign competition, forcing them to become more competitive?

It makes sense to protect for a while; It makes sense to let these firms face foreign competition to become more competitive

8. Take the following government services. For each of them, say if would you like it to receive increased funding (even if that means more taxes or reduced spending in other areas), decreased spending (in order to reduce taxes or increase spending elsewhere) or would you like for its funding to be left unchanged?

- Transfers and income support programs for those out of work
- Better schools for children from low-income families
- Income support and retraining programs for workers who are displaced by international competition and trade
- Subsidies for low-income households to help them with the costs of health insurance premiums and health care
- Wage subsidies and help for the working poor who work for low wages More of this service, more taxes; Service and taxes as now; Less of this service, reduced taxes.

I.7 Role of government in ensuring economic security

We would now like to ask you about your views on what role the government should play in providing good jobs and ensuring a certain level of economic security. We define good jobs as “a stable formal-sector position that comes with core labor protections and enables provides income for housing, food, transportation, education, and other family expenses, as well as some savings.”

1. Do you agree with the following statement? “The government has the ability and the tools to stimulate the creation of more good jobs”

[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]

2. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: *[1- Strongly disagree, 5- Strongly agree]*

- “Government should prioritize the quantity of jobs available, even if that means giving up minimum standards of pay and quality.”
- “Government should guarantee all jobs meet a minimum standard of quality and pay, even if that means that some people stay unemployed”

3. Do you support or oppose the following proposals: *[Strongly oppose to Strongly support]*

- Government should raise the minimum wage.
- Government should design additional regulations to improve work conditions.
- Government should provide or subsidize the provision of continuing education and training programs.
- Government should provide subsidies for businesses to create and provide more good jobs.

4. Do you support or oppose the following policies to improve access to good jobs for more people:
[*Strongly oppose; Slightly oppose; neither support nor oppose; slightly support; strongly support*]
 - Providing more dual education programs, which provide formal academic training as well as job experience, in partnership between local universities and employers
 - Expanding social insurance and benefits, including unemployment benefits, so that everyone can benefit from them regardless of whether they are on part-time work contracts, alternative work arrangements, or the gig economy.
 - Improving publicly provided job search assistance
 - Implementing a job search assistance program that coordinates with local employers specifically.
5. There has been considerable concern in recent years about the loss of manufacturing jobs in the US. What do you think these job losses are mainly due to?
 - Technological changes (e.g., automation)
 - Globalization, trade and outsourcing
 - Immigration
6. How about your job? Please tell us to what extent, on a scale from 0 to 10, the following factors have a negative or positive effect on your job.
 - Technological developments
 - Globalization and trade
 - Immigration
7. Suppose a large firm that employs 30,000 people in the US is closing permanently because foreign competitors can produce the goods more cheaply. Do you agree or disagree that the government should do the following: [*Strongly disagree to Strongly agree*]
 - Provide transfers to unemployed workers
 - Provide training and job placement services to unemployed workers
 - Raise import tariffs on foreign goods
 - Try to create good jobs in other sectors/firms
 - Do nothing
8. Now suppose instead the firm is closing permanently because it's moving production to a country outside the US. Do you agree or disagree that the government should do the following: [*Strongly disagree to Strongly agree*]
 - Provide transfers to unemployed workers
 - Provide training and job placement services to unemployed workers
 - Raise import tariffs on foreign goods
 - Try to create good jobs in other sectors/firms
 - Nationalize/take over production
 - Do nothing
9. Now suppose instead the firm is closing permanently because of management failure. Do you agree or disagree that the government should do the following: [*Strongly disagree to Strongly agree*]
 - Provide transfers to unemployed workers
 - Provide training and job placement services to unemployed workers

- Raise import tariffs on foreign goods
 - Try to create good jobs in other sectors/firms
 - Nationalize/take over production
 - Do nothing
10. Now suppose instead the firm is not closing permanently, but it's employing new technologies and replacing workers with robots. Do you agree or disagree that the government should do the following:
[Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]
- Provide transfers to unemployed workers
 - Provide training and job placement services to unemployed workers
 - Raise import tariffs on foreign goods
 - Try to create good jobs in other sectors/firms
 - Nationalize/take over production
 - Do nothing
11. Are you a member of a union?

I.8 Feedbacks

1. Do you feel that this survey was biased?
Yes, left-wing bias; Yes, right-wing bias; No, it did not feel bias
2. Please feel free to give us any feedback or impression regarding this survey.
[text]

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